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Corporate governance in emerging markets 
1 
 
1 Background to the Study 
 
Corporate governance is a matter of current public debate, following the 
controversy surrounding the collapse and financial distress of many markets 
including China, Hong Kong, Russia, UK and the US firms and the resultant 
impact on shareholder value. The debate revolves around matters such as 
agency relationships, disclosure of executive remuneration, irrelevance of 
audit, board composition, financial control and reporting, directors’ fiduciary 
duties and shareholder activism. Recent reports in the media and markets 
have cited ineffective governance and poor internal controls as a major cause 
of corporate failures. 
 
R Naidoo (2002: 1) argued that, “Corporate governance can be an important 
competitive tool used to maximise a company’s performance, increase a 
company’s potential to encourage capital investment and positively influence 
a country’s ability to attract foreign investment. It remains an essential 
ingredient for nurturing trust and business confidence.” The King II (2002) is 
premised on the philosophy that governance in any context must reflect the 
value system of the society in which it operates, which means there is no 
universally applicable corporate governance model than to just base on 
accountability, responsibility, and transparency. 
 
The King II (2002) incorporates the African value system, which emphasises 
the collective over the individual good, the principles of mutual 
interdependence and co-existence, the spirit of humanity, (ubuntu) based on 
the premise that the individual is entitled to respect because of his cordial 
coexistence with others, a hierarchical political ideology, but one based on an 
inclusive system of consultation at various levels.  Integrating this approach 
into corporate governance implies a shift in organisational emphasis from a 
decision making hierarchy to one that is more consultative and consensus 
based.  
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Trevor Manuel (2002) the Minister of Finance of SA in his speech argued that, 
“in the same way as man was charged with the responsibility to act as the 
guardian of the planet for future generations, directors and managers are 
tasked with preserving the growing value, not for themselves but for 
stakeholders of the future.” The crisis of American and British corporate 
responsibility is not “moral cancer” described by J Patterson (2000), former 
US Secretary, instead, it is something more practical and amenable to 
treatment argued P Martin et al (2002). 
 
Corporate governance has always been integral to business practices, 
beginning with the creation of corporate structures and the distinction between 
owners and managers. The “agency problem” between owners, managers 
and directors who represent the owners began to become formalized in 
economic literature in the 1930s.  In more recent years corporate governance 
has established a greater standalone identity as a field of study and as an 
area of risk. The wide wake of damage and disenfranchisement caused by 
recent corporate failures has made corporate governance cot just a concern 
for financial markets, but an issue of political economy on a global basis. 
 
The crisis reflects a breakdown in the fundamental bargain on which business 
has been operated since ownership first diverged from management. The 
agency relationship has worked well in some corporations but failure has 
become a fad. The concepts that have underpinned the discussion will 
provide the tool kit to address issues pertaining to corporate governance and 
competitive advantage in emerging markets in fulfilling the conduct of the 
research process, research objectives in confirming the conceptual 
framework.  
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Regulatory bodies have responded with the passing into law of regulations, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the USA, and recommendations 
that the companies subscribe to best practice and principles detailed in 
various reports, including the King II (2002) report on corporate governance in 
South Africa and the combined code of corporate governance in the UK. The 
reputation and governance of a corporation translate into a “governance 
premium” R Millson and M Ward (2004) argued, consulting firm McKinney & 
company (2002) measured and translated into higher price/earnings multiples 
and other improved metrics Howell and Hibbard (2002). A report by OECD 
(1999: 22) confirms this, concluding the adherence to practices of good 
corporate governance will help to improve the confidence of investors, may 
reduce the cost of capital and may induce more stable sources of capital. 
 
Beneficiaries of this research include: 
 
 Investors  Shareholders 
 General public and potential investors  Auditors 
 Directors, management and employees  Governments 
 Bankers and Fund Managers  Legislators 
 Business Schools  Researchers 
 Respective Financial Institutions  
 
Table 1.1 
 
Road Map 
This document will map the way forward for the researcher to remain focused 
on issues that are affecting different stakeholders in the governance process 
in emerging markets. Documents 2, 3, 4, and 5 will be summarized so that 
they will fit within the framework of this document. The researcher also 
expects a lot of resistance from the audit fraternity due to mindset and legal 
framework in place, which requires that all public companies be audited but 
does not tell us whether the audit adds shareholder value. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
The objective of this literature review is to provide an insight into the concepts, 
theoretical framework and research done to date on the effectiveness of the 
board of directors in different markets. The review will aim to explore the 
relevance of this theory, its impact on emerging markets and put into 
perspective different schools of thought and their limitations. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance Definitions 
 
Stone, Hurley and Khemani et al (1998) defined Corporate Governance as, 
“the rules and incentives by which the management of a company is directed 
and controlled to maximize the profitability and long term value of the firm for 
shareholders while taking into account the interests of other legitimate 
stakeholders.” Johnson and Scholes (1999: 203) define corporate governance 
as, “concerned with the overall purpose and scope of the organisation to meet 
the expectations of owners, major stakeholder and add value to different parts 
of the enterprise.” Bob Garratt (2003: 12) says corporate governance is the 
appropriate board structures, processes and values to cope with the rapidly 
changing demands of both shareholders and stakeholders in and around their 
enterprises. There is no agreement to the definition of corporate governance 
generally. These definitions have same focus on shareholder value, rules, 
purpose, profitability and interest, which are the issues that need to be 
addressed in the corporate governance paradox. 
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Rules versus Principles 
 
In this context, debate and analysis that begins with a prescriptive “cookie 
cutter” view of governance rules and compliance procedures is fraught with 
peril and runs the risk of either missing the point or confusing the “forest” for 
“trees.” It is worth drawing from the Business Sector Advisory Group of the 
OECD in the development, during the late 1990s, of the OECD corporate 
governance guidelines Johnston (2004: 22) which are as follows: 
 Fairness: The equality of treatment of all financial stakeholders, and in 
particular avoiding fraud, insider dealing or any form of expropriation by 
a company’s managers or controlling shareholders 
 Transparency: To provide clear and equal access of material 
company information on a regular basis to all investors to allow for 
informed investment decisions and the ongoing monitoring of the 
company’s activities 
 Accountability: The existence of legitimate systems of control – 
particularly to provide shareholders and creditors with an effective 
structure to enable them to express and enforce their interests and 
concern over the actions of a company’s managers and controlling 
stakeholders 
 Responsibility: Adherence to the prevailing laws of the jurisdictions in 
which the company operates and the management of relationships with 
key constituencies or stakeholders to promote long-term sustainability 
and avoid potential disruption. 
 
These principles transcend into individual jurisdictions and have relevance 
across a range of differing governance environments. The principles can 
serve as a “lens” or a filter through which individual company practices or 
structures can be interpreted. 
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Cairnes et al (2003) in her book, “Boardrooms That Work” argued that, “what 
brings boards down is not tangible, visible and measurable. What brings 
boards and companies down is dysfunction within their social system and 
failure to observe governance principles. If strong, healthy, social dynamics 
are what make great boards’ great, and then boards need to create a culture 
in which trust, respect, candor and open constructive dissent are the norms.”  
What affect these norms are issues of agency theory, divided loyalty, ethics, 
training and financial control and discipline. 
 
2.2 Historical Foundation of Corporate Governance 
 
Clarke (2004: 154) argued that, Berle and Means (1932) were the first to 
explore the structural and strategic implications of the separation of ownership 
and control. The separation of ownership and control leaves shareholders 
with little or no control over the actions of a company’s managers Berle and 
Means, (1932: 8) argued. In response, shareholders attempt to protect their 
investment by using a variety of control mechanisms, Targett, 2002; Shleifer 
and Vishny, et al (1997); Jensen and Meckling, (1976). They wrote in the 
preface of The Modern Corporation and Private Property that “It was apparent 
to any thoughtful observer that the American corporation had ceased to be a 
private business device and had become an institution” Clarke (2004: 155) 
stated.  
 
This discovery was after the corporate scandals in the US in 1929 called the 
US Wall Street Crash , which resulted in the first corporate governance 
legislation called Glass – Steagall Act (1932) (figure 1) culminating into many 
more up to now the Sarbanes – Oxley Act (2002) after the World Com and 
Enron collapsed. The first legislation in the UK was the Cadbury Report 
(1992) (figure 1 of Document 2 page 8) followed by a few others.  Corporate 
governance literature has since grown up to date but these have been 
reactive to scandals hence not adding value to shareholders. 
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South Africa developed its own legislation in order to force compliance in 
corporate organizations by making the requirements of the King 11 Report 
(2002) compulsory to all organizations. Zimbabwe also adopted the King 11 
Report although the country is being affected by poor governance. Since then 
there has been a lot of research in both countries in different sectors including 
OCED (2004) in Zimbabwe and Advocate Myburgh (2003) in the banking 
sector in South Africa. 
 
History of corporate governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Regulation in the United States: Source: Clarke (2004: 155): 
Cycles of Crisis and Regulation: The enduring agency and 
stewardship problems of corporate governance 
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2.3 Agency Theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 305-360) defined the agency relationship as a 
situation where an individual (the principal) engages another person (the 
agent) to perform a service, and to this end delegates some decision-making 
authority to the agent. Damodaran (2002) www.stern.edu states that 
managers are capable of putting their own interests above those of 
bondholders and stakeholders, delaying bad news or providing misleading 
information to the financial markets, and incurring significant social costs on 
society, not all of which can be traced back to the firm. The author calls this 
divided loyalty. The appointment of an agent and the ongoing relationship 
between agent and principal to meet the seemingly juxtaposed positions of 
financial performance on the one hand and governance on the other, is thus 
of critical importance, and one which, according to Jensen and Smith (1995) 
www.papers.ssrn.com should be governed by a contract to ensure that inter 
alia the interests of the agent are aligned to those of the principal. 
 
Agency theory can be loosely traced back to Spence and Zeckhauser (1971: 
119-132) who provided an early analysis of the problems associated with 
structuring the agent’s compensation to align his/her incentives with the 
interests of the principal. Ross (1973: 134-139) described this as the 
“principal’s problem” where the principal delegates a variable level and type of 
authority to the agent with the aim of generating a certain result. However the 
outcomes are capricious as they are influenced by factors outside the control 
of both agent and principal, resulting in agents being paid for their effort, and 
not for the level of output. 
 
Milson and Ward (2005: 74) agreed with Hendry (2002: 98-114) who stated 
that people are generally not perfectly honest and truthful, resulting in the 
“principal’s problem,” which is rooted in the following assumptions: 
I. People in general are self-seeking and opportunistic economic utility 
maximisers 
II. The interests of the principals differ from those of their agents 
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III. Principals have incomplete knowledge of their agents’ actions. 
 
Sapienza, Korsgaard, Goulet and Hoogendam et al (2000), argued that, 
agency problems are exacerbated because the interests of management are 
in conflict with those of shareholders “goal conflict” and because shareholders 
have less access than management to information on which to make 
educated decisions regarding the performance of management (information 
asymmetry). Eisenhardt (1989: 57-74) came up with his fundamental 
assumptions underlying agency theory where he argued that: 
I. There exists goal divergence between the principal and the agent 
II. There exists hidden information either before or after the contracting of 
the agent 
III. The principal and agent have different risk preferences, which may 
lead to different actions being taken. 
 
Within the agent-principal relationship, corporate governance deals with the 
question of how shareholders incentivise management to effectively align the 
goals of management and owner, ensure that there is sufficient information 
flow from agent to principal enabling the proper monitoring of management , 
and control management to perform in such a manner that they act 
responsibly. These researchers mentioned here agree on all issues affecting 
agency theory that is goal conflict, information asymmetry and goal 
divergence. Agency theory therefore forms the backbone to corporate 
governance and therefore serves as a foundation for the literature review. 
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In a management context, moral hazard may take the form of the 
misappropriation of firm’s resources by the agent, the simple avoidance of the 
tasks required for the meeting of objectives or the pursuit of selfish interests, 
such as career progression, rather than focusing on the needs of the firm. 
Short  (2000: 203-249) argued that. “the agent’s private benefit of control 
leads to empire building, perks, entrenchment and biased decision making.” 
Hendry (2002: 98-114) added that, the agent may also engage in 
philanthropic or ethically motivated behaviour with respect to stakeholders, 
which may not be in the best interests of the shareholder. 
 
2.4 Shareholder Activism 
 
The attitude of investors has changed following the emergence of accounting 
irregularities and fraud investigations at a number of internationally known 
organizations. G Dallas (2003: 324) argued that, investors in the UK 
companies are increasingly more active and vote more frequently in recent 
years. Research conducted by ProShare (2002) shows that private investors 
are more active and that company directors and accounting procedures are 
heavily scrutinized in UK than in emerging markets. 
 
While investor activism is growing in both countries and is becoming more 
forceful everywhere due to the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), 
it is still the case that UK activism tends to be much less grassroots in nature 
and is effected more behind the scenes than in the US market. The 
emergence of socially responsible investment is another difference, as an 
investment trend has been more pronounced in the UK. Myners Report (2001: 
5) on institutional investment recommended that pension and investment 
funds monitor their fund managers’ approach to shareholder activism. 
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In emerging markets, shareholder activism is almost unheard of term, 
although this is attributable mainly to this market’s short history and lack of 
institutional investors. An interesting, and provocative finding of LLSV (1997) 
stemming from this research is that, differences in the level of investor 
protection among countries are explained by differences in origin of their legal 
systems of which SA and Zimbabwe share same legal system. 
 
2.5 Financial Control and Reporting 
 
Dallas (2003: 5) argued that, “evaluating governance in individual companies 
must start with an assessment of a company’s given architecture.” However, 
good or bad governance ultimately is less a question of architecture and more 
a question of the people who are governing from within this architecture. This 
requires an assessment, not only of codes and guidelines, but also how 
effectively or ineffectively a company’s managers, directors and auditors 
interact to create shareholder value while respecting the interests of the 
company’s stakeholders. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) legislation in the 
US, the new listing rule proposals by the NYSE and NASDAQ are prominent 
among these legal and regulatory initiatives, which were introduced with both 
urgency and rapidity. They did not look at real problems of corporate failures, 
which are agency theory, irrelevance of audit, and inconsistence of 
accounting standards and GAAP (financial control and reporting). 
 
The Accounting Framework (referred to as the conceptual framework in 
accounting or IAS) can be regarded in general terms as a constitution for 
financial accounting and reporting. IAS 1 defines the framework as 
authoritative, a generally practical guideline for recording and measuring of 
financial information in the annual financial statements. These statements 
attempt to enhance the usefulness of the information for economic decision 
making purposes. 
 
The framework has different objectives among which are (IAS 000): 
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 To assist auditors in forming an opinion as to whether financial 
statements comply with GAAP and IAS 
 To assist preparers of annual financial statements in applying 
accounting standards and in dealing with topics that have yet to form 
the subject of an IAS 
 To provide interested parties with information about how IASC 
approaches the formulation of IAS. 
 
Although the framework provided definitive objectives, it lacked depth and 
created more problems for shareholders. The preparation and presentation of 
financial statements has different alternatives and assumptions (benchmark 
and alternative treatment). It is the author’s submission that this is the route of 
causes of corporate failures as this support the agency theory in giving 
directors other alternatives of reporting, which best suite their interests. 
Auditing has become an unnecessary cost and irrelevant as its opinion does 
not add value to the shareholder as the opinion is based on assumptions that 
best meets the interests of the agent. Empirical evidence has shown that the 
appointment of auditors is a failure by directors to perform their function as an 
agent. 
 
Further related to the specification of objectives is what Holmstrom and 
Kaplan et al (2001) refer to as “multitasking” which arises because of the 
complex or multifaceted nature of the principal’s objectives. Hendry (2002: 
111) states that in these cases, attempts to specify outcomes can be 
dysfunctional, as an agent will perform in such a manner as to meet specific 
terms of the incentives, rather than in the general interests of their principal 
that is the agent is rewarded according to what is specifically measured and 
will thus perform to those terms exclusively, if not thus when alternative 
treatment comes into play. White, Sondhi and Fried (2003: 413) argued that, 
the accounting standards brought the problem of smoothing, which has 
legalized different alternative treatment of reporting. 
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2.6 Director Development 
 
David Kock (1982:47) in his article Step-by-Step Coaching - Creating the Life 
you want, mentioned that, “Every professional sports person today has a 
coach. In fact in the sports arena, the higher you go, the more coaching you 
get. The sports coach’s job is to guide, encourage, inspire and to challenge 
the performer to achieve their personal best performance every time they go 
out onto the field.” Since the late 1990’s coaching has become an important 
tool in the business world as well, tools for helping high performers achieve 
their best in work and life. Personal best gives you a first hand experience of a 
powerful coaching system that has changed the lives and improved the 
performance of thousands of directors’ world over. 
 
The reason why boards or companies fail is through poor coaching of 
directors. Most of the companies that failed, was due to the board of director’s 
ignorance and divided loyalty for example Maxwell Communications, BCCI, 
Enron (2001), WorldCom (2001), Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd (1996) 
and CA Pacific Finance (1998) and recently Livedoor caused Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in Japan to close to mention but a few. 
 
2.7 Emerging Markets  
 
The Oxford English dictionary defines emerging markets as financial markets 
in the early stages of development, as in developing countries or former 
socialist countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia. The developing 
countries showing signs of economic growth.  
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As in the developed world, emerging markets have seen significant reforms in 
corporate governance, since the crisis in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Russia, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. These reforms range from the introduction of the 
Novo Mercado in Brazil, PRC law in China, Naresh Chandra Committee in 
India, Code of Corporate Conduct in Russia under FCSM, Commercial Code 
in Turkey, King 11 Report and the  adoption of the British Common Law 
system in most of Britain’s former colonies in Africa and Asia. 
 
Unlike in Europe and US where ownership is widely dispersed and conflicts 
are usually associated with the classic agency problem between professional 
managers, large and diffuse shareholder basis, emerging market’s main 
source of governance conflict come from the relationship between controlling 
and minority shareholders.  The highly concentrated ownership structure and 
lack of protection of minority shareholders’ rights are behind the most relevant 
governance problems.  Block ownership generates different governance 
concerns in contrast to developed markets. 
 
Ownership structure in particular, the concentration of control in the hands of 
a few shareholders (mostly governments or family members) has been 
associated with many of the countries’ governance problems.  These include 
poor functioning of boards to the disregard for minority shareholders’ rights, 
rule of law and the low liquidity of stock markets.  Most listed companies have 
one single shareholder and are owner managed.  There is a problem of 
independence, and internal controls are not effective. 
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Most emerging markets, shareholder activism is almost an unheard of term in 
the market, although this is attributable mainly to the market’s short history 
and lack of institutional investors. Attributes raised on Table 4.2 below have 
the same impact they have in developed economies and emerging markets. 
Agency theory affects all the other attributes as corporate failures in China, 
Hong Kong, Russia and South Africa can be traced back to divided loyalty, 
poor internal controls and irrelevance of auditing, which reflects on the failure 
by the board to execute its fiduciary duties.  
 
Tai (2003: 445) argued that, to transform from the traditional “rule person” to 
the more systematic “rule of law” will require not only a good governance 
system but also a major learning and cultural transformation. Once the 
Learning Board Model is adapted in setting up the learning boards, this will be 
the first step in solving the corporate governance paradox in emerging 
markets. 
 
2.8 Research Objectives 
 
a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial service sector and to investigate attributes 
that affect good corporate governance practices. The attributes will be 
used to assess why investors prefer other portfolios and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. 
Companies to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First 
Rand Bank, Old Mutual, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank 
of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and National Merchant Bank (NMB). 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
c. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
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2.9 Research Questions 
 
Drawing from the literature, three strategic research questions were 
formulated: 
 
a. Strategic Questions 
i. What are the corporate governance attributes that must be 
present in an organization to ensure transparency? 
ii. How does corporate governance practice affect investor 
perception, corporate strategy and performance? 
iii. How will training and accreditation of directors solve the agency 
problem and create shareholder value? 
 
b. Broad Research Questions 
 
 What are the important corporate governance attributes that influence 
performance of directors in order to meet shareholder expectations? 
 What are the factors/issues that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness of Corporate Governance? 
 What are the main causes of Corporate Governance failures in 
Emerging Markets as compared to developed markets? 
 How will training and accreditation of directors create value and impact 
on Corporate Governance in the financial service sector? 
 What is the role of auditors and independent directors in creating 
shareholder value? 
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2.10 Summary 
 
The literature dealing with agency theory strongly advocates for a new 
approach to solving this problem as people are self seeking and there exists 
goal divergence between the principal and the agent. The legal framework 
defining a company as a legal persona affects the participation of 
shareholders in the running of companies in SA and Zimbabwe leaving the 
Governments with the sole prerogative to decide the direction of the economy. 
 
The weakness of IAS is the major cause of information symmetry as it allows 
different treatments of financial reporting. Coaching of directors is very 
important in order to improve corporate governance practice. The critical and 
analytical review of this literature will be done in document two. 
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3 The Conceptual Framework 
 
McKinsey and Company (2000) defined corporate governance in individual 
firms as an abstract combination of “effective boards of directors, broad 
disclosure, strong rights and equal treatment of shareholders.” This 
combination creates a sustained shareholder value creation (figure 3.1). 
 
3.1 Dashboard for Sustained Value Creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Source: Garratt (2003: 156) Thin on Top: Why 
Corporate Governance Matters and How to 
Measure and Improve Board Performance 
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Any flashing light on the board’s dashboard will help in triggering a quick 
check by directors before erosion of the business assets. In order for 
corporate organizations to achieve sustainability performance leadership can 
create competitive advantage; reinforce “brand equity,” boost profits and 
shareholder value on the positive, by enhancing a number of key “value 
drivers.” Given that the main dial will concern the resulting added shareholder 
value, which empirical research has shown that between seven and ten dials 
are needed to have a reasonable chance of assessing opportunities, risks and 
costs involved in having an effective board (Figure 3.1) Garratt (2003: 156)? 
The deep learning for the board is to begin to understand the linkage of these 
indicators as shown Figure 3.1. 
 
3.2 The Corporate Governance Ecosystem 
 
The researcher has identified some key fundamentals from the above 
literature review as follows: 
 Non-Executive directors are not independent as they are appointed by 
the major Shareholder to represent their interests. 
 Accreditation of directors will professionalize the board hence create 
independence and improve behaviour. 
 Due to poor compensation there is always conflict of interest as human 
needs change every day, “soft issues” Checkland (1999: 165) argued. 
 Owner managed companies cannot comply to corporate governance 
principles as rights of all stakeholders are not respected. 
 Separation of responsibilities between the Chairman and the CEO 
improves efficiency of the board as there is supervision at all levels 
Advocate Myburgh (2003) argued. 
 Balance of power will improve leadership and communications issues 
Clutterbuck & Waine (1986) argued; hence corporate performance 
improves through the adaptation of the corporate governance 
ecosystem. 
Corporate Governance Ecosystem 
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Figure 3.2: Source: Garratt (2003: 159) Thin on Top: Why 
Corporate Governance Matters and How 
to Measure and Improve Board 
Performance 
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The powerful mixture of understanding the basics and yet seeing the 
complexities of the business linkages, that allows the board to know the 
correct levers to pull when there is trouble  (Figure 3.2). The dashboard can 
be assured that the enablers are actually connected “pull” board performance 
by understanding opportunities and capabilities in financial sector. 
 
The available literature shows that there is no law that regulates how 
corporate governance issues should be handled, but only reports even in the 
UK, US, Europe or emerging markets. Failure to develop a standard of 
corporate governance has greatly affected the performance of companies’ 
worldwide as there is no suitable law to regulate these issues. Agency 
problem, ineffectiveness of audit, undivided loyalty and single shareholder 
dominance has become key issues in the failure of corporations in the world. 
Technology has become the key issue in a globalized economy as 
shareholders can monitor the performance of their investments on the net and 
make decision immediately (shareholder activism) but is mostly not accessible 
in developing countries. 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
The two models, Dashboard for sustained value creation and the Corporate 
Governance Ecosystem will be used to formulate the conceptual framework 
together with the literature review. A hybrid of the two will result in a very 
effect conceptual framework which will assist the board of directors in 
complying with best practice. 
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The author will therefore be guided in this study by which highlights the main 
drivers of corporate governance (Figure 3.2) as improving director 
independence, structure compensation system, accreditation and continuous 
improvement will result in a learning organisation Nonaka et al (2002). The 
broad strategic direction set by the owner should provide authority for the 
directors to begin the change process. This means creating knowledge-based 
networks which lead to greater levels of organizational learning and flexibility, 
Kaplan & Norton (1996) argued. 
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4 Research Methods 
 
Various techniques used in the collection of data will be discussed in this 
section. Although a number of theories are invoked in this chapter, most of 
them have been referred to in the review of published material. The research 
process has been designed in such a way that there is an integrated 
understanding of formulating and implementing code of best practice on 
corporate governance. The approach and methods used to review the 
literature, survey designs and procedures will be discussed. 
 
The research strategy used in this research was through surveys based on 
semi structured, structured interviews, desk research, observation and 
questionnaires, which provide an opportunity to probe answers and build on 
responses. The research took a two dimension approach that is the critical 
realism (Mutch 2004) and ethnographic - phenomenology approach according 
to Jankowicz (1995), Dr Mark, Saunders, Dr Lewis   and Dr Thornhill (1997) et 
al. The research was based on the analytical review of the board of directors’ 
performance in all markets with special emphasis on emerging markets (SA 
and Zimbabwe). 
 
Sources of Data:  
Primary Data Secondary Data 
 Financial Statements 
 Business Reports 
 Government Publications 
 World Bank Reports 
 Published Research 
 Practitioners in different fields 
o Internet  
o Journals 
o Books 
o Newspapers 
o Business Magazines 
 
Table 4.1 
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The population in this research consisted of practitioners in corporate 
governance, auditing, finance, investments and commerce that have 
participated in reviewing companies for the purpose of addressing 
governance issues. The field study was limited to a convenience sample of 
participants. Informal exploratory discussions were held with experts 
comprising five audit partners, five directors of difference organizations, three 
company secretaries and five investment analysts to obtain a general 
understanding of governance in emerging markets. These discussions served 
to supplement the literature review and to identify the most relevant attributes 
for the purpose of further rating and analysis. 
 
To reduce the complexity of the data for the purpose of analysis, Aaker and 
Day (1990), Zikmund (2003) advised on using a maximum of five attributes. 
The listed generic attributes were therefore filtered via interview process 
according to their relevance to the issues explored in the literature review vis-
à-vis agency theory, board performance and corporate governance. Following 
the finalization of these attributes, a pilot study with the same panel of experts 
was conducted where respondents were required to verify and rate the 
importance of the attributes in the governance process.  
 
Due to the complex nature of the survey tool, face-to-face interviews were 
used to determine the attribute rankings as far as possible, but electronic mail 
combined with telephone and video conference discussion was also used 
where respondents were geographically remote. Each of the questions given 
to corporate governance practitioners described hypothetical combinations 
(constructed using factorial design) of management and governance attributes 
concerning the current position and future prospects of governance. The 
highest ranking attributes were identified as follows: (in their specific order) 
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Attribute Explanatory notes/ perspectives explored in 
literature review 
Governance policies • Level of commitment by directors and 
shareholders to, and implementation of, 
documented policies such as King II and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Financial Control • Regulatory framework: Weaknesses in the 
preparation of financial statements  
• Management information and accounts 
• Accounting standards 
Transparency • Shareholder involvement and activism 
• Information symmetry: Shareholder access to 
management information 
Director accreditation • Induction and training of directors 
• Director knowledge and experience of industry 
Equity participation of 
directors 
• Incentive mechanisms: Capital structuring, more 
specifically the granting of equity and convertible 
debt (share option schemes) 
Audit • Audit opinion 
• Auditor knowledge of industry and experience 
• Timing of audit 
 
Table 4.2 
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4.1 Phenomenological Approach 
 
Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz et al (1998) argues that, the 
phenomenological approach is more holistic, it can “delve below the surface 
to understand the essence of what is happening” and therefore it is the most 
appropriate method for conducting research into organizations and people. 
Most researchers favour this approach because of the sub-conscious nature 
of many factors that constitute human behaviour. Smiricich (1983) advocates 
building up a picture of the culture of the organization very slowly, using a 
series of methods such as observation at the onset followed by interviews. 
 
While recognizing that objectivity in research is difficult regardless of whether 
one opts for positivism or qualitative approach Ott (1989) recommends the 
use of ethnographic and participant observation studies, as it facilitates the 
study of organizations and the environment. The disadvantage of using such 
methodology is that qualitative studies do not replicate well and difficult to 
apply confidence levels to the findings. 
 
4.2 Critical Realism Approach 
 
This approach accepts neither a constructionist nor an objectivist ontology 
and instead takes the view that the “social world is reproduced and 
transformed in daily life Bryman and Bell et al (2003). Critical realism defines 
a different perspective to different situations and allows for comparison. It is 
the critical realism stance and it is an attempt to bring together realism and 
nominalism by transcending their differences Fisher (2004: 16) argued.  
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4.3 Realism/Quantitative Approach 
 
Fisher (2004:16) stated that, realist research is an approach that retains many 
of the ambitions of positivism but recognises and comes to terms with, the 
subjective nature of research and the inevitable role of values in it. 
Quantitative approach is more authoritative as confidence levels can be easily 
measured. This approach aims to be scientific but makes fewer claims to 
knowledge that perfectly mirrors the objects of study. 
 
Realism approach will be combined with the epistemological realism to fill the 
gap as the later believes that universals have a reality that is independent of 
how people talk about them. It mirrors what is real in the world. This approach 
is favoured as performance of organizations with strong Corporate 
Governance can be analysed against perceived less compliant. The incentive 
for investors to invest is the confidence they get from compliance and 
experience of directors, which result in level of value creation. 
 
4.4 Summary of Research Methods 
 
The objective of the study was to test the effectiveness of board of directors 
based on the corporate governance concepts and accreditation of directors 
through induction and training programmes. The use of both random and 
systematized sampling method was as a basis of the selection of key 
informants because of the distribution of directors and market leaders. In 
order to test the quantitative hypothesis such as whether the accreditation will 
change the behaviour of directors and improve performance of organizations, 
there was need to use statistical analysis such as regression model and 
graphical methods (realism approach). These tools helped to test if there will 
be a change of behaviour in terms of undivided loyalty and value addition. 
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5 Matters Arising 
 
The sample consisted of respondents who are generally of senior 
management level and ranged from managing directors to senior consultants 
and market analysts. All respondents had more than five years’ experience, 
the average being fifteen years. The academic focus of the respondents was 
primarily in the financial, accounting, corporate governance, investment and 
auditing fields. 
 
It is evident from the analysis above, that corporate governance policy, 
experience and track record of directors was most important to respondents, 
followed by financial control. 
 
5.1 Governance Policies 
 
Credit rating agencies has been instrumental in the evaluation of a model to 
rate companies on their corporate governance practices, value creation 
record and sustainability of value creation. These ratings enable companies to 
be differentiated on the basis of their governance practices and sustainability 
of value creation. 
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Documented governance policies were not considered to be of great 
importance (group utility of 9%). Although acceptance of and operating in 
accordance with governance policies is generally advocated in the literature, 
the formalized documentation of policies and their integration into business 
planning showed a low utility (0,7%). This shows how management is against 
best practice, which is caused by conflict of interest. This was reflected in 
comments suggesting that strict adherence to documented guidelines can 
impose unnecessary obligations on management. Tacit agreement on 
governance issues, generated a score of (-0.8%), indicating that respondents 
had a negative attitude towards a mere implied acceptance of governance 
guidelines. 
 
Corporate governance debate during the late 1990s shifted more towards the 
emerging markets, as weak corporate governance was often diagnosed as 
contributing to the financial crisis such as those that emerged in Asia and 
Russia. These crises put the spotlight on governance problems in regimes 
with weak protection of investor rights and helped to stimulate the 
development of corporate governance guidelines by OECD in the late 1990s. 
The attempt was to create a framework for corporate governance to have 
relevance over a wide range of legal jurisdictions, market practices, ownership 
structures and cultures. 
 
The respondents put little value on the relevance of the existing policies 
especially the introduction by the US government of the “The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002).”  This act places personal criminal liability on parties to the 
preparation and presentation of information, which respondents did not 
support. Even though auditors used to exonerate themselves from the 
accuracy of financial statements, put responsibility on directors alone, the act 
has introduced liability on auditors. At the time of this research a few auditing 
firms have been charged for misinforming stakeholders and shareholders. 
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5.2 Director Experience and Financial control 
 
Investors today are particularly concerned with the strength of the 
management team as Payne (2003) argued that investors are willing to pay a 
premium on companies which are well managed. The dominant strength of 
the group utility for this feature (55%) was supported by commentary received 
from interviewees who emphasised that investors are principally investing in 
the management team and thus focused on the skills and competence of 
management as evidenced by previous levels of success and experience. 
 
Although the literature review indicated the importance of management quality 
(principally in sections dealing with agency theory, goal conflict and director 
entrenchment) the extent of dominance of this feature amongst respondents 
was unanticipated. Respondents believed that there is no substitute for 
experience, hence quality alone will not suffice as a strong preference (utility 
score of +4) for an experienced board of directors team whose members have 
together achieved success and have worked in the same industry before. It 
was clear that investors strongly avoid companies where the management 
team has little prior experience in the industry or technology, “the ANG asset 
management (2004) in Zimbabwe.” 
 
The most interesting observation was that the respondents do not like 
governance guidelines; they seem to agree on issues such as accounting 
standards and auditing standards, as these give them leeway in how they 
disseminate information to shareholders.  
 
5.3 Transparency 
 
Dallas (2003: 50) argued that investors must focus attention when evaluating 
any given corporate governance system on certain critical corporate 
governance concerns. These include: 
a. auditing, disclosure and reporting requirements 
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b. legal requirements with respect to balancing interests among 
competing stakeholders 
c. responsibilities and duties of the corporate board. 
 
Investors ultimately rely on the truthfulness, accuracy and completeness of a 
company’s published financial statements, which is not sufficient. 
Transparency and disclosure are leading indicators of a company’s overall 
governance standards. Companies with greater level and higher quality of 
disclosure tend to be more open and investor friendly. The information that 
companies disclose has been under close scrutiny, particularly with respect to 
its scope and quality. In emerging markets, generic and superficial information 
disclosure is the norm even in the US and fails to meet the actual information 
needs of investors and others. 
 
With the utility of 15%, it is clear that transparency is of concern to investors, 
who place importance on regular access to director information. Comments 
received highlighted that director’s ability to provide timeous accounting and 
operational information is also seen as a reflection of the quality of their 
systems and processes. These findings are supported by the literature on 
agency theory, which emphasises information symmetry as a requirement for 
purposes of monitoring and control. 
 
5.4 Training and Continuous Development 
 
Fitzgerald (1936) argued that, the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to 
hold two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the 
ability to function. Most directors do not have Fitzgerald’s “first-class 
intelligence” most are average human beings, Garratt (2003: 169) argued. 
Many are scared and confused by idea of having to cope with uncertainty and 
instead crave certainty. 
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There are three main causes of suboptimal board decisions, a toxic mixture of 
ignorance of board processes, abuse of power around the boardroom table 
and willingness to avoid hard facts Garratt (2003) stated. Effective directors 
have to have a mindset that allows them to be comfortable handling high 
levels of uncertainty, while maintaining both their sense of direction and their 
moral stance. The learning board model (the conceptual framework) has 
proved effective in bringing directors from a rudimentary understanding of 
their roles, tasks and duties to becoming a more professional board.  
 
The learning board model Garratt (2003: 179) was constructed by beginning 
with the two fundamental roles of the board, that is driving the enterprise 
forward, while keeping it under prudent control and then adding both business 
timespan (short and long term) and business perspective (internal and 
external) dimensions. The quadrant formed adds the four key tasks of the 
board: 
• formulating policy and foresight 
• strategic thinking 
• supervising management 
• accountability. 
Once the model is adopted under the supervision of the chairman, directors 
will have successfully completed their rigorous induction, inclusion, training 
and directoral competence building programmes. These allow them to 
concentrate now on adding shareholder value in three ways: through the 
development of the board itself as an effective workgroup, through developing 
their personal abilities to become competent directors, and through better 
ensuring that the whole company was based on adding shareholder value.  
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5.5 Equity Participation 
 
As detailed in the literature review, the granting of equity to directors is a key 
incentive mechanism and generally happens as a matter of course in private 
equity investments. What is less defined however is the allocation level. 
Based on this research, the allotment of 10% equity up front and the option for 
directors to ratchet this up on the basis of performance reflected a preferred 
quantum and means of allocation. 
 
Certain respondents commented that it was also important to establish the 
proportion of the director’s total wealth that was invested in the business, the 
greater the proportion, the greater the incentive to perform. This belief brings 
in the controversy brought in by share option schemes. Once directors own a 
significant number of equity in the business, they seem to look at their 
personal interest than those of the shareholders. The accounting standards 
have failed to protect the shareholders regarding the accounting treatment of 
share options, as the capital appreciation of the options is not expensed in the 
income statement. 
 
Share options have created the principle of divided loyalty as directors are 
worried about increasing the value of their options at the expense of the 
shareholders. The concept of smoothing comes into play as directors are 
measured against the performance of the company and share price. By 
default conflict of interest is created as directors will do everything in their 
power to make sure that the share price is increased in order to maximize 
their wealth affecting the going concern of the business (the Enron case 
2002). 
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5.6 Auditing 
 
White, Sondhi and Fried (2003) defined the role of the auditor as a firm 
responsible for seeing that the financial statements issued conform to GAAP. 
The auditor must agree that management’s choice of accounting principles is 
appropriate and any estimates are reasonable. His/her responsibility is to 
examine on a test basis the company’s accounting and internal control 
systems, confirms assets, liabilities and generally tries to ensure that there 
are no material errors in the financial statements. 
 
According to IAS and Auditing standards, the audit reports are standard with 
two main attributes: 
• preparation of financial statements is the responsibility of directors and 
the auditor performs an independent review of the statements 
• the audit is conducted using GAAP and auditing standards that require 
the auditor to provide “reasonable assurance” that there are no 
material errors in the financial statements. 
 
The auditor does not guarantee that the financial statements are free from 
error or no fraud is present. Almost all respondents agreed that legislation on 
auditing needs to be changed so that auditors will take responsibility for any 
misstatements in the financial reporting. Financial reporting structure is done 
by qualified accountants up to financial director assisted by internal audit and 
the audit committee. The fourth party in the process is the auditor; all this to 
me is mere responsibility shifting by the board.  
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The audit staff who does most of the work are less qualified, even the audit 
partners lacks the industrial experience and technical knowledge of issues like 
derivatives and smoothing which resulted in the Enron case (2002) and 
others. Directors need not to shift their responsibility by engaging third parties 
as they have the duty to act responsibly and looking after the interests of the 
shareholders. What makes audit a farlace is that it is done at most twice a 
year, meaning to say the opportunities that will have been missed by the 
directors, auditors will not pick them up as a cost to the business. 
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6 Research Outline 
 
Fisher (2000) highlighted the importance of a research strategy, which has 
been emphasised by other authors as well. Howard and Sharp (1996) argued 
that, a research is not a linear process and hence requires flexibility as well as 
amenable to change. Gill and Johnson (1997) stated that, the research 
process is not a clear – cut sequence of procedures following a neat pattern, 
but a messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical world, 
deduction and induction occurring at the same time. However the authors 
highlighted the need for a topic selection which includes the literature review, 
conceptual framework, the study, analysis, interpreting findings and 
conclusions. 
 
My main assumption is that the major role of the board as a company lever is 
about leadership, being accountable to shareholders, setting direction, 
providing value added, selecting the best people, mentor them and walking 
the talk. Wiley (2004) argued that, in doing so every board faces several 
dilemmas, the why, what and how are by no means obvious – not least 
because the shaping influences for corporate governance differ widely and 
there is no one-fits-all approach, which result in document 2. 
 
6.1 Document 2 
 
The critical literature review will be linked to this proposal as it is the body of 
knowledge, which will give direction to the new knowledge and contribution to 
be developed. Smith (1966) argued that, this part of the research is very 
enjoyable reading and contains many practical lessons for managers. Fisher 
(2004) stated that the literature review takes a broader perspective, and 
remove the need to rediscover knowledge that has already been reported. 
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A critique of the knowledge in existence will be done in order to unpack the 
value of the literature to this research and how it impact on directors in 
emerging markets. A conceptual framework will be developed with the support 
of the knowledge developed from the literature review. This will be the 
reference point for the study and answering the research questions. The road 
map of the review will be as follows: 
 Rules versus Principles 
 Agency Theory 
 Shareholder Activism 
 Financial Reporting 
 Role of Auditing and non – executive directors 
 Director Development 
 
6.2 Document 3 
 
Fisher (2004: 126) argued that this part of the research is the primary 
research phase of the project. It is more practically focused than some of the 
other chapters because it is about the technical problems of carrying out the 
research. It is about discovery, which theme leads to the metaphor of 
corporate governance issues. Fisher (2004: 127) continues to say, explorers 
travel into the unknown territory. Their mission is to make the unknown known 
and make the strange familiar to those who read their books of adventure.  
 
Exploration requires an open approach. To discover more the conceptual 
framework will be used to identify groups of respondents in order to have 
correct narratives from the interviews, questionnaires, observations and 
gather qualitative data for inclusion in the project. Participants will be selected 
from senior management, directors, researchers, lecturers, audit partners, 
market analysts and investors in different organizations. 
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6.3 Document 4 
 
In this section, the development and use of questionnaire – based survey that 
is largely pre-coded, which will be completed by a sample taken from a 
particular population will be analysed quantitatively and used to illustrate the 
use of structured techniques. Stages in the process will be defined in setting 
the sample size to analysing the results of the questionnaire. 
 
According to Churchill (1988) stratified sampling involves dividing the 
population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets and selecting an 
independent simple random sample from the subset. The strata that are 
proposed for this research are geographical area, role, rank and interest. The 
focus will be to analyse the reasons behind the failure of corporate 
organizations in emerging markets. 
 
6.4 Document 5 
 
A triangulation model will be used to consolidated the work done in document 
three and four as I will be looking at knowing why many corporate failures and 
what can be done to improve the situation. Fisher (2004) introduced the 
abduction or kidnapping concept at this stage. The researcher will use the 
same concept to raid the store of knowledge and reading from the literature 
review to hunt for possible solutions.  
 
Different analysis will be used in driving solutions to the strategic question and 
the research questions, linking them with the literature review and the 
conceptual framework. The research findings in document three and four will 
assist in providing these solutions and contribution to new knowledge. There 
are some research questions which will not be answered in this project but will 
be left for the researcher’s and others researcher’s future use. 
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In driving conclusions to this project the researcher will be guided by the 
research questions, literature review, conceptual framework and the research 
findings of this project and other recent researchers in the same field for 
example Helga Krapf who has been researching on investor relations in global 
companies. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
Investors are primarily concerned with the strength of director’s team of any 
company under review. Respondents indicated an overwhelmingly strong 
preference for an experienced management team whose members have 
together achieved success and or who have previously worked in the same 
industry as a criteria of appointing directors. Conversely, investors strongly 
avoid companies where management team has little prior experience in the 
industry or technology. 
 
Continuous development of directors and their accreditation by IOD was one 
attribute that came out clearly as a factor that enhances shareholder value 
and compliance to best practice also by Tai (2003). The conceptual 
framework proves that training and development of directors plays a key role 
in the strategic thinking of the organization and adding value hence 
developing a learning organization. The concept of creating a learning 
organization starts from the top and understanding the organizational 
dashboard. Investors have a preference to be involved in strategy formulation 
and have permanent representation on the main board and seats on the 
subcommittees. 
 
The literature dealing with management incentive mechanisms strongly 
advocates the use of debt to discipline management and keep it focused on 
meeting performance metrics.  There seems to be consensus between the 
findings of the literature review and investors in emerging markets on the 
need for, but not the extent of, leverage imposed. Issues of share options are 
the merger problem as the capital appreciation cost is not shown in the 
financial statements giving shareholders a wrong impression of operating cost 
of the business. 
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The granting of equity to management is a key incentive mechanism world 
over to align the goals of agent and principal. While the investors prefer to 
allocate low levels of equity at an early investment stage, they further 
incentivise management through an option to increase their equity stake in the 
business over time following good performance. This is the route of conflict of 
interest as management apply different accounting methods to show an 
improvement in performance in order to enhance their wealth (the Enron case 
2002). 
 
Transparency is of great concern to all stakeholders and especially to 
investors who demand regular access to management information. The 
research findings are well supported in the literature on agency theory, which 
emphasises information symmetry as a requirement for purposes of 
monitoring and control. There was consistency across all the respondents that 
the existing legislation does not protect the shareholders and investors as the 
company is considered a legal persona separate from the owners. 
 
The Learning Board Model is a requirement for the board to be able to 
operate above board. This will improve emerge, not only of the board but the 
whole company and the economy. Once this model is adopted as a tool, 
corporate governance and ethics will improve, which will result in investor 
confidence. Ulrich & Becker, Huselid (2001) argued that, once this is in place 
there will be a shared mindset between directors and stakeholders. 
 
Conclusion drawn from the findings and the literature review shows that audit 
is irrelevant as it is an unnecessary cost, which does not add value to the 
shareholder but legitimize the position taken by directors to the detriment of 
the investor. In appointing auditors, it is a sign that directors have failed to 
excite their duties to the shareholder of fairness, transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and value creation. 
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Interview 
 
Introduction 
 
My name is Cleopas Sanangura, working for ABSA as Consultant: Corporate 
Asset Finance based in Johannesburg (ABSA head office). 
 
I am currently doing a DBA (Doctorate in Business Administration) and the 
topic I am researching is as follows: Behind the boardroom door. The 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value and the 
effect of shareholder activism in financial service sector in emerging 
markets. A case study of Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe 
What I am trying to do is to solve the agency theory paradox and how it 
affects the performance of directors. 
 
You have been selected to participate in this research and assist me in 
developing new knowledge on director effectiveness in emerging markets in 
the financial sector. I am interested in your personal observations and 
opinions. However, I want to make it perfectly clear from the onset that 
complete confidentiality is guaranteed and that anything you might say in the 
course of the interviews will remain anonymous. Your contribution may be 
quoted in the study, but will not be attributed to you if need be. I propose that I 
will be recording all the interviews, for the sole reason of having an accurate 
account for transcribing which I intend to do in the next few days. I will wipe 
off all the tapes as soon as I have transcribed them and in the meantime I will 
be keeping them in a secure place. 
 
I have some open ended questions that I propose to ask, which I am sending 
together with this introductory letter.  There are issues that you may wish to 
contribute to my research, which you can submit under general comments. If 
you require any clarification at any stage, please do not hesitate to call me. 
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Definitions 
 
Affirmative Action: is the action favouring those who often suffer from 
discrimination 
Black Economic Empowerment: is a concept of empowering economically the 
previously disadvantaged black people 
Democratization: is a system of Governance by the whole population through 
elected representatives with no discrimination 
Globalization: is the process of increasing the connectivity and interdependence 
of the world’s markets and businesses 
Institutionalization: is the grouping of organizations or markets into 
associations or working relationships in order to remove trade 
barriers 
Liberalization: is the unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions to reduce tariffs 
and/or remove other measures that restrict international trade.  
Modern Economy: is a free market economy that includes tradability of other 
features like stock, derivatives and private property in the 
management of wealth and resources of a community or 
country in terms of the production of goods or services 
 
Ubuntu: a Zulu word, literally meaning “humanness.” It is a social and spiritual 
philosophy serving as a framework for African society. Its 
essential meaning can be conveyed using the Zulu maxim 
“umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”—meaning, in essence, “a 
person is a person through other persons.” The practice of 
ubuntu is fundamentally inclusive, involving respect and 
concern for one's family and one's neighbors. It also implies 
respect for one's ancestors, in a deeper spiritual sense. 
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1 History and development of corporate governance 
 
1.1 Recapping the topic and research questions 
 
As a result of the literature available the author had to revisit the 
strategic research questions, which had to be revised as follows: 
 
1. What relationship exists between good corporate governance 
and corporate performance? 
2. How does good corporate governance practice affect how 
investors behave when making investment decisions and the 
impact on corporate strategy and performance? 
3. Is there such thing as independent directors and auditors?  
4. How does independence affect board effectiveness and 
organizational performance? 
 
Review of the strategic questions was as a result of the author 
identifying the questions had to be more strategic and focused in 
addressing the research questions. The research questions remained 
unchanged as they support the research title. These questions will 
continue to be reviewed as the research progresses. 
 
1.2 Introduction 
 
 Clarke (2004: 1) quoted Berle and Means (1932) that they were the 
first to explore the structural and strategic implications of the 
separation of ownership and control.  The separation of ownership and 
control leaves shareholders with little or no control over the actions of a 
company’s managers, Berle and Means, (1932) argued.  In response, 
shareholders attempt to protect their investment by using a variety of 
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control mechanisms, Targett (04 February 2002); Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997); Jensen and Meckling (1976).  They wrote in the preface of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property that “it was apparent to any 
thoughtful observer that the American corporation had ceased to be a 
private business device and had become an institution,” Berle and 
Means (1932). 
 
Traditional agency theory assumes that ownership of a firm is well 
diversified among shareholders and that managers of the firm have 
control over it, so the agency problem is derived from the conflict 
between shareholders and managers Jense and Meckling, (1976) 
argued.  However, several researchers have criticized the validity of 
the assumption of well-diversified ownership structure, such as Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986), Morck et al. (1988), Claessens et al. (2000) and La 
Porta et al (1999, 2000). Of these, La Porta et al. (1998) examined the 
largest firms in 27 high-income economy identities and found that 
except for the economies with solid protection for the shareholders, 
few firms were widely held by general shareholders, with most typically 
being held by controlling families.  The dispersal or equity ownership of 
companies raises a series of agency dilemmas highlighted by Blair 
(1995 : 32-33). 
 
It is in the historical effort to resolve these and related agency 
dilemmas that the principles and mechanisms of corporate governance 
have evolve.  In the market-based outsider systems of the US, UK, and 
the effort to constrain the behaviour of managers by shareholders led 
to a narrow focus on financial performance indicators, short-term 
horizons and a relative neglect of other stakeholders in the enterprise.  
In contrast, the insider system pre-dates Berle and Means (1932) and 
involves controlling shareholders, with companies in close 
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relationships with banks rather than equity markets.  In Europe and 
Asia, this has traditionally encouraged a wider conception of the 
purpose of the company, with longer investment horizons and an 
orientation towards the interest of a broader group of stakeholders 
Clarke, (1998 : 182-5).  However, periodically serious problems have 
occurred in the governance systems of European and Asian countries 
also, as the long standing malaise in the Japanese economy 
illustrates. 
 
1.3 Corporate governance defined 
 
Stone, Hurley and Khemani (1998) and Cheung (2002) referred 
corporate governance as, “the rules and incentives by which the 
management of a company is directed and controlled to maximize the 
profitability and long-term value of the firm for shareholders while 
taking into account the interests of other legitimate stakeholders.” 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Dallas et al (2003) defined corporate 
governance as “the interaction of a company’s management, its board 
and shareholders to direct and control the firm and to ensure that all 
financial stakeholders (shareholders, employees and creditors) receive 
their fair share of the company’s earnings and assets.” McKinsey and 
Company (2000) defined corporate governance as “an abstract 
combination of “effective boards of directors, broad disclosure, strong 
rights and equal treatment of shareholders” document 1 : 17.” 
The African perspective by King (1994) defines corporate governance 
as “concerned with holding the balance between economic, social 
goals and between individual and communal goals ….” King’s 
definition ignores the rights of shareholders and other stakeholders like 
employees. The aim of defining corporate governance should be to 
align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations, 
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society, balance economic and social goals. Whichever of these views 
is correct, and it will no doubt remain an open debate, the author is 
entitled as a researcher to choose the focus of his research and in this 
project the focus will be on corporate governance as a means of 
protecting the interests of different stakeholders. 
 
Companies are required by law to meet minimum legal requirements in 
their operation, hence directors have minimum obligation to other 
stakeholders, SA Companies Act 61 of (1973). Ayogu (2001) 
developed a definition that matches African perspectives of “ubuntu” 
(document 1 : 1) as is concerned with the design of institutions that 
induce management in their actions of stewardship, to take into 
account the welfare of different stakeholders. Although there is no 
single definition for corporate governance, there is congruence 
on creating shareholder value, board effectiveness and having 
proper structures that supports the stewardship theory. The 
author will however pursue all these definitions in line with Ayogu’s 
(2001) thinking, which meets the notion of Ubuntu. 
 
1.4 Summary 
 
The author decided to call Berle and Means, the father of corporate 
governance, as they have made significant contribution to this field. 
The definitions highlighted above supports the institutionalization of the 
company, which has resulted in the agency theory problem. 
Development of corporate governance in US and UK has had positive 
contribution to SA and Zimbabwe governance systems (skills transfer). 
The corporate governance definitions discussed here will be used in 
filling the gap in the research of this field in Southern Africa. King, 
Ayogu (2001) and Myburgh’s effort will be complimented in developing 
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concepts that will assist in solving corporate governance problems in 
the countries under review. Definitions discussed above had both 
positive and negative impact on how companies have been managed 
since 1932 to date. The negative being the Wall Street Crash 1929, 
The Great Depression in UK (1991), Asia Crisis and the positive being 
the reduction in corporate scandals and the development of literature 
and legislation to regulate operations of corporates as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The researcher will be guided by these definitions in 
answering the research questions and developing the Conceptual 
Framework. 
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2 Evolution of corporate governance 
As a result of globalization, the Wall Street crash (1929), UK scandals (1987-
1991) and the Asian crisis (1998), South Africans and Zimbabweans were 
negatively affected as poor corporate performance resulted in banks failing. 
The Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression resulted in the re-
colonization of Africa and war as European countries were fighting for 
resources like gold and diamonds in Africa. The Anglo-Boer war had long 
term effects to the development of Southern Africa as resources were 
depleted. After the second Anglo-Boer War, the British government did not 
give up its ambition for unifying South Africa under Imperial British rule. The 
two Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic 
or Transvaal still maintained their desire for independence, 
(www.sahistory.co.za). The Boer republics were a stumbling block for the 
British Empire until the British were defeated. These wars were followed by 
the Second World War and all these had negative impact on corporate 
performance and governance system of African countries as US and Britain 
had to source for resources in order to turnaround their economic crisis. 
Governments had to bale out subsidiaries in respective countries in order to 
avoid total collapse of the institutions and economy at large. BCCI and 
Hoechst were financed by the government as they were the biggest 
institutions in Zimbabwe and SA. Their collapse would have resulted in the 
collapse of the countries.  The impact to the economy of a bank closing is 
very significant and can paralyze the whole economy for example recession 
in South Africa in the late 1990s after the Anglo-Boer War. The legislation 
that followed the scandals impacted on the countries under review as 
companies affected in the scandals were operating in SA and Zimbabwe for 
example BCCI, which resulted in the governments adopting new reforms like 
ESAP in order to turnaround the economies. 
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2.1 US Wall Street crash 1929 
 
The US corporate governance system is generally regarded as the 
most robust: it is related to the largest economy, the largest 
concentration of leading corporations, the deepest and most fluid 
capital markets, a dispersed shareholding base, and well-established 
laws and regulatory institutions, Clarke (2004 : 154) and Millstein 
(2001 : 10) argued.  One of the strengths of the US system lies in its 
encouragement of self-regulations by corporate entities, supported by 
law around basic principles, but not mandated point by point. The US 
system enables people who know the corporation most intimately to 
effect its operation, so that the corporation can be positioned to 
achieve the highest level of efficiency and competitiveness it is 
capable of within its economic environment stated Millstein, (2001 : 
10). 
 
However, though the US system may have partly evolved out of the 
pragmatic development of case law in response to changing 
circumstances, this is a subtext compared to the major legislative 
interventions that have resulted at times of crisis (Figure 2.1) 
document 1 pp 7 as Millstein (2001 : 10) notes: “This minimally 
intrusive system also leaves room for abuse.  The US system has had 
to make many adjustments to counter mistakes generated by too 
much discretion.  Our regulatory system has evolved over time, in 
reaction to outright abuse.  At various points in our corporate history, 
fraud, larceny and mismanagement have not been all that unusual – 
ultimately they led to law and regulation,” Barnes (2004 : 91-93) gave 
the same argument. 
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Expanding confidence in the American economy of the 1920s, with 
rising output, sustained growth and an increase in personal wealth, led 
to the speculative euphoria of 1928 and 1929, centered on New York 
that led to the Wall Street crash.  Figure 2.1 (document 1) : 7 shows 
the failure of the US (legal framework) governance system since 1930 
as all the laws were passed as a reaction to a crisis, the same as in 
the UK (Chart 2.2.1) below.  The market collapse revealed market 
manipulation, insider trading, general mismanagement and a reckless 
trampling of shareholder rights, with the loss of 86 per cent of market 
capitalization between 1929 and 1933 Soros, (1998) : 145 argued. 
 
The long recession that followed provoked deep misgivings about the 
nature of the economic system unleashed upon an apparently 
defenceless public.  Congress enacted the Securities Act 1933 and 
the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 to address some of these 
misgivings, primarily through the regulation of corporate financial 
disclosure to improve transparency.  The laws and rules that ensued 
imposed liability on officers and directors for fraud and abuse, 
established the SEC to enforce these measures, and to regulate 
solicitation of shareholder proxies by public corporations. “Congress 
opted for honest and fair disclosure as the primary tool for securities 
regulation, obviating the need for more detailed substantive regulation” 
Millstein (2001 : 11). These efforts have yet to yield the required 
results of best practice in US and the rest of the world. 
 
2.2  UK Robert Maxwell MMC, BCCI, Polly Peck 1990/91 
 
The UK had some similar experiences to the US in terms of the post-
war recovery and long period of complacency regarding corporate 
governance, though economic growth was more stumbling, and 
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executives had less to be self-satisfied about argued Clarke (2004 : 
156).  The financial exuberance that arrived in the 1980s was halted in 
the market crash of 1987, and later high interest rates precipitated a 
series of high profile corporate collapses in 1991, including Robert 
Maxwell’s MMC, Polly Peck and the BCCI, whose primary commercial 
activity turned out to be money laundering. 
 
Public confidence and trust in the efficiency and reliability of the 
governing structures of industry was severely shaken in that each of 
these corporations received healthy audit reports shortly prior to their 
collapse Clarke and Bostock, (1994).  Consequent concerns included 
the standards of the audit and accountancy professions Cadbury 
report (1992); the lack of accountability disclosure and transparency of 
boards to shareholders Monks and Minow, (1991); concerns over the 
adequacy of board structures and processes Lorsch and Maclver, 
(1989); the quality of directoral competencies; the apparent lack of 
corporate social responsibility; the destabilizing impact of the growth of 
merger and acquisition activities Pound (1992 : 83) the short-tem 
basis of corporate performance Gregg (1993 : 2) the spate of business 
fraud; and the evident weakness of corporate self-regulation. 
 
These problems were exacerbated by the development of more 
complex corporate structures and, as a result, modern company law 
was unable to keep pace with modern corporate reality Hopt, (1984). 
As one of the greatest proponents of active corporate governance, Sir 
Adrian Cadbury’s report published in (1992) was to have considerable 
influence not just in the UK, but in many other countries around the 
world that adopted similar corporate governance codes of practice 
with the inspiration of Cadbury, and in similar circumstances. 
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Further UK reforms of corporate governance followed the Cadbury 
code, with the Greenbury Report (1995) proposing guidelines for 
director remuneration; the Hampel Report (1998) focusing on 
disclosure and best practice; the Combined Code (1998) outlining a 
mandatory disclosure framework; and the Turnbull Report (1999) 
offering advice on compliance with mandatory disclosure.  This was 
followed by a three year inquiry Modern Company Law Review, which 
for the first time addressed the fundamentals of the reform of company 
law, which in the UK was particularly antiquated.  However, any sense 
that universally improved standards of corporate governance were 
gradually bringing greater stability and security in international equity 
investments was abruptly dispelled by the looming Asian financial 
crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2.2.1: Adapted from Clarke (2004): Regulations in the UK 
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2.2.1 Asian financial crisis 1997/98 
 
The ink was barely dry on a series of high profile reports by the 
World Bank (1993, 1996) celebrating the unique combination of 
high investment and sustained high growth rates of the tiger 
economies of East Asia as an inspiration to the other developing 
economies, when the Asian financial crisis broke.  Erupting in 
June 1997 in Thailand, it quickly swept through the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and South Africa 
impacting upon Taiwan and Hong Kong.  Meanwhile Japan was 
experiencing a deepening crisis in its financial institutions.  As 
Michael Camdessus, South China Morning Post, (2 October 
1998) the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
confessed, “A universe of specialists did not see the Asian crisis 
come.  We did not see the violence of the contagion.  It was so 
strong, quick and struck in the most unconnected places”. 
 
Corporate governance came to the centre of the international 
development agenda following the Asian crisis in the mid to late 
1990s above when the Hong Kong Stock Exchange shrank by 
24%. Boycko et al (1994) researched and found out that, regional 
securities markets lost from 15% to 79% in US dollar terms.  
 
There was much evidence of a profound inclination towards 
reform in the countries concerned, but should this dissipate as 
the East Asian economies move towards recovery, there was an 
array of external agencies with an interest in ensuring the 
process of reform is adhered to. The IMF, World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank all have launched significant initiatives to 
encourage and facilitate the reform process. International 
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investors were unlikely to be sympathetic towards countries and 
companies that were not significantly improving their corporate 
governance standards. However, the question arises concerning 
the appearance and substance of reform, and the prospect of 
regulatory capture by business interests that never identified with 
reform process. 
 
2.3  African governance system 
 
The demise of apartheid and advent of democratization in South Africa 
coincided with a number of critical global developments, namely 
ascendancy of globalization, land inversion in Zimbabwe, economic 
liberalization based on market fundamentalism, emergence of the third 
wave of democratization encompassing countries of the former 
socialist bloc and spreading to other developing countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. It coincided too, with increasing interest 
(propelled by the revival of institutional analysis) in the lessons to be 
learned from East Asia experience with respect to the role of the state 
in promoting development, Amsden (1989), Evan (1993), Jang and 
Kim (2001) and Wade et al (1990), which is historical information. 
 
Mhone and Edigheji (2003) pp 1- 15  argued that Southern African 
countries are confronted with the major challenges of attempting to 
promote democratization, good governance and sustainable human 
development in the context of an increasingly integrated global order 
driven by market fundamentalism. They were supported by Henderson 
(2006), Cheung (2004) and Myburgh 2003) who argued that 
democratization should be done in the context of “ubuntu” in order to 
promote good governance, which should result in employees buying-in 
to corporate ethics. The author however disagrees with this argument 
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as employees are only a stakeholder in the corporate governance 
mapping without any representation at board level. They do not 
influence the out come of compliance to best practice but directors do. 
The challenges are that there are no sufficient skills to implement and 
audit corporate governance implementation programmes. 
 
As a result of these problems Myburgh’s report (2003) list some of the 
banks that failed as a result of failing to comply with corporate 
governance code of best practice, (Appendix 1) although subject of 
corporate governance in developing economies has recently received 
a lot of attention in the literature Oman (2001), Goswami (2001), Lin 
(2001), Malherbe and Segal (2001). Corporate governance in banks 
has been almost ignored by researchers Caprio and Levine (2002). At 
the time of writing this document there is very little research done on 
corporate governance in Southern Africa and especially in the financial 
sector. It is clear that corporate governance in Southern Africa is 
under-researched refer also 3.3 below. 
 
Corporate governance of banks in developing countries is important 
as they are engines of economic growth, source of finance for majority 
of firms, provides means of payment system and the liberalization of 
banks argued King and Levine (1993a/b), Levine (1997). Arun and 
Turner (2004) pp 371-373 managers of banks in these economies 
have obtained greater freedom in how they run banks especially in 
South Africa leading to bank failures Appendix 1. Africa has yet to 
witness the level of corporate governance failure experienced 
elsewhere argued Okeahalam (2004), but what he failed to identify is 
the stage of capitalization of companies in Africa. The author 
disagrees with Okeahalam as the failures in Africa has been 
significant compared to the respective economies (market 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 14 of 75 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
capitalization) for example Masterbond, Nedcor (1990s) in SA, 
Appendix 1, hence considered as a high risk continent by international 
investors to invest in, Theobald (2001). 
 
The Louw (2003), KPMG (2003) report highlighted that there was a 
general increase in fraud and corruption in Africa, 61% of the 
respondents confirmed this. The reason for this increase in fraud is as 
a result of deregulations, which resulted in appointment of unqualified 
directors (cronyism and easy wealth, Klapper and Love (2002)) who 
are poor and inexperienced. Countries being researched are however 
affected by international companies that have dual listing, which has 
resulted in companies complying with international codes of best 
practice, Vermaulen (2001 : 73). Scandals in the countries under 
review in the late 1990s resulted in professionals in SA volunteering to 
assist by developing a document which was to outline a code of best 
practices as a first attempt towards developing best practice 
document, which was named King 1 Report (1994). Corporate failures 
continued in SA and Zimbabwe resulting in the King 11 Report (2002), 
which was adopted by both countries as a requirement for all public 
companies.  
 
2.4.1 Evaluation of corporate governance codes in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe 
 
South African and Zimbabwean corporate governance is 
administered by the King 11 (2002) Report, Myburgh (2003) 
Report and manual of best practice in Zimbabwe. It is a 
requirement that every public and listed company is required to 
comply with these codes. These codes define directors’ job 
descriptions which state the obvious with no legal enforcement.  
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The King 11 Report did not address the issues of corporate 
governance as it lack depth and command to enforce legislation. 
It did not address issues like independence, role of auditors and 
non – executive directors. This resulted in every company 
insetting a sub heading “Corporate Governance,” which showed 
that the companies were complying with the King 11 Report 
which does not have substance but form...  
The recent failure of banks in Zimbabwe has been as a result of 
failure by the legal system, or rule of law, abusive insider and 
related party transactions (Appendix 1). The operations of some 
sectors of the economy are considered as black boxes for 
example how Ministry of defence, Presidency and other 
companies owned by the state do not comply with the King 11 
and the international best practice. Failure to observe property 
rights and self enrichment has resulted in the current crisis. 
Political allegiance is a major issue that has affected corporate 
governance systems, which resulted in the Zimbabwean 
government closing some banks like Trust Bank, Century Bank, 
Barbican Bank and The Daily Newspaper (Appendix 1). 
Appendix 1 gives details and similarities of the reasons for banks’ 
failure in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The main reason for failure 
of banks, in both countries has been failure of external and 
internal CG system, non-core speculative activities as well as 
fraud. 
 
Evidence by Armstrong (2003), Millson and Ward (2004), 
Turnbull (2006) and Barnes (2004) has shown that complying 
with the King 11 Report (2002) and Myburgh (2003) Report does 
not mean complying with the codes of best practice. This 
document has been used as a public relations document to 
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attract investment in South Africa and Zimbabwe according to 
Barnes (2003). The development of these codes is an indication 
of the failure of the legal framework of the two countries, which 
has resulted in bank failures. The idea of the volunteers (authors) 
of these codes was to create awareness and promote highest 
standards of corporate governance, but lacked the legal 
framework support. 
 
Banks have abused the codes by appointing executive directors 
at holding companies as independent or non executive directors 
in subsidiary companies. Independence is not properly defined, 
which has resulted in conflict of interest. The introduction of BEE 
and affirmative action has worsened organizational structures as 
board members who lack knowledge and experience of the 
business but after quick accumulation of wealth being appointed 
and influence setting of policies by the governments. Majority of 
them do not even attend board meetings as reflected in 
document 3. Ineffective governance has often formed the 
backdrop to corporate failure with the resultant negative impact 
on shareholders argued Millson and Ward (2004 : 73). Therefore 
the non existence of the legal framework which governs 
corporate governance issues in both countries is a challenge for 
researchers and academia. 
 
2.4 Critical analysis of the literature 
 
The evolution of corporate governance in USA, UK and Asia had a 
positive impact (transfer of knowledge) on South Africa and Zimbabwe 
as these countries followed the same trend of events. Most corporates 
in SA and Zimbabwe have dual listings JSE, LSE, NYSE, HKSE and 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 17 of 75 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
TSE affecting how best practice issues are addressed. The collapse of 
most of the US (The Wall Street Crash 1929) and UK (The Great 
Depression 1987-1991) companies had negative impact to SA and 
Zimbabwe as they had subsidiaries operating in these countries for 
example BCCI affecting the liquidity of these countries. The difference 
with the US corporate governance is that, when there is a corporate 
failure it is considered as the level of risk that the shareholders had 
taken, while in Southern Africa it is an economic crime the researcher 
has observed. 
 
Concerned with the direction and control of corporations grew in both 
developed and developing countries in the wake of privatization, 
affirmative action, ESAP and liberalization in the financial markets. A 
number of high profile corporate failures in 2001-2002 Appendix 1 
have brought a renewed focus on the importance of good corporate 
governance, bringing the topic to a broader audience. What has 
emerged through international debate on the topic is that the 
underlying principles of fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility reflect minimum standards to provide legitimacy to the 
corporation, reduce vulnerability to financial crisis, broaden and 
deepen access to capital.  
 
Financial liberalization and large current account deficits financed by 
short-term foreign loans, left these economies open to large 
international movements of capital. Collapsing currencies, equity and 
property markets in East Asia in 1997/98 exposed underlying 
vulnerabilities both in governance structures and values in Southern 
Africa. However, an international confidence crisis was fuelled by a 
growing realization of the structural weaknesses of economies often 
governed by crony capitalism, opaque accounting, auditing systems 
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and too close relations between business and the state argued Clarke 
(2004 : 153). The question remains how could all this have happened 
in economies that were formerly celebrated for their robustness and 
efficiency? The question remains, where were the boards and 
auditors? The author would like to find out in document 3 and 4. 
 
All these developments resulted in the first attempt by the King 
committee to develop a document called “The King 1 (1994) Report 
followed by The King 11 Report, Myburgh Report and the Best 
Practice document in Zimbabwe. King (2002) argued that the King 2 
Report was to raise awareness as the CG revolution, which had swept 
the world, had arrived in South Africa (www.btimes.co.za). Although 
these documents failed to address real issues affecting the 
governance of companies is Southern Africa, they were assisted by 
international best practice document, in bringing awareness to 
Southern Africa. These documents improved the perception of 
investors as the countries under review were seen to be making an 
effort to comply with CG best practice. 
 
In a modern economy, companies are disciplined by a combination of 
internal and external controls. Internally, the company directors’ duty is 
to ensure adequate financial control is exercised, and reinforced by 
“independent audit” of the annual accounts. Externally, there is a 
“legal framework of corporate law,” policed by regulatory authorities 
and the tax authorities. Finally, there is the capital market that 
exercises a commercial discipline upon companies. Though this 
institutional structure was broadly in place in the East Asian 
economies, the problem is that this did not work properly argued 
Clarke (2004 : 154). Given the systematic nature of the problems of 
corporate governance in East Asia, only a fundamental programme of 
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reform on institutions and practices, conducted in an energetic and 
committed manner over a considerable period of time, is likely to 
produce results. Ryan (2004) (www.btimes.co.za) also argued that, it 
is evident that CG is increasingly regarded as a management tool 
rather than a burden. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
As a result of the new reform policies, new shareholders or ESAP, 
partners lack the experience and only want to be board members with 
no contribution but political will. They do not attend board meetings 
and neither do they have time to analyze companies’ performance as 
reflected in document 3. The crisis in Zimbabwe at the time of this 
research is as a result of greedy, legal framework failure and lack of 
knowledge, which may affect South Africa very soon. The new 
investors as a result of lack of knowledge do not seek to acquire 
experience and knowledge so that they can be involved in the strategy 
formulation of the organizations they own, which will be reflected in 
document 3. Garratt (2003) coined that shareholders and board 
members should develop a concept of a learning board so that every 
member of the organization participate and strive to achieve success. 
 
Accountability, fairness, responsibility and transparency (document 1 
pp 5 and Cadbury Report 1992) are of great concern for an effective 
board. Willson and Ward (2004 : 81) argued that for this to happen, 
board members need to be granted equity so that they will be aligned 
to the goals of the shareholders and reduce the level of information 
asymmetry. The challenge that faces South African enterprises is to 
translate the commitment of best practice and high standards of ethics 
into organizational practice. It is on this score that most codes of 
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corporate governance in Southern Africa fall short as they provide very 
little guidance on how ethics should be institutionalized in enterprises 
argued Rossouw (2005 : 105), Crane and Matten (2004 : 37-219). 
 
The experience in US, UK and Asia did not only bring to Africa 
negative effects of corporate failure as well are positive factors like 
skills transfer. Southern Africa benefited from the developments in 
legal framework and implementation of the codes of best practice. 
This has resulted in significant growth in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
until seven years ago. As a result of political leadership is Zimbabwe, 
economic growth has been affected, hence affecting corporate 
governance structures (Appendix 1) 
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3 Corporate performance 
 
3.1 Defining the concept 
 
Helmer (1996 : 2) stated that boards have a definite responsibility and 
key role to play in organizational effectiveness, hence should endeavor 
to acquire skills and strategic orientation driven by the dynamics of 
economic, technological, political and social change (PESTI) which are 
global in magnitude Chart 3.1.1. Van Der Walt and Ingley (2001) 
contributed that, if organizations are to perform according to 
shareholder expectations in an environment of increasing strategic 
change and uncertainty, boards have a governance responsibility to 
ensure they identify and build or acquire and maintain necessary 
capabilities to their organizations towards those goals and ambitions 
Chart 3.1.3. The author was impressed by Pawson and Tilley’s (2004 : 
1-220) work, which had an impact in developing the conceptual 
framework assisted by Garratt (2003 : 17 and 19) document one, Chart 
1.3.2 document two and Kaplan and Norton (1996), Chart 3.1.1. Their 
argument matches the researcher’s argument of enhancing shareholder 
value by making sure that all positive mechanisms on the Board 
Effectiveness Model are triggered, hence creating shareholder value. 
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Linking corporate governance to shareholder value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3.1.1: Value generation: Adapted from Kaplan & Norton (1996) 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996) (Chart 3.1.1) coined the model that link 
corporate governance to shareholder value above, arguing that cash is 
the best measure of value creation.  This argument was supported by 
Garratt (2003) when he came up with a corporate governance policy 
review cycle (Chart 3.1.2). The author agrees with the above 
researchers in their value creation models as cash ratios are not easily 
manipulated and as the cycle by Garratt (2003) is observed, then there 
is compliance to best practice. These models were useful in developing 
the author’s mindset in looking for mechanisms that add shareholder 
value after being triggered.  
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Garratt (2003 : 156) developed a dashboard for sustained value 
creation, where the enablers trigger the drivers in order to create value 
and market potential. Garratt (2003), : 159 developed the Corporate 
Governance Ecosystem, which links the learning board and the 
customer satisfaction levels. The argument that Garratt (2003) came up 
with was to make sure that the cycle is complete in order to meet 
corporate governance best practice goals. 
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 Stewardship 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance 
Culture Cycle 
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The later argument is in line with linking corporate governance to 
corporate performance Chart 3.1.1/2, which draws together from the 
literature key elements of corporate governance best practice, which 
are used to highlight the dynamics of board evaluation and performance 
from which to develop measures of board effectiveness. 
 
These models are relevant to emerging markets where many of the 
companies have been created from the nationalization of state owned 
enterprises or family controlled companies. There are no policies to 
measure value generation but titles are being used to satisfy directors 
yet some have no real value addition especially now during the 
economic transformation process in SA, the researcher has observed. 
The boards are dominated by owner directors and owner appointed 
directors Bradley (2003 :111).  Chart 3.1.1/.2 are critical in formulating a 
board effectiveness model (Chart 3.1.3), which creates good corporate 
governance, and results in good corporate performance that creates 
shareholder value. In developing the conceptual framework the author 
used these models; Chart 3.1.1/2 and those in document one to explain 
the board effectiveness concept. 
 
The Conceptual framework (Chart 3.1.3) was developed in line with the 
above authors’ thinking. The Mechanisms identified by the author are 
triggered to result in outcomes that affect the effectiveness of directors. 
Mechanisms which generate social and behavioral problems should be 
removed or countered through the alternative casual mechanisms. 
Pawson and Tilley (2004) p 65 and 216 argued that, researchers should 
understand “why” an action of mechanisms should refer to choices and 
capabilities that lead to regular pattern of social behaviour.” The 
behaviour of the board has an impact on the company’s performance. 
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Mechanisms (Chart 3.1.3) are activated or triggered by a certain 
corporate governance culture or ethical behaviour. Realist evaluators 
seek to understand “for whom and in what circumstances” a programme 
works through the study of contextual conditioning, which results in 
positive outcomes. Different mechanisms have different effects on 
outcomes. If all positive mechanisms are triggered, the outcome will be 
an effective board, while negative mechanisms (attributes) reduce the 
effectiveness of the board. Attributes that do not support the 
stewardship theory reduces the effectiveness of the board the author 
has observed. 
 
The conceptual framework (Chart 3.1.3) addresses the issues raised by 
the research questions in document one p 15 – 16. In order to develop 
an effective board, there is empirical evidence that owner managed 
companies are less likely to fail than those managed by agents. The 
concept of stewardship explained below shows that owner managed 
companies are more effective than agent managed for example, Apple, 
De Beers, Mittal Steel, Luciano Benetton and family, Virgin Group, 
Microsoft, Tata Group to mention but a few. It is evident that the skills 
level, family culture and experience of board members has an effect on 
its functionality, hence the Japanese model of appointing board 
members is among the most effective in the world. The criteria for 
appointment is either one has to be an employee of the company, ex-
employee or the owner in order to be appointed, which, the conceptual 
framework, document three and four will endeavor to investigate 
whether this model work in emerging markets. 
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The Conceptual Framework 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3.1.3: Board Effectiveness Model 
Internal attributes 
• Skills mix 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Participation 
• Management 
interest 
• CEO influence 
• Power distribution 
• Internal systems 
• Employees 
 
 Corporate 
financial 
performance 
 Shareholder 
value growth 
 Bank survival 
and growth 
 CFROTA 
growth 
Board 
Effectiveness 
Nature of the Board 
• Gender composition 
• Stewardship Theory 
• Agency Theory 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Conflict of interest 
• Ethical issues 
• Communities 
Board continuous 
development 
• Qualification 
• Experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Teamwork 
• CSR issues 
• Culture 
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• Ownership 
structure 
• Development of 
strategies 
• Evaluation 
Committee 
• Board affairs 
Committee 
• Government 
policies 
• Independent 
Auditors 
• Independent 
Directors 
• Independent 
Consultancy 
• Other 
stakeholders 
Internal influence 
• Internal Audit 
• Audit Committee 
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• Financial control 
• NED 
• Mission 
• Vision 
• Strategy 
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activism 
• Regulatory 
framework 
• PESTI 
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Corporate  
performance 
C.G principles 
 Fairness 
 Transparency 
 Accountability 
 Responsibility 
(Document 1 pp 5) 
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Corporate governance culture cycle is a model that creates a shared 
mindset, argued Ulrich (1997) among board members, which will create 
an ethical behaviour of transparency and accountability. The result of 
which is ROCE and CFROTA being above average, Dulewicz and 
Herbert (2004: 265) supported this argument. Board effectiveness is a 
result of linking corporate governance culture to shareholder value. 
(Drucker 1955) wrote that effective management must direct the vision 
and efforts of all managers towards a common goal, linking to Ulrich’s 
contribution, which coincides with the author’s conceptual framework 
and supporting models. 
 
3.2 Behind the boardroom door 
 
The researcher agrees with (Garratt (2003: 1) when he agues that there 
are fundamental differences between “managing” and “directing” an 
organization and that most current “board directors” are in reality merely 
rebadged managers as they are only directing not managing.  The 
present global corporate governance crisis in the private and public 
sectors is a complex mixture of directoral ignorance, strategic 
incompetence, and greed. (Garratt 2003: 1) argues that a key to 
resolving the present crisis is to induct, train and appraise directors as 
true professionals and accept the intellectual, moral and behavioral 
consequences of this, which answers the research question, why there 
is need to train board members, which are the attributes that enhances 
effectiveness Chart 3.1.3. 
 
(Davies 1999), (Ezzamel and Watson 1997), (Garratt 1996), (Mintzberg 
1994) and (Helmer 1996) asserted that the board sits behind the 
boardroom door and provide strategic thinking, which is close to the 
“guiding” view but implies a stronger leadership and cognitive 
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involvement. This argument agrees with the principles of corporate 
governance, which state that, “the corporate governance framework 
should ensure that strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board and the board’s accountability 
to the company and shareholders.”  
 
(McNulty and Pettigrew 1999), (Fox 1998) and (Judge and Zeithaml 
1992) had developed the argument supporting this notion, but what 
puzzles the author is, why then do companies fail, while there is all this 
framework (to be answered in document 3 and 4). The author agrees 
with the empirical evidence by (Garratt 2003) that, resolutions are 
prepared by the executives and what really happen behind the 
boardroom door are to rubber stamp them. The board follows the 
direction the CEO is taking (Garratt 2003) argued but (Johnson et al 
1993) had argued that, what happens behind the boardroom door is 
positively associated with financial performance of the company. This 
argument brings the paradox why boards fail and where were the 
boards before the company failed? Warren Buffett put it so succinctly, 
“it is only in the rinse cycle that you see just how dirty the washing was. 
We are in the rinse cycle now,” we do not know which direction to take 
as (Professor Howard Schilit 1990s) put it as an era of “creative 
accounting and manipulation.” 
 
3.3 Board effectiveness 
 
(Garratt 2003: 1) argued that, until we see the board’s role being 
professionalized and the supremacy of the board being reasserted, we 
shall not restore full shareholder confidence in business, public leaders 
or the markets. (Ingley and Van Der Walt 2002) argued that, while the 
management literature is accepting the value of performance 
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appraisals, there is disagreement in the governance literature as to the 
role, value and contribution of board appraisals to board effectiveness. 
Typically, performance evaluation is concerned with assessing board 
function and processes which will bring back the confidence. TSE 
guideline 5 provides that, “every board of directors should implement a 
process to be carried out by the nominating committee or other 
appropriate committee for assessing the effectiveness of the board as a 
whole, the committees of the board and the contribution of individual 
directors” (Kazanjin 2000). 
 
(Herman and Renz 2000), (Tricker 1999a), (Dilenschneider 1996), (Van 
Der Walt and Ingley 2001a) argued that boards should be evaluated as 
a team maintaining collegiality, while (Blake 1999), (Davies 1999), 
(Garratt 1997), (Tricker 1999b) and (Walker 1999) argued that board 
members should be evaluated individually. The author will in document 
3 investigate which model is the best way to evaluate board 
performance. (Kazanjin 2000) and (Steinberg 2000) disagrees with 
researchers above as they suggest that board appraisals brings 
discomfort, uncomfortable, disrupt open interaction, collegiality and 
untrustworthiness among the board and should be left to the 
shareholders who will vote to remove a director. (Kazanjin 2000) argued 
that discomfort may arise there by opening a pandora’s box revealing 
sensitive issues such as under-performing or incompetent directors. 
 
(Forbes and Milliken 1999) stated that board effectiveness is likely to be 
heavily dependent on social-psychological processes like group 
participation, interaction, information exchange and critical discourse. 
They also argued that various aspects of board demography are likely 
to have multiple and contrasting effects on the processes that contribute 
to effective board performance, which the author calls corporate 
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governance culture cycle and (Chart 3.1.3 (mechanisms)). (Taylor 
2001) links knowledge based strategic governance to organizational 
learning and highlights the need for the board to move from a “react-
and-ratify” model to a “define-and-delegate” approach and to move from 
a management board to a governance board, which is affected by the 
attributes below. 
 
3.4 Attributes that affect board effectiveness 
 
Answering the research questions, the author looked at different 
corporate governance attributes/mechanisms (Chart 3.1.3) and factors 
that assist or influence board performance and effectiveness. (Taylor 
2003: 156), (Hendry and Kiel 2004: 500) observed that, accounting 
irregularities, level of knowledge, corporate corruption, excess agency 
costs, and inadequate disclosure practices have significantly affected 
corporate performance resulting in high profile corporate failures. 
(Herman 1981), (Mace 1971), (Pfeffer 1972), (Golden and Zajac 2001) 
and (Stiles and Taylor 2001), (Vance 1983), (Lorsch and Maclver 1989) 
supported the passive school view, which views the board as rubber 
stamp or tool of top management whose only contribution is to satisfy 
the requirements of company law. Managerial hegemony theory 
supports this school of thought by arguing that boards are a legal fiction 
dominated by management. This line of thinking argues that board 
decisions are largely subject to management control especially with the 
powerful CEOs in developing countries makes life difficult for boards to 
add value. (Mizruchi 1983) argues that the board has ultimate control 
and has capacity to fire the CEO hence he agrees with the active view. 
 
(Davis and Thompson 1994), (Hendry and Kiel 2004), (Walsh and 
Seward 1990), (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) disagreed with the 
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passive school and supported the active school, which sees the board 
as independent thinkers who shape the strategic direction of the 
organization. The CEO is seen as a visionary who brings solutions to 
the board for discussion according to the active school; hence the 
author will have to investigate how boards work in the two countries in 
document 3. The attributes that affect board performance are as 
follows: 
 
3.4.1 Stewardship – equity participation 
 
(Davis et al 1997) and (Donaldson 1990: 375) argues against the 
opportunistic self – interest assumption of agency theory, claiming 
that managers are motivated by “a need to achieve, to gain 
intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing inherently 
challenging work, to exercise responsibility, authority and thereby 
gain recognition from peers and bosses. (Hugg 1998) and (Stiles 
et al 2001) supported this perspective saying it recognizes a range 
of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour and it supports 
the active school, arguing that the strategic role of the board 
contributes to this overall stewardship of the company. (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998) agree with above researchers saying that insider 
– dominated boards contribute a depth of knowledge, expertise 
and commitment to the firm which facilitates an active strategic 
role. 
 
The author agrees with the stewardship theory as it gives 
ownership and total responsibility to managers to run the firm. If 
boards were appointed as stewards not agency the author agrees 
that corporate governance problems would not have sufficed. The 
Japanese model of appointing board members fits very well with 
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the stewardship theory at this stage. (Pfeffer 1972, 1973), (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978), (Goodstein et el 1994), (Zahra and Pearce 
1989, 1991) added that this theory stems from research in 
economics, sociology and focuses on the role of interlocking 
directorates in linking firms to both competitors and other 
stakeholders. Boards are a “cooptative” mechanism for a firm to 
form links with its external environment, to access important 
resources and buffer the firm against adverse environmental 
change.  
 
An important factor that underlines the importance of stewardship 
is the exceptional ability to generate wealth. Joint research in the 
US, UK and SA has revealed that owner managed (stewards) 
businesses generated jobs and wealth on a much larger scale 
than any type of business (Adendorff, et al 2005), (Hugo 1996), 
(Van Der Merwe 1999) and (Zimmerer and Scaborough 2002). In 
SA owner managed businesses listed on the JSE during 1987 – 
1992 recorded a rate of return of 36% compared to the rate of 
return of 27% recorded by non family managed businesses 
(Venter 2002:. 33), (Maas 1999a a & b) , (John 1994:.26), 
(Beckhard and Dyer 1983), and (Sharma 1997). These 
researchers and the statistics above support the argument that 
directors should be owners and former employees of the 
organization. 
 
3.4.2 Board knowledge and experience 
 
(Demb et al 1992) queried why boards fail? Their argument was 
that apathetic, unqualified, inexperienced director and self – 
interested directors are certainly among the reasons, but these 
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directors account for the uneven performance of the board, hence 
the author advocate for director accreditation as a way for 
continuous development of directors. (Anderson and Anthony 
1986: 1) quoted Peter Dricker who argued that the board of 
directors is an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction as the board 
has little choice but to follow meekly where the CEO leads them 
as they are not experienced to execute their duties, which the 
author is keen to find out Dricker’s argument. 
 
(Garratt 2003), (Kakabadse 2002) and (Frederikson 1992) argued 
that investors are willing to pay a premium of up 27% when 
investing in a well structured organization. (Rossouw 2002), 
(Hyden and Barton 1993) termed these social aspects of 
enterprise leadership as the basic elements of governance that is 
degree of shareholder trust, accountability and director experience 
and skills level. The author agrees with the above contribution in 
that experience plays a role in director effectiveness. Effective 
directors have to have a mindset that allows them to be 
comfortable handling high levels of uncertainty, while maintaining 
both their sense of direction and their moral stance. 
 
3.4.3 Transparency and financial control 
 
DuPont used a pyramid of financial ratios, which were linked to 
ROI. The pyramid had an explicit hierarchical structure linking 
measures at different organizational levels. This held management 
responsible not only for measures of margin and net income but 
also ROI and introduced an early concept of performance 
management to organizations, (Neely and Austin 2002). (Johnson 
and Kaplan 1987) blamed the IAS (IFRS), (Professor Howard 
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Schilit 1990s) called it an era of “creative accounting,” (Barnes 
2004:. 91) called it manipulation of accounting information – 
eventual failure and fraud. These researchers found out these as 
the reasons for board ineffectiveness and why corporates fail. 
 
(Turnbull 2006) argued that external auditors do not add 
shareholder value but just an unnecessary cost that reduces tax 
revenue. IFRS allows auditors only to check on a test basis 
leaving the responsibility to the board. If the boards act as 
stewards then they do not need to appoint a third part to check on 
what they are doing as they are mandated by shareholders to look 
after their interests argued (Turnbull 2006). (Turnbull 2006) argued 
that appointment of auditors is a way to support the Agency 
Theory so that shareholder gets comfort while fraud is going 
undetected. The author will look at Turnbull’s argument in 
document 3 with keen interest as the researcher has been 
influenced by the Stewardship and Active School theories. 
 
(Melis 2004), (De Jong 1997), (Moerland 1995), (Pagano et al 
1998) and (Amatori and Colli 2000) argued that shareholders have 
played a marginal role in the administration of the companies they 
own and boards abuse their power by appointing third parties to 
check on how they operate. (Spira 2003: 180) mentioned that bad 
news sells newspapers and audit failures make headlines, the 
argument here is that fraud does not happen in a day but over a 
number of years for example (Enron, WorldCom, DRDGold, 
Leisurenet BCCI Banks in South Africa and Zimbabwe). The 
question is what were they auditing and where was the boards? 
The relevance of auditors has been a black box argued 
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(Armstrong 2003). This ineffectiveness of auditors affects the 
effectiveness of the board argued (Turnbull 2006). 
 
Supporting the Turnbull’s argument of auditor irrelevance, (Corrin 
1993: 81) coined his support for Turnbull that the whole structure 
is like “soap” where the NEDs is cast as saint, the auditor is a 
tarnished guardian angel and the executive director is a villain. 
The focus on executive directors has shifted attention away from 
implications for the accountancy profession of audit failure 
resulting in the introduction of the (Sarbanes – Oxley Act 2002). In 
support of this act the author suggest that audit committee be 
legislated to take over the responsibility of financial reporting as 
the assumption made by the Cadbury Report about audit 
committees remain largely unchallenged and untested, (Corrin 
1993), (Lindsell 1992), (Grout et al 1994), (Samuels et al 1996) 
and (Millstein 1999) supported this argument. 
 
The assumption that auditor “independence” has a direct influence 
on the quality of financial reporting deserves some examination. 
Independence is ultimately a psychological construct and the 
appearance of non – independence is only indicative of the 
likelihood of non – independent behaviour, (Gwilliam 1987: 105), 
(Wolnizer 1995: 45). Unless accounting and audit practices are 
reformed so that financial statements can be authenticated by 
recourse so reliable commercial evidence, audits are red herrings 
argued (Wolnizer 1995). The presumption that steps taken to 
strengthen the independent status of auditors will lead of 
themselves to more “objective financial statements” is unfounded 
(Wolnizer 1995: 54) argued. 
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3.4.4 Shareholder Activism 
 
(Millson and Ward 2004: 81) argued that, private equity 
partnerships are primarily concerned with the strength of the 
management team of the respective company. In their research, 
respondents indicated an overwhelmingly strong preference for an 
experienced board whose members have together achieved 
success and or who have previously worked in the same industry 
in which shareholder would want to invest. They also argued that 
investors strongly avoid companies where the board has little prior 
experience in the industry or technology. This argument supports 
the author’s conceptual framework and answers the research 
question that board members need to be trained and accredited 
for them to be appointed to the board. 
 
 (Koontz 1967: 75-6) argues that there are matters typically 
requiring shareholders’ action, which, by their very nature, should 
be approved by the board before submission to shareholders, 
which means board members and shareholders must have the 
necessary skills for them to make effective decisions. (Pomeranz 
1998), (Monks 2002 a and c), (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) argued 
that although shareholders can exercise their voting rights, in 
reality these rights are not only expensive to exercise but also to 
enforce and are susceptible to managerial interference by 
coercing shareholders to support them and concealing information 
from their opponents.  
 
The problem with Koontz’s argument is that of information 
asymmetry as shareholders only wait for information from the 
board and only sits on the annual general meeting. Shareholder 
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activism is very passive in Africa (Shareholder apathy – business 
report 06 December 2005) due to the fact that most of the block 
holders are governments through nationalization, who by their 
nature do not understand how boards work. (Puckey 1969: 230) 
stated that, on the whole directors are not honest and manage 
organizations to oppress their shareholders by strictly legal means 
as a result of conflict of interest. 
 
Taylor (2003 : 3) and Sir Puckey (1969 : 253) supported the 
author’s argument that shareholders and directors need training. 
He argued that the forces existing in business environment have 
weakened greatly the role of ordinary shareholders and many 
directors now believe that although they are nominally, “the 
owners of business” their authority is of declining value. 
Shareholders as a class require to be stimulated much more than 
they are today, and there is much need for a major new effort by 
IOD in training shareholders and directors. City Press Business 
(12/06/2005) argued that informed shareholder activism can be a 
force for good corporate governance and need to be encouraged, 
as corporate scandals committed by some boards are the worst 
enemies of capitalism. These scandals tell us that the greatest 
threat to capitalism in the 21st century is not the Communist party 
but greedy executives whose actions have plunged capitalism into 
an unprecedented crisis of credibility. 
 
In South Africa and Zimbabwe the greatest threat to business is 
the system of governance and business leaders who are self 
centered and greed, who resist change argued Dlamini (2006). 
Shareholders have the right and responsibility to use their muscle 
to ensure that companies in which they invest are managed wisely 
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and do not resist the winds of change in the local and global 
economies. As a result of ignorance they do not exercise their 
rights in the governance of companies they are shareholders. It is 
against this backdrop that shareholders must participate in the 
decision-making process of the companies they are shareholders, 
Garten (2003), Kirby (1996), Kostant (1999), Wharton Jr (1995) 
and Stapledon (1996) 
 
3.4.5 Regulatory framework 
 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) argued that in the 1990s scandals 
involving gross dishonesty and fraud resulted in the publication of 
the Cadbury Report (1992) after all other reports had failed to 
address the issue of corporate failure Chart 2.2.1 above and figure 
2.1 in document one : 7. South Africa and Zimbabwe are affected 
by all these peaces of legislation as US and UK companies 
operate in these countries. Figure 2.1 and Chart 2.2.1 shows how 
the regulatory framework has been reactive to scandals and to 
date corporate governance practitioners and governments have 
failed to be proactive to corporate failures.  
 
A recent indication is the rushing of passing the Sarbanes – Oxley 
Act (2002), (Garratt 2003 called this act a disaster) and NYSE 
listing requirements into law without checking the effects of that 
law in the US and world over. Jones and Pollitt (2002a/b) and 
(2004), Mori (2003), Dulewicz and Herbert (2003), Gay (2001) 
argued that all these reports have failed to address the corporate 
governance crisis including the King 11 (2002) Report and 
Myburgh (2003) Report used in Africa as a guideline on best 
practice. The King 11 Report is just a public relations document 
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being used to attract FDI with out any meaning or value addition 
argued Barnes (2004). The Cadbury report is the only peace of 
legislation that stands out among its successors as having a high 
quality process of investigation in the face of varied, strong 
influencer interest and implementing radical yet realistic proposals 
resulting in its international recognition. 
 
The legal framework has actually supported the maximization of 
agency costs by allowing alternative treatment in the preparation 
and reporting of financial statements (IFRS) and the Companies 
Act. Monks (2003) quoted Drucker when he stated that, 
“Whenever an institution malfunctions as consistently as board of 
directors has in nearly every major fiasco of the last forty or fifty 
years it is futile to blame men. It is the institution that 
malfunctions.” Everyone had their share of responsibility when 
Enron collapsed but there was a veritable chorus of “we were 
mislead by management,” “we were mislead by auditors,” 
“we instituted systems of controls that we were entitled to 
believe would do the job,” “Reality cannot be laid at our 
door.”  
 
This was the board’s reaction. What is striking is that the board 
approved very important transactions in full knowledge that the 
accounting treatment did not convey an accurate picture of the 
economic implications of the matter. The auditors who certified 
that transaction complied with GAAP and received very large fees 
to contrive the transaction. The auditor went on to confirm the 
going concern of Enron. Audit as a profession has failed, hence 
the recent development of the new act on audit to tighten up the 
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rules. The development of forensic audit shows how audit has 
failed to add shareholder value. 
 
Development of the King 11 Report was an indication of the failure 
of the governance system in the countries under review. The King 
committee was composed of volunteers; hence the result of the 
report is not binding at law. The Zimbabwean government 
indorsed its own code of best practice which is not binding at law 
as well. This lack of commitment on the part of legislators has left 
shareholder vulnerable to abuse by directors and management. It 
is the author’s view that audit be revised as it does not only reduce 
shareholder value but deprive government of revenue as audit 
fees are allowable and use the law to maximize their own 
interests. 
 
 
3.4.6 The agency theory 
 
An agency cost is the cost incurred by an organization that is 
associated with problems such as divergent management – 
shareholder objectives and information asymmetry. The agent 
(director) is working on behalf of the principal (shareholder) who 
does not observe the actions of the agent. The information 
asymmetry that exists between directors and shareholders is 
generally considered to be a classic route of the principal – agent 
problem first identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They 
argued that the separation of ownership and control together with 
growth in their share capital, leads to a diffuse ownership situation 
in which the power of large shareholders is diluted. This weakness 
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and information asymmetry affords management a greater level of 
control which, based on agency theory is likely to be self-serving. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that agents are opportunists who 
operate with bounded rationality – they will self satisfice rather 
than profit maximize on behalf of the principal. This theory argues 
that the major role of the board is to reduce the potential 
divergence of interest between shareholders and management. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) : 302 disagreed with Eisenhardt (1989) 
that the importance of the board’s role places a premium on a 
board’s strategic contribution, specifically the board’s involvement 
in and contribution to the articulation of the firm’s mission, 
development of the firm’s strategy and setting of guidelines for 
implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy.  
 
The author disagrees with Zahra and Pearce (1989) as the board 
does not have enough time to add value to the firm as it should. 
Individuals sit in many boards rendering themselves ineffective as 
they are left with little time to add value. They sit as a board four 
times a year leaving the rest of the year to management to run the 
business as they wish. Most board members do not even attend 
board meetings as reflected in all banks’ attendance registers 
document 3. Zahra and Peace’s argument does not apply in Africa 
where most of the directors do not have the experience in an 
organization which they are directors. Special skills required in the 
financial sector, has led to firms compromising the skills level. The 
introduction of the BEE as a strategy has worsened the situation 
as BEE partners sitting as board members, are ignorant of 
operations of the sector. 
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3.4.7 Auditor Independence  
 
Melis (2004 : 77) argued that, the main task of auditors is to 
monitor the directors’ performance in the discharge of their duties 
and Cadbury (1992) stated that annual audit is one of the 
cornerstones of corporate governance. Although an increasing 
amount of research has focused on the relationship between 
governance structure, the entrepreneurial activities and 
performance of the firm, relatively little empirical work has 
examined the impact of internal governance characteristics on 
external auditor pricing decisions, relevance of their work and 
what value they bring to shareholders. 
 
Adams et al (1997), O’Sullivan (1999), O’Sullivan and Diacon 
(1994), argued against Cadbury and Melis, that audit costs have 
become so exorbitant compared to the value they bring to 
shareholders. They advocated that stronger internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, board structure and experience are 
important to transparency than to put reliance on auditors. 
Turnbull (2006) in his article called “How can auditors lie about 
being independent” argued that the markets have been 
brainwashed by the repeated statements in audit reports that 
auditors are independent. He added that, it is because we do not 
dare to consider the possibility that the law, regulations, 
regulators, auditing standards, stock exchange rules, corporate 
governance codes and the professional code of conduct for 
accountants have got it wrong. 
 
However, a potential problem is how we have to deal with the 
legislation to change this brainwash and lie. The author agrees 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 43 of 75 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
with Bazerman et al (1997), Turnbull (2006), O’Connor 
(2002/04/06) that markets have been brainwashed to believe that 
auditors are relevant that they add shareholder value yet they 
seem to be an unnecessary expense. The author therefore 
submits that audit fees should not be allowed as a tax deduction (it 
is shareholders’ own choice to appoint auditors) so that the tax on 
audit fees can be used for infrastructure development. 
 
3.4.8 Summary 
 
As an organization’s ultimate decision-making body, the board is 
inexorably linked to corporate performance. Schein (1999) and 
Pye (2001 : 192) developed the notion of culture as being a set of 
psychological pre-dispositions developed and shared by members 
of a group over time, which leads them to think and act in 
particular ethical codes. Boards should not be any different to any 
other cultural grouping (Chart 3.1.2 p 22). The literature review 
has conceptualized how boards work and what are the factors that 
affect the effectiveness of the board Chart 3.1.3. Document one 
contributed that, for directors to be effective, board members 
needs to be part of the shareholding and this review introduced 
the stewardship theory as the attribute that improves board 
effectiveness. The proposition exists that strategic decision-
making by the board is the link between board effectiveness 
model and corporate financial performance. Effective strategic 
decision-making by the board in turn is dependent upon the 
experience, independence of judgment, very specific 
competences, and behaviors of individual directors and the ability 
of that board to work together as a team. This is not the case in 
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the financial sector as direction comes from the CEOs and 
Chairmen. 
 
Leblanc (2004 : 440) argued that the missing link in establishing 
the relationship between board governance and corporate 
performance may be an understanding of that elusive activity 
called board process. Effective board process require high level of 
knowledge and experience, hence board members need training, 
ownership and investor participation for them to operate 
effectively. Levine (1999) added that the presence of foreign 
banks improves efficiencies in how banks in emerging markets 
operates as they are governed by international codes of best 
practice, hence becoming prudentially sound. 
 
Professor Stanley Milgram who showed how good people can do 
the wrong thing from, “peer pressure and the power of authority,” 
argued that people have been conditioned to believe that auditors 
are independent like the citizens of apocryphal country, where 
everyone believed that the Emperor was wearing clothes when he 
was not. The word independent has become lost in the thicket of 
convoluted words used to define independence in regards to 
auditors in the law, regulations, auditing standards and 
professional codes of conduct.  
 
However, by lack of independence as auditors are affected by 
collegiality they have lost value and hence shareholders need not 
appoint auditors and should delegate this responsibility to audit 
committees. The responsibility of reporting need to be carried by 
the shareholders, directors, and audit committees, which will 
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reduce the level of information asymmetry and increase 
shareholder participation in the administration of the banks. 
 
The conceptual framework answers the research questions and 
addresses the agency theory problem in general. The researcher 
has observed that, mechanisms or attributes that do not support 
the stewardship theory reduces the effectiveness of the board, 
while supporting the agency theory. Distribution of power is 
important to the functionality and ethical behaviour of the board. 
The effectiveness of the board is also influenced by the 
environment, both internal and external. Chart 3.1.3 supports the 
value creation model by Garratt (2003 : 156), in that when all 
positive mechanisms are triggered, will result in an effective board 
as measured by the corporate governance principles Johnston 
(2004 : 22), shown under board effectiveness on the conceptual 
framework, which will be tested in document three and four.  
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4 Measuring board effectiveness 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1992/6a/6b) developed the balanced scorecard in trying 
to measure performance of management and organizations. The researchers 
identified the need to ensure that financial performance, the drivers of it 
(internal, operational and customer performance) on going improvement and 
future performance are given weighting. The concept however has some 
short comings including, environmental perspective, employee/human 
resources satisfaction and shareholder perspective. Brown (1996), Lingle 
and Schiemann (1996), Ewing and Laundahl (1996) and Maisel (1992) 
agreed to these short comings. The balanced scorecard therefore does not 
determine success such as generic strategic objectives of quality, cost, 
turnaround, board effectiveness and flexibility.  
 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) argued that 
profit is an opinion and cash is a fact hence argued that ROA, ROE, ROCE, 
Profit and Sales growth are opinions which are subject to manipulation while 
CFROTA is a fact. To measure the effectiveness of different boards of banks 
the author will use CFROTA as its numerator circumvents the impact of 
variously contentious accounting policies (IAS 000 – 41 or IFRS) and its 
denominator gives expression to the total value of all conventional assets 
while taking cogitate of other variables. Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) called 
this measure a plausibly robust measure of the efficiency mustered by the 
company’s leaders in marshalling the resources with which they have been 
entrusted. 
 
The measure of success in developing markets is profits, ROI and headline 
earnings. The growth in these is an indication that the bank is performing 
very well and results in heft bonuses being paid to the CEOs. The financial 
sector is a heavily regulated industry that does not give any leeway to show 
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the board’s competency. Interest rates, gearing, liquidity and type of 
business is determined my the Registrar of banks, meaning that everything is 
given. The author calls this sector an industry on “auto cruise.”  The market 
has no choice but to deal with banks and have no say on how much they will 
be charged which are the bank’s profits. 
 
Steger (2004) : 110 argued that, recent, spectacular business collapses 
share one major commonality. When the reasons for the failures were 
debated, one central organ was often put to the pillory: “the board of 
directors.” The underlying trends here are the ever increasing agency costs, 
which results in poor financial control and information asymmetry. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe has no defined board appraisal system or evaluation 
process. Van Den Berghe and Levrau (2004) supported the author that 
advocates of corporate governance in developing economies plead for a 
formal board evaluation; this is still a bridge too far for most boards of 
directors. 
 
4.1 Financial sector governance processes 
 
Survey of banks in South Africa and Zimbabwe done by KPMG (2003) 
revealed a number of weaknesses in their corporate governance, which 
include the appointment of board members, level of expertise, 
experience, succession and training of directors. The Registrar of banks 
Errol Kruger (Registrar of Banks) (2006) called the boards clubs as only 
friends are appointed without considering merit. Directors accept 
appointment for prestige without understanding their responsibilities and 
duties, Business report (05 August 2006). 
 
The failure of the legal framework which resulted in firms adopting the 
King 11 Report (2002) as the code of best practice has resulted in 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 48 of 75 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
banks failing to comply with international codes of best practice 
resulting in most banks failing Appendix 1. These problems are issues 
that have resulted in poor performance of the boards, while banks’ are 
performing very well. The reason being that this is a sector on auto 
cruise, where the banking regulations stipulate what interest banks 
charge clients, hence making huge profits not as a result of the 
effectiveness of directors. 
 
4.2 Corporate governance linkages to Concepts 
  
Concepts are the building blocks of theory argued Bryram and Bell 
(2003). Fisher (2004) stated that clear definitions of concepts and 
creating a conceptual framework are a means of simplifying the 
research task (structured or grounded approach). The author opted for 
the grounded approach in order to be able to focus on issues that affect 
developing countries after looking at the evolution of the field of study 
and research questions. 
 
The author selected South Africa and Zimbabwe among African 
countries as they seem to follow a similar pattern of growth and policy 
(affirmative action, ESAP and BEE) changes and have similar economic 
historical background. The King 11 Report (2002) is applied in both 
countries and have same legal framework (Roman – Dutch Law). The 
emerging market crisis of 1997 – 98 drew attention to the nexus 
between sound corporate governance and effectively functioning capital 
markets. While the crisis was set off by currency, interest rate and asset 
price volatility, it was perpetuated by vulnerable corporate and banking 
balance sheets unable to absorb the volatility, which raised how 
corporations were governed. Malherbe and Segal (2001) argued that 
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the crisis had massive negative externalities and affected the value of 
many firms on the JSE and ZSE. 
The author on p 21 and 22 above adopted models which can be used 
by firms so that they remain structured and focused during periods of 
crisis by have performance measuring systems which cannot be 
manipulated (CFROTA), which adds value to shareholders. The 
corporate governance culture cycle is a tool that promotes 
transparency, accountability, strategic thinking and responsibility. The 
models promote the stewardship theory and the Japanese model of 
board appointments. The use of these tools in answering the research 
questions and reviewing the literature assisted the author to develop the 
conceptual framework Chart 3.1.3 “The Board Effectiveness Model.” 
 
The model benefits firm stakeholders as it promotes transparency, 
individual skill, ethics and consistency of managing the environment. 
Board effectiveness is the beginning of good organizational 
performance and governance, which eliminates the agency theory 
discussed above. The model eliminates the concept of teamwork on 
board evaluation as collegiality affect individual evaluation. Individual 
board performance evaluation helps in making the whole team perform 
effectively. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
The analysis of board structure and effectiveness addresses the role of 
the corporate board and its ability to provide independent oversight of 
board’s performance and to hold management accountable to 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders while ensuring that 
management is appropriately motivated argued Bradley (2003 : 111). 
The author agrees that this is the focal point of corporate governance 
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as the board is the bridge between owners and managers. 
Shareholders provide funding for the business in exchange, expect a 
return on their investment – usually from a combination of income 
(dividends resulting from the profits made by the business) and capital 
appreciation, resulting from the increase in share price as a 
consequence of the sustainable long – term growth of business. 
 
Real return is measured by CFROTA, which is a measure not easy to 
manipulate like other accounting measuring techniques. For the boards 
in the financial sector to be truly effective, not only must an appropriate 
structure and qualified directors be in place, but individual board 
members also should be engaged, well informed and represent diverse 
skills sets and perspectives. Diverse skills is a critical attribute that will 
make boards more effective, hence the author addresses the research 
questions that directors should belong to a professional board which will 
continue to train its members. 
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5 Research Outline 
 
As discussed in document 1, the literature review has provided the 
knowledge and contribution to this study by articulating historical research in 
this field, which resulted in the author being able to develop the conceptual 
framework to answer the research questions. The literature review and the 
conceptual framework will be used as the basis for document 3 in answering 
the research questions, identifying respondents and developing 
questionnaires. Document 3 will explain the reasons for bank failures in SA 
and Zimbabwe using these as case studies. Comparison will be done 
between successful banks and arguments by other researchers will be tested 
in document 3 and 4. 
 
The models discussed in this document will be used as the tools in 
developing quantitative analysis of the research in document 4. CFROTA is 
the tool which will be used to measure board effectiveness and how it impact 
on shareholder value creation. Analysis of different banks will be done in 
order to prove which banks adhere to the conceptual framework. 
 
Document 5 will consolidated the work in all the prior documents and solution 
corporate governance problems and answer the research questions with 
evidence from document 3 and 4. At the end of this document, the store of 
knowledge will have been raided. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The challenge is two fold, to maintain the board’s key role in the governance 
system while working with governments, other stakeholders, institutions and 
approach to corporate governance that recognizes three pivotal realities of 
the twenty first century argued Demb and Friedrich Neubauer (1992 : 4), 
which are: 
 To achieve both societal and business objectives, a governance 
approach is needed that fosters a new concept of partnership between 
directors and shareholders 
 Business should be an effective engine for societal development and 
therefore the governance demands should assist business to maintain 
a platform of creating shareholder value, profitability and innovation 
 Shareholders and directors must approach their activities with full 
understanding of broader responsibilities that the present scale and 
impact of business activity entails. 
 
Westphal (2002 : 6) and Leblanc (2004) nearly two decades of research finds 
little evidence that board or auditor independence enhances board 
effectiveness. Studies have, however found a negative effect. The most 
important predictor of director effectiveness is not independence, but 
evidences that strategic experience and stewardship matches the company’s 
needs. Director experience is critical to the board effectiveness, is relatively 
new evidence. Ingley and Van Der Walt (2004) coined that tougher 
legislation; tighter control and regulatory reform (discussed p 36) are 
insufficient as remedial measures to resolve problems of governance 
weakness that lead to corporate underperformance. 
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The conceptual framework has proved that experience is the best teacher 
and is a motivation for stewardship theory as directors should not only look at 
monetary compensation as a motivating factor but a sense of belonging, 
ownership, growth and responsibility. Literature review has shown that 
training of directors results in a learning board, which is more effective. 
Shareholder activism is very passive in South Africa and Zimbabwe as a 
result of deregulation of the economy, new shareholder has no knowledge to 
run businesses, which needs to change. Active participation of shareholders 
will keep directors on their toes as they do not have to wait for the AGM for 
them to vote against the reappointment of a director. 
 
Attributes or mechanisms that add shareholder value include director 
continuous development, stewardship theory, Japanese model of board 
appointment and owner managed entities as listed in Chart 3.1.3. These 
attributes have been explored in this review and the conceptual framework, 
linked to the research questions and document 3. The conceptual framework 
and the literature review has illustrated that individual board experience and 
knowledge have an impact on board effectiveness, better organizational 
performance and teamwork which will add value to shareholders. 
 
The value generation model on p 21 has reviewed that there are some 
attributes which are negative to shareholder value generation like audit fees 
and agents costs. This model and the literature reflected that audit fees are 
unnecessary costs which should be avoided as they are depriving revenue 
authorities’ funds for societal development as audit fees are allowable for tax. 
Shareholders and appointed directors should take ownership of running the 
entity not to appoint third parties who also exonerates themselves from the 
responsibilities of the actions of the directors. 
The next piece of this research (document 3) will contact a series of 
interviews to gather qualitative data for inclusion in the study and identify 
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issues that will generate the questionnaire. The questionnaires will be 
supported by the information gathered from different research gurus in the 
literature review. The focus groups for interviews will be mostly CEOs, board 
members, market analysts, company secretaries, shareholders and different 
market experts to explore the characteristics of effective board performance 
in different banks. 
 
Implementation of the conceptual framework will be tested during the 
interviews in order to unpack the relevance of the model to South African and 
Zimbabwean perspective. The intention is to begin to look at all the research 
questions, debates and outstanding issues in the field of corporate 
governance. This research is designed to fill the gaps, which still exist in this 
field as the King 11 Report has proved to be inadequate in both countries as 
it has created awareness. The different theories, passive, active, stewardship 
and agency will be discussed in documents 3 and 4. They will be used to fill 
the gap in knowledge of and provide possible solutions to the problems of 
corporate governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
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Appendix 1 – List of Banks that failed in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
 
Year SA Banks and reason for 
failure 
Zimbabwean Banks 
and reason for failure 
1989 - 1991 o Alpha Bank Ltd: 
Internal and external CG 
failure, mismanagement 
and fraud 
 
 o BCCI: 
Money laundering and 
fraud 
o BCCI: 
Money laundering 
and fraud 
 o Cape Investment Bank Ltd 
Internal and External CG 
failure and fraud 
 
 o Pretoria Bank Ltd: 
Internal CG failure  
 
 o Sechold Bank Ltd: 
Mismanagement and fraud 
 
1993 o Prima Bank Ltd: 
CG failure 
 
1994 - 1999 o Community Bank Ltd: 
Mismanagement and fraud 
o Nubian Pvt. Ltd: 
Internal CG failure 
and abuse of power 
 o FBC Fidelity Bank Ltd: 
Internal and external CG 
failure 
o United Merchant 
Bank Pvt Ltd: 
Mismanagement, 
fraud and internal 
CG failure 
 o Islamic Bank Ltd: 
Internal and external CG 
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failure and fraud 
2000 - 2005 o New Republic Bank Ltd: 
CG failure 
o Barbican Bank Ltd: 
Government 
interference, 
External CG failure 
and 
mismanagement. 
Trading in non 
banking products 
 
 o Ons Eerste Volks Bank 
Ltd: 
Fraud, mismanagement, 
and CG failure 
o Century Bank 
Holding Ltd: 
Mismanagement 
and fraud as a 
result of failure of 
political governance 
system. 
Misrepresentation of 
financial 
statements. 
 o The African Bank Ltd: 
Mismanagement and 
External and internal CG 
failure 
 
 o Real African Duroling 
Investment Bank Ltd: 
Internal CG failure 
 
 o Regal Treasury Bank Ltd: 
Mismanagement and 
failure of the internal CG 
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systems 
 o Saambou Bank Ltd: 
Mismanagement, fraud 
and Internal and external 
CG failure. Directors’ 
inexperience and nepotism 
o Time Bank Ltd: 
Government 
interference, 
mismanagement 
and failure of the 
governance system.  
Misuse of 
depositors’ funds 
 o Southern Bank of Africa: 
Internal CG failure and 
fraud. Mismanagement,  
Government  interference 
and misallocation of 
resources  
o Trust Bank Pvt. Ltd: 
Government 
interference, 
internal and external 
CG failure and 
mismanagement. 
Misuse of power 
and allocation of 
resources 
 o TA Bank of South Africa 
Ltd:  
Internal CG failure, fraud 
and mismanagement 
o Unibank Ltd: 
Mismanagement, 
fraud and Internal 
CG failure 
 o The Business Bank Ltd: 
CG failure and fraud. 
Misuse of resources and 
mismanagement 
 
 
 
Note: Both banks in SA and Zimbabwe that failed has shown that all were caused by 
the    failure of the internal and external corporate governance system 
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Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect 
of shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
1 Background to the Study  
 
Much of the current debate on corporate governance has centred on 
practical issues, including corporate fraud, the abuse of managerial power 
and social irresponsibility. In essence, the debate is about how to solve 
these perceived problems in corporate practice. For many commentators 
corporate governance is about building effective mechanisms and 
measures, either in order to satisfy current social expectations or to satisfy 
the narrower expectations of shareholders argued (Letza at el 2004: 242). 
In the UK, several influential proposals have been produced in recent 
years in an attempt to settle the practical issues affecting corporate 
governance (Cadbury Committee, 1992; Greenbury Committee, 1995; 
Hampel Committee, 1998; Turnbull Committee, 1999; Higgs 2003).  
 
In conjunction with the practical debate sits a debate on the theoretical 
framework and the quest for the optimal   or superior theoretical model of 
corporate governance. The debate has touched many deep-seated, 
fundamental questions, for example, hat is the purpose of the bank? In 
whose interest is the bank run? Who should control the bank? How should 
they control it? In general, corporate governance is about the 
understanding and institutional arrangements for relationships among 
various economic actors and corporate participants who may have direct 
or indirect interests in a bank, such as shareholders, directors/managers, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, local communities, 
government, and the general public. Different perspectives in theory result 
in different diagnoses of and solutions to the problems of corporate 
governance practice. 
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This document explores the corporate governance understanding, 
institutional arrangements and relationships that exist between different 
stakeholders who include among others, auditors, NEDs and IDs in the 
financial sector in Southern Africa (Diagram 6.1.54). The research focuses 
on the operation of corporate governance in the financial sector, and how 
the relationship between independence and transparency of board of 
directors and auditors triggers execution of their fiduciary duties. The 
proposition is that transparency can be enhanced and information 
asymmetry reduced, if NEDs, IDs and Auditors are independent. 
Independence is meant that they do not have any conflict of interest with 
any of the stakeholders concerned in the financial sector.  
 
The argument is suggested that NEDs, IDs, and Auditors are less 
independent than they might be as a result of the following factors: 
• They are all interconnected through professional networks (Diagram 
6.1: 54); 
• Their concern is to maximize their emoluments and fees from their 
role as directors and auditors. Transparency is affected by 
information asymmetry as directors are self – seeking and 
opportunistic economic utility maximizers, argued (Millson and Ward 
2004:75), which the author will try to find out if this applies to this 
sector. People are generally not perfectly honest and truthful, 
resulting in the agency problem, which is rooted in the interest of the 
principal being different from that of the agent and the agent hiding 
information from the principal (information asymmetry), as argued  
by Hendry (2002:98). Directors and auditors are influenced by their 
association and fees stated  (Turbull 2006:1); 
• The banks on whose boards they serve expect NEDs and IDs to 
channel deals from their companies they own or serve. 
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These factors suggest that in addition to the classic agency problem that 
can exist between managers and owners, there can also be an agency 
problem between NEDs, IDs and owners. Whilst membership of 
professional associations can diminish independence, the existence of 
professional codes of conduct and professional practice may serve to 
minimize conflict of interest together with the stewardship theory discussed 
in document 2. 
  
In this document, elite interviews (senior practitioners in the field of 
research) were interviewed together with leading players in Southern 
Africa financial sector to discover their views on the complex dynamics 
between independence and transparency. This will help to discover 
whether in their view, independence increases transparency, diminishes 
conflicts of interest and leads to better corporate governance or not. As the 
head offices of all the four banks are in SA, most of the interviews were 
conducted at head office level.  
 
1.1 Corporate Governance dilemma in the Financial Sector 
 
Within any group, members will have preferences for association 
with other members. These association preferences, which may be 
of attraction, rejection, racial, gender or simply indifference, 
constitute the field of study of sociometry, argued (Moreno 1953: 5). 
Sociometry is defined as an instrument used to identify the 
association preferences, which can be combined with the 
Spearman’s rho in trying to measure the strength between 
associations. 
 
The association that has created the CG dilemma is the networks 
that are created by the organizational association matrix (Diagram 
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6.1: 54), which result in the appointment of auditors, NEDs and IDs. 
Shareholders tend to trust people they are familiar with or those that 
are in good standing that is with a good track record in their 
professional career or business success. Some board members are 
appointed to represent certain interests of shareholder hence they 
are instructed by the shareholders, how they will be conducting 
themselves during their term of office. If one is not a member of the 
network will find it difficult to be appointed (Turnbull 2006:1). 
Auditors, ED, some NEDs and IDs belong to the same institutions, 
bringing the concept of collegiality but governed by institutional 
professional ethics. NEDs and IDs have divided loyalty as they are 
after creating their own wealth while the bank expect them to bring 
in business from their companies, argued (Turnball 2006: 1). 
 
CG stakeholders were identified based on the level of interest and 
power on the administration of banks. Diagram 6.1: 54 is based on 
the total population of 34 respondents, 20 of which are members of 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants and five attorneys and a 
mixture of economists and engineers who all work for different 
banks. Based on these respondents, the researcher realized that 
there are strong linkages in these associations which can affect 
independence and transparency. The research has shown that the 
connection matrix is based on membership of an association. Sixty 
(60%) percent of the respondents (20 respondents) preferred to be 
associated with members of the same institution. Forty percent (14 
respondents) agreed that the boards needs to have a mixture of 
skills but should have some association either being members of 
IOD or other membership so that they have the same ethical 
conduct. These interviews were carried out in order to justify the 
linkages on the associations in Diagram 6.1: 54. 
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Document 1 and 2 has shown that, stakeholders identified above 
have an interest in sharing the profits of the bank. Auditors receive 
fees, ED, IDs and NEDs receive remuneration, and shareholders’ 
interest is capital and dividend growth, while the bank expects 
directors to create opportunities through their networks, creating the 
conflict of interest in all associations. 
 
1.2 The dilemma 
 
Auditors and executive directors of banks are mostly members of 
the institute of Chartered Accountants (Appendix 1). NEDS, IDs and 
ED belong to the same associations as reflected by Diagram 6.1: 54 
and both derive income from the bank in the form of fees or 
remuneration. Auditors provide audit and advisory services to the 
bank and generate fees, hence calling the banks key clients. The 
Reserve Bank regulates the industry, generate income from money 
lend to banks, provides compliance and monitoring services, while 
the Government is interested in the income tax  from the profits 
generated by the bank. Shareholders’ are interested in the capital 
and dividend growth (dividend policy). These different interest levels 
are the basis of the agency theory and conflict of interest, (Turnbull 
2006: 1). 
 
Communities and other stakeholders like employees have little 
power in how income is distributed; hence they have to benefit from 
the CSR (Turnbull 2006: 1). What causes the dilemma is the 
scramble for the scarce resources (income). Mitigating factor is that 
directors are regulated by their membership to the associations and 
are bound by the institutional ethics, which advocates for 
professional conduct. NEDs and IDs are business people whose 
businesses depend on the banks funding their financial 
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requirements hence the conflict of interest affects their 
independence, which results in information asymmetry affecting 
transparency (Myburgh 2003). The dilemma is as a result of conflict 
of interest (divided loyalty). 
 
The association between NEDs, IDS, EDs and Auditors is enshrined 
in their membership to ICA, IOD and banking associations. These 
associations are evident in both SA and Zimbabwe. As a result of 
confidentiality and the head office being in SA most of the 
interviewees had to be at the head office. These were the officials 
allowed to discuss the research project and CG issues affecting the 
banks. 
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2 Research Questions and Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Research Objectives 
 
Research objectives will remain unchanged from those set out in 
documents 1. The main themes remain as effectiveness of the 
board, training, independence and transparency, which the 
researcher will test how they affect IDs, NEDs, Auditors and the 
banks’ reporting framework and risk management. The focus of this 
research is to understand corporate governance practices in the 
financial sector and the roll of directors and auditors. 
  
a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe in the financial service sector and 
to investigate themes that affect good corporate governance 
practices. Different themes will be used to assess why investors 
prefer to invest in another bank and why banks perform differently 
while operating in the same environment. Banks to be covered 
are ABSA – (Barclays), FirstRand Bank (CBZ), Nedbank (MBCH 
Bank) and Standard Bank (Stanbic Bank). 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and 
independent directors creates shareholder value and increase 
transparency 
a. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice and performance of banks. 
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2.2 Research framework 
 
On the face of it corporate governance appears to be a field that 
does not affect the growth and profitability of firms. Understanding 
how boards work is not a simple task, however if grasping on how 
an individual will behave is difficult, the complexity involved in 
understanding how a group goes about overseeing the operations of 
a bank is a daunting task argued (Nicholson and Kiel 2004: 442). 
Despite this complexity, the health of companies, economies and 
society rely on people understanding how boards can influence firm 
performance. 
Research Framework
Objective Analysis Outcome
Analysing the functionality of 
corporate governance in the 
financial sector and how it is 
affected by independency 
and transparency
Mechanisms
• Role of directors and 
Auditors
• Conflict of interest
• Training and skills required
• Best practice
Triggers
• Independence
•Transparency
• Internal controls
• Risk management
• Business ethics
Bank performance 
(Board effectiveness)
By contrasting the 
mechanisms and triggers 
it is possible to articulate 
how banks are affected 
by the behaviour of the 
board and Auditors
Chart 2.1: Developed for this research 
 
The research framework was used to direct the research process, 
which assisted in the identification of mechanisms and themes that 
affect the governance processes of banks. The researcher was able 
to define and identify the most important stakeholder in the 
governance process. Triggers which have a positive and negative 
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impact on the performance of the banks were analysed on the 
conceptual framework. 
 
2.3 Recapping research questions 
 
As a result of the literature review (Document 2) and the conceptual 
framework below, the  author had to revisit the research questions, 
which will be answered in this document: 
 
1. What is the role of NEDs and IDs in owner managed banks? 
2. How are NEDs and IDs affected by conflict of interest in 
executing their duties in order to meet shareholder 
expectations while maintaining their independence? 
3. What are the factors that shareholders take into account 
when considering the existence and effectiveness of 
Corporate Governance? 
4. How will training and accreditation of directors create 
shareholder value and impact on Corporate Governance in 
the financial service sector? 
5. What is the role of auditors in creating shareholder value and 
transparency? 
2.4 The Conceptual Framework 
 
External and internal mechanisms that influence the behaviour of 
directors were identified. Most of the mechanisms are positive 
mechanisms that influence the effectiveness of directors. There are 
mechanisms which when triggered causes negative behaviour by 
directors, which are management interest, audit fees, and conflict of 
interest. These will be analysed during the research in order to 
assess their effect on the performance of directors. 
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Chart 2.2: Board Effectiveness Model 
 
 
Internal themes 
• Skills mix 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Participation 
• Management 
interest 
• CEO influence 
• Power distribution 
• Internal systems 
• Employees 
 
 Corporate 
financial 
performance 
 Shareholder 
value growth 
 Bank survival 
and growth 
 CFROTA 
growth 
Board 
Effectiveness 
Nature of the Board 
• Gender composition 
• Stewardship Theory 
• Agency Theory 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Conflict of interest 
• Ethical issues 
• Communities 
Board continuous 
development 
• Qualification 
• Experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Teamwork 
• CSR issues 
• Culture 
External themes 
• Ownership 
structure 
• Development of 
strategies 
• Evaluation 
Committee 
• Board affairs 
Committee 
• Government 
policies 
• Independent 
Auditors 
• Independent 
Directors 
• Independent 
Consultancy 
• Other 
stakeholders 
Internal influence 
• Internal Audit 
• Audit Committee 
• Board composition 
• Financial control 
• NED 
• Mission 
• Vision 
• Strategy 
External 
influence 
• Shareholder 
activism 
• Regulatory 
framework 
• PESTI 
• Power 
distribution 
 
Mechanisms Triggers Outcome 
Corporate  
performance 
C.G principles 
 Fairness 
 Transparency 
 Accountability 
 Responsibility 
(Document 1 pp 5) 
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3 Financial Sector Setup  
 
This chapter provide a contextual account of the banking industry in SA 
and Zimbabwe which is the location for this study. The structure includes 
all the players in the financial sector that is public banks, family banks and 
regulators like the Central Banks, Financial Services Board and the Stock 
Exchange to mention but a few. 
 
3.1 South African Financial Sector Industry Structure 
 
The SA financial services industry, which includes banks, assurance, 
insurance and wealth management companies represents 27, 4% of 
the value of all listed companies on the JSE and ZSE as at 31 March 
2005 www.jse.co.za A number of developments have continued to 
shape the global financial services industry. Significant developments 
in Southern Africa had to be adapted to a lower inflation and interest 
rate while in Zimbabwe it was the opposite. Competition intensified, 
customer sophistication increased and regulatory challenges 
increased compliance pressures. Major events in the sector during 
2005 were – Barclay’s acquisition of ABSA and major BEE 
transactions were announced in the sector. 
 
South Africa's financial services sector, backed by a sound regulatory 
and legal framework, is efficient, boasting dozens of domestic and 
foreign institutions providing a full range of services - commercial, 
retail and merchant banking, mortgage lending, insurance and 
investment www.southafrica.info. The banking sector compares 
favourably with those of industrialized countries. Foreign banks are 
well represented and electronic banking facilities are extensive, with a 
nationwide network of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and internet 
banking facilities available. The Financial Services Board oversees 
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the regulation of financial markets and institutions, including insurers, 
fund managers and broking operations but excluding banks, which 
fall under the South African Reserve Bank.  
3.1.1 South Africa banking system 
The South African banking system is well developed and 
effectively regulated, comprising a central bank, a few large, 
financially strong banks and investment institutions, and a 
number of smaller banks. Many foreign banks and investment 
institutions have set up operations in South Africa over the 
past decade. The Banks Act is primarily based on similar 
legislation in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
argued (Swamy and Tavlas 1995: 165).  
Although no formal agreements have been concluded towards 
a consistent international position in the area of banking 
regulation, there have been amendments to exchange controls 
as well as financial market legislation, making South Africa an 
attractive investment prospect argued interviewee 36. The 
National Payment System Act of 1998 was introduced to bring 
the South African financial settlement system in line with 
international practice on settlement systems and systematic 
risk management procedures. The Act confers greater powers 
and duties on the SA Reserve Bank in respect of providing 
clearing and settlement facilities, www.resbank.co.za .  
The Payment Association of South Africa, under the 
supervision of the Reserve Bank, has facilitated the 
introduction of payment clearing house agreements. It has also 
introduced agreements pertaining to settlement, clearing and 
netting agreements, and rules to create certainty and reduce 
systemic and other risks in inter-bank settlement. These 
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developments have brought South Africa in line with 
international inter-bank settlement practice and best practice, 
which has resulted in the sector not being affected by the 
current (2008) financial crisis. Investment and merchant 
banking remains the most competitive front in the industry, 
while the country's "big four" banks - Absa, First National Bank, 
Standard Bank and Nedbank - continue to consolidate their 
grip on the retail market stated interviewee 38.  
3.1.2 South African Reserve Bank 
In 1985 a department for bank supervision was created in the 
Reserve Bank to monitor the foreign activities of South African 
banking institutions. With this step South Africa confirmed its 
support of the Basle Concordat of June 1983, in terms of which 
central banks undertake to extend their supervisory activities to 
include the international activities of banking institutions to 
facilitate closer co-operation between the supervising 
authorities (www.reservebank.co.za). This reduced the 
exposure of the banks to USA mortgage lending system 
except Old Mutual which has incurred huge losses in America 
(Old Mutual 2008 Financial Statements). 
Following recommendations made in 1985 by the De Kock 
commission of inquiry into the monetary system and monetary 
policy in South Africa, the functions of this department were 
expanded to include supervision of the domestic activities of all 
banks - a task previously performed by the Registrar of 
Financial Institutions. An office headed by the Registrar of 
Banks, operating as part of the Reserve Bank, is responsible 
for registering institutions as banks or mutual banks as well as 
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enforcing all the requirements of the Acts and corporate 
governance issues stated interviewee 38.  
The registrar acts with relative autonomy in executing his 
duties, but has to report annually on his activities to the 
minister of finance, who in turn has to table this report in 
Parliament. The extent of supervision entails the establishment 
of certain capital and liquidity requirements and the continuous 
monitoring of institutions' adherence to legal requirements and 
other guidelines.  
The performance of an individual institution is also monitored 
on an ongoing basis against developments in the relevant 
sector as a whole. If deemed necessary, inspectors can be 
appointed to inspect the affairs of any bank, or any institution 
or person not registered as a bank if there is reason to suspect 
that such an institution or person is carrying on the business of 
banking argued interviewee 38.  
3.1.3 The JSE Ltd 
The JSE Limited is the 18th largest exchange in the world by 
market capitalization (some R3.3-trillion as of September 
2005) (www.jse.co.za). With approximately 400 listed 
companies and a market liquidity of 31.2% (September 2005), 
South Africa's exchange is only marginally smaller than 
Stockholm's and larger than no fewer than nine exchanges 
officially classified as "developed".  
World-class systems allow the JSE to offer leading technology, 
surveillance and settlement on a T+5 basis. The JSE is an 
essential cog in the functioning of South Africa's economy, 
providing an orderly market for dealing in securities and 
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thereby creating new investment opportunities in the country 
and enforcing corporate governance practices argued 
interviewee 38.  
The JSE's main function is to facilitate the raising of capital by 
re-channelling cash resources into productive economic 
activity, thus building South Africa's economy while enhancing 
job opportunities and wealth creation. In addition, from a 
derivatives perspective, the JSE provides an effective and 
efficient price determination facility and price risk management 
mechanism. The JSE offers investors the choice of four 
markets, www.jse.co.za :  
• An equities market, including stocks from the Main 
Board and the small to mid-cap Alternative Exchange.  
• An interest rate market.  
• An active financial derivatives market.  
• An agricultural products market  
3.1.4 Zimbabwe Financial Sector 
Zimbabwe’s banking and financial infrastructure is highly 
developed www.rbz.co.zw. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is 
the central bank and carries out functions normally associated 
with such institutions. The balance of payment pressures and 
macro-economic instability which persisted in 2001 and saw a 
widening of the parallel market for foreign exchange prompted 
the government to reintroduce exchange control regulations. 
All persons in Zimbabwe must use the official exchange rate 
when transacting in foreign exchange argued interviewees 35 
and 37, which is not the case. The opposite is true. Authorized 
dealers in foreign exchange must surrender 50 percent of all 
export proceeds to the Reserve Bank (www.rbz.co.zw). The 
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holiday travel allowance for residents has been reduced to 
US$1,000 per annum.  The Bank allocates the foreign 
exchange, mainly to the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 
and to the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority as they are 
the national energy providers and critical economic drivers 
argued interviewee 35.  
All external loans must now be submitted to the ELCC for 
approval. In the 2003 Budget, the government announced that 
Bureau De Change were to be abolished, effective November 
2002, which was done. By December 2002, 14 commercial 
banks and five merchant banks were operating in Zimbabwe. 
The four major banks are among a few mature banks and are 
subsidiaries of SA banks and report to South African 
shareholders. There are seven finance houses which 
specialize in leasing and hire-purchase financing requirements 
of the private sector. In addition, five building societies offer 
mortgage finance, while the Post Office Savings Bank, under 
the auspices of the Post and Telecommunications Corporation, 
has an asset portfolio consisting of gilts and semi-gilts. The 
State-owned Agribank provides agricultural loan financing 
similar to Land bank in SA, stated interviewee 37.  
The Zimbabwe Credit Insurance Corporation underwrites 
political risk and commercial risk. Other risks underwritten by 
the Corporation include insolvency of buyers, non-payment of 
undisputed debt by buyers and failure or refusal by the buyers 
to accept delivery of goods. Over 60 direct insurers, 
professional re-insurers and insurance brokers operate life and 
non-life funds. The banking sector has been deregulated and 
interest rates are now market determined. The financial 
reforms have introduced dynamism to the banking sector and 
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new service and financial instruments have emerged. 
Commercial banks have introduced international credit cards in 
line with international banking practice argued interviewee 35.  
 
3.1.5 The ZSE 
Boosted by a decline in rates of return on the money market at 
the beginning of 2001, activity on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE) remained firm during 2001 and has since 
declined to unprecedented levels www.zse.co.zw. The 
negative real returns on the money market resulted in a shift of 
investment resources to the equity market, which drove up 
share prices. Surprisingly during the world financial crisis 
(2008) the ZSE was the only SE which gained while the 
leading markets lost over 50% of its value argued interviewee 
35.  
The ZSE is one of the oldest and most vibrant stock 
exchanges in Africa, having been established in 1890. 
However, trading was sporadic until 1946. At the time of this 
report, it had 73 companies listed. Its operations are governed 
by the Stock Exchange Act. The listing requirements are 
equivalent to those employed by other SADC member States. 
It is currently rated as one of the worst performing stock 
exchanges in Africa.  
During 2001, eight new companies listed on the ZSE, mainly 
on the financial and retail counters, contributing to increased 
activity on the stock market. Market capitalization rose to 
Z$3,597.04 billion (R1, 027.7 million using bank rate) by the 
end of 2001. The ZSE is open to foreign investors. Foreign 
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investors can purchase up to 40 percent of the equity of any 
company listed on the ZSE. Single investors can acquire a 
maximum of 10 percent of the shares on offer. Foreign 
investors can invest on the local money market up to a 
maximum of 25 percent per primary issue of government 
bonds and stocks with a single investor acquiring a maximum 
of 5 percent. Foreign investors are still not permitted to 
purchase from the secondary market. These investments 
qualify for 100 percent dividend and interest remittance. 
Broking firms offer comprehensive advisory services on local 
and foreign markets.  
The government is amending the Stock Exchange Act to make 
it more responsive to new market conditions and to introduce 
transparency. The stock market is looking for Z$120 million 
(R8 million) to establish a computerized central depository 
system that would eliminate the need to use share certificates 
and also play a major part in improving the security of the 
share trading system, but is facing foreign currency problems. 
3.1.6 Summary 
 
The four major banks under review in this research operate in 
both countries South Africa and Zimbabwe. The head offices 
are based in Johannesburg, while listed on both stock 
exchanges (JSE and ZSE). All the banks comply with the (King 
11 Report 2002), Code of best practice, Banking Act and 
respective Companies Acts as this is a requirement by both 
JSE and ZSE. The listing requirements are part of meeting the 
requirements of the King 2 Report (2002) and code of best 
practice. Once a bank is listed, the reporting requirements 
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improve so that all stakeholders receive similar information at 
the same time in order to avoid insider trading. 
 
Structure of banks and their subsidiaries 
 
South African Banks Zimbabwean banks (Subsidiary 
Banks of SA banks) 
ABSA Barclays 
FirstRand (First National 
Bank) 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) 
Nedbank MBCH Bank 
Standard Bank Stanbic Bank 
 
Table 3.1: List of banks under research 
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4 Review of key issues raised by research questions 
 
Chapter 4 is an attempt to analyze the research questions highlighted in 
Chapter 2 taking cognizant of the research objectives and the contributions 
by the different researchers during the literature review (document 2). 
 
4.1 What is the role of NEDs and IDs in owner managed banks? 
 
Owner managed banks are banks that have not reached the maturity 
level (being listed on the JSE, ZSE, LSE, NSE etc) and are managed 
by the promoters or promoters have direct influence in the day to day 
running of the bank. Maturity of a bank is defined as its ability to be 
listed on a stock exchange and attracting public investors to buy 
shares in the bank after meeting all the requirements for listing. The 
author will not be dealing with business growth models as defined by 
Churchill and Lewis (1983) or Greiner (1972) as these are not the 
type of maturities the researcher will be discussing. Most banks in SA 
and Zimbabwe failed before their maturity level due to undue 
influence from the owners.  
 
NEDs and IDs are appointed by the owners of the bank. They are 
supposed to bring in their expertise and business acumen-ship to the 
bank. In a similar relationship explained below their independence is 
affected in that they derive income from the bank (Diagram 6.1: 54). 
They also expect the bank to fund their businesses bringing in the 
issue of divided loyalty (conflict of interest). Appendix 1 of document 
1 analyzed the banks that failed; most of them were still not listed 
(public banks). What was clear was that the IDs and NEDs did not do 
what they were supposed to do (fiduciary duties) as they are 
influenced by the owners. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
21 
 
The Reserve Bank Governor of Zimbabwe stated that, owner 
managed banks fail, due to breach of corporate governance code of 
best practice through abusive insider and related party transactions, 
poor risk management systems and engaging in non-core speculative 
activities (www.resbank.co.za and www.rbz.co.zw). As a result of 
issues above, the Lebanese Government introduced the Lebanese 
code of best practice (2006) in order to regulate SME and family 
business as their non compliance to best practice was affecting 
revenue collection and fraudulent reporting. The collapsing of these 
banks was as a result of the failure by the Central Banks to monitor 
compliance in the banks, which shows the failure of the legal system 
in the financial sector argued interviewee 37. 
 
NEDs and IDs are appointed by the owner hence have to succumb to 
undue Shareholder influence. Their role then is not independent and 
the auditors fall in the same category otherwise they will be removed 
from office argued interviewees 3, 15 and 19. Appendix 1: document 
2 shows why these banks failed. Minority shareholders are affected 
by poor corporate governance practices in owner managed banks 
argued interviewees 18, 33 and 34. 
 
NEDs and IDs are also expected to bring in business through their 
influence in the market as they are executives of big corporations. 
Through this expectation, NEDs and IDs are important elements in 
the success of the bank as well as effectiveness of the board. In 
retrospect IDs have their own expectations (Diagram 6.1: 54) that 
they will influence the bank to provide finance for their businesses 
bringing in the issue of conflict of interest (CG paradox). 
Independence seems to be affected by the conflicting loyalty, hence 
negatively affecting the themes on the conceptual framework. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
22 
 
4.2 How are NEDs and IDs affected by conflict of interest in 
executing their duties in order to meet shareholder expectations 
while maintaining their independence?  
 
IDs and NEDs are individuals selected mostly by major shareholders 
to sit on the board as a result of their professionalism, skills, 
experience, business acumen-ship, and relationships with 
shareholders. They represent the interests of the shareholders. They 
are however affected by divide loyalty as they have their own 
interests which may be different from those of the principal. 
 
Agency relationship is a situation where an individual, (the 
shareholder) engages another person, (the NED or ID) to perform 
service/s on his/her behalf (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 305 - 360). 
The principal delegates some decision-making authority to the agent 
(Damodaran 2002). Document 1, states that managers are capable of 
putting their own interests above those of bondholders and 
stakeholders, delaying bad news or providing misleading information 
to the financial markets, and incurring significant social costs on 
society, (WorldCom and Enron cases 2002) not all of which can be 
traced back to the firm (Damodaran 2002). The dilemma mentioned 
on 1.2: 4 and Diagram 6.1: 54is the route of the CG problem as 
conflict of interest results from the level of income derived from the 
services being rendered. 
 
Level of income affect one’s performance and time spend on bank’s 
business argued (advocate Myburgh 2003). Agency theory argues 
that the major role of the board is to reduce the potential divergence 
of interest between shareholders and management, minimizing 
agency costs and protecting shareholder’s investment, argued 
(Eisenhardt 1989: 57) yet they are also not well remunerated. This 
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issue triggers negatively the mechanisms on the conceptual 
framework (Appendix 3) resulting in information asymmetry affecting 
transparency. 
 
NEDs and IDs are business people whose interest is to create their 
own wealth (Diagram 6.1: 54), while the bank needs the directors to 
bring business to the bank through their influence in the market. 
While these directors are expected to add value through their 
influence in the market and Government, they have their own interest 
to get funding from the bank affecting the major theme of this 
research which is independence. This is the question the author rose 
in trying to find out whether these directors add value to the bank.  
 
Although NEDS and IDs are affected by the factors discussed above, 
they have a professional obligation to execute their responsibilities. 
The argument is that independence is within individuals; hence their 
appointment to the board is evidence of their professional conduct 
and responsibility. It is therefore true that their experience and 
professional conduct are the attributes that assist the bank in creating 
shareholder value and transparency. This background therefore 
assists these directors as to how they behave and conduct 
themselves when exercising their independence or fiduciary duties. 
 
4.3 What are the factors that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness Corporate 
Governance? 
 
Institutional investors have grown in power and influence during the 
last few years and have exerted tremendous influence on the 
companies in which they invest (Webb 2002: 67). Investors are willing 
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to pay a premium of up 27% when investing in a well-structured 
organization argued, (Garratt 2003, Kakabadse 2002 and 
Frederikson 1992). Well-structured organization means an 
organization that observes best corporate governance practices.  The 
reputation and governance of corporations translate into a 
“governance premium,” which (McKinsey and Company 2002) 
measured and found that it translates into higher price/earnings ratio 
and other improved metrics, (Levitt 1999, Howell and Hibbard 2002: 
7).  
 
Concluding that adherence to best practice of good corporate 
governance will help to improve the confidence of investors, may 
reduce the cost of capital and more stable sources of capital (OECD 
1999). The author agrees with these researchers as well governed 
banks are attractive to investors for example the acquisition of ABSA 
by Barclays Plc in 2005 and Standard Bank by Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 2008. 
 
4.4 How will training and accreditation of directors create 
shareholder value and impact on Corporate Governance in the 
Financial Sector?  
 
Matching the competencies and behavioural characteristics of 
individual directors to the strategies followed by a bank is the key to 
designing a better board, argued (Leblanc and Gillies 2005: 223). 
Boards are built around three components that affect the manner in 
which boards make decisions which are: “the competency of 
directors, the behavioural characteristics of directors and the strategy 
that the bank is following (the decision making process).  The 
business environment is always changing; boards are not static 
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structures, hence companies need to implement the C-B-S-R model 
in an endeavour to develop effective boards. The C-B-S-R model is a 
model that looks at the competency, behaviour, strategic 
development process and the recruitment process that brings in 
directors with capacity to manage change. Meeting and aligning all 
these varying needs – C: competency, B: behaviour, S; strategy and 
R: recruitment – when building a board is somewhat like solving a 
simultaneous equation or solving a puzzle. People being appointed to 
boards are successful business people, academia, but needs to be 
inducted into the business of the bank and be able to adjust to these 
changes argued (Advocate Myburgh 2003) as it is difficult to find 
board members with both behaviours on the C-B-S-R model.  
 
Until we see the board’s role being professionalized and the 
supremacy of the board being reasserted, we shall not restore full 
shareholder confidence in business, public leaders or the markets, 
argued (Garratt 2003: 1). Private equity partnerships are primarily 
concerned with the strength of the management team of the 
respective companies, argued (Millson and Ward 2004: 81). This 
indicates that director knowledge and experience is important in 
influencing investors’ decisions. Trained directors are governed by 
their institutions’ ethical beliefs, hence compelled to follow the codes 
of conduct, which will result in following the codes of best practice. 
This knowledge adds value to the bank argued interviewee 18. 
Training and induction as a theme is an important attribute defined by 
the conceptual framework as a factor that improves reporting and 
transparency. Impact of collegiality is reduced when directors are 
properly inducted and trained argued interviewees 35 and 37. 
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4.5 What is the role of Auditors in creating Shareholder value and 
transparency? 
 
Right now, the USA is suffering from the aftermath of hubris. All of the 
triumphalism of the 1990s, 2000s and the current sub-prime 
mortgage crisis 2008/9 – GAAP as the supreme accounting language 
(used by Auditors), governance as the global preference, competitive 
performance as the wonder of the world – has turned to ashes out of 
concern that trust has been destroyed argued (Monks 2003: 164). It 
is not only a concern with certain renegade companies such as 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, BCCI, AIG, Lehman 
Brothers but a concern for all companies. The “best” companies in 
the USA used accounting practices that, with hindsight, appear 
dubious at best and criminal at worst argued (Monks 2003: 164). 
 
Auditors are important stakeholders in the corporate governance 
matrix; they are expected to bring in their expertise and knowledge of 
business to the bank. The main task of auditors is to monitor the 
directors’ performance in discharging their duties and that annual 
audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate governance argued 
(Cadbury 1992 and Melis 2004: 77). While this should be the case, 
(Adams et al 1997: 69 – 86, O’Sullivan 1999: 253 – 263, O’Sullivan 
and Diacon 1994: 70 - 84), disagreed with Cadbury and Melis that 
audit costs have become so exorbitant compared to the value they 
bring to shareholders which creates a negative trigger on the 
conceptual framework. Mechanisms that cause negative triggers are 
those themes that do not promote the effectiveness of directors or 
reduces shareholder value. The constant increase of audit fees is a 
cost that has not been matched to shareholder value creation.  They 
advocated that stronger internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
board structures and experience are important for transparency than 
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to put reliance on auditors as defined by the themes on the 
conceptual framework. 
 
Markets have been brainwashed to believe that auditors are relevant, 
independent and that they add shareholder value yet they seem to be 
an unnecessary expense, argued (Bazerman et al 1997, Turnbull 
2006: 1 and O’Connor 2002/04/06). During the research it was clear 
that banks cannot do away with auditors as they are important 
triggers in the governance process, but their relevance is still subject 
to further research although there was a general agreement that audit 
committees and internal audit can play a more assuring role than 
external auditors. 
 
4.6 Analysis of research themes   
 
The field of corporate governance research needs to change based 
on the relationship between governance structure and corporate 
performance argued (Leblanc 2004: 436). For businesses to survive, 
the need for strategic flexibility is paramount. A crucial element in 
determining whether a business can achieve the requisite flexibility is 
the quality and effectiveness of its board of directors and the system 
of corporate governance in which the organization operates stated 
(Taylor et al 2001: 2). The Cadbury report on financial aspects of 
corporate governance discusses the importance of board 
effectiveness and states that, “tests of board effectiveness include the 
way in which the members of the board as a whole work together 
under the Chairman, whose role in corporate governance is 
fundamental and their collective ability to provide both leadership, 
checks and balances which effective governance demands” (Cadbury 
1992: 20).  
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Based on these requirements, Document 1 developed the concept of 
resource utilization, which triggers the enablers (mechanisms), that 
pushes the drivers in order to achieve organizational efficiencies 
(value creation). The CG ecosystem demonstrated the flow of events 
for the bank to realize its full potential through governance policies, 
legislation, director training, transparency, equity participation and 
independence.  
 
Relationship between board and director effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4.1: Adopted from Leblanc and Gillies (2005) 
 
Board effectiveness (BE) depends on board structure (BS) + board 
membership (BM) + board process (BP) 
BE = BS + BM + BP 
 
DE = DI + DC + DB 
 
Director effectiveness (DE) depends on director independence (DI) + 
director competence (DC) + director behaviour (DB) 
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The literature review unpacked the knowledge developed so far, 
which suggests that listed banks attract experienced executives who, 
by virtue of the nature and their role, have detailed specific 
knowledge resulting in the author developing the conceptual 
framework on page 10. Key to resolving the current global crisis is to 
induct, train and appraise directors as true professionals and accept 
the intellectual, moral and behavioural consequences of this, which 
answers the research question, why there is need to train board 
members, which are the attributes that enhances board effectiveness 
stated, (Garratt 2003: 1) and (Chart 3.1.3: document 2). 
 
So many exogenous factors impact on the financial performance of a 
bank, neither effective nor ineffective governance may be neither 
necessary nor sufficient condition to ensure positive or negative 
financial performance. Majority of the studies of corporate 
governance have not been able to show a casual relationship 
between the structure and the form of boards and corporate financial 
success (Chart 4.1). Common sense suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between the two and this research strongly indicates that 
the connection may be found by studying board processes. An 
effective board depends upon the existence of appropriate board 
structure, board membership and board process argued (Leblanc and 
Gillies 2005: 157). Since decisions are made by people, it is the 
people on the board – the directors and their behavioural 
characteristics, plus the manner in which they interact (social 
behaviour) among themselves – who determine the decision-making 
process. Board effectiveness is deeply linked to the behavioural 
characteristics of the directors (Chart 4.1) 
 
A good deal is known about the necessary qualities required of board 
members with respect to the question of independence? Less in 
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known about the competencies that directors must have in order for 
them to be an effective board. Almost nothing is known about the 
behavioural characteristics of directors. It is the success or failure of 
board processes that is a major factor in determining the board’s 
effectiveness. Anyone who has ever been a member of any group 
charged with making decisions knows that there are many differences 
in the way in which members act – some are aggressive, others 
passive, some are always prepared for a meeting, others never, 
some are anxious to find solutions to problems, others will use 
pretence to delay a solution argued (Leblanc and Gillies 2005: 158). 
Boards of directors are no different than any other small groups, but 
because they meet in private, all that is known about the manner in 
which they make decisions is based on the revelations and 
reminiscences of individual board members.  
 
Accounting irregularities, level of knowledge, corporate corruption, 
fraud, agency costs, and inadequate disclosure practices have 
significantly affected corporate performance resulting in high profile 
corporate failures observed, (Taylor 2003: 156, Hendry and Kiel 
2004: 500), which are the results of board behavioural characteristics. 
During the interviews, two schools of thought (Active and Passive) 
will be tested and will test the power of CEOs in the banks as a result 
of how banks have been performing over the years. There is an 
element of both passive and active schools of thought but more of the 
later argued (Davis and Thompson 1994, Hendry and Kiel 2004, 
Walsh and Seward 1990, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996).  
 
The author established that the sector is heavily regulated that there 
is not much boards can do to add value hence considered this sector 
as a sector where directors are limited to show case their 
entrepreneurial expertise. Executives gained reward power as a 
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result of rendering IDs and NEDs ineffective. The research questions 
here address the themes highlighted by the conceptual framework, 
which will be investigated and answered by the respondents on 
Chapter 6. 
 
4.7 Summary  
 
The CEO is the driver of the success of the bank while the Chairman 
is accountable to the activities of the bank. The Chairman is 
mandated to report and inform shareholders and different 
stakeholders on the performance of the bank as indicated by the 
conceptual framework. Board induction and training are the most 
important attributes for an effective board Chart 4.1. 
 
Section 4,4 highlighted the distribution of power and responsibilities 
between the principal and the agent. The agent has the power of 
information which can be used to the agent’s advantage that is if 
information is delayed or provide misleading information to 
shareholders. Shareholders takes cognizance of different factors 
when looking for banks to invest in, which include board experience, 
composition, historical performance, share price and skills level  to 
mention but a few. 
 
Sections 4,2 and 4,3 deliberated on the role of auditors, NEDs and 
IDs, which was found to be a requirement of any board in order to 
have a strong corporate governance structure. The major problem is 
the increase in audit fees and divided loyalty, which may result in 
conflict of interest. Section 4,6 highlighted some of the triggers 
(director training, equity participation, independence and legislation), 
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which assist in the bank having strong corporate governance 
structure and processes. 
 
An effective board has the following themes as its vision, 
stewardship, experience and knowledge, financial control and 
shareholder participation. These attributes are important in triggering 
mechanisms that push for an effective board that result in better bank 
performance and transparency. An experienced board makes the 
structures of the bank functional, resulting in sound internal controls 
and disclosure. Banks that have not matured are very risk, hence do 
not attract international and corporate investors until such time that 
they are listed. Listed bank means that the bank now complies with 
the code of best practice, Companies Act, JSE listing requirements 
and the King 11 Report (2002). These assertions will be confirmed in 
Chapter 6 by respondents. 
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5 Methodology 
 
5.1 Context 
 
The medicine for researchers is for them to make their intentions 
known from the beginning stated (Miles and Huberman 1994: 4). The 
author considers himself as realist, but “realism” has come to mean 
many things coined (Miles and Huberman 1994: 4). The lineage of 
“transcendental realism” discussed by (Bhaskar 1978, 1989, Harre’ 
and Secord 1973, Manicas and Secord 1982: 390), which states that 
social phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the objective 
world and that some lawful and reasonably stable relationships are to 
be found among them. The lawfulness comes from the regularities 
and sequence that link together phenomena. The fact that most of 
those constructs are invisible to the human eye does not make them 
invalid argued (Miles and Huberman 1994: 4). 
 
Human relationships and societies have peculiarities that make a 
realist approach to understanding them more complex – but not 
impossible. Unlike researchers in physics, realists must contend with 
institutions, structures, practices, processes and conventions that 
people reproduce and transform argued (Miles and Huberman 
1994:4). Social phenomena, such as language, decisions, conflicts 
and positions exist objectively in the world and exert strong influences 
over human activities because people construe them in common 
ways. Although the researcher agrees with interpretivists, the 
researcher affirms the existence and importance of the subjective, 
phenomenological and the meaning-making at the centre of social 
life. The research does not use deductive logic of classical positivism 
or covering laws, but register and transcend these by building 
theories to account for real world that is both bounded and 
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perceptually laden stated (Miles and Huberman 1994: 4). The author 
aims to account for events for the period 2002 to 2006, rather than to 
document their sequence, and look for specific activities, 
mechanisms, social processes and structures that can be captured to 
provide a causal description of the factors that influence the conduct 
of directors in the financial sector. 
 
 This research focuses on developing theory from empirical data 
because the document focuses on developing countries and the 
literature discussed in document 2 is not necessarily appropriate to 
this environment. The nature of the relationship between theory 
(document 2) and research (document 3 and 4), where theory is 
guided by research will be the focus of this document. The 
importance of adopting a suitable research approach is vital, as far as 
the contemporary researcher is concerned, for ensuring 
comprehensive, valid and practical outcomes. Nevertheless, in any 
research, care must be taken to ensure that the approach followed is 
so structured as to provide a solid link between concepts and data 
(Punch 1998). The two main types of research paradigms (Easterby 
et al 1991) are: 
• Positivist or scientific 
• Non-positivist or phenomenological 
There are many other variations in between that form a continuum 
from one extreme to the other (Ticehurst and Veal 2000: 19) Chart 
5.1. 
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Chart 5.1 Source: Ticehurst and Veal (2000) 
 
There are various methods within each research domain but they 
broadly fall within two categories: 
• Qualitative (non-numerical, which is this document) 
• Quantitative (generally numeric, which is document 4) 
 
Qualitative research, views humans as complex and unpredictable, 
that is they are less stable than the physical world. Central to the idea 
of qualitative research is the development of a deep understanding of 
human behaviour to real people’s values, interpretive schemes and 
belief systems argued (cavana et al 2001) 
 
The author will use an inductive epistemological approach (theory 
generated from research: Chart 5.2) as some theories do not apply to 
emerging markets. This does not mean that theoretical issues will be 
ignored in preference for the purely empirical findings from this 
research. Theory is often used in a manner that involves little more 
than doing the background literature review in a field of research, 
argued (Fielder 1967, Willmott 1990, Sackmann 1992 and Bryman 
and Bell 2003, Saunders et al 1997). Often research is based on 
empirical evidence without any acknowledgement of social theories 
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that affect political realities of organizations. Researchers should not 
hypothesize as an inductive research methodology develops the 
unknown into new knowledge hence the author has chosen this 
approach (Sackmann 1992: 343). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.2: Developed for this research 
 
The epistemological realist believes that universals have a reality that 
is independent of how people talk about them, hence concepts we 
use when talking about management can be real, argued (Fisher 
2004). Epistemological realism is the belief that the structure of the 
real world is “cognitively accessible” to those who investigate, coined 
(Johnson and Duberley 2000). Realism will be a tool the researcher 
will use in this document, (which is not interpretive) and will not seek 
to understand the sense making process. 
  
This approach accepts neither a constructionist nor an objectivist 
ontology and instead takes the view that social world is reproduced 
and transformed in a daily life argued (Bhaskar 1989: 4). Adoption to 
changing world is the reason why the researcher chose this method 
among other methods.  The objective is to recognize the reality of the 
natural order, structures, events and discourses of corporate 
governance. These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the 
Inductive reasoning 
Observe 
phenomena 
Analyse 
patterns and 
themes 
Formulate 
relationships 
Develop 
theory 
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observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the 
practical and theoretical work of practitioners, argued (Bhaskar 1989: 
2). 
 
It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects 
the differences between people and the objects of the natural 
sciences and therefore requires researchers to grasp subjective 
meaning of social action argued (Bryman and Bell 2003: 16). This 
argument denotes an alternative to the positivist orthodoxy that has 
held sway for centuries that people are independent argued (Turbull 
2006: 1). The positivist thinking that has tendered to characterize 
other studies of leadership, by arguing that effective leadership relies 
on the management of subjective meaning has been challenged by 
Grint (2000). The skills of leadership involve shaping the way that 
organizational problems are defined and persuading others that this 
definition is correct; hence the researcher took this approach. 
 
5.2 Research Methods 
 
Explorers travel into the unknown territory. Their mission is to make 
the unknown known and make the strange familiar to those who read 
their books of adventure, argued (Fisher 2004: 127). The study 
follows the classical form of research known as realist epistemology 
and ontology theory using realism and inductive approach (Chart 
5.2). Corporate governance theory was generated from 
organizational set up where the structure was the separation of 
ownership and management.  
This research is based on participant observation (attending ABSA 
board meetings (4 meetings attended lasting 2 hours each), reading 
board minutes and refer 5.2.1), elite interviews, social mapping 
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(sociometrics) Diagram 6.1: 54, open ended unstructured 
questionnaires and desk research methods as standardized 
questionnaire was used to allow comparison of banks. Huberman and 
Miles (1994) defined the inductive approach where data collection 
started without an initial formalized theoretical framework, but the 
theory was developed through observation and situation analysis. 
The researcher is attempting to open the corporate governance black 
box (social world and phenomenology) through unpacking the norm. 
 
The research focuses on the purpose of the findings and matches 
that to the conceptual framework so that researchers and 
practitioners in this field will be introduced to the bigger picture of 
corporate governance. Public documents were used as sources of 
information (published financial statements). Predominantly the 
research’s emphasis is on change, action and development of new 
knowledge making it an action research, (Parker 1994). 
 
5.2.1 Research design  
 
A useful model of research design process was developed by 
Cavana et al (2001) which the researcher followed in this 
document and document 4. The model was used as a tool to 
remain focus and address the themes discussed by the 
research questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Source: Cavana et al (2000) 
 
5.2.2 Data collection methods 
 
a. Participant observation 
 
Participant observation is a method for systematically 
observing the behaviour of individuals or organizations in 
terms of a schedule of categories argued (Bryman and Bell 
2003: 176). The author started observing the behaviour of 
banks (financial performance) during his studies for the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries (2000) and MBA (2004), 
which he focused on governance and strategy. The 
researcher systematically started to analyse the 
performance of banks through financial analysis, attending 
board and executive meeting of banks as a researcher and 
observing growth or causes of failure. The idea was not to 
come up with quantifiable results but to observe how 
different board members participate in proceedings of 
Purpose of 
study 
Exploration 
Description 
Survey 
Case study 
Hypothesis 
testing 
Type of 
investigation 
Clarification 
Casual 
Correlational 
Experimental 
Extent of 
researcher 
interference 
Minimal 
Manipulation 
Measure
ment 
Operational 
definition 
Items 
(measure) 
Scaling 
Qualitative 
data 
collection 
Interviews 
Focus groups 
Observation 
Unit of 
analysis 
(population 
to be studied) 
Individuals 
Groups 
Dyads 
Firms 
 
Study 
setting 
Contrived 
Non 
contrived 
Time 
horizon 
One shot 
(cross – 
sectional) 
Longitudinal 
Sampling 
design 
Probability
/non 
probability 
Sample 
size (n) 
Quantitative 
data 
collection 
Questionnaires 
Experimental 
design 
Pr
o
bl
em
 
st
at
em
en
t 
D
at
a 
an
al
ys
is 
Qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
&
 
Qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
40 
 
board meetings, which results in how the bank’s 
performance, where financial statements were used as 
tools for measurement. The banks include: SA (ABSA, 
Nedbank, TA Bank, Investec) Zimbabwe (Barbican Bank, 
Century Bank and Trust Bank) and on average each board 
meeting was scheduled to last two hours. 
 
The author started with the analysis of Alpha Bank, BCCI 
(1991), United Merchant Bank (1995), Pretoria Bank (1999) 
and others until recently Fidentia (2007). The structure of 
the observations was focused on board meetings, AGM, 
strategy formulation seminars and preparation of financial 
statements. All these banks started with liquidity problems, 
excessive exposure concentration, directed lending, money 
laundering, related party transactions and weak 
shareholder activism. These were as a result of corporate 
governance failure, which resulted in these banks failing. 
Nedbank is among the banks that survived failure as a 
result of shareholder intervention in 2001. 
 
b. Elite  interview schedule 
 
The researcher identified respondents based on their 
position in the bank they work for. The positions identified 
as important for this research were the Chairman, CEO, 
FD, NEDs, IDs and other CG practitioners, who have 
contributed immensely to this field. This was done so that 
the researcher can have an understanding of how all 
groups feel about the value addition model developed on 
the conceptual framework. Appendix 1 shows the profile of 
directors, practitioners interviewed including their profiles 
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and each interview was scheduled to last an hour. These 
were recorded using electronic recorders, and then the 
data was transcribed using a professional service provider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  5.4: Elite interviewee time table 
 
 
As a result of the setup of the banks, which have their head 
offices in Johannesburg, most interviews were conducted in 
South Africa (Table 3.1 19). There are delegated officials in 
each bank who are allowed to interact with researchers and 
provide information due to confidentialities involved in the 
banking sector. The structure worked well for the researcher 
as he is resident in Johannesburg. 
Interview Date Name Organization Title 
Number     
1 2006/10/20 
W R Somerville and 
his 3 ABSA Group Secretariat 
  Company secretaries   
2 2006/12/08 
Dr S Booysen and J 
H Schindehutte  ABSA CEO and FD 
3 2007/03/15 Advocate Myburgh 
Myburgh 
Attorneys Partner 
4 2007/06/12 T Dixon IOD Director 
5 2007/05/10 M King 
King & 
Partners Managing Partner 
6 2007/05/03 Dr R J Khoza Nedbank Chairman 
7 2007/04/17 
T Boardman and M 
Brown Nedbank CEO and FD 
8 2007/01/18 P Mageza ABSA 
Executive 
Director 
9 2007/05/24 S Nxasana FNB 
Executive 
Director 
10 2007/02/13 G Gono RBZ Governor 
11 2007/02/06 T Mboweni SARB Governor 
12 2007/03/15 
Dr C L Dhliwayo and 
N Ncube RBZ 
Deputy 
Governors 
13 2007/03 27 Dr X P Guma SARB Deputy Governor 
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The nature of the study resulted in identifying the elite of the 
banks as the targeted interviewees, hence those selected to 
be interviewed were the directors. Policy makers and 
shareholders as they are the individuals who formulate 
strategies for the banks were the target. Out of 40 identified 
respondents, 15 interviews were conducted. As a result of 
unavailability of some of the interviewees 12 interviews were 
conducted through telephone or video conference. Themes 
identified included what happens behind the boardroom 
door, independence, transparency and conflict of interest. 
 
The use of unstructured interviews (Appendix 2) allowed the 
researcher coverage of a wide range of topics that affect 
performance of directors. Interviewees were not confined to 
yes and no answer so that interviewees could express their 
opinion broadly with no limitation.  
 
c. Desk research 
 
Information on the success and failure of banks stretch 
over a long period, in this case since 1989 to date. Library, 
internet, documentary analysis and other public information 
were used to gather information on different bank 
performance together with those that collapsed. Some of 
the information on collapsed banks could not be obtained 
as they were not listed and no records are still available for 
such banks.  
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d. Social mapping (sociometrics) 
 
All banks are associated in one way or another as 
evidenced by Table 5.4, where Bankserv (a payment 
settlement house) is owned by all banks. Banks as 
shareholders of other banks can exercise influence by 
setting prices as evidenced by the charges on loans, where 
all banks charge 3.5% above prime lending rate. Recently 
the Reserve Bank Governors were at war path with the 
CEOs of banks as the Governors feel that banks are over 
charging clients. This association influences how all 
directors of banks behave and their association 
preferences.  The researcher analyzed the relationships 
caused by professional associations (1.0: 1 and Diagram 
6.1: 54) as most of the board members in all the four banks 
are members of the ICA, IOD and admitted attorneys to 
mention but a few. Within any group members will have 
preferences for association with other members, of which, 
board members were asked to identify the qualities they 
would want other board members to have.  
 
Each member preferred a member with the same 
background or of the same institution while a mixture of 
skills was also preferred. There is a strong positive 
correlation within institutions and their professions; hence 
most of the board members are chartered accountants or 
attorneys, who would want to associate with colleagues in 
the same profession (Diagram 6.1: 54). These 
associations have an impact on how information is 
disclosed to shareholders, which affect triggers on the 
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conceptual framework that is transparency and 
independence. 
 
Table 5.5: Association and collaboration of banks 
 
5.2.3 Sample group construction 
 
The population (page 13 and 29) from which the sample group 
was taken was classified as Chairmen (…. strategic direction 
of the bank), CEOs (… strategy execution), NEDs (... 
representatives of different shareholder groups), IDs (… 
professionals, business people and other stakeholder 
representatives), Financial Directors (… internal controls, 
financial information and reporting) and Company Secretaries 
(… custodians of registers, minutes, induction and training of 
directors and public officers) of each bank. Different sets of 
information were obtained from a different class, which 
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assisted the researcher to focus on important roles played by 
each position in the bank. Cross bank analysis was easier as 
similar positions were cross referenced to each other. The 
classification of these respondents assisted the researcher in 
questioning respondents according to their role in the bank in 
addressing different themes. 
 
 Practitioners in the field were identified including M King (King 
2 Report Chairman), Advocate J F Myburgh (Myburgh Report), 
Dixon director (IOD), Reserve Bank Governors and the 
Registrar of banks. The study was interview based research, 
where there was need for face to face discussion as the 
questionnaires were open ended. The total group sample was 
five groups from a population size of 40 respondents. The 40 
respondents were put into groups for example all Chairman 
were one group, CEOs and FDs another and so forth. This 
size was considered to be representative of the population. 
 
The elite sample (Table 4.1: 29) was directly selected as they 
would provide required information from each bank, while 
practitioners were selected according to their contribution to 
the field of study. The practitioner were Myvern King – 
Chairman of the King 1 and 11 Report, Advocate John F 
Myburgh – author and researcher of the Myburgh Report on 
the financial sector in SA and Tony Dixon – lecturer of CG and 
director at the IOD SA. Their understanding of the sector was 
important as they provided independent information on 
governance structures in Southern Africa. 
 
Four major banks (ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank 
including their subsidiaries in Zimbabwe) participated in the 
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research and the two Central banks (SARB and RBZ), who 
provided very important information on regulation, director 
training and compliance. The conceptual framework was not 
reviewed in order to test the themes discussed in document 2 
in this research. Response rate was 46%, which was below 
expectation. This was as a result of unavailability of 
respondents and confidentiality of banks considering that the 
researcher works for one of the banks, hence directors from 
other banks were not willing to discuss any issues relating to 
their bank. 
 
5.3 Morals and ethics        
 
In this study, morals are not considered equivalent to ethics, despite 
this being the approach often adopted by many contemporary 
scholars. This study considers that view as misleading and often 
results in false debate. In this study, moral behaviour is defined as 
individual action that is considered good or at the very least neutral 
with respect to the common good. This definition is compatible with 
Bowie and Dunfee’s (2002) definition that stated that individuals hold 
moral beliefs concerning social rights and wrongs. This definition also 
does not preclude group behaviour from being judged in moral terms 
(Trigg 2005; Soares 2003). 
 
Ethics is a system or framework of agreed-upon rules for a 
community to live by; that may or may not be based upon moral 
considerations. When discussing business ethics, one cannot avoid 
discussing capitalism, and it is relevant to consider the moral 
philosophy of the father of capitalism, Adam Smith: Social ethics 
comes out of the moral or cultural concepts that help define society 
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argued (Behrman 1988: 7). In this sense, ethics are seen as agreed-
upon social rules, and morals are taken to be aspects of individual 
values underlying those rules. The definition is consistent with the 
definition .... (Delridge et al 2003) and also the view adopted for this 
study in which ethics are underpinned by moral values. Following the 
above, Table 5.5 below depicts the general view that lies under the 
approach taken in this study. 
 
Relationship between morals and ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Source: Adapted from Crane and Matten (2004: 12) 
 
Financial sector is a heavily regulated industry with stringent ethical 
requirements, which includes client confidentiality and secrecy.  This 
made it very difficult to get all the required information as some 
respondents could not divulge more information as stipulated by the 
banks’ ethical conduct. Some could decline to participate on the 
interviews as they had to avoid saying what they might not be allowed 
to say. All interviewees allowed the researcher to disclose their 
names as they felt that there is need for more research to be done in 
the CG field and they would like to be part of that process.  
 
Morality 
Innate 
values/needs 
based on 
human nature 
Ethics 
Debate and 
agreement 
on moral 
values 
Ethical 
theory 
Formalization 
of laws, rules 
& regulations 
Potential 
solutions to 
ethical 
theory 
.... to produce 
ethical theory .... Ethics rationalizes 
morality ....... 
.... that can be 
applied to any 
situation. 
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5.4 Problems with participants 
 
Participants were the elite of the banks. They are very busy people 
who are always difficult to get because of their busy schedules, which 
resulted in a lower respondent rate. Most of the NEDs and IDs are 
members of an average of ten boards besides being executives of 
other companies. It was difficult for them to spare time for the 
interviews. 
 
Confidentiality was another constraint as only delegated directors are 
allowed to issue a statement on behalf of the bank. Regulatory and 
professional beliefs restricted the respondents’ thinking as they could 
not accept an environment where auditor responsibilities are 
substituted by internal audit and Audit Committees.  
 
5.5 Project constraints 
 
As with many research efforts, there are often limits imposed by 
various factors outside of the researcher’s sphere of influence. The 
fields touched upon in this study are potentially far-reaching, and it 
would require unreasonable effort and time to expand on all issues in 
the depth required to comprehensively explore all their links. There 
were some assumptions and compromises made, resulting in 
reasonable containment of the scope of the work: 
• The study is not longitudinal, but cross-sectional. 
• Gender issues are not examined. 
• The nature versus nurture debate remains a contentious issue, 
and the assumption made here is that both play an important 
role; neither is viewed as dominant nor was any further 
argument attempted in this regard 
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• The roles of personal belief systems such as religion or socio-
political orientation are also not considered 
• The issues surrounding legislation are dealt with only 
superficially 
 
The research covers two countries, which means the researcher had 
to travel for interviews, on arrival the meeting would be cancelled due 
to the directors’ other commitments. Use of technology helped in a 
way as video and telephone conferencing assisted whenever the 
directors could get time. The major limitation however was bank 
secrecy, hence the researcher could not get all the information he 
wanted especially the technical aspects of how the banks are run and 
director appraisal systems. 
 
Boards are dominated by formal processes, IDs and NEDs are 
exposed to executives through formal board presentations and in-
depth strategic discussions are limited to annual or bi-annual events. 
The ability to monitor financial processes is restricted due to 
communication channels and time commitments. 
  
5.6 Methods of analyzing data  
 
There are two contradictory things people often discover about 
analysing unencoded research material. The first thing is “the law of 
the missing middle,” which states that students who move straight 
from collecting their research material to writing up the dissertation, 
thereby missing out the intermediate stage of sorting and sifting the 
material, tend to end up in a mess and muddle argued (Fisher 2004: 
153). The sorting and sifting was one stage the researcher identified 
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as necessary and important. Data was sort according to different 
banks and interviews were arranged in the same way.  
 
There are devices that Riley (1996) recommended researchers to use 
which are, memorandum to self, keeping a researcher’s dairy and 
imaginary letters to a friend. The researcher opted for the second 
recommendation in order to keep track of all events during the 
research. Interviewees were not coded as they agreed that reference 
would be made to their submissions as they feel that they need to 
contribute to the development of literature on corporate governance 
in emerging markets. Financial material was coded by bank name. 
 
Content analysis of data from the banks and their financial 
statements was done to add quantitative element to the analysis of 
qualitative data. Excel was used to collate and analyze profiles of 
board members, association preferences, rank the banks and 
comparison of banks’ performance. 
 
5.7 Summary    
 
The structure of the financial sector is a difficult environment for 
researchers due to confidentiality and availability of board members. 
Regulatory beliefs make the methods of research mentioned above 
difficult as interviewers may fail to achieve their objectives but this 
researcher was helped by the fact that he works for one of the banks 
under review. Public information, literature review and financial 
statements were useful in analyzing the field of study as not much 
could be obtained from the directors. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
51 
 
Methods of data collection selected by the researcher were useful in 
unpacking the system and adding value to the field of study. Most 
information was obtained from the practitioners like Advocate John 
Myburgh, Mervin King and Phillip Armstrong who are leading 
practitioners in the corporate governance field in SA. The two central 
banks provided much needed support for this project to be 
successful. 
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6 Findings and analysis 
 
6.1 Key findings 
 
The researcher discussed factors affecting CG in Southern Africa 
(Chapter 3) and world over with the interviewees in order to answer 
the research questions and enhancement of the conceptual 
framework. These include board effectiveness, processes, dynamics, 
transparency, independence of auditors, directors, involvement of 
owners in the management of banks and the effect of legal 
framework. A comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory 
was also discussed in order to get the view of respondents as to how 
these factors affect reporting and transparency. The findings in these 
matters were discussed under different themes below. 
 
From the interviews, there emerged a picture of directors who are 
generally satisfied with the effectiveness and practices of their 
boards, but who also see areas where there is significant room for 
improvement. Key findings include: 
 
Board effectiveness: Some 95% of directors rate their boards as 
either effective or very effective overall. Directors are generally 
positive about all aspects of their fiduciary oversight, and their rating 
of their effectiveness at ensuring ethical behaviour continues to rise. 
Only 59% of the directors responded favourably when asked to rate 
their boards’ effectiveness in shaping long-term strategy. Only 63% of 
the directors responded favourably when asked to rate their boards’ 
effectiveness in planning for CEO succession. A great majority (84%) 
of directors say they have effective evaluation of CEO performance 
but far less effective processes for evaluation of individual directors. 
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Board processes: The overwhelming majority (95%) of directors are 
satisfied that they receive sufficient information to do their jobs, but 
satisfaction with the CEO on this score is low and less than one-third 
of directors have independent information channels about company 
operations. Only 33% of directors say they monitor company culture 
to a great or very great extent and only 32% closely monitor human 
capital. Almost all boards have regular executive sessions and nearly 
two-thirds hold strategic retreats, but only about half require outside 
directors to visit company operations. Despite governance 
requirements that are more stringent, less than two-thirds of boards 
have regular training for directors. 
 
Board dynamics: Ninety percent (90%) say that their boards behave 
independently of management to a great or very great extent. 
Nevertheless, 91% say their boards work well with senior 
management. Despite greater focus on board independence, only 
11% of respondents felt that it had become “much more difficult for 
outside directors to work in close partnership with management.” 
 
Eighty-two percent (82%) of directors report, “CEOs have less control 
over their boards” to at least some extent, with 49% indicating this 
has happened to a great or very great extent. The reforms have also 
shifted the focus of boards’ activities significantly, with 84% of 
respondents indicating that to at least some extent they are “now 
spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy.” Fifty-seven 
percent (57%) of directors say they are now more hesitant to serve 
on other boards, with inside directors expressing even more 
hesitancy than outside directors. 
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6.2 Results of findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 6.1: Sociogram depicting Sociometric test of CG dilemma 
 
Diagram 5.5 and 6.1 defines the associations that exist in banking 
corporate governance structure as defined on Chapter 1 of this 
document. Different stakeholders have different interests (shown 
above), which results in divided loyalty. The construction of boards is 
influenced by these associations argued interviewee 34. How board 
Banks 
(Scramble for a 
share of the pie) 
• Auditors 
 
• ED 
• NED 
• ID 
• Communities 
• Other 
Stakeholders 
Central 
Bank Government 
Investors or 
Shareholders 
Auditors 
(members of ICA) 
EDs, IDs and 
NEDs are 
members 
Income and 
business 
Divided 
loyalty 
CSR 
Investment 
Taxes Regulations: 
Monitoring, 
compliance and 
loans 
Key Clients: Audit 
and Consulting  
Capital 
growth and 
dividend 
Employment 
Fees 
Collegiality 
• IOD 
• ICA 
• IOB 
• ECI 
• BASA 
Interest on 
loans 
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members behave and conduct themselves is influenced by board 
fees, ethics, skills and relationships as defined by Chart 6.4.1: 73. 
The outcome of this research is based on the themes discussed on 
diagram 6.1: 54, Chart 6.4.1: 73 and the conceptual framework. 
Banks are an important sector of any economy, hence has as many 
stakeholders as any other important sector. The growth of any 
economy is as a result of the efficient system of banking. Each 
stakeholder then needs to increase the level of income from the 
profits from banks argued interviewees 34, 35, and 36. 
 
Governments through the Central bank plays a critical role of 
monitoring and defining the banking regulatory framework in order to 
reduce insider dealing, non-banking business and protecting 
depositors money. Investors’ interests are to insure that there is 
capital (... increase of share price and market price) and dividend 
growth), that is growth of shareholder value. Communities and 
employees are interested in continued existence of the banks for 
creation of employment and security of jobs, while directors and 
auditors are interested in increase in fees. Institutional boards like 
BASA, IOD, ICA and others are worried about the governance 
processes in the bank and the conduct of their members. They also 
play a monitoring role of how their member conduct themselves and if 
they are found to be breaching the institution’s ethics, then they will 
be struck off from being members. There are therefore balances and 
checks within this association which assist in the improvement of 
corporate governance system in the sector argued interviewee 19. 
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Chart 6.2: Association correlation 
 
A test was done to test if there is any relationship between 
institutional memberships, professional field and how they affect 
independence and transparency. The results are shown on Diagram 
6.2, which shows a positive correlation between the two. 
Respondents are more willing to associate with members of their own 
groupings that are either same professional or institutional affiliation. 
The argument was that members of the same profession tend to 
observe the ethical requirements of their institution as they can be 
struck off the register if their conduct is found not to be consistent 
with the institution.  
 
The positive correlation therefore is a trigger for compliance with 
ethical requirements of different institutions, which results in 
independent behaviour and transparency argued interviewee 30. The 
association is therefore beneficial to all parties as it stimulates the 
behaviour of members so that they can comply with the requirements 
of different institutions which improve compliance with best practice of 
corporate governance argued interviewee 1. Interviewees 3, 6, 7, 9 
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expressed the view that banks value NEDs and IDs for the skills and 
experience, business they bring in from the companies they manage 
and for their influence in Government. As a result of this background 
directors are considered to be independent as their history supports 
the notion that they are independent professionals who can improve 
transparency in how banks disclose information to different 
stakeholders.  
 
6.2.1 Shareholder Activism 
 
When share prices drop, shareholders lose money but option 
holders only lose an opportunity argued (Monks 2001: 142 - 
147). Option holders are the executives, who agreed that there 
is growing recognition that broader conceptualizations of how 
boards add value to their firms are required (Interview 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 7). The author managed to secure 27 interviews and table 
4.2.1 shows the schedule of interview times.  
 
Historically Shareholders in emerging markets did not take part 
in the running of the firm they own argued interviewee 5. This 
responsibility was left to the board until recently when 
institutional investors began to increase in number especially 
for listed companies argued interviewees 3 and 5 who agreed 
with (Garratt 2004: 52). Boards were left to determine dividend 
policy, options and remuneration levels without the 
participation of Shareholders resulting in executive 
remuneration increasing more than revenue growth especially 
in US argued (Jackson 2001: 200). 
 
Hirschman (1970) discussed the exercise of power within a 
“voice” and “exit” framework. “Voice” includes inter-alias, 
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meetings, constructive dialogue and voting. “Exit” in this 
context, would be selling the shares. Exercising “voice” by 
means of voting may not be easy to do especially when trying 
to exercise votes attached to overseas investments.  
 
The research showed that individual investors dispose their 
shareholding if not happy with the board while institutional 
investors participate in the running of the bank argued Adv 
Myburgh and interviewee 3. Disposal by an institutional 
investor results in share price falling. Participation of 
shareholders and other stakeholders like the Registrar of 
banks in the running of banks is increasing resulting in 
improved corporate governance practice argued interviewee 5. 
Interviewees 3, 4, 5 and 6 argued that the participation of 
Shareholders in the administration of banks improves 
transparency.  
 
6.2.2 Owner Managed Banks 
 
The shareholding perspective as an orthodox and dominant 
approach to the understanding of corporate governance has its 
ideological and theoretical origin in the fundamental mentality 
of individual private ownership rights as the foundation of 
capitalism. Traditional wisdom is that private ownership is 
fundamental to a desirable social order and to development of 
an efficient economy and thus private ownership rights are 
inviolable to corporate governance argued interviewee 10 and 
11.  
 
This belief was the major cause of bank failures as owners 
operated banks as personal private business, which resulted in 
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the banks failing to reach the maturity levels, hence collapse 
as a family owned bank. Abusive insider trading and related 
party transactions were the order of the day argued 
interviewees 35, 36, 37 and 41. Serious corporate governance 
failures emanated as owners engaged in non-core speculative 
activities similar to the BCCI case contributed interviewees 8, 
10, 11, 35, 36, 37, and 41. Owner managed banks were seen 
to be more risk than public banks as all corporate governance 
weaknesses were observed in how the banks were managed. 
Unlisted banks do not meet the disclosure requirements as per 
the King 2 Report (2002); hence shareholders do not have 
access to most of the information argued interviewee 9. There 
is no compliance to the code of best practice even the King 2 
Report, resulting in most of them collapsing argued interviewee 
5. Most of the banks that failed were not listed, hence did not 
meet the disclosure requirements of listed banks. 
 
The positive side of this setup is likely, one can find in family 
banks where the family factor is helping communication and 
information exchange between family members in different 
roles. The father–daughter relationship where the father is 
family-shareholder and the daughter family-manager improves 
corporate governance practice contributed interviewee 3.  
 
The family involvement does not require specific disciplining 
governance mechanisms. The reference model assumes that 
both the principal (father) and agent (daughter) have the same 
information throughout the relationship. The principal and 
agent share common information regarding all relevant 
characteristics and variables (symmetric information), and the 
agent’s effort is verifiable, so that it is possible for the principal 
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to check that the agent fulfils the tasks. In addition, the 
principal will offer the contract to the agent depending on the 
type of agent argued interviewee 19. FNB is one of these 
success stories of Corporate Governance argued interviewee 
3 as they are a listed owner managed bank, which grew to 
maturity levels when the bank was listed in 1998. 
 
6.2.3 NEDs and IDs 
 
The board members are not expert in banking matters, they 
work relatively few hours, and they have limited options but to 
accept the advice from executive directors argued interviewee 
37. As a result of low fees (Chart 3,1) directors contribute less 
hours and effort to the bank  argued interviewee 33. They meet 
four times a year as a board to analyze bank performance, 
source financial statements 2006 (ABSA p.: 14, FirstRand 
(FNB): 70, Nedbank: 86 and Standard Bank: 33). Scandals, 
fraudulent incidents, (document 2: Appendix 1), for example 
(BCCI, Maxwell. Enron, Ahold, WorldCom and recently 
Fidentia cases), demonstrate that NEDs have not always 
carried out their fiduciary role effectively argued interviewee 5. 
As (Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004: 314) argued that any 
NED or ID is only as good as the executive will allow him to be. 
Any executive can kid any NED to do virtually anything argued 
(McNulty and Pettigrew 1996: 160). These arguments are the 
true reflection of the effect of independence, which board 
members have to show in order for them to be seen to be 
carrying their fiduciary duties. Failure by directors to carry out 
their duties will result in information asymmetry, fraud and 
bank failures argued interviewees 18, 19, 34, 35 and 36. 
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Given the limited amount of time spent on board activities, the 
executives give NEDs and IDs information they want to give 
them (information asymmetry). What came out clearly was the 
lack of time as most board members of the banks sit on more 
than six boards giving them little time for preparation and to 
understand bank business agreed all the interviewees as 
reflected in all the financial statements. It was clear that on this 
respect there is no value added regarding the administrative 
issues of the bank, hence the researcher propose that ED take 
stewardship role in managing the affairs of the bank they are 
employed. 
 
Why are the IDs and NEDs needed then? (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992, Delfos-Roy 1997 and Maassen 1999) found 
out that IDs and NEDs do not have time for the boards they sit 
on and they trust the executives will give them information to 
be able to do their work. If that trust is not there and the CEO 
holds information then they are seen to be irrelevant, leaving 
the executive to run the banks. The results of the researcher’s 
interviews indicate strongly that NEDS and IDs rely heavily on 
information from the CEO. The role of IDs and NEDs is to bring 
business from the companies they are executives, they 
influence policies and relations with the Government and 
expertise argued interviewee 3. There is empirical evidence 
that NEDs and IDs are important drivers of the bank as their 
role is to formulate strategy, while at the same time 
representing the interests of different stakeholders argued 
interviewee 34. 
 
Administratively they have no major role argued (Amoako-Adu 
and Smith 1995: 413) this was the result that came from the 
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survey of NEDs, IDs and market analyst. While (Leblanc 2004: 
1 - 313) argued that there is no statistical evidence of a 
relationship between corporate performance and NEDs/IDs 
participation, the results of this research were contrary to these 
findings as NEDs and IDs influence deals that flow to the bank 
from the companies they are executives for example the 
acquisition of ABSA by Barclays was as a result of the role of 
NEDs and IDs being board members of Barclays Plc and 
Standard Bank by ICBC.  
 
6.2.4 Independent Auditors 
 
Auditors are governed by their membership of the ICA; hence 
have professional obligation to operate ethically. They are 
required by law to test materiality of how directors behave and 
report to shareholders (ISA).  Shareholders place reliance on 
the auditor’s opinion, which has created CG problems argued 
interviewee 5. Directors have a responsibility to manage the 
bank but shifting their responsibilities to a third party to check 
on how they operate the bank creates the corporate 
governance paradox argued interviewee 33. 
 
Unless accounting and audit practices are reformed so that 
financial statements can be authenticated by recourse, reliable 
commercial evidence, audits will remain red herrings (Wolnizer 
1995: see also document 2). This has been the finding of the 
researcher; and the dilemma (Diagram 6.1: 54) shows the 
evidence of collegiality of auditors and EDs. Interviewee 3 
argued that the relationship between EDs and auditors is an 
area of concern in the CG literature until such time when EDs 
take their stewardship role in order to mitigate risk.  
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The findings from this research indicates that audit fees 
causes a negative trigger as a result of the growth in audit fees 
(document 4: Appendix 1) Auditors have lied about their 
independence, which is the reason why auditors call banks key 
clients argued (Turnbull 2006: 1). Auditors generate huge 
sums of money from banks compromising the issue of 
independence argued interviewees 3 and 19. It was agreed 
that, as a result of the law and regulations, every respondent 
assumed auditors are important stakeholders in the CG 
system. All the three Financial Directors interviewed and 
Advocate Myburgh agreed that the role of auditors can be 
supported by audit committees through re-sourcing internal 
audit as they have more knowledge of the business than 
external auditors. The growth in audit fees acts as a negative 
trigger on the conceptual framework considering the number of 
corporate failures in recent times and the current global 
economic crisis (2008). As a result of the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), Auditors have a personal liability if 
misstatements are found in audited financial statements, which 
are a positive stance, which will assist to mitigate the risk of 
bank failures argued interviewee 18. 
 
6.2.5 Board evaluation 
 
The themes discussed so far indicates that the role of the 
board is instrumental in good corporate governance. The task 
is characterized by the pressure of responsibility, limited time 
and distance from operations of the bank, which the board is 
set to direct and control. Board appraisals are prescribed by 
the UK Combined Code   and other codes of governance 
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applicable to Southern Africa. Board evaluation can help the 
board to tune its contribution to the sustained success of the 
bank argued interviewees 35 and 37. 
 
Analyses of the evaluations done by the four Chairmen of the 
four banks were made available to the researcher and Table 
6.2 is a table of outcomes of the findings. Evaluations are 
categorized into five major themes which are strategy, control, 
information, decisions and practice of the board work. Answers 
provided in the evaluations reflect how individuals or groups of 
individuals (board members) evaluate their contributions to the 
work of the board to which they belong. 
 
Board leadership was found to be a decisive factor when it 
comes to the performance of each board. Data was analyzed 
from the duties of the Chairperson, IDs, NEDs and CEOs of all 
banks and there was no difference in their activities as the 
governance structure of all the banks are the same. Minimum 
standards of compliance to best practice are maintained by 
each bank resulting in the scoring to be between 4 and 9 out of 
10. 
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Table 6.3: Results of board evaluations of the four banks 
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The board evaluation was done on a scale of 1 to 10 and the 
average on all categories was 6,5. Table 6.3 above indicates 
the gap that exists between actual performance of the board, 
expectation from different theories and what is expected of 
them by different stakeholders. An average of 6,5 is an 
indication of an average board that observes board practices 
but weak in risk management and internal control which is why 
failures ok in the financial sector (Table 6.3). There was 
growing recognition, that broader conceptualizations of how 
boards add value to their banks are required argued 
interviewees 4, 6, 10 and 11.  
 
Instead of describing particular elements of corporate 
governance (agency theory and monitoring) boards need to 
develop a model that conceptualizes the board as a social 
phenomenon argued (Nicholson and Kiel 2004: 444, Katz and 
Kahn 1978 and Kazanjian 2000). Boards in the banks were 
found to be dynamic but no open social systems are used to 
measure the behaviour of the board argued interviewees 1, 2, 
22, 19, and 34. Table 6.3 indicates the gap that exists between 
actual performance and expected performance especially on 
key deliverables like strategy formulation, internal control, and 
risk management. 
 
There is a formal appraisal system for board of directors in the 
two countries (mostly group board evaluations are made public 
not individual). Non performing directors are not identified in 
the appraisal process, while affecting the value creation model. 
Shareholders decide during the annual general meeting who 
should resign. Boards are viewed as a bundle of intellectual 
capital that enables it to enact a role set argued interviewees 
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3, 19 and 33. As a result the concept of collegiality is applied 
when evaluating the bank and appraising the board’s 
performance.  
 
6.2.6 Legal Compliance 
 
(Document 1: figure 2.1 and 2: Chart 2.2.1) raised the issue of 
the failure of the legal framework, which resulted in many Acts 
being promulgated into law in UK and USA. Respondents 3, 5, 
10 and 11 agreed that the law has been reactive to scandals 
than being proactive. It was agreed that there is a need for 
governance reform as corporate governance issues are not 
static (interviewee 34). 
 
As a result of the failure of the regulatory framework, the 
Governments of SA and Zimbabwe ended up bailing out banks 
which we on the verge of collapse, which include: SA (African 
Bank, Nedbank, Trust Bank, TA Bank and Saambou Bank), 
Zimbabwe: (Barbican Bank, Trust Bank, Unibank, Century 
Bank and Time Bank). In SA out of the banks that got 
assistance only Nedbank, African Bank and Trust Bank 
survived. African Bank and Nedbank were assisted by its 
major shareholder Old Mutual which has also incurred huge 
losses due to exposure to the subprime market. Trust Bank 
was merged into ABSA. The Zimbabwean banks which were 
merged into ZBAG were Barbican Bank, Trust Bank and Time 
Bank. These survived as a result of the bailout plan. Unibank 
collapsed while Century Bank was bought out by CFX 
Holdings now called CFX Bank. These failures were as a result 
of poor corporate governance structures argued interviewee 
35, 36, 37 and 41. 
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6.2.7 Agency Theory versus Stewardship Theory 
 
CEOs at 23 firms in the USA which were under investigation 
between 1999 and 2001 took US$1,4 billion in income, while at 
the same time these companies laid off 162 000 employees 
and the value of their shares fell by US$530 billion – about 
73% of their market value argued (Cornforth 2001: 219). This 
was the time when it became fashionable to link the CEO’s 
remuneration to shareholder value; this led to a massive 
transfer of wealth from shareholders to CEOs. This trend exists 
in the banks. CEO of banks enjoys massive remuneration 
including share options which are not linked to performance 
argued interviewee 9. 
 
Agency theory focuses on the notion of an agency relationship 
(conflict of interest) explained in previous two documents, 
while stewardship theory focuses on successfully performing 
inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility and 
authority, thereby gaining recognition from shareholders 
argued interviewee 3. Directors of banks agreed during the 
interviews that the stewardship theory is the way to solve the 
CG paradox as directors should be accountable to the 
shareholders and should not involve auditors in responsibility 
sharing. They need to satisfy all stakeholders that they are 
doing an excellent job argued interviewee 5.  
 
The argument by Cornforth (2001: 219) states the failure by 
directors to satisfy all stakeholders is due to a conflict of 
interest, hence an adoption of the stewardship theory will 
mitigate the level of self-centeredness among directors argued 
interviewee 19. The emergence of stakeholder theory (Gay 
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2002) was prompted by the growing recognition by boards of 
the need to take account of the wider interests of society. The 
interests of all legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic value and 
no set of interests is assumed to dominate the other, hence 
interviewee 19 believes this theory is not centred on director 
monetary rewards. 
 
Long term relationship between principal and agent, will result, 
in shareholder loyalty argued (Charkham 1994 and Sykes 
1994). Loyalty of shareholders is influence by the performance 
of the bank. If the bank performs poorly, shareholders will 
always seek safe heavens. The myopic market model supports 
the principal – agent model as it supports the maximization of 
shareholder wealth while ignoring the interests of other 
stakeholders argued interviewee 19.  
 
There is need for statutory changes in order to solve the CG 
problem suggested (Hutton 1995, Kay and Siberston 1995). 
Support for managerialism is an important factor in the 
financial sector in emerging markets as this advocate for 
stakeholder theory, which equates managers with other 
stakeholders. The model will assist bank to perform better 
argued interviewee 34. The abuse of executive power and 
stakeholder models, (Hutton 1995, Kay and Siberston 1995, 
Freeman 1984 and Blair 1995) support the stewardship theory 
as a way of improving social efficiencies of the economy, 
which will result in satisfying all stakeholders. 
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6.3 Board Effectiveness 
 
As the ultimate corporate decision-makers, boards of directors are 
assuming an increased importance in business life. Understanding 
how boards work is not a simple task argued (Nicholson and Kiel 
2004: 442). Despite this complexity, the health of our banks, 
economies and society rely on people understanding how boards can 
influence firm performance. There are three major factors that dictate 
how a board functions and how it achieves a greater degree of 
control over governance outcomes, which are institutional and 
historical factors, capability set that will enable it to carry out its 
mandate and various board level interventions will result in changes 
to this capability set resulting in different organizational outcomes. 
 
It is therefore important to note that board effectiveness starts with 
strategic and financial control and a board that emphasises neither of 
these would be classified as a “rubber stamp” board representing the 
managerial hegemony perspective argued (Hendry and Kiel 2004: 
512, Mace 1971, Vance 1983, Lorsch and Maclver 1989) (Sec 9.1).  
They also argued that boards are a legal fiction dominated by EDs, 
which interviewee 19 disagrees with his contribution on Section 9.1. 
EDs however become so powerful as a result of how the bank has 
performed over the years. Good results, result in the CEO becoming 
powerful as he/she is seen to be the brains behind the success 
although this can be a natural result or other factors argued 
interviewee 3. Attributes or themes below are the major factors that 
influence director effectiveness stated all respondents. 
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6.3.1 Knowledge and Experience 
 
Chart 3,1 indicate that skills, experience and knowledge are 
major themes for bank’s transparency and information 
asymmetry reduction. A balanced board with skills, experience 
and competencies (inside and outside) will result in a robust, 
transparent and effective board argued Garratt 1996: 52. All 
the banks are equipped with highly skilled members mostly 
CAs and some have post graduate qualifications (Appendix 1). 
The four big banks in the two countries have been posting 
almost similar results for the past five years as reflected in 
document 4. The respondents agreed that director experience 
is an important attribute in board effectiveness. 
 
6.3.2 Stakeholder Expectation 
 
Attempts to identify direct relationships between corporate 
performance and board performance are naïve, particularly 
when carried out in a cross – sectional analysis argued 
interviewee 5. The dilemma developed on Diagram 6.1 shows 
the interests and benefits which are expected by different 
stakeholders and Table 6.4.1 highlights market efficiency as 
the proposition by shareholders. 
 
Shareholders expect higher dividend and capital growth. A 
bank that always performs better than all other banks is a 
centre of attraction for shareholders. Constant capital and 
dividend growth is an indication that the bank is well managed 
and comply with best practice argued interviewee 5. 
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Employees expect growth in income, bonuses and long term 
employment contract. Creditors and debtors are a key element 
of the operations of the bank as they require security that the 
bank will remain in existence. Community expects that the 
bank will continue to absorb and employ school and college 
leavers. The banks play an important role in CSR through 
bursaries, sponsorships and community development, which 
supports the growth in the standard of living responded 
interviewee 3. 
 
Boards of directors are keen to be associated with the most 
successful bank, which will result in the capital growth through 
share options. Their interests are divided as they expect the 
bank to grow through their efforts while the end result is to 
create their own wealth bringing the paradox into play. Board 
performance is affected by these expectations and conflict of 
interest argued interviewee 10. The situation in the financial 
sector in emerging markets remained the same as in the 
developed markets as international banks operate in the same 
markets. The corporate governance crisis remains a problem 
in both developed and developing economies as summarized 
below argued interviewee 11. These models shows that 
different stakeholders have conflicting interests, hence the 
conceptual framework advocates for the mechanisms to be 
triggered in order to reduce the conflicting interests. 
 
6.4 Analysis of themes, theory and conceptual framework 
 
Table 6.4.1 is an analysis of different models of CG, outcomes of the 
research findings and how different stakeholders’ interests are 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
73 
 
addressed (Diagram 6.1: 54). Shareholders do not have enough 
control of the banks they own as a result of separation of ownership 
and control stated (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Manne 1965). They 
argued that, in order to address this problem, there is need to 
improve the incentive system (Chart 6.4.1: 59) and improve the role 
of audit committees. This argument does not apply to the bank 
industry as banks are mostly owned by institutional investors who are 
active shareholders in formulating strategies for banks. Institutional 
investors advocate for market efficiency, which will result in dividend 
and capital growth argued interviewee 34. 
 
 
The principal-
agent 
The myopic 
market 
The abuse of 
executive 
The 
stakeholder 
 or finance model model power model model 
Major 
contributor 
(Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), 
(Manne 1965) 
Charkham 
(1994), (Sykes 
1994) 
(Hutton 1995), (Kay 
and Siberston 1995)  
(Freeman 1984), 
(Blair 1995) 
     
Purpose of 
bank 
Maximization of 
shareholder wealth 
Maximization of 
shareholder 
wealth 
Maximization of 
bank wealth as a 
whole 
Maximization of 
shareholders’ 
wealth 
     
Problem of 
governance 
      
Agency problem  
 
          
Excessive 
concern with 
short-term 
market value 
Abuse of executive 
power for their own 
interests 
 
Absence of 
stakeholders’ 
involvement 
 
     
Cause 
 
 
Shareholders do 
not have enough 
control 
 
Ineffective 
market forces 
 
Institutional  
arrangements leave 
excessive power to 
management 
Governance 
failure to 
represent 
stakeholders’ 
interests 
     
Background 
 
The separation of 
ownership from 
control  
The takeover 
movement 
(1980s) 
Managerialism 
 
Different styles 
of capitalism 
     
Assumption 
about the 
causation 
Self-interest human 
behaviour 
 
Market 
dysfunction 
 
Authoritarian 
governance 
 
Traditional 
mentality of 
private 
ownership 
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Rejection 
 
Any external 
interventions 
Market 
governance 
The principal-agent 
model 
The principal-
agent model 
     
Proposition 
 
Market efficiency 
 
Importance of 
long-term 
relationship 
Director as a 
stewardship or 
trusteeship 
Social efficiency 
of economy 
 
 
    
Recomm-
endations 
 
• Removing 
restrictions on 
markets 
• Strengthening 
the incentive 
system 
• Introducing a 
voluntary code. 
• Give power to 
audit 
committees. 
• Reduce 
dependence on 
auditors. 
• Increasing 
shareholder 
loyalty and 
voice 
 
• Reducing 
the ease of 
shareholder 
exit 
 
• Encouraging 
relationship 
investing. 
 
• Empowering 
long-term 
offer groups. 
• Statutory changes 
in governance 
• Fixed ten - year 
terms of CEO and 
CFO 
• Independent 
directors should 
be used as 
consultants to ED 
• Greater power to 
audit and risk 
committees 
 
• Trust 
relationships 
and long –term 
contractual 
associations 
between the 
banks and 
stakeholders 
• Inter-bank 
cooperation 
• Employees' 
participation 
• Business ethics 
• Stewardship 
 
Table 6.4.1 Themes, theory and practice 
 
Table 6.4.1 highlights themes raised on Diagram 6.1: 54, which 
shows the conflict that exists between different stakeholders and 
theories. Different expectations create corporate governance 
dilemma as theory in itself does not agree on one principle. The 
finance model (Agency Theory) and The Myopic Market Models’ 
(Takeover movement) major focus is on maximization of shareholder 
value while Executive Power Model focuses on managerialism. The 
Stakeholder Model’s major focus is social efficiency which empowers 
the mentality of private ownership of resources by all stakeholders, 
which create trust and long term contractual association of all 
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stakeholders. The difference in focus areas creates the gaps in 
corporate governance discussed above and in document 4.  
 
All these models do not recommend any specific model as the most 
suitable for any environment. Different philosophies provide different 
views on best practice, which results in different human behaviour. As 
a result of different interpretation of these models, corporate continue 
to fail as these models cannot identify potential fraud or shenanigans 
in the financial management system. This has resulted in financial 
measurement tools failing to indicate potential failure of banks argued 
interviewee 34. Recommendations on Table 6.4.1 are issues which 
banks are struggling with as they cannot strike a balance between 
different models. 
 
The themes here (Chart 6.4.1: 59) show that if highly qualified board 
members are appointed, will result in the bank being able to report on 
all its activities, reducing information asymmetry. Internal controls will 
improve, while risk is reduced. Board fees causes negative triggers 
on the conceptual framework as directors do not spend enough time 
on the bank’s business and due to high audit fees which are charged 
when the bank is in trouble. Low board fees result in qualified 
identified board members rejecting appointments. If they accept 
appointment, the quality of work will be poor due to less time being 
employed argued interviewee 34. 
 
Chart 6.4.2 is an outcome of the analysis of the conceptual 
framework and the behaviour of the board. The themes are triggered 
to produce either a positive or negative outcome as a result of the 
theme’s impact on the performance of the bank. 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
76 
 
Themes  Catalyst   Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.4.2: Themes and Outcomes 
 
 
 
6.5 Analysis of Findings 
 
6.5.1 Experience and skills level 
 
Banks are managed by highly qualified directors mostly with 
first degree, Chartered Accountants and post graduates mostly 
MBAs (Appendix 1 and Table 6.4.3) below. There are very few 
 
 
Independence 
 
 
 
Induction, 
Training, Skills 
experience and 
associations 
 
 
Fees 
 
 
 
Appointment of: 
• NEDs, IDs, Internal Audit, 
Audit Committees, and 
Auditors 
Accreditation of board 
members: 
• Recruitment and selection 
• Shareholder interests 
Low payment of board fees: 
• Role of Regulator 
• Listing requirements 
• Audit fees 
Effective board 
• Transparency 
• Reporting 
• Improved internal 
controls 
• Risk mitigation 
 
 
• Bank structures 
• Stewardship  
• Competitive 
advantage 
 
 
• Less qualified 
board members 
appointed 
• Board members 
not putting less 
time to the bank  
• Auditors fees too 
high 
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individuals with doctorates and a few with no first degree but 
strong industrial experience. It was clear that these 
qualifications are important instruments in running the banks. 
 
The problem which came out clearly was the issue of induction 
and accreditation. Most of the IDs and NEDs are experienced 
business people but non bankers hence need to go through a 
through induction programme for them to appreciate how 
banks are administered. The registrar of banks has introduced 
a post graduate programme to train all bank directors, which 
has become a basic requirement for every director. This 
programme has assisted in reducing the risk of all banks as 
evidenced by the strength of the Southern Africa banks during 
the global financial crisis argued interviewees 36 and 41. 
 
6.5.2 Independent and Non-Executive directors 
 
Banks have different ways of defining independence. These 
definitions were developed to suite the perceived skills 
shortage argued interviewee 1. It was found out that there is a 
cooling off period of three years after a director has been an 
executive of the bank for him or her to be appointed as board 
member. The issue here is whether this is sufficient to change 
an individual to be independent. The researcher’s argument is 
supported here that director independence is a personal 
mindset as level of interest differs. Independence is influence 
by many things (Diagram 6.1: 54) which includes profession, 
ethics, benefits and culture among other things.  
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Board Scorecard 
 ABSA FNB Nedbank 
Standard 
Bank 
     
Independent 
Directors 12 13 15 14 
     
Average ID 
Boards 10 9 10 10 
     
NEDs 5 4 6 3 
     
Average NEDs 
Boards 6 4 5 6 
     
Executive 
Directors 4 10 4 2 
     
Skills level "++" "++" "++" "++" 
Board meeting 
attendance 86% 91% 83% 87% 
     
Shareholder 
activism H HH H HH 
     
Key     
H Moderate participation  
HH High Shareholder participation  
"++" Very high skills level   
 
Table 6.4.3: Director Attendance  
 
The IDs and NEDs have their own interest, like getting finance 
from the bank where they are directors to finance their own 
businesses or companies they manage. Banks are interested 
in getting business from the companies which are managed by 
the IDs and NEDs. This shows that the issue of conflict of 
interest is a difficult paradox to solve argued interviewee 2 and 
3. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
79 
 
Although NEDs and IDS are considered to be an important 
part of the board, the issue of personal interest was seen to be 
the dominant attribute affecting their independence and 
effectiveness argued interviewee 34. On average each director 
sits on ten boards, besides being an executive of another 
company, which resulted in lower board meeting attendance 
as reflected on Table 6.4.3. This also shows that NEDs and 
IDs have little time for the bank they are directors resulting in 
little value addition as reflected in the 2006 financial 
statements of all banks (Appendix 1). Low participation shows 
that their interests are somewhere not in the bank, (Table 
6.4.3.) Interviewee 33 suggested that black Governments in 
Africa express the need to have influential black NEDs and IDs 
on bank boards that can negotiate policies on behalf of the 
bank with the governments. Their role is as negotiators rather 
formulation of strategies argued interviewee 33  
 
NEDs and IDs increase deal follow to the bank, and need not 
be involved in the administration of the bank argued 
interviewee 3 and 5. Although there is conflict of interest 
between the directors and the bank, NEDs and IDs are an 
important component of the bank as they add value as a result 
of their experience, knowledge and influence in the industry. 
They improve the transparency and reduce the levels of risk 
and information asymmetry. 
 
6.5.3 Auditor independence 
 
It was difficult to conclude that auditors can be independent as 
they derive a lot of income from banks, (KPMG, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst and Young 2006 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
80 
 
financial statements). In Auditors’ terms banks are considered 
to be key clients as they do not only provide audit services but 
also consulting services. Audit fees have been going up for the 
past five years at an average rate of 20% year on year 
(Appendix 1), which is more than the wage bill of each bank. 
 
Auditors belong to the same Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, where most directors are also members 
(Diagram 6.1). Although there is professional and ethical 
obligation to perform, this obligation was found to be 
outweighed by collegiality and fees. Auditors will always assist 
their college mates in cases of qualification of financial 
statements; hence Turnbull (2006) argues that there is no such 
thing as auditor independence. 
 
6.5.4 Owner managed banks 
 
After the liberalization of the financial sector in SA and 
Zimbabwe, there was a growth in the number of banks which 
were owner managed. Most of them did not last (failed to 
reach the maturity level) as a result of the failure of the CG 
systems and legal framework (Document 2: Appendix 1). 
Although the board composition complied with the King 11 
Report, IDs and NEDs were appointed by the owners hence 
where influenced by the owners to enter into abusive related 
part transactions, noncore speculative activities and excessive 
lending exposure argued interviewee 10, 11, 35, 36, 37 and 
41.   
 
Table 6.4.3 shows a high level of Shareholder activism at FNB 
as it is one successful owner managed bank. FNB is one of the 
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major four banks in Southern Africa, which is owner managed 
that reached maturity level and has shown constant growth. 
Other banks’ majority shareholders are institutional investors, 
who determine how the bank will conduct itself. 
 
6.6 Summary of Findings 
 
Corporate governance has assumed an increasingly important place 
in the banking industry. The board as an ultimate decision making 
body, is inexorably linked to corporate performance. Skills and 
experience was found to be critical to the success of the bank and 
shareholder confidence. The more experienced the board (Chart 
6.4.3: 59 and Appendix 1) the more the shareholders are willing to 
pay a premium on the investment. 
 
Board appraisals (Table 6.2: 49) can be useful as part of the 
development of a strategic plan for board or director development 
and performance measurement consistent with the bank’s strategic 
plan: vision, mission and goals. This was found not to be easily 
acceptable by the board members as they felt appraisals will impact 
on interpersonal dynamics and collegiality among members of the 
board. Cohesion and trust is important to the effectiveness and 
functioning of the board. 
 
The evaluation above (Table 6.4.1) concludes that there is still a lot of 
work that need to be done in an endeavour to solve the corporate 
governance paradox. The conceptual framework (Appendix 3 and 
Chart 6.4.1) addressed the research questions while proposing 
solutions to the conflict of interest problem. Board members need to 
take the stewardship role as this will enhance CG best practice. 
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The evaluation and analysis above (Table 6.4.1) supported the 
conceptual framework in answering the research questions, that there 
is always conflicting interests when directors are appointed as 
agents. The recommendations (Chapter 7) recommended practical 
solutions to the paradox, which if implemented in the banks; 
compliance with the CG best practice will improve. 
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7 Proposed policy options 
 
Drawing from the management literature, the literature review (document 
2), research questions, conceptual framework and findings from interviews, 
bank processes and performance, they posit that board effectiveness is 
likely to be heavily dependent on socio-psychological processes, 
especially those pertaining to group participation, interaction, information 
exchange and critical discourse.  Each of various aspects of board 
demography is likely to have multiple and contrasting effects on the 
processes that contribute to effective board performance, (Forbes and 
Milliken 1999) supported this argument. These processes has the potential 
for reciprocal influence, although the exact nature and strength of these 
relationships are likely to vary hence the researcher proposes the following 
policy changes: 
 
7.1 Audit Committee 
 
Audit Committees needs to play a major role in the administration of 
the bank especially on risk management and compliance. Audit 
Committees through the internal audit has a better understanding of 
the operations of the bank than external auditors argued interviewee 
18. The role of external auditors needs to change so that Audit 
Committees can issue a statement and sign the financial statements 
interviewees 33 and 34 concurred with interviewee 18. Independent 
auditors will continue to be used for the purpose of supporting the 
internal audit function argued interviewee 19. The growth in audit fees 
is an area of concern which requires further research in order to see if 
this growth matches with the value created for banks by auditors. 
Respondents confirmed that Audit Committees are important 
stakeholders in the management of risk and internal control of any 
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organization. Their skills are important for mitigating risk, improving 
transparency and reporting argued interviewee 3. 
 
7.2 Board Composition 
 
It is proposed that the requirement for the composition of board 
members be changed. Banks should be administered by executive 
directors, who will take full responsibility of the running of the bank. 
NEDs and IDs can be used as consultants to the banks as they do 
not have enough time to add value to the administration of the bank. 
If EDs takes ownership of management of the bank then IDs and 
NEDs will concentrate on their major functions of watchdog, trustee 
and pilot of strategy formulation, which will improve value creation. 
 
Their role has been observed to be mostly of business development 
than policy and strategy formulation. Why there have been a big 
number of banks that failed was as a result of NEDS and IDs not 
performing their fiduciary duties including risk management and 
monitoring. If fraud and non-compliance can happen in their presents 
then it is true that they do not know what happens in the bank. 
 
7.3 Conflict of Interest 
 
Diagram 6.1 shows the sociometric that exists at board level and the 
related service providers. In order for the banks to solve this paradox 
there is great need to appoint directors as stewards together with the 
owners. The removal of NEDs and IDs from the board will reduce the 
issue of conflict of interest as the executive directors will be full 
responsible for their actions. 
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Why should shareholders put reliance on third parties (auditors) when 
they have appointed directors to look after their interests? Reliance 
should be on the executives; hence NEDs and IDs should only be 
used as consultants if their skills are required by the bank. 
 
7.4 Continuous Professional Development  
 
Board members of banks are mostly highly qualified in the financial 
markets, with a few successful business people. Most of the NEDs 
and IDs are executives of big corporates and entrepreneurs who are 
very busy people. Directors need to be knowledgeable about the 
business of the bank and changes thereof, hence need to be 
inducted and trained in this field. All bank directors should be put in 
development programmes so that they can be aware of the changes 
in the industry argued King during the interviews. 
 
Directors can be accredited by the IOD, who will develop 
programmes for this purpose. The Reserve Bank of SA has arranged 
with GIBS to train bank directors in all aspects of the banking 
business. Once a director completes the programme, he/she will be 
an accredited director of the bank. This will improve compliance and 
effectiveness of each board member argued Myburgh.  
 
7.5 Independent Auditors 
 
There is no such thing as auditor independence argued (Turnbull 
2006: 1). During the interviews it was clear that bank directors and 
auditors are members of the same professional board Diagram 6.1). 
They share same information and knowledge; hence the collegiality 
theory comes into play. 
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As a policy change proposal, the researcher submits that the role of 
auditing can be done by the Audit Committees through the internal 
audit function. The internal audit departments need to be staffed with 
highly skilled accountants who will develop the skills required by the 
bank. Internal Auditors are the best people to manage risk and 
monitor compliance as they spend more time in the bank than 
External Auditors who only visit the bank twice a year. 
 
In compliance with the (Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002), the Audit 
Committee will take the responsibility of signing the financial 
statements and issuing a statement on the going concern, true and 
fairness of the financial reports. This proposal will improve 
transparency and disclosure of information as per the conceptual 
framework (Appendix 3). The researcher believes that this can be a 
solution to the issue of information asymmetry.   
 
The gearing of the bank is an important aspect of monitoring 
compliance and risk management as the lenders will always monitor 
the gearing of the banks. Affordability of the bank to pay its loans, 
liquidity and the interest cover ratios are the signs of how the bank is 
managed. Debt issuers always monitor the performance of debt 
holders, in the same process they will be managing the effectiveness 
of the bank taking away the role being played by Auditors. 
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8 Research Integration 
 
The most important predictor of director effectiveness is not independence, 
but strategic experience that matches the bank’s needs …… Evidence that 
director experience is critical to board effectiveness is relatively new. 
However, evidence that board and auditor independence has neutral to 
negative effects on board effectiveness argued (Cornforth 2001: 218 and 
Ingley and Van Der Walt 2002: 164). The more experience the board the 
more transparent and accountable (Chart 3.1.3: document 2). Generally, 
the results from the research suggest that there is no statistical evidence of 
the relationship between corporate performance and proportion of outside 
directors on the board. 
 
All the themes raised on the research objectives and questions are 
answered by the director experience and ethical conduct of board 
members argued interviewee 5. Experience and social systems are the 
major triggers that activate the mechanisms on the conceptual framework, 
in order for the bank to follow the CG principles, which will result in better 
corporate performance that add value to shareholders. Like (Nadler 2004: 
102 and Leblanc 2004: 437) argued, that the key to better CG lies in the 
working relationships between executive directors and managers, in the 
social dynamics of board interaction and in the competence, integrity and 
constructive involvement of individual directors.  
 
Stewardship theory is an element of the social dynamics, where directors 
are motivated by sense of belonging not by agents’ costs, which is the 
solution to the agency theory. How, when and why boards act, or fail to act 
is best determined by the social dynamics. Independence is irrelevant. 
Placing reliance on Auditors is the major cause for the failure of corporate 
governance. Executive directors should take their stewardship role and be 
accountable to the reporting and performance of the banks argued 
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interviewee 3. This research therefore is integrated on the level of skill, 
experience and stewardship theory, which triggers most of the positive 
mechanism on the conceptual framework, while answering the research 
questions. 
 
8.1 Summary 
 
To avoid mandatory restrictive over regulation, active voluntary self-
regulation, particularly in terms of confidence, accountability, 
ownership and growth is necessary. If not there will never be a 
perfect “system” of corporate governance. It is important that, the 
most obvious abuses will be outlawed and loopholes closed, but the 
ingenuity of self-interest will lead to the devising of new schemes to 
evade accountability. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
Radical change over the last decade has focused the spotlight on the 
principles by which enterprises are governed and advanced the 19th 
century legal basis of the Anglo-American governance model appears ill-
matched not only to the realities of the 21st century stated (Plender 2003: 
21-24), but to the variety of board and company structures composed to 
create long-term value for shareholders. There is an assumption within the 
literature that CG research has adopted a Darwinian view (companies 
survive because they have optimal governance structures and diminish 
because they fail to adapt to the changing environment and requirements) 
(Kole and Lehn 1997: 421). CG and board performance are inextricably 
linked but little is understood as Forbes and Milliken (1999: 502) stated 
that, understanding the nature of effective board functioning is among the 
most important areas of management research as more about behavioural 
dynamics (the relationship between executive, IDs and NEDs) needs to be 
reviled (McNulty et al 2002). 
 
It is clear that banks are currently attempting to redefine CG with practices 
that extend past rules and regulations in order to demonstrate their own 
brand of ethics, honesty, integrity and transparency. The development of 
effective evaluation is critical to the ongoing effort to understand and 
improve board performance, enhance individual contribution and satisfy 
shareholder concerns. Of equal importance is the transparency of 
disclosure regarding evaluation outcomes to shareholders, other 
stakeholders and the timely manner in which boards incorporate change, 
(a culture of openness and constructive dialogue in an environment of trust 
and mutual respect). 
 
The key to better corporate governance lies in the working relationships 
between boards and managers, in the social dynamics of board 
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interaction, and in the competence, integrity, knowledge, experience and 
constructive involvement of individual directors. Clearly, board structure is 
not as important a factor in determining board effectiveness as is normally 
believed; board membership and director competencies are quite 
important; and most significantly the behavioural characteristics of 
individual directors are crucial, if not determinant, of overall board 
effectiveness has been the evidence from the research.   
 
The key isn’t structural, it’s social. The most involved, diligent, value-added 
boards may or may not follow every recommendation in the good-
governance handbook and King 11 Report. What distinguishes exemplary 
boards is that they are robust, effective and social systems are functional. 
The outcome of this research is that there is a strong positive correlation 
between skills, experience, independence and organizational performance. 
The trigger for transparency is the social behaviour of directors, auditors 
and shareholders. 
 
In reality, principals and agents do not always share common information 
and have limited capabilities to process the available information (bounded 
rationality). The situation becomes even more complex when the principal 
loses full control over the firm (non-family shareholder enters the 
ownership structure) or is not fully informed about the variables affecting 
his/her utility function. There will never be a “perfect” system of corporate 
governance argued (Clarke 2004: 160).  
 
This is why corporate governance is about wealth creation, compliance 
and risk-management. Continued efforts to make corporate governance 
both improve corporate performance and enhance corporate accountability 
are vital and ongoing. The continuous raising of standards of disclosure 
will be critical to effective corporate governance. The reason corporate 
governance standards and reforms will increase in future as a matter of 
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public concern is that more of the public will have more of their wealth 
invested in companies they will insist should behave responsibly. The 
volatility of markets is part of the cycle of risk and return, and the 
significance of corporate governance is to mitigate the most damaging 
outcomes whilst encouraging the most positive.  
 
9.1 Statement of new and useful knowledge 
 
The researcher found out from the respondents that the belief that 
independence reduces information asymmetry is a fallacy. 
Transparency happens as executive directors take responsibility and 
accountability of the administration of the bank argued interviewee 3, 
5, 6, 10, 11 and 19. The field of corporate governance is at cross 
roads. Our knowledge of what we know about efficacy of corporate 
governance mechanisms are revealed by what we do not know and 
believe in argued (Daily et al 2003: 371).  
 
The legal framework put practitioners between parallel lines so that 
researchers can believe that auditor and director independence 
exists. Independence is not as easy as the “regulatory definitions” 
would indicate. This is so because much of what compromises 
independence may only be identified within the boardroom, in the 
context of specific decision-making situations and the individual 
involved. The effectiveness of individual directors, including their 
independence of mind, competencies and behaviours, not just their 
“regulatory” independence, matters in this regard argued 
(Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004: 317). 
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Board dynamics and social systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 9.1: An Effective board 
 
The useful knowledge developed in this research is the board 
dynamics and social systems (Chart 9.1). This creates effectiveness 
and motivation to take responsibility in the dissemination of 
information to shareholders. The missing link in establishing the 
relationship between board effectiveness and corporate performance 
may be an understanding of that elusive activity called board 
processes and setup, which will result in excellent corporate 
performance argued (Hendry and Kiel 2004: 505). 
 
Interviewee 19 developed a new interesting board developmental 
process that links well with Diagram 6.1, Table 6.2, Table 6.4.1 and 
Document 4 Table 5.3.2: 60, which argues that boards are 
categorized according to their social behaviour and performance of 
the bank. This categorization of boards was after his research on 
board dynamics and effectiveness in 2008. This model fits very well 
with the findings in document 4 and the ranking thereof, which form 
part of the new knowledge and arrangement of corporate governance 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Board structure 
Information 
asymmetry 
Board 
strategic role 
 Strategic 
control 
Financial 
control 
 
Bank 
performance 
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evaluation process. The boards were grouped or ranked into three 
categorize being: 
 
1. The Ceremonial Boards: Exist to perform their duties 
perfunctorily (Country club or passive board) 
a. Buddies club 
b. Wiser than thou attitude to Board newcomers 
c. Management has all ducks in a row ‐ scripted 
d. Presentation – Tight Agenda 
e. Little or No CEO – Board Communication between Board 
Meetings 
f. Directors Perform a compliance Role – Love the prestige  
g. Resolutions proposed by Management rubber‐stamped 
 
2. The Liberated Board: Free of CEO/EXCO Domination 
(Representative board) 
a. Sarbanes Oxley a Milestone: New Generation CEOs 
expect Boards to contribute  
b. Directors expect active participation as condition of 
acceptance  
c. Impetus from scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc  
d. Then Sarbanes Oxley 2007  
e. The Capital Markets began to price quality of transparency 
and good governance into securities. 
 
3. The Progressive Board: Focus on enduring company success, 
beyond any CEO’s reign, transcending any single market 
opportunity or product cycle (Professional board) 
a. Comply meticulously with the letter of the law; also, 
embrace its spirit 
b. Focus on sustainability of company 
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c. Typically effective as a team – gel 
d. Directors maintain independence 
e. Collaborative Constructive working relationship between 
CEO and Board – Board still confronting issues 
f. Board adds value at many levels without being wasteful of 
time 
g. Constructive and focused feedback 
h. Management’s strategy – setting diverse; enriched by 
directors’ diverse perspectives on the external environment 
i. Progressive boards take the selfevaluation/evaluation 
seriously and implement findings 
j. Consciously move from compliance to value add 
k. This way they become an intrinsic competitive advantage 
 
9.2 Reflective Critique 
 
The learning during the research included the fact that, corporate 
governance crisis and reform is essentially cyclical. Waves of 
corporate governance reform and increased regulation occur during 
periods of recession, corporate collapse and re-examination of the 
viability of regulatory systems. When board dynamics and social 
systems are incorporated as part of the corporate governance best 
practice, will regulatory framework address the paradox?  
 
As an accountant the information gathered during this research did 
not make sense as the researcher could not find evidence of director 
and auditor independence. In the researcher’s mind, independence is 
influenced by what an individual receives yet there are so many 
dynamics involved in people’s behaviour especially at board level. 
Board members are expected to conduct themselves in a 
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professional manner as their decisions affect the operations of the 
bank. The King 11 Report states that boards should be composed of 
majority independent directors in order to improve on transparency 
and independent opinion when making decisions. Auditors are 
required to be independent so that their opinion after the audit of the 
bank can be relied on by different stakeholders including 
shareholders who place reliance on auditors’ opinion. The 
professional conduct of these two bodies has an impact on how 
banks perform and disclose information. 
 
 The wave of corporate failures was caused by directors in most 
instances and the success of most corporates was caused by 
directors. How different they are cannot be quantified besides to 
theorize that there are two schools of thought “stewardship and 
conflict of interest,” which the researcher could not quantify. This 
created problems to understand how one can separate the two 
schools of thought. The most recent interesting failure of AIG and 
Lehman Brothers intrigues every researcher and scholar as these 
organizations were the leading advisors of risk management and 
investment banking. 
 
Everyone knows how this story ends. Lehman Brothers, the once 
storied investment bank, collapses in the fall of 2008. Its 
bankruptcy—the largest ever—triggers a financial crisis, which sends 
the global economy into a tailspin. But the story of the bank's journey 
to its grave has never been so poignantly told as in A Colossal 
Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the Collapse of 
Lehman Brothers by Lawrence G. McDonald, a vice-president at 
Lehman from 2004 to 2008, and Patrick Robinson. While the crisis 
has spawned many books, McDonald's is among the first from an 
insider and is the front-runner on the subject of Lehman. He 
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witnessed, often in amazement and disgust, the corporate 
dysfunction and hubristic leadership that led to the bank's demise. 
 
However as a realist, the researcher had to reflect on how the 
concept of Ubuntu (the spirit of humanity - based on the premise that 
the individual is entitled to respect because of his cordial coexistence 
with others, a hierarchical political ideology, but one based on an 
inclusive system of consultation at various levels) affect human life 
and behaviour, (respect, which is grounded both in the nature of 
African people and in the nature of all races). The author then came 
to realize that directors are driven by the need to succeed and when 
they fail, some fail as a result of the behaviour of others while others 
fail as a result of their behaviour. 
 
9.3 Look forward to document 4 and 5 
 
Document 3 has prepared the qualitative framework on which the 
quantitative analysis will be based. The flow of arguments raised in 
this document will be tested using quantitative tests using (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28) tools in document 4 cost – to – income ratio, 
and the ROCE and CFROTA model developed by (Dulewicz and 
Herbert 2004) in document 5, in testing the effectiveness of directors.. 
 
Document 1 stated that, triangulation model will be used to 
consolidate work done in document 3 and 4 supported by the 
literature review. Research questions will be answered, solutions 
proposed and new policies recommended. A proactive legal 
framework will be proposed as well in document 5. 
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ABSA Group 
 
1. Dr D C Cronje, Dcom – Non Executive Chairman 
Dr Danie Cronje is 59 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce 
(Dcom) and he is the chairman of ABSA Group since 1987. He is 
also the chairman for Sage Group, ABSA Foundation, ABSA Group 
Retirement Fund, and director of Idion Technology Holdings Ltd. His 
executive career dates back to 1975 when he joined Volkskas, 
where he held various positions in the Merchant Bank division. He 
became Deputy CEO subsequently CEO of ABSA after the name 
change until 1997. Danie has 31 years experience with ABSA. 
 
2. Dr S Booysen, CA (SA), Dcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Dr Steve Booysen is 42 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce and 
is Chartered Accountant. He is the CEO for ABSA Group since 2004. 
After completing his articles with Ernst and Young in 1983 he 
became a lecturer in accounting at the University of South Africa 
until 1988. He was appointed Senior Manager: Finance at TrustBank 
until 1994 when he was appointed General Manager: Group Finance 
at ABSA. He later joined ABSA Corporate and Merchant Bank where 
he rose to Deputy Operating Executive, the Group Executive 
Director before he was appointed Group CEO. 
 
3. J H Schindehutte, Bcom (Hons), CA (SA), HDip Tax – CFO 
Jacques is 46 years old and is the CFO for ABSA Group after joining 
the group in 1999 as Group Executive: Finance. He is responsible 
for Group Finance, office of the General Counsel, Group Economic 
Research, Investor Relations and Group Secretariat. He served his 
articles with Ernst and Young before joining Portnet and Transnet 
until 1999. 
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4. Dr D Baloyi, PHD (International Education Development) – 
Independent NED 
Danisa is 50 years old and she is an Independent board member of 
ABSA Group since 2004. She currently sits on 8 boards and she is 
an Executive Director of the National Black Business Caucus. 
 
5. A S Du Plessis, Bcom, CA (SA), HDip Tax, AMP – Independent 
NED 
Attie is 62 years old and has been an Independent director since 
1992. He chairs the Group Audit, Group Risk, Credit, and Board 
Lending Committees. He is also Chairman for Gencor Ltd, Sanlam 
Ltd, KWV Group Ltd and various other companies besides being an 
Executive Director for Sankop Ltd. 
 
6. L W Maasdorp, BA, Msc Economics – NED 
Leslie is 39 years old appointed in 2004 as a non-executive director 
representing the interests of the BEE Company Banke consortium. 
He is Chairman of Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority, South Africa 
Weather Services and sit on the boards of Coega Development 
Corporation, Johannesburg Property Company and Yard Capital 
 
7. T M C Sexwale, Certificate in Business Studies - NED 
Tokyo is 53 years old appointed to the ABSA Group board in 2001 
representing the BEE consortium Batho Bonke. He is the owner and 
Executive Chairman of Mvelaphanda Holdings Pty Ltd, Chairman of 
Northam Platinum Ltd, Trans Hex Group Ltd, Gold Fields Ltd, former 
member of the ANC National Executive Committee and Premier of 
Gauteng. 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
108 
 
8. Group Secretariat – W R Somerville, ACIS, ACMA, Dip Corp Law 
William is 49 years old and is the Group Company Secretary since 
1990. 
 
 
FirstRand Group 
 
10  T Ferreira Bcom (Hons) B (B&A), MBA – Non Executive 
Chairman 
Gerrit is 59 years old and has been involved in the financial services 
sector since graduating from the University of Stellenbosch.  He 
started his career at the Bank of Johannesburg and was a co-
founder of Rand Consolidated Investments (“RCI”) in 1977.  RCI 
acquired control of Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he 
was elected as executive chairman.  When RMB Holdings was 
founded in 1987 he was appointed chairman, a position which he still 
holds.  Following the formation of First Rand in 1998 he was 
appointed non-executive chairman.  He is a member of the Council 
of the University of Stellenbosch. 
 
Directorships 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee Remuneration committee. 
First Rand Bank Holdings – Chairman Glenrand MIB Momentum 
Group RMB Holdings – Chairman VenFin. 
 
11  L Dippenaar  CA (SA), Mcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Lauritz is 58 years old and he graduated from Pretoria University, 
qualified as a chartered accountant with Aiken & Carter (now KPMG) 
and spent three years with the Industrial Development Corporation 
before becoming co-fonder of Rand Consolidated Investments 
(“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 
1985 and he became an executive director.  He was appointed 
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managing director in 1988, which position he held until 1992 when 
RMB Holdings (“RMBH”) acquired a controlling interest in 
Momentum Life Assurers, the fifth largest insurance company in 
South Africa at that rime.   He was appointed as executive chairman 
of that company, a position he held until being appointed chief 
executive officer of First Rand in 1998. 
Directorships 
FirstRand – memberships Audit committee Executive committee – 
chairman 
Discovery Holdings – Chairman First Rand Bank Holdings 
Momentum Group – Chairman OUTsurance – Chairman RMB Asset 
Management RMB Holdings. 
 
12 P K Harris MCom – Chief Executive Officer 
 
Paul is 57 years old and has graduated from the University of 
Stellenbosch and joined the Industrial Development Corporation 
where he served for a number of years.  He was a co-founder of 
Rand Consolidated Investments (“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of 
Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he became an executive 
director of the bank.  He spend four years in Australia where he 
founded Australian Gilt Securities (later to become RMB Australia) 
and returned to South Africa in 1991 where he was appointed deputy 
managing director of RMB.  In 1992 he took over as managing 
director and chief executive officer.  He has been chief executive 
officer of FirstRand Bank Holdings since July 1999. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – membership’s Executive committee 
FirstRand Bank Holdings, Momentum Group, Remgro Limited, RMB 
Holdings. 
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13 K C Shubane BA (Hons); MBA – Independent NED 
Khehla is 51 years old and graduated at University of the 
Witwatersrand.  Prior to this he was a student at the University of the 
North where his studies were terminated following his arrest for 
political activities, conviction and sentence which he served on 
Robben Island.  Upon his released he was employed at Liberty Life 
for a short time. He served on various political organizations until 
joining the Centre for Policy Studies in 1988.  He is an author and 
has co-authored several political publications and is a member of the 
board of the Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand memberships – Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee 
FCB South African, Newhco, Nurcha, RMB Holding.  
 
14 J P Burger Bcom (Hons), CA (SA) 
 
Johan is 48 years old and he is the founding member of the bank. 
He has been with the bank since its incorporation as the CFO. 
 
15 S E Nxasana Bcom, Bcompt (Hons), CA (SA) – CEO FirstRand 
Banking Group 
Sizwe is 49 years old, he started his career at Unilever. In 1989, he 
established Sizwe & Company, the first black owned audit practice in 
Kwazulu Natal. In 1996, he became the founding partner of Nkonki 
Sizwe Ntsaluba, the first black owned national firm of accountants 
and was national Managing Partner until 1998 when he joined 
Telkom SA as Chief Executive Officer. He held this position until 
2005. 
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His experience in the financial sector includes being a NED of NBS 
Boland Bank, DBSA from 1995 to 1998, and Chairman of Mesele-
Hoskens Insurance Group from 1994 to 1996. He joined the board of 
FirstRand Bank Holdings in 2003 and was appointed CEO from 
2006. During the same year he was appointed a NED of FirstRand. 
 
Board membership: FirstRand Executive Committee, Zenex Trust 
 
16 N N Gwagwa BA (Fort Hare); MTRP (Natal); MSc (cum laude) 
(London); PhD (London) – Independent NED 
Nolulamo is 47 years old.  She worked as a town planner in the 
private, public and NGO sector between 1981 and 1986, whereafter 
she proceeded to further her studies.  In 1992 she joined the 
University of Natal as a senior lecture in the Department of Town 
and Regional Planning.  In 1995 she was appointed as a deputy 
director general in the national Department of Public Works, where 
she was responsible for the national public works programme and 
the transformation of the construction industry.  From 1998 to 2003 
she was the chief executive office of the Independent Development 
Trust.  She is currently an independent development consultant. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee; Financial sector charter and transformation monitoring 
committee. 
ACSA, Development Bank of South Africa. 
 
17 S  E N Sebotsa LLB (Hons); LSE; MA (McGill); SFA – NED 
Sonja is 34 years old.  Her studying areas were Law, Business and 
Economics.  She started her career in investment banking at 
Deusche Morgan Grenfell Johannesburg in 1997 working on M & A 
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transactions, privatizations and BEE deals.  She left Deutsche Bank 
almost six years later, after having spent some time working in their 
London and Tokyo offices.  Leaving Deutsche Bank as a Vice 
President in late 2002 she took up an executive position with the 
WDB Group where her role largely involves negotiating and 
executing BEE transactions on behalf of the WDB’s sole 
shareholder, the WDB Trust. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – membership Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee 
Adcorp Holdings, Makalani Holdings, Paracon Holdings, Willis South 
Africa. 
 
18 Prof M W King CA (SA); FCA – Independent NED and Chairman 
of the King 11 Report 
He is 69 years old. He graduated at the University of Witwatersrand 
as a lawyer.  He qualified as a chartered accountant with Deloittes.  
In 1961 he joined Union Acceptances and was deputy managing 
director from 1972 to 1974.  He left to join Anglo American 
Corporation of SA, and was finance director from 1979 to 1997.  He 
became executive deputy chairman in 1997, executive vice-
chairman of Anglo American plc in 1999, and retired in May 2001.  
He served on the board of Barclays Bank DCO South Africa, whose 
name was changed in 1987 to First National Bank of Southern 
Africa. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – membership Audit committee – Chairman Directors’ 
affairs and governance committee Remuneration committee. 
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FirstRand Bank Holdings, African Rainbow Minerals, Sturrock and 
Robson Holdings, The Tongaat-Hulett Group 
 
Nedbank Group 
 
19 Dr R J Khoza, BA (Hons) Psychology (UNIN), MA Markerting 
Management (University of Lancaster), EngD (University of 
Warwick), IPBM-IMD (Lausanne), PMD (Havard) – Non Executive 
Chairman 
 
Reuel is 58 years old, a businessman, a director of companies, was 
appointed to the Nedbank board in 2005. He is a Chairman of Aka 
Capital, Nedbank Group, Corobrik, NEPAD Business Foundation 
and Murray and Robberts Cementation. He is also a board member 
of Nampak Limited, Protea Hospitality Group, Old Mutual Plc and 
Gold Reef Resorts Limited. Reuel is also a president of the Institute 
of Directors and in this capacity served on the King 11 Committee on 
Corporate Governance. He is founder of the Black Management 
Forum and former Chairman of Eskom.  
 
20 M L Ndlovu, Dip LR (Unisa), MAP (Wits), EDP (North West), AMP 
(Havard) – NED Vice Chairman 
 
Maduke is 56 years old, was appointed to the Nedbank board in 
1994. He is a director of 20 companies besides being a member of 
four committees. 
 
21 T A Boardman, Bcom, CA(SA) CEO 
 
Thomas is 58 years old, was appointed in 2002 to turnaround the 
bank after its near collapse. He was previously CEO and executive 
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director of BOE Limited and before that he was a director of 
Boardmans and Sam Newman Limited and BOE International 
Holdings Limited and Northwind Investments. He is a NED of Mutual 
and Federal Insurance Company Limited a subsidiary of Nedbank 
and The Banking Association of South Africa. 
 
22 M Brown, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Financial Director 
 
Mike is 41 years old, after qualifying as a CA at Deloitte and Touche 
he joined NBS Treasury department in 1993. He then moved to BOE 
corporate as General Manager and was later appointed MD in 1999. 
After the merger of Nedbank and BOE in 2002 he was appointed MD 
of Property and Asset Finance. 
 
In June 2004 Mike was appointed FD and executive director of 
Nedbank Group. His area of responsibility include Asset and Liability 
Management, Group capital management, Tax, Financial reporting, 
and investor relations. 
 
23 T C P Chikane, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Independent NED 
 
Thenjiwe is 42 years old, was appointed to the board in 2006 and 
she is the CEO of MGO Consulting. She was previously Head of the 
Gauteng Department of Finance and Economic Affairs and she is a 
board member of Development Bank of Southern Africa, PetroSA 
and State Information Technology Agency 
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24 Prof B De Lacy Figaji, Bsc (Eng) Dip Tertiary Edu Med, DEd 
(Coventry University), DLitt (hc) (California) 
 
Prof Brian is 63 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002. Brian 
is the Chairman of HHO Africa Pty Ltd, I & J Limited, MARIB 
Holdings. He is a board member of PetroSA, Cape Lime Pty Limited, 
ASSET (Educational Trust) (Trustee), Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and a former Vice – Chancellor of the Peninsula 
Technikon. 
 
25 G T Serobe, Bcom (Unitra), MBA (Rutgers) 
 
Gloria is 48 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002 and she is 
the CEO of Wipcapital. She is the founder and executive director of 
WIPHOLD. She was previously the executive director, finance at 
Transnet and serves on the boards including JSE Limited, FSC 
Council, Old Mutual Life Assurance Company South Africa Limited. 
 
Standard Bank Group 
 
26 Cooper, CA (SA) – Non Executive Chairman 
Derek is 66 years old and was appointed Chairman since 1993. He 
is also Chairman of Standard Bank Africa, Liberty Group and Liberty 
Holdings, Standard Bank Plc and president of Business Leadership 
South Africa. 
 
27 J Maree, Bcom, MA (Oxford) PMD (Harvard) – Chief Executive 
Officer 
Jacko is 51 years old and was appointed CEO in 1997. He is a 
director of Standard Bank, Liberty Group, Liberty Holdings, Stanbic 
Africa Holdings, SBIC Investments SA, Standard International SA 
and Chairman of Standard Bank Plc. 
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28 S Macozoma, BA, (Unisa) BA (Hons) (Boston) - NED 
Saki is 49 years old, a businessman and he is a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of many companies including 
Standard Bank Group, The Standard Bank of SA, Liberty Group, 
Liberty Holdings, Deputy Chairman of Safika Holdings, Chairman of 
Andisa Capital, Cahirman of Business Trust, Chairman Lliso 
Consulting, Chairman of Stalib, Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 2 and VW 
South Africa. He sits on different committees within the companies 
he is a board member. 
 
29 C Ramaphosa, BProc (Unisa) - NED 
Cyril is 54 years old, a businessman and a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of Standard Bank Group, 
Standard Bank South Africa, Alexander Forbes, Macsteel Holdings, 
Mondi South Africa, MTN Group (Chairman), MTN International 
(Chairman), SAB Miller, SASRIA, Shanduka Holdings (Chairman), 
The Bidvest Group (Chairman) and Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 1 
 
30 Dr C Strauss, BA, PHD (Rhodes), MS(Cornell), AMP (Havard), 
FIBSA, DEcon (hc) (Rhodes, Dsc (hc) (Pretoria) 
 
Conrad is 71 years old and was appointed to the board of Standard 
Bank Group in 1984. He is a board member of Standard Bank 
Group, Standard Bank SA, African Oxygen and Hans Merensky 
Holdings. 
 
31 K Moroka, BProc, (Uni of the North), LLB (Wits) 
 
Kgomotso is 52 years old and was appointed to the board of 
Standard Bank Group in 2003. She is a director of Standard Bank 
Group, Standard Bank SA, Electronic Media Network (M-Net), 
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Gobodo Forensic and Investigative Accounting (Chairperson) New 
Seasons Investments Holdings and South African Breweries. 
 
32 S Ridley, Bcom (Natal), CA(SA), AMP (Oxford) 
Simon is 51 years old and he joined the group in 1999 and was 
appointed Financial Director in 2002. 
 
 
Other Corporate Governance Practitioners 
 
33 Advocate J Myburgh 
 
John is 52 years old and trained as a lawyer and was admitted to the 
bench 32 years ago. He chairs a lot of boards and is a member of 
the SARB advisory board and he is a lecturer of law. 
 
34 T Dixon 
 
Tony is 53 years old and he is an executive director of the IOD. He is 
an advisor and sits on different boards. Tony is also a lecture of 
Corporate Governance 
35 T Mboweni - South Africa Reserve Bank Governor 
 
36 G Gono - Zimbabwe Reserve Bank Governor 
 
37 X P Guma - Deputy South Africa Reserve Bank Governor 
 
38 C L Dhliwayo - Deputy Zimbabwe Reserve Bank Governor 
 
39 N Ncube - Deputy Zimbabwe Reserve Bank Governor 
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2E2 ABSA Towers North 
180 Commissioner Street 
Johannesburg 2000 
 
24 October 2006  
 
The Board of Directors 
All Banks 
 
Att: Chairman of the Board 
 
Subject: Doctorate in Business Administration Research 
 
Introduction 
My name is Cleopas Sanangura, working for ABSA as Consultant: Corporate 
Asset Finance based in Johannesburg (ABSA head office). 
 
I am currently doing a DBA (Doctorate in Business Administration) and the 
topic I am researching on is as follows: Behind the boardroom door. The 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value and the 
effect of shareholder activism in financial service sector in emerging 
markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
My Research Objectives 
b. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect 
good corporate governance practices. The factors will be used to 
assess why investors prefer other portfolios and why they perform 
differently while operating in the same environment. Companies to be 
covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First Rand Bank, 
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Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe 
(CBZ) and Stanbic. 
c. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
d. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
 
 
It is a requirement that I have to contact interviews and do some observations 
on how the board contacts itself in executing its duties. I therefore request your 
permission to interview the following board members listed below including 
yourself. As you are the CEO, you have been selected to participate in this 
research and assist me in developing new knowledge on director effectiveness 
in emerging markets in the financial sector in South Africa. I am interested in 
your personal experience, knowledge, observations and opinions in this field. I 
would appreciate through your office if I can interview the directors of the bank 
as per the profiles attached. 
 
I want to make it perfectly clear from the onset that complete confidentiality is 
guaranteed and that anything you might say in the course of the interviews will 
remain anonymous. Your contribution may be quoted in the study, but will not 
be attributed to you if need be. I propose that I will be recording all the 
interviews, for the sole reason of having an accurate account for transcribing 
which I intend to do in the next few days. I will wipe off all the tapes as soon as 
I have transcribed them and in the meantime I will be keeping them in a secure 
place. 
 
I have some open ended questions that I propose to ask, which I am sending 
together with this introductory letter.  There are issues that you may wish to 
contribute to my research, which you can submit under general comments. If 
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you require any clarification at any stage, please do not hesitate to call me. My 
contact details are as follows: 
 
Cleopas Sanangura 
ABSA – Corporate Asset Finance 
Tel:  +27 11 350 9440 
Fax:  +27 11 350 6195 
Mobile: +27 82 943 8700 
Email: cleopass@absa.co.za 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Objectives 
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a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect 
good corporate governance practices. These factors will be used to 
assess why investors prefer other counters than others and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. 
Companies to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, 
First Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial 
Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic bank. 
 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
 
c. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
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Questionnaires 
 
The Organization & Shareholder Activism 
 
1. What are the main causes of Corporate Governance failures in 
Emerging Markets as compared to developed markets? 
2. What are the factors/issues that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness of Corporate Governance? 
3. What are the important corporate governance attributes that influence 
performance of directors in order to meet shareholder expectations? 
4. You mentioned sustainable value creation strategies in the 2005 
financial report. How do you measure them? 
5. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of 
the board’s capabilities? How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs 
affect a director’s willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
6. What has been the participation of shareholder in creating value to the 
bank and involved are they? 
 
Environment 
1. What makes the bank different from others? 
2. If I we to appoint you CEO of another bank what impact will you make? 
3. How has the regulatory framework affected performance of banks in the 
country? 
4. Boards have been characterized as largely ceremonial bodies. What is 
you comment? 
5. How do you manage conflict of interest as it relates to Agency theory 
and stewardship theory? 
 
Directors 
 
1. How do NEDs creating shareholder value and does the bank need 
them? 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
124 
 
2. What type of qualities do you consider when appointing an individual to 
the board? 
3. Will training and accreditation of directors create value and impact on 
Corporate Governance in the financial service sector and how? 
4. How is power distributed among board members?  
5. How do you measure individual and collective board performance? 
 
Auditors 
 
1. How do auditors creating shareholder value? 
2. Can the bank operate with external auditors? What value do they add to 
the bank and to shareholders? 
 
 
General Comments 
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2E2 ABSA Towers North 
180 Commissioner Street 
Johannesburg 2000 
 
23 May 2007  
 
The Chief Executive Officer 
IOD 
25 Wellington Road 
Park Town 
Johannesburg 2000 
 
Att: Mr Tony Dixon 
 
Subject: Doctorate in Business Administration Research 
 
Introduction 
My name is Cleopas Sanangura, working for ABSA as Consultant: Corporate 
Asset Finance based in Johannesburg (ABSA head office). 
 
I am currently doing a DBA (Doctorate in Business Administration) and the 
topic I am researching on is as follows: Behind the boardroom door. The 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value and the 
effect of shareholder activism in financial service sector in emerging 
markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
My Research Objectives 
e. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect 
good corporate governance practices. These factors will be used to 
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assess why investors prefer other counters than others and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. Companies 
to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First Rand Bank, 
Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe 
(CBZ) and Stanbic bank. 
f. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
g. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
 
 
It is a requirement that I have to contact interviews and do some observations 
on how the board contacts itself in executing its duties. I therefore request your 
permission to interview yourself. As you are a director of the institute, you have 
been selected to participate in this research and assist me in developing new 
knowledge on director effectiveness in emerging markets in the financial sector 
in South Africa. I am interested in your personal experience, knowledge, 
observations and opinions in this field.  
 
I want to make it perfectly clear from the onset that complete confidentiality is 
guaranteed and that anything you might say in the course of the interviews will 
remain anonymous. Your contribution may be quoted in the study, but will not 
be attributed to you if need be. I propose that I will be recording all the 
interviews, for the sole reason of having an accurate account for transcribing 
which I intend to do in the next few days. I will wipe off all the tapes as soon as 
I have transcribed them and in the meantime I will be keeping them in a secure 
place. 
 
I have some open ended questions that I propose to ask, which I am sending 
together with this introductory letter.  There are issues that you may wish to 
contribute to my research, which you can submit under general comments. If 
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you require any clarification at any stage, please do not hesitate to call me. My 
contact details are as follows: 
 
Cleopas Sanangura 
ABSA – Corporate Asset Finance 
Tel:  +27 11 350 9440 
Fax:  +27 11 350 6195 
Mobile: +27 82 943 8700 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Objectives 
 
d. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate attributes that 
affect good corporate governance practices. The attributes will be 
used to assess why investors prefer other portfolios and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. 
Companies to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, 
First Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, and Stanbic 
bank. 
 
e. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
 
f. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
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Questionnaires 
 
The Organization & Shareholder Activism 
 
7. What are the main causes of Corporate Governance failures in 
Emerging Markets as compared to developed markets? 
8. What are the factors/issues that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness of Corporate Governance? 
9. What are the important corporate governance attributes that influence 
performance of directors in order to meet shareholder expectations? 
10. You mentioned sustainable value creation strategies in the 2005 
financial report. How do you measure them? 
11. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of 
the board’s capabilities? How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs 
affect a director’s willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
12. What has been the participation of shareholder in creating value to the 
bank and involved are they? 
 
Environment 
6. What makes the bank different from others? 
7. If I we to appoint you CEO of another bank what impact will you make? 
8. How has the regulatory framework affected performance of banks in the 
country? 
9. Boards have been characterized as largely ceremonial bodies. What is 
you comment? 
10. How do you manage conflict of interest as it relates to Agency theory 
and stewardship theory? 
 
Directors 
 
6. How do NEDs creating shareholder value and does the bank need 
them? 
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7. What type of qualities do you consider when appointing an individual to 
the board? 
8. Will training and accreditation of directors create value and impact on 
Corporate Governance in the financial service sector and how? 
9. How is power distributed among board members?  
10. How do you measure individual and collective board performance? 
 
Auditors 
 
3. How do auditors creating shareholder value? 
4. Can the bank operate with external auditors? What value do they add to 
the bank and to shareholders? 
 
 
General Comments 
 
 
 Relevance of the King 2 Report 
 Adv Myburgh Report 
 Cross directorships in banks 
 Independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
Nottingham Business School 
 
 
In Association with 
 
 
Nottingham College of Business, Law and Social Sciences 
 
 
Doctorate of Business Administration 
 
 
Document Four 
 
 
Structured research methods 
 
 
“Document four submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements of The 
Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctorate of Business 
Administration” 
 
Authored by   Cleopas Sanangura 
 
Student Number:  YA008250 
 
Date:    October 2007 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
ii 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ABSA  Amalgamated Bank of South Africa 
AGM  Annual General Meeting 
AIG  American International Group 
ANC  African National Congress 
BEE  Black Economic Empowerment 
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1 Terms of reference 
 
This document aims to further the research done in document 3 and answer 
the quantitative research questions in fulfilling the application of the 
conceptual framework (Document 2: 25). A critical literature review 
(document 2) articulated different issues that affect the effectiveness of 
directors which has an impact on effectiveness of the board and on corporate 
governance. 
 
This discussion will highlight the importance of participation of owners of 
banks in operations and the role that IDs and NEDs play in improving the 
effectiveness of the board. An assessment of the current measurement tools 
will be done for each bank and match this to the role of IDs and NEDs. The 
research questions will be revised in line with the new knowledge and 
contribution of respondents. 
 
Details of the research methods applied to date and the remainder of the 
programme will be discussed on Chapter 2. The methodology will be 
influenced by realism, and positivist approaches that include quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to data collection and analysis. A modernist approach 
to corporate governance will be taken in order to add value to the existing 
knowledge through assessing the following research objectives: 
a. Examining the effectiveness of the board of directors of banks 
b. The role of shareholders, IDs, NEDs and auditors in the 
performance of different banks 
c. Analyze the skills requirements for the banks and how they affect 
compliance issues. 
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d. Analyze the effect of recent changes to the legal framework and the 
proposed changes in the Companies Act and King 3 Report 
 
1.1 Background information to the study 
 
A number of theories of board behaviour have been propounded over 
a long period, dating back as far as the 18th century argued (Dulewicz 
and Herbert 2004: 263). A succinct review of these is provided by 
(Stiles and Taylor 2001), but three main theories are of relevance to 
this study in conjunction with the research questions and the 
conceptual framework.  
 
a. Agency Theory focuses on the agent–principal relationship to 
further our understanding of the governing board document 2 and 
3. The agency relationship is a contract under which one or more 
persons, the principals, engage another person, the agent, to 
perform some services on their behalf. This involves delegating 
authority to the agent. Agency theory incorporates important 
assumptions about managerial behaviour being self-interested, 
prone to moral hazard and evincing bounded rationality argued 
(Simon, 1976). According to (Stiles and Taylor 2001), the theory 
regards the board of directors as an instrument of control, which 
the author would test its functionality. 
 
b. Stewardship Theory propounds that there is no conflict of interest 
between directors, owners and that to be successful the 
organization requires a structure that allows coordination to be 
achieved most effectively. Document 2 and (Muth and Donaldson 
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1998: 6 - 10) pointed out that Stewardship Theory, in contrast to 
Agency Theory, recognizes a range of non-financial motives of 
managers found in the occupational psychology literature, for 
example need for advancement and recognition, intrinsic job 
satisfaction, respect for authority and the work ethic. 
 
c. The emergence of Stakeholder Theory, according to (Gay 2002: 
36), was prompted by the growing recognition by boards of the 
need to take account of the wider interests of society. Gay lists the 
essential premises upon which Stakeholder Theory rests. Citing 
(Jones and Wicks 1999: 206 - 221), as being, “the corporation has 
relationships with many constituent groups (stakeholders) that 
affect, and are affected by, its decisions; the theory is concerned 
with the nature of these relationships in terms of both processes, 
outcomes and focuses on managerial decision-making. The 
interests of all legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic value, and no 
set of interests is assumed to dominate the other”. 
 
Summarizing a long history of academic debate, (Stiles and Taylor 
2001) pointedly noted, “The view that one theory by itself does not 
illuminate the whole spectrum of board endeavor receives strong 
support from examination of their [emphasis added] shortcomings”. 
Presciently, (Pettigrew 1992: 178) opined:  
 
. . . the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by 
over-ambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board 
composition to outcome variables such as board and firm 
performance. The research agenda . . . need not be guided just by 
studies testing the explanatory power of agency theory or theories of 
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managerial hegemony. The task is perhaps a simpler one, to . . . . 
provide some basic descriptive findings about boards and their 
directors. 
 
“The gap between the contributions of theory and what practitioners 
are interested in seems to be widening. . . . Both Agency and 
Stewardship studies typically do not reflect the dynamics of 
governance – the interplay of power, conflict and ideology” argued 
(Tricker 1994: 55). This study is an attempt to narrow this gap. Whilst 
it seeks to provide some new evidence about the utility of three extent 
theories, its principal aim is to present evidence about real board 
practice alongside the company performance with which it is 
associated. It should, therefore, be of value to practicing directors, 
regulators, academics and it might illuminate a new direction in which 
theory might usefully be developed. 
 
1.2 Study to test the theories 
 
Although the author was unable to find in the literature any studies of 
the link between board practice and subsequent company 
performance, several studies have attempted to investigate the 
relationship between board composition and company performance. 
An article by (Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2001: 24) states: 
 
. . . the analysis of 40 years of data from 159 studies in the financial 
and service sectors, carried out by Dalton and Daily, concluded that 
there is no clear evidence of a substantive relationship between board 
composition and financial performance, irrespective of the type of 
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performance indicators, the size of the firm or the manner in which 
board composition is measured. . . . most empirical studies are not 
theory driven and, of those that are, most are focused on structural 
dimensions of the board with only speculative inference of board 
behaviour. 
 
However, one study has been selected for the development of 
taxonomy for styles of corporate governance, because the 
researchers concerned formulated a number of hypotheses to test the 
validity of Agency and Stewardship Theories. Muth and Donaldson 
(1998: 5 - 28), cited above, gathered data on the performance of 145 
Australian companies (40 in the financial, 85 in the services and 20 in 
the resource sectors) between 1992 and 1994 on the following 
measures, which the author is going to use in this document in testing 
the effectiveness of directors of the four banks: 
• Return on Assets (ROA) 
• Return on Equity (ROE) 
• Profit 
• Shareholder Wealth 
• Sales Growth 
 
They performed a factor analysis on the data and identified two 
independent performance factors: Profit Performance and Shareholder 
Wealth. Sales Growth, a single item, did not load onto either factor but 
the authors believed that, if a second Sales Growth item had been 
entered, Sales Growth would have probably constituted a third factor. 
Regarding board composition, they gathered data on ten variables 
relating to Chairman duality; number of executive, NED and total 
directors; interest alignment; age; tenure (mean); external organization 
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and director links; internal director links; and, highest number of 
director links. Again, a factor analysis on these variables produced two 
independent factors which they named: 
 
Board Independence: consisting of Chairman Duality; board size; 
proportion of IDs, NEDs; interest alignment with owners and average 
age of directors.  
 
Network Connections: consisting of average number of external 
organization links; average number of external director links 
(Document 3: Diagram 5.1: 38); average number of internal director 
links and highest number of links of an individual director as discussed 
in document 3 diagram 1.1:  2.  
 
In order to test their hypotheses, the two board structure (composition) 
factors were correlated with the two company performance factors. 
Their main findings were that “the Agency theory predictions relating 
to performance were not upheld, while those of stewardship theory 
were supported” (Muth and Donaldson, 1998: 26), which was 
supported by the author in document 2 and 3. In particular, 
significantly better results were achieved by companies whose boards 
had fewer independent directors (NEDs) and where the roles of 
Chairman and CEO were combined. Smaller boards almost 
exclusively composed of executive directors seemed to protect 
shareholders’ interests better than larger boards with a high proportion 
of IDs and NEDs argued (Muth and Donaldson 1998: 26) as will be 
reflected in this document. They concluded by advocating replication 
studies in the US and UK to see if their results stood up in countries 
with different boardroom structures and composition. 
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In a review of Muth and Donaldson’s study, (Hunt 1998) draw attention 
to the importance of their results in respect of board theories and 
corporate governance codes of best practice, and pointed out that the 
study, “has reminded us that there is a dearth of research on how 
boards actually work”. This research has also found out that there is 
now a thin line between agency and stewardship theories as a result 
of the level of experience, knowledge and training of current directors 
as compared to (Berle and Means’ 1932) argument separating the 
two. Even though there is now a thin line between agency and 
stewardship theories as a result of professional contact, the agency 
paradox has been replaced by independence paradox argued (Hunt 
1998: 7). 
 
1.3 Independence Paradox 
 
Many commentators compared the (Ahold bookkeeping scandal 2003) 
with (Enron 2002) and raised their concerns about the effectiveness of 
existing corporate governance structures. For example, in (Het 
Financieele Dagblad 2003) of 4 March, it was suggested that Ahold 
forced the Dutch to catch up with international corporate governance 
regulations. Although questions such as “Where were the auditors, 
independent and non-executive directors?” and “What were they 
doing?” (The Financial Times, 2 March 2002) are still being asked 
even today. 
 
Scandals like (BCCI 1991, Enron 2002, WorldCom 2002 and Ahold 
2003) are, however, not new argued (Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 
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2004: 314). In a study of 400 years of corporate governance history, 
covering the period 1602–2002, (Frentrop 2002) conscientiously 
shows that problems such as accountability of management and 
protection of the rights of (minority) shareholders have emerged since 
the foundation of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (“Dutch East 
India Company”), a partnership that seems to be a “modern 
corporation” (Berle and Means, 1932) avant la lettre. Many of the 
corporate governance problems can be blamed on the fact that in 
corporations with dispersed ownership it is the managers who control 
the corporation and, consequently, are able to pursue their own 
interests. Several devices have been put forward to mitigate this – 
from shareholders’ point of view – unwanted effect of the separation of 
ownership and control argued (Stiles and Taylor 2001). 
 
Executive directors are responsible for the operation of the bank; non-
executive and independent directors essentially fulfill two roles: 
“strategic advisor and corporate watchdog” argued (Short et al. 1999: 
339, Blanco- Fernandez 1993, Tricker 1994, Maassen 1999, Weimer 
and Paape 1999 and Stiles and Taylor 2001). Scandals and 
mismanagement incidents like BCCI, Maxwell and more recently 
Enron, WorldCom and Ahold, however, demonstrate that auditors, 
independent and non-executive directors have not always carried out 
their watchdog role effectively as a result of (document 2 and 3) fraud 
and financial misstatements. Additionally, such events have led to the 
establishment of various committees, such as (Cadbury 1992, King 2 
Report 2002, Greenbury Report 1996, Peters 1997, and Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act 2002), which have also failed to address the independence 
paradox. 
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These committees have contributed to the worldwide corporate 
governance debate. An important element in the debate is the 
effectiveness of independent and non-executive directors in 
monitoring a company’s management. From the many discussions 
and reports in journals, newspapers and different markets, it is clear 
that non-executive directors have to be independent of ED for them to 
be effective in their monitoring roles argued (Peters Committee 1997 
and OECD 1998). The question is how they can be independent when 
they are influenced by income they receive from the banks (document 
3: 38, Diagram 5.1) 
 
However, notwithstanding the emphasis on IDs and NEDs’ 
independence in the various reports and “Codes of best practices”, it 
remains questionable if IDs and NEDs are in practice able to 
effectively  execute their watchdog role. First of all, ID and NED 
directorship is a part-time function and many non-executive directors 
serve on many other boards as well argued (McNulty and Pettigrew 
1996, Maassen 1999 and document 3: 59). Furthermore, just like a full 
board of directors, a supervisory board only meets a few times a year, 
implying that non-executives spend only a limited amount of time to 
the company argued (Maassen 1999). This “makes it difficult for any 
outside, ID and NED to be fully informed about the affairs of a large, 
complex, fast-moving corporation” like a bank stated (Donaldson and 
Davis 1994: 157). Finally, IDs and NEDs have to rely on the 
information that is provided by the CEO to execute their function 
stated (Delfos-Roy 1997, Stiles and Taylor 2001). 
 
The auditors and executive directors of banks are mostly members of 
the institute of Chartered Accountants NEDS, IDs and ED belongs to 
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the same associations as reflected by (Document 3: Diagram 5.1: 38) 
and both derive income from the bank. Auditors provide audit and 
advisory services to the bank and derive income, hence calling banks 
key clients. Shareholders’ are interested in the capital and dividend 
growth (dividend policy), which then affect the whole concept of 
independence.  
 
Communities and other stakeholders like employees have little power 
in how income is distributed, hence have to benefit from the salaries 
and CSR expenditure. What causes the paradox is the scramble for 
the scarcy resources (income). Mitigating factor is that directors are 
regulated by their membership to the associations and are bound by 
the institutional ethics, which advocates for professional conduct 
argued interviewee 19. NEDs and IDs are business people whose 
businesses depend on the banks funding their financing requirements 
hence the conflict of interest affects their independence. 
 
The continuous failure of banks in South Africa, Zimbabwe and other 
countries as a result of conflict of interest necessitated this research. 
In 2005 alone there was a crisis in Zimbabwe as six banks collapsed 
(Barbican Bank, Century bank, CFX, Time Bank, Trust Bank and 
Intermarket Bank). In South Africa nine banks collapsed (New 
Republic Bank Ltd, Ons Eerste Volks Bank Ltd, The African Bank Ltd, 
Real African Duroling Investment Bank Ltd, Regal Treasury Bank Ltd, 
Saambou Bank Ltd, Southern Bank of Africa, TA Bank of South Africa 
Ltd, and The Business Bank Ltd) at the same time as in Zimbabwe. 
Major reasons for failure were failure of the regulatory framework, 
abusive insider trading and related party transactions. The impact to 
the market was huge, with depositors failing to access their 
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investments. The two economies nearly came to a standstill until the 
intervention of the two Governments who ended up injecting money in 
order to rescue the situation, which is the same situation in American 
and European counties {(USA US$700 billion) and UK GBP200 
billion)} who have spend millions bailing out banks as a result of the 
Global credit crunch.  
 
The paradox to this was that this was after the introduction of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, where investors had thought more 
stringent measures were in place to cab corruption and fraud. The SA 
Government had to inject over 200 billion rand in order to rescue the 
failed banks, which resulted in the formation of Amalgamated Banks of 
SA (ABSA). The amalgamation of failed banks was to make sure that 
they are supervised by the central bank and address the CG 
weaknesses. The same set up existed in Zimbabwe as most of the 
failed banks were consolidated into one bank Zimbabwe Banks 
Association Group (ZBAG), where the Government invested over 
US$100 million. The bailout plan has worked as ABSA and ZBAG 
have grown to be among the biggest banks in the Southern Africa 
region although shareholders suffered huge losses during the 
amalgamation process. 
 
1.4 Research progress and policy change 
 
This research was necessitated by the continuous failure of corporates 
and banks (BCCI 1991, WorldCom 2002, Enron 2002, Appendix 1 
Document 2, Fidentia 2007, Trust Bank 2004) while there is constant 
growth in legislation as reflected in document 1: 7 and document 2: 
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10. With such a background, shareholders are more worried with the 
state of CG world over. The author managed to answer the qualitative 
research questions raised in document 2: 15 -16 and developed a 
conceptual framework document 2: 25, which will be revised in 
document 5. 
 
Document 3 deliberated on the findings from respondents, who came 
up with necessary proposals in answering the research questions. 
What came out strongly was the training and experience of directors, 
which is a strong element to mitigate risk (fraud and corruption) and 
ethical issues in the banking industry. The conceptual framework 
developed in document 2: 25 and Appendix 7 will not be helpful if the 
skills level of directors is low. The implementation of the conceptual 
framework is based on triggering the mechanisms that produces an 
effective board. A concept of partnership in order to achieve societal 
and business objectives was proposed by (Demb and Friedrich 
Neubauer 1992). Nearly two decades of research finds little evidence 
that board or auditor independence enhances board effectiveness 
argued (Westphal 2002: 6 and Leblanc 2004). Tougher legislation; 
tighter control and regulatory reform (discussed document 2: 36) are 
insufficient as remedial measures to resolve problems of governance 
weakness that lead to corporate underperformance coined (Ingley and 
Van Der Walt 2003). 
 
In trying to solve CG problems document 3 proposed policy change 
options, which included the findings from the interviews. The Audit 
Committee needs to be resourced so that it can play a major role in 
risk management and expressing an opinion on the going concern of 
the banks argued interviewee 3. Independence is a personal issue as 
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human needs changes every time, hence the researcher’s argument 
that there cannot be a board which is called independent. External 
Auditors and IDs should be set up as professional consulting boards to 
EDs so that EDs can tap into the skills and experience of the Auditors 
and IDs suggested interviewee 34. 
 
Conflict of interest will continue to exist unless boards adopt the 
Stakeholder and Stewardship theories and those owners of banks are 
involved in the administration of the banks, were some of the findings 
of document 2 and 3. This is evidenced by two banks FNB and 
Investec, who have matured into corporate banks (Listed banks), 
where owners are involved at operational level. Continuous director 
training has been found to be a mitigating factor against agency 
theory, which results in board members bound by professional ethical 
conduct.  
 
1.5 Researcher’s role and position 
 
Adding to this problem is the information asymmetry between 
executive IDs and NEDs board members discussed in document 1 
and 2. Many authors writing on corporate boards emphasize that IDs 
and NEDs have to face a relative disadvantage when they monitor and 
provide advice: they are dependent on the CEO with respect to the 
information they need to perform their tasks argued (Lorsch and 
MacIver 1989, Donaldson and Davis 1994, McNulty and Pettigrew 
1996, 1999, Stiles and Taylor 2001 and Lorsch 1995: 111) They also 
states that “superior knowledge about corporate matters provides 
even the most well intentioned CEO with a real power advantage over 
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the outside directors”. Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
executives are in the position to “colour” the information in such a way 
that they get what they want from the IDs and NEDs argued (McNulty 
and Pettigrew 1999, Stiles and Taylor 2001). For example, one of the 
NEDs (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999: 60) interviewed remarked:  
 
“…. any non-executive is only as good as the executive will allow him 
to be. I will tell you now that any executive can kid any non-executive 
to do virtually anything. If he is really strong-willed, and he has all the 
facts, and so forth, it is jolly difficult for you to find out as a non-
executive. You receive papers and whether they have all the facts in, 
you do not know”.  
 
The researcher supports these findings as this was found to be the 
case where the participation of shareholders was weak (Table 5.3.2). 
Audit Committees’ role needs to be improved in line with the proposed 
policy changes in document 3, while training of directors should be 
every bank’s priority in line with the SARB’s new requirement. 
 
1.6 Performance measurement tools 
 
There exists a multitude of options for measuring corporate 
performance, including those pertaining to financial and non-financial 
performance. The author will use the traditional financial performance 
measurement tools used by (Muth and Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28) 
discussed above (1.2: 4) to answer the research questions and the 
hypothesis in measuring performance. In the case of the later and for 
the purposes of this research, preference is given to those concerned 
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with shareholders’ returns. (Muth and Donaldson 1998) contacted a 
similar research and used the accounting-based ROE and TSR 
(Shareholder wealth ratio). TSR fails to measure directly the efficiency 
with which banks generate profits from the assets with which they are 
entrusted, irrespective of how those profits are delivered to the 
shareholders through dividends or capital appreciation. ROE is a tool 
used to measure return on capital employed by shareholders using 
historical information, while ROA measures the return from the use of 
assets/resources owned by the bank. A higher ROA is an indication of 
an efficient balance sheet. Sales growth is a reflection of organic 
growth of the bank which results in higher profits if costs are 
maintained resulting in higher reserves for distribution to shareholders. 
In line with (Muth and Donaldson 1998), the researcher will be using 
the same traditional measurement tools in testing the effectiveness of 
each bank.   
 
1.7 Recent structural changes 
 
The collapse of (Enron 2002, WorldCom 2002 and Ahold 2003) 
resulted in confusion in the corporate governance field resulting in the 
rushing of the (Sarbanes – Oxley Act 2002) into law (Document 1: 7). 
After the failure of (DRD Gold 2006 and Fidentia 2007) the regulators 
instituted a commission to review the Companies Act, in SA, which 
has resulted in the King Committee reviewing the King 2 Report by 
developing King 3 Report due to be published in 2009. 
 
All four major banks (ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank) under 
this study are now required to be audited by two audit firms each year. 
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This was done as a result of audit firms failing to exercise their 
independence and income threshold of 10% as required by ISA. Audit 
fee levels had diluted auditor independence, which has resulted in this 
new requirement. This is a desperate move as this law may not 
improve independence (document 3: 38). 
 
1.8 Hypothesis 
 
a. There is a poor association between a bank’s performance as 
judged by traditional measurement tools (Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE), Profit, Shareholder Wealth and Sales 
Growth) and the viability and sound governance of the bank.  
b. There is an association between the degree of independence of 
NEDs, Auditors and IDs and the effectiveness of boards. 
c. There is an association between board style (Professional, 
Representative, country club and Passive) (Table 2,4:30) and the 
performance of banks 
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2 Research methods and approach  
 
According to (Collis and Hussey 2003: 55) research methods refer to the 
various means by which data can be collected and/or analyzed. They 
identified the following issues as important; why the data was collected, when 
it was collected, how it was collected and how it will be analyzed. This is 
used here as a framework for reporting the gathering of data sets analyzed at 
this stage of the research.  
 
This section is organized by data set; in each case the methods are reviewed 
prior to the findings being reported. The section begins with discussion of the 
research problem, progression data and concludes with the analysis of the 
effectiveness of each board.   
 
Bank performance information (financial statements) is collected by the 
researcher and different analysts as progression data. The collected data is 
secondary data mostly from the financial statements and commentaries by 
analysts with the intention of investigating the hypothesis and research 
questions. 
    
2.1 Philosophical basis 
 
The epistemological paradigms of interpretivism or phenomenology 
and positivism that constitute the philosophical poles of management 
research were the subject of considerable discussion in Document 3. 
However it should not be inferred from this document’s being based 
on quantitative research methods that the author, though not being 
hermeneutically inclined, has assumed a positivist stance in its 
commission. The investigative processes reported here do indeed 
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involve the establishment of theories and the construction of 
hypothesis that amount to the “normal process under a positivist 
paradigm” (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 56) but as (Jankowicz 2005: 122) 
cautions:  
“it is very important not to confuse […] two distinctions: that 
between positivist versus interpretivist ontology and 
epistemology on the one hand and between qualitative versus 
quantitative on the other.” 
 
According to (Collins and Hussey 2003: 47) there is ‘considerable 
blurring’ between the positivist and interpretive philosophies. The 
same authors went on to contend that, 
‘the positivist and phenomenological paradigms are two 
extremes and very few people would operate within their pure 
forms. There are […] not just two paradigms but a whole range.’ 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003: 51), hence the author chose the 
phenomenological paradigms. 
 
Within this range is the stance to which the author intuitively leans, 
that of realism. The adopting of this position is not based on a desire 
to ‘cop out’ by evading the extremes, like voting the DA as an 
alternative to ANC and SACP, but on the inherent nature of the realist 
position. 
 
Realism, suggests (Fisher 2004: 15): 
“retains many of the ambitions of positivism but recognizes, and 
comes to terms with, the subjective nature of research and the 
inevitable role of values in it. Realism still aims to be scientific 
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but makes fewer claims to knowledge that perfectly mirrors the 
objects of study.” 
 
According to (Saunders et al. 2003: 85) realism: 
“shares some philosophical aspects with positivism [but] also 
recognizes that people themselves are not objects to be studied 
in the style of natural science. [It] recognizes the importance of 
[…] subjective reality [in] seeking to understand broader social 
forces, structures of processes.” 
 
(Bryman and Bell 2003: 15) argues that, 
 
“realism shares […] two features with positivism [empirical and 
critical realism]: a belief that the natural and social sciences can 
and should apply the same [kinds] of approach to collection of 
data and to explanation, and a commitment to the view that 
there is an external reality to which scientists direct their 
attention (in other words, there is a reality that is separate from 
our description of it).” 
 
These authors argue that realist philosophy is by no means unusual in 
management research, which they suggest is 
“often a mixture between positivist and interpretivist, perhaps 
reflecting the stance of realism.’ (Saunders et al., 2003: 85). 
(Fisher 2004: 218) argued that, “epistemological realist believes 
that universals have a reality that [is] independent of how 
people talk about them.” It is within this context that the 
researcher took an independent view on factors that affect 
corporate governance and the behaviour of directors. 
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The researcher took this stance after recognizing that corporate 
governance and strategy cannot be measured and studied in the 
same way as can physical and chemical processes.  In establishing 
this stance the author was somewhat taken aback by (Jankowicz’s 
2005: 110) bald assertion that ‘[p]ositivism is realist,’ Reading on it 
seemed that he was using the term to reflect the ontological basis of 
positivism, viz. a reality of truths that exist independently and are 
discoverable by anyone adopting a given analytical procedure. This 
contrasts with the sense in which the author had understood the use 
of realism, namely that it conveys the importance of being realistic in 
seeking knowledge about complex organizational entities and 
contexts.  
 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 32) used realism in contradistinction to 
relativism in terms of the ontological basis of the positivist 
epistemology of science. They define traditional realism as the stance 
holding that, 
“the world is concrete and external, and […] science can only 
progress through observations that have a direct 
correspondence to the phenomena being investigated.” 
 
Their applying the contrasting position of relativism to social science 
seems to cover the same terrain as the descriptions of realism 
previously cited, to the point of implicit synonymity. They describe 
critical realism, which according to (Fisher 2004: 16), “shares the 
ambitions of realism” as a ‘variant of the relativist position’ (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002: 33). For (Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 33), the 
subjectivity of knowledge is inherent in the relativist stance; according 
to them adherents of the position regard facts as ‘depending on the 
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viewpoint of the observer.’ The methodological implications of 
relativism are that: 
‘the assumed difficulty of gaining direct access to ‘reality’ 
means that multiple perspectives will normally be adopted, both 
through ‘triangulation’ of methods and through surveying 
viewpoints and experiences of large sample of individuals.’ 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 34)    
 
The relationship between realism, positivism and the field of study 
made it impossible for the researcher to consider other research 
methods as they do not fit into this type of research. Epistemological 
considerations loom large in considerations of research strategy, to a 
large extent; these revolve around the desirability of employing a 
natural science model versus interpretivism. Ontological 
considerations, concerning objectivism versus constructionism, also 
constitute important dimensions of quantitative contrast. Relevance is 
taken to be assessed from the vantage point of the importance of a 
topic within its substantive field or the contribution it makes to the 
literature on the corporate governance field. It is within the 
philosophical framework of realism/relativism that this stage of the 
project was launched. It appears to offer substantial congruence 
between the outlook of the researcher and the sphere to be 
researched. 
 
2.2 Research approach 
 
The research approach used in empirical work reflects and influences 
the relationship the researcher conceives between theory and data. 
According to (Saunders et al. 2003: 85) and (Bryman and Bell 2003: 9) 
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the deductive approach is that the development of theory and 
hypotheses is followed by the design and implementation of a 
research strategy to test those hypotheses. In contrast the inductive 
approach involves building theory from data. They indicate that the 
former is associated with positivism and the latter with interpretivism, 
but consider these connections to be “potentially misleading and of no 
practical value.”  
 
Typically research undertaken based on the deductive approach 
involves a sequence or progression. (Jankowicz 2005: 111) describes 
this process, the hypothetico-deductive method as involving the 
generation of hypotheses from theory, the operational definition of the 
hypotheses, the measurement of appropriate variables, and the 
testing and verification of the hypotheses, which has a bearing in CG 
today. The characteristics of the approach include “the search to 
explain causal relationships between variables”, the researcher being 
“independent of what is being observed,” the need for concepts to be 
“operationalised in a way that enables facts to be measured 
quantitatively,” and the sample size being large enough for justifiable 
generalization argued (Saunders et al., (2003: 86 - 7).  
 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 47) consider that 
“the main practical advantage of the hypothesis-testing 
approach […] is that there is initial clarity about what is to be 
investigated.” 
 
(Saunders et al. 2003: 90) suggest that deductive work is easier to 
plan and speedier to execute than inductive research, but caution that 
“data collection is often based on ‘one take.’’  
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The drawbacks of the approach identified by (Easterby-Smith et al. 
2002: 47) are that “its contribution may be quite trivial’ and that if the 
results are inconclusive or negative it can give little guidance on why 
this is.” (Collis and Hussey 2003: 54) argue that the type of design 
inherent in the deductive approach  
“imposes certain constraints on the results and may ignore 
more relevant and interesting findings.” 
 
The deductive approach has also been criticized because it involves 
exploring causal relationships between variables “without an 
understanding of the way in which humans interpret […] their social 
world” and it tends to ‘construct a rigid methodology that does not 
permit alternative explanations of what is going on’, that is has ‘an air 
of finality about the choice of theory and the definition of the 
hypothesis’ argued (Burger 2007: 4). Alternative theories might 
emerge in its application but ‘these would be within the limits set by 
the highly structured research design’ argued (Saunders et al., (2003: 
87).     
 
The deductive approach discussed in document 2 and 3 also appears 
to be compatible with the application of the study method in this 
project, a method which (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 49) describe as 
occupying “an intermediate position” between the experimental design 
they align with positivism and the fieldwork they associate with 
interpretivism.  
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2.3 Merits for choosing the realism approach 
 
The approach tries to match the study of CG and strategy to Chemical 
and physical processes. Secondary data [financial statements] from 
the banks under review will be used in trying to answer the research 
questions and the hypothesis. (Saunders et al. 2003: 72) argued that, 
realism approach is based on the way people experience social 
phenomena [an attempt to understand what is happening in the CG 
field and why it is happening] in the world in which they live. 
 
This approach will try to test the efficiency of the existing CG systems 
using the traditional financial measurement tools within the banks in 
answering research questions on page 26 and 27 by interviewing 
practitioners in the field. Thirty-five respondents have been identified 
for the purpose of this research. The population (Document 3: 13 and 
29) from which the sample group was taken was classified as 
Chairmen (…. strategic direction of the bank), CEOs (… strategy 
execution), NEDs (... representatives of different shareholder groups), 
IDs (… professionals, business people and other stakeholder 
representatives), Financial Directors (… internal controls, financial 
information and reporting) and Company Secretaries (… custodians of 
registers, minutes, induction and training of directors and public 
officers) of each bank. Different sets of information were obtained from 
a different class, which assisted the researcher to focus on important 
roles played by each position in the bank. Cross bank analysis was 
easier as similar positions were cross referenced to each other. The 
classification of these respondents assisted the researcher in 
questioning respondents according to their role in the bank in 
addressing different themes. 
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 Practitioners in the field were identified including M King (King 2 
Report Chairman), Advocate J F Myburgh (Myburgh Report), Dixon 
director (IOD), Reserve Bank Governors and the Registrar of banks. 
The study was interview based research, where there was need for 
face to face discussion as the questionnaires were open ended. The 
total group sample was five groups from a population size of 40 
respondents. The 40 respondents were put into groups for example all 
Chairman were one group, CEOs and FDs another and so forth. This 
size was considered to be representative of the population. 
 
Four major banks (ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank including 
their subsidiaries in Zimbabwe) participated in the research and the 
two Central banks (SARB and RBZ), who provided very important 
information on regulation, director training and compliance. The 
conceptual framework was not reviewed in order to test the themes 
discussed in document 2 in this research. Response rate was 46%, 
which was below expectation. This was as a result of unavailability of 
respondents and confidentiality of banks considering that the 
researcher works for one of the banks, hence directors from other 
banks were not willing to discuss any issues relating to their bank. 
 
(Bhaskar 1989: 4) argued that this approach accepts neither a 
constructionist nor an objectivist ontology and instead takes the view 
that the social “world is reproduced and transformed in daily life.” The 
researcher will endeavor to produce a new thinking in the corporate 
governance field using these methodologies. The positivism approach 
was found to be suitable as it is an epistemology that advocates for 
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the application of the methods of natural sciences, hence the 
researcher is looking at social science methods. 
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3 Research problem and analysis      
 
The convergence of opinion in the normative literature for an active role of 
boards in strategy and organizational performance is not as clearly reflected 
in the academic literature (Document 2). Despite considerable scrutiny from 
researchers, there is little consensus on the behavioral dynamics of boards 
and on how they impact on the development and execution of firm strategy 
and performance argued (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999: 47, Golden and Zajac 
2001: 1087). The research efforts that have developed from the active and 
passive schools (Document 2: 29) have followed different agendas and led to 
different conclusions argued (Golden and Zajac 2001: 1080). In fact, 
(Rindova 1999: 953) has described the evolution of research on board’s 
performance and strategy as following a dialectical sequence from a thesis 
that managers dominate directors to an antithesis that directors should 
control managers.  
 
Managerial hegemony theory [defined …boards are a legal fiction dominated 
by management…] found early expression in the work of (Berle and Means 
1932), but it was (Mace’s 1971, Vance 1983, Lorsch and Maclver 1989) 
study that set the agenda for the passive school of thought. Mace 
interviewed 50 directors of medium and large US corporations and found that 
boards only impacted on strategic decision-making in times of crisis and that 
they were otherwise controlled by chief executive officers. Other scholars 
followed Mace’s approach with similar results (Norburn and Grinyer 1974, 
Pahl and Winkler 1974 and Rosenstein 1987), concluding that boards 
provided little strategic direction and that this role rested primarily with the 
chief executive officer. Recognizing that these results were largely driven by 
the power imbalance between management and boards, the latter were 
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termed “creatures of the CEO” (Mace 1971) who serves merely as rubber-
stamping function (Herman 1981) added. 
 
Research in the early 1990s continued to position the strategic role of boards 
in a more active light. Survey research by (Demb and Neubauer 1992) with 
UK and European companies found that 75 per cent of respondents 
considered setting strategy as the main function of boards. However, 
qualitative research by these scholars demonstrated that the degree of board 
involvement was dependent on the strategy formation process and the 
relative power of the chief executive vis-à-vis the board – a more emergent 
strategy formation process was associated with a more powerful chief 
executive officer and less influence by the board on strategy affecting their 
effectiveness. 
 
However, while these studies demonstrated a growing recognition of the 
importance of boards’ involvement in strategy, they did not address the 
nature of this involvement. Insight into this aspect came from (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992: 55), who proposed three archetypes for boards based on 
their overall role portfolio – the Watchdog, the Trustee and the Pilot – and 
elaborated these characterizations relative to the strategy role. The 
Watchdog board focuses primarily on monitoring and evaluating strategy 
post-implementation; the Trustee board plays a limited role in the initiation of 
strategy, but a substantive role in analyzing options, monitoring and 
evaluating results; and the Pilot board plays a more substantive role in all 
areas. These scholars characterized this progression of involvement as a 
continuum, a notion that subsequently gained prominence in the normative 
literature (Ingley and Van de Walt 2001), which has failed to match 
performance to the effectiveness or relevance of the board. 
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3.1 Research questions and Conceptual framework 
 
Document 4 will be answering research questions listed below in 
conjunction with earlier research questions discussed in document 1, 
2 and 3. Ingley and Van Der Walt (2001) assisted the researcher with 
five main attributes of directors as: 
• Integrity 
• leadership skills - team player/communicator 
• analytical understanding 
• specialist skills and knowledge 
• thinker - open-minded/strategic perception and decision-making 
ability. 
 
From a report published by the (IOD, UK 1995 and Davies 1999) adds 
the following key competencies for building an effective board, which 
will assist the researcher in analyzing and answering research 
questions and developing a new conceptual framework. The attributes 
are: 
• skill in communicating 
• effective interaction with others 
• ability to plan, delegate, appraise and develop others 
• focus on achievement through risk taking  
• resilience 
• independence (especially for non-executive directors). 
 
The research questions which will be answered in this document 4 
and 5 will include among others the following: 
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a. How do boards fulfill their strategy role and are they necessary? 
b. How is the strategic role affected by contextual factors in the 
firm’s internal and external environment? 
c. Does director experience and training matter in the 
effectiveness of the bank and transparency? 
d. How does the strategic role relate to bank performance? 
e. What is the impact of the traditional financial measurement 
tools have on evaluating the effectiveness of the board? 
 
What is clearly apparent from the dialogue in the literature review 
(Document 2) and the conceptual framework (Appendix 7) is that, 
while there is a slow gathering convergence on the view that boards 
do have a definite responsibility and a key role to play in corporate 
strategy, there is no consensus on the extent or nature of that role 
argued (Helmer 1996). The direction of current thinking supporting the 
need for boards to acquire a strategic orientation is driven by the 
dynamics of economic, technological, political and social change 
which are global in magnitude.  
 
It is the nature, scope and intensity of this change and the attendant 
demands for higher levels of corporate performance that is leading to 
a need for boards to focus on strategic issues and how best to equip 
themselves and their organizations to deal effectively with the 
emerging challenges. If organizations are to perform according to 
stakeholder expectations in an environment of increasing strategic 
change and uncertainty, their boards have a governance responsibility 
to ensure they identify and then build or acquire and maintain the 
necessary capabilities to lead their organizations toward those goals 
and ambitions argued interviewees 3, 18 and 19. 
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3.2 The hypothesis (Sec 1, 8) and the research questions 
 
(Zikmund 2003: 44) defined a hypothesis as an unproven proposition 
or supposition that tentatively explains certain facts or phenomena, a 
proposition that is empirically testable. The propositions discussed in 
Sec 1.8 above will be discussed together with the research questions 
(3.1 above). Formulating a series of research questions and 
hypotheses can add clarity to the statement of the business problem 
argued (Zikmund 2003: 98). Research questions are the researcher’s 
translation of the business problem into a specific need for inquiry, 
which document 4 and 5 will endeavor to answer. 
 
3.3 Developing measures of financial performance 
 
Why financial statements are useful asked (White et al 2003: 2). Their 
answer was that, financial statements help investors and creditors 
make better economic decisions. The researcher highlighted in 
document 2 that financial reporting are the root cause of information 
asymmetry and corporate governance failures, which was supported 
by (White et al 2003: 2, Brighham and Gapenski 1994: 653,Correia et 
al 1993, Rodriguez and Carter 1984: 333). “Financial statements are, 
at best, only an approximation of economic reality because of the 
selective reporting of economic events by the accounting system, 
compounded by alternative accounting methods and estimates added 
(White et al 2003: 2). The tendency to delay accounting recognition of 
some transactions and valuation changes means that financial 
statements tend to lag behind reality and is not perfect.”  
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“The role of a director is not easy in SA and Zimbabwe in the light of 
recent corporate scandals as per accounting experts, (Temkin 2006) 
supported the above argument. A director’s life used to be far more 
glamorous with lavish pay for little time spent in the boardroom and 
plenty of overseas trips and golf at first class resorts. Executives sat 
on 10 to 15 boards. But nowadays it has become risky business.  
Since the (Enron 2002 and WorldCom 2002) scandals, directors have 
become far more reluctant to warm the boardroom seats. A raft of 
rules, regulations and stringent legislation has forced executives to re-
examine their role” argued interviewees 6, 11, 24 and 33. 
 
Financial reporting should provide information that is useful to present 
potential investors, creditors and other stakeholders in making rational 
investment and similar decisions. The information should be 
comprehensible to those who have a reasonable understanding of 
business and economic activities and are willing to study the 
information with reasonable diligence argued interviewees 2, 3, 10, 12, 
14, 21, 22, 27, 28 and 34. Based on these financial weaknesses the 
research will analyze the existing traditional financial measurement 
tools in analyzing performance of banks by looking at the balance 
sheet, income statement and cash flows. The following tools will be 
used in this document to test the effectiveness of boards that lead the 
banks: 
• Return on Assets (ROA) 
• Return on Equity (ROE) 
• Profitability 
• Shareholder Wealth 
• Sales Growth 
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3.4 Developing a rating for CG 
 
The researcher developed a model of rating corporate governance in 
the banks after considering the performance of each bank and its 
structure using tools above. The model assesses the role of 
independent directors, NEDs and shareholders in the performance of 
the bank. 
 
Corporate Governance Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Corporate Governance rating system 
 
“The pressures for improving board performance are growing too 
strongly for them to be stopped argued (Garratt 2003: 207). What is 
now obsolescent, and will soon be obsolete, is the all-too-common 
notion that a few amateur friends of the CEO and Chairman can enjoy 
Financial performance High Low 
 
 
Representative 
board  
 
 
Passive board 
 
 
Professional 
board  
 
 
Country club 
board 
• Little Shareholder participation 
• Low levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Less technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Stakeholder mapping 
• Active Shareholder participation 
• High levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Highly technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Stakeholder mapping  
• Entrepreneurial 
Judgment 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Low 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 34 of 163 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
some good food and wine, lots of golf and somehow fit in a bit of time 
to give guidance to the company and add value for the owners in the 
long term.” The model below positions each bank in a category 
according its CG structure, performance and profitability, which is 
measured against board performance. The professional bank is the 
most effective board with lower cost to income ratio and higher ROE, 
ROA, sales growth and shareholder wealth. The passive bank is the 
one with most corporate governance weaknesses. 
 
3.5 Developing Time series and analyzing events 
 
Adding to the rating system, the researcher will analyze each bank 
using its five year published historical performance in order to come 
up with the most efficient and effective bank. The five year period 
gives a constant history of how each bank has been managed and 
performing. Efficiency and effectiveness will be measured based on 
the five year review using the traditional financial analysis methods. 
IDs and NEDs’ contribution will be analyzed based on the events 
during the review period. 
 
Time series is a set of observations on a variable’s outcomes in 
different time periods for example the five year performance review. 
Time series as a tool is used to explain the past and predict the future 
of a time series argued (DeFusco et al 2004: 516 and Newbold 1991: 
714). The review period will be linked to the role played by IDs and 
NEDs in that trend by each bank. 
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3.6 Selecting sample banks 
 
The researcher identified four major banks operating in SA and 
Zimbabwe (document 1 and 3: 13) using the basis that all the four 
banks operate in SA and Zimbabwe. The four banks observe the 
requirements of the (King 2 Report 2002); they are all listed on the 
JSE and ZSE. We take sample for one or two reasons argued 
(DeFusco et al 2004: 286) and here the reason being to narrow down 
the population so that the study  can be economically efficient. 
Selected banks were ABSA (Barclays), FirstRand Bank (FNB) (CBZ), 
Nedbank (MBCH) and Standard Bank (Stabic Bank) as they operate in 
both countries. An additional bank will be included in this document 
(Investec Bank). Investec Bank is an owner managed bank like 
FirstRand Bank (FNB) and its inclusion is to assist in analyzing how 
owner managed banks perform against agent managed. 
 
Within these banks, the researcher selected CEOs, Financial Directors 
and Chairman for Audit Committees as respondents to this 
document’s questionnaires and each was interviewed. This sample is 
representative of the total population as they are the board members 
responsible for the preparation of the financial statements. 
 
3.7 Requirements from interviewees 
 
• Chairman 
The  Chairman of each bank was require to discuss his relationship 
with the board, executive directors, the role of Audit Committee, 
External Auditors, independency and how the bank operates. They 
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also gave an insight into the environment in which banks operate 
and how the environment affects corporate governance practices. 
 
• CEO 
Each CEO was required to discuss his relationship with the board, 
the history of the bank, performance and its future outlook. The 
issues of skills, training and politics were discussed 
 
• Financial Director 
The financial director of each bank was required to provide the 
financial statements and giving explanations on the bank’s financial 
performance. Most of the activities which have a financial impact 
were discussed. 
 
• Chairman of Audit Committee 
Discussed internal controls, reporting requirements, risk 
management policies and the role of auditors (internal and 
external), role of internal auditors. 
 
 
• Company Secretary 
Discussed the legal framework in which banks operate and how 
boards function. 
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4 Research findings  
 
Secondary data was used in this research as the published financial 
statements of the banks were the primary source of information. In analyzing 
the financial statements, the Financial Directors were the main contacts and 
respondents to the researcher’s questions (Appendix 5). ROA measures the 
performance of assets owned by the bank in generating income. Constant 
growth of assets is a reflection of shareholder value growth argued 
interviewees 1, 2 and 3. 
 
4.1 ABSA (Barclays) performance analysis 
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Chart 4.1.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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ABSA (Barclays) total assets grew over the five years, year on year by 
50% resulting in a constant growth of revenues and profitability 
(Appendix 1). The growth in assets has not been constant with the 
growth in revenues and profitability as a result of more non-performing 
assets and high volume low margin strategy. ABSA derives 46% of its 
bottom line from retail banking where margins are thin and require 
more employees, which results in low income per employee argued 
interviewees 1, 2 and 3. This strategy has a negative impact on the 
cost to income ratio although there has been a shift as reflected by 
Chart 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 as a result of the Barclays acquisition of 
ABSA. The change in strategy has resulted in profit for the year 
growing by 41% in 2006, which is expected to be higher in 2007 as a 
result of reducing non-performing assets. 
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Chart 4.1.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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The group increased headline earnings by 25, 3% (23, 3%) in 2005, 
which outperformed the group’s objective of delivering real earnings 
growth of 10% argued interviewee 1, 3 and 8. Diluted headline 
earnings per share increased by 2,8% in 2006 (5,1%) in 2005 as a 
result of the value of the options issued to Batho Bonke Capital Pty Ltd 
contributed interviewee 7. The constant growth in revenues and profits 
had a positive impact on the ROE, which has a positive correlation 
with the growth in revenue, profits and cost to income ratio Chart 4.1.4 
and Appendix 1.  
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Chart 4.1.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
The lower the cost to income ratio the profitable the bank becomes 
Chart 4.1.3 and interviewee 2 as this is one efficient measure of board 
effectiveness. Constant decline of this ratio results in the growth of 
profitability of the bank and increase in cash flows as reflected in 
document 5. A decline in non-performing assets results in a lower cost 
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to income ratio, which had a positive impact on the performance of 
ABSA argued interviewee 2 and 6. 
 
ABSA Performance Summary 
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Sales Growth (000) 38,368 27,232 28,901 30,299 24,517 
Total Assets (000) 495,112 348,686 306,848 269,064 247,300 
Profit for the year (000) 8,266 5,585 4,596 3,461 1,306 
Cost to income (%) 54.6 56.8 57.1 60 62.3 
ROE (%) 27.4 25.2 24.6 21.4 12.9 
 
Table 4.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Table 4.1 and Chart 4.1.4 depicts a positive correlation, which shows 
that if the cost to income ratio is declining, revenue, profits, assets and 
ROE will be growing, which results in shareholder value and dividend 
growth. Conventional measurement tools neglect the growth in cash 
flows, which is a proper measurement of shareholder value growth. 
Chart 4.1.4 shows the positive effect of the declining cost to income 
ratio has on ROE. If the cost to income ratio continues to decline, ROE 
will continue to grow until such a point ROE will be above cost to 
income ratio as reflected below. 
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Chart 4.1.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Interviewees 1, 2, 3 and 8 argued that ABSA performance cannot only 
be accredited to management and employees. IDs and NEDs played a 
major role in the growth of ABSA especially during the acquisition of 
ABSA by Barclays as it was the IDs and NEDs who facilitated the 
acquisition. The group has made excellent progress with initiatives to 
improve earnings by implementing best practices applied by Barclays. 
IDs and NEDs’ role assisted in the constant growth of ABSA and 
added value to shareholders as reflected by growth in dividend paid, 
dividend cover and capital growth (Appendix 1). This growth answers 
the research question that IDs and NEDs are important in the value 
addition model defined in the conceptual framework document 2. 
Interviewee 8 argued that the performance of ABSA can also be 
attributed to internal controls and participation of Auditors in risk 
management. 
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It was clear that Auditors are required for risk mitigation purposes, but 
the growth in the level of their fees has a negative correlation to the 
cost to income ratio, the growth in dividend paid and profitability of the 
bank. Most of their duties can be efficiently done by the internal audit if 
it’s properly resourced argued interviewee 33. During the acquisition 
(2005), audit costs increased by 300%, which is a negative trigger on 
the conceptual framework document 2 and Appendix 7. The 
effectiveness of the board is affected by this increase as it increases 
the cost to income ratio and reduces retained income and profitability.  
 
4.2 FirstRand Bank (CBZ) Performance Analysis 
 
Through its ownership of First National Bank, Momentum, Rand 
Merchant Bank, WesBank and Discovery and CBZ (Appendix 2) the 
Group can operate in almost every area of the financial services 
arena. The Group is structured as a confederation of profit centres that 
serve the various parts of the financial services market. This structure 
is successful because it allows FirstRand to function as a number of 
small focused businesses that can find and swiftly exploit profitable 
niches, whilst at the same time enjoy the financial muscle and 
operational critical mass of the Group argued interviewees 11 and 12.  
 
“Each profit centre has its own strategy and its own highly motivated 
management team often supported by its own individual brand, 
specifically designed and positioned to service that particular customer 
base. The significant balance sheet of the Group provides financial 
credibility to these individual businesses and the capital required to 
operate and grow. In addition, FirstRand's integrated structure allows 
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each business to leverage off all the different building blocks available 
across the Group, such as IT systems, client bases and skills,” stated 
interviewee15. This is referred to in the Group as “collaboration” and in 
the past two years significant top line growth has been created 
through the various businesses working together www.firstrand.co.za.  
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Chart 4.2.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
The group achieved consistent performance through focusing on a 
number of core strategies which underpin a unique bank. A 
combination of these strategies and strong external environment 
meant that despite the high base created from previous years, the 
bank exceeded its earnings growth targets each year by 10% argued 
interviewee 11. Harris (interviewee 12) (2007: 12 of the financial 
statements) attributed this growth to: “the extent, to which our 
business philosophy has empowered our divisions and their 
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management to provide the results, is the key success factor for our 
bank and this differentiates our bank from other banks,” as reflected 
by the asset growth (Chart 4.2.1). 
 
The growth in revenues and profitability (Chart 4.2.2) of the bank 
resulted in the constant growth of the assets and the strength of the 
balance sheet. Interviewee 13 (Burger 2007: 16) argued that, the 
board’s responsibility is to strategically position the balance sheet and 
the income statement by managing the assets and liabilities of the 
bank Chart 4.2.1. His argument leaves out the management of cash 
flow, which is the most important element of financial performance of 
an organization according to (Dulewicz and Herbert 2004: 265) 
. 
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Chart 4.2.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Interviewee 14 argued that, “normalized earnings grow 20% year on 
year over the period under review, which is 3% above industry 
standard. The bank maximizes the spread between ROE and cost of 
equity (COE) as a strategy to improve cost to income ratio and 
profitability. This strategy has assisted the bank in its effort to monitor 
the effectiveness of the board.” The reduction of non-performing 
assets, management of interest exposure, exchange risk and capital 
management programme assisted the bank in reducing the cost to 
income ratio from 57 in 2003 to 53.8 in 2006 argued interviewees 11 
and 12 and Chart 4.2.3, which is a great achievement. As a result of 
this effective management of resources, page 19 of the financial 
statements shows a constant growth in shareholder value of 20% over 
the period under review. 
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Chart 4.2.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Chart 4.2.3 shows the impact of cost to income ratio or profitability of 
the bank to ROE. In 2003 the cost to income ratio increased to 57 
from 55.5 in 2004, hence reducing the ROE from 25.2% in 2002 to 
22.6% in 2003. This movement shows the correlation between the two 
measurement tools. Lower cost-to-income ratio, higher ROE and 
growth in assets Appendix 2 is a result of well skilled board which 
operates efficiently is show by low cost to income ratio and constant 
growth in assets under management. Performance of FirstRand is and 
indication of how a well-structured bank operates which shows that a 
combination of IDS, NEDs and owners create a hybrid of skills which 
add shareholder value. 
 
4.2.1 FNB Summary 
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Sales Growth (000) 30,395 27,505 23,417 22,412 21,528 
Total Assets 579,787 462,739 424,821 393,674 374,766 
Profit for the year 8825 7137 5676 4516 4495 
Cost to income 53.8 56.6 56.9 57 55.5 
ROE 25.1% 25.2% 25.4% 22.6% 25.2% 
 
Table 4.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Chart 4.2.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
FirstRand as an owner managed bank has shown a terrific growth 
since it incorporation in 1998. FirstRand being the youngest bank has 
managed to claim a second biggest bank position by assets and 
profitability, which is attributed to the participation of owners in the 
management of the company. The bank has the most efficient asset 
utilization ratio of 1, 5% compared to Standard bank’s 1.08% and 
income to asset ratio. 
 
The importance of the auditors here again is questionable as their fees 
continue to grow at a rate of 80% year on year. This growth cannot be 
matched to the growth of business of 41% year on year, which proves 
that auditors are a negative trigger on the conceptual framework. 
Auditors are necessary for risk mitigation purposes but their role has 
been over legitimized, yet their value addition is very minimal. 
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4.3 Nedbank (MBCH) performance analysis 
 
Nedbank is one of the oldest banks with one of the strongest 
institutional investor in Old Mutual (Appendix 3). As a result of 
mismanagement and poor corporate governance practice, the bank 
went through very difficult times from 2000 to 2003 Appendix 3 and 
Chart 4.3.1. This resulted in the replacement of the whole board and 
senior management in 2002 as assets declined as a result of BOE 
acquisition Chart 4.3.1. 
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Chart 4.3.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
The acquisition of BOE, mismatch of foreign currency hedging and risk 
management resulted in the near collapse of the bank as the capital 
adequacy ratio drop from 12% to 10% in one year. The acquisition of 
BOE was financed by debt while the board did not project a waste 
case scenario of interest rates going up and at the same time paid a 
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premium on the acquisition, which was not supposed to be the case. 
Chart 4.3.1 shows a slow growth in total assets from 2003 to 2005 as 
a result of a lot of non-performing assets and turnaround strategy 
being implemented. The results of the turnaround programme started 
to yield results as reflected by the growth of the balance sheet and 
growing profits from 2004 Appendix 3 and Chart 4.3.2. 
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Chart 4.3.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Chart 4.3.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
4.3.1 Nedbank summary 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Nedbank is a good example of how boards can poorly perform and 
lead to shareholders losing their wealth Appendix 3. It is also a good 
example of the irrelevance of auditors. Shareholders lose their wealth 
even though the auditors’ role is to mitigate risk. In the event of poor 
decisions by the board auditors do not take responsibility to protect 
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Sales Growth (000) 28,521 23,234 22,789 28,141 23,607 
Total Assets (000) 424,912 352,258 327,840 313,113 324,767 
Profit for the year (000) 5,061 4,297 1,882 -1,334 1,078 
Cost to income ratio (%) 58.2 64.8 71.8 80.2 65.4 
ROE (%) 18.6% 15.5% 11.0% 0.4% 14.9% 
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shareholders, hence (Turnbull 2006) argued that they do not add 
shareholder value. 
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Chart 4.3.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
When the bank was experiencing problems (2003) Chart 4.3.4 audit 
fees grew by 84% resulting in higher cost to income ratio and low ROE 
(Appendix 3) was draining the little remaining shareholder value. 
When directors make wrong decisions auditors do not correct the 
mistakes on time in order to protect shareholders. This is the same 
situation in all banks that collapsed (document 2 Appendix 1). Auditors 
although they have a professional and legal responsibility to report on 
the going concern of any business, their reports do not add 
shareholder value as argued by the board of Enron and WorldCom, 
when they charged huge sum of money for audit fees yet in the 
following few months Enron collapsed. 
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Chart 4.3.4 is a tool that conventional boards should use to monitor 
performance so that they can formulate strategies that will reduce 
operating costs and improve shareholder value. The correlation 
between ROE and cost to income ratio is so positive that responsible 
board members need to monitor this relationship. 
 
4.4 Standard Bank (Stanbic) performance analysis  
 
Standard Bank is the largest bank by assets, revenue, profitability and 
market capitalization (Appendix 4). Over the years their strategy has 
been low volume and high profit margins, which has been a critical 
success factor for the bank argued interviewees 26 and 27. 
Interviewee 32 stated that, corporate and investment banking loans 
and advances continue to be the cash cow for the bank growing by 
32% year on year as a result of renewed demand for corporate term 
lending in South Africa and collateralized lending outside Africa. The 
strategy here is low volume high margins, which resulted in a 
continuous balance sheet growth Chart 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.  
 
Interviewees 26, 27 and 29 argued that robust asset growth and 
buoyant transactional activity from both consumer and corporates 
contributed to the bank achieving income rising of 25% year on year. 
Standard bank generates most of its income from advisory services on 
acquisitions, private equity transactions and other corporate advisory 
service resulting in the cost to income ratio being low and growing 
profitability Cart 4.4.2 and 4.4.3. 
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Chart 4.4.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
The three charts here are positively correlated as a result of the 
declining cost to income ratio. These measurements however do not 
tell us how much cash has been generated during the year by the 
bank. This is the major weaknesses of these conventional 
measurements tools. The researcher in document 3 argued that profit 
is an opinion and cash is a fact. During the year the bank generated 
R6, 154 million cash R31, 717 million less that the previous year. 
These ratios do not explain why and what happened to the cash from 
previous year. 
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Chart 4.4.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
 
Profit for 2006 (10,551 million) and 2005 (8,753 million) against cash 
generated of 6,154 million and 37,871 million respectively is not 
explained by the four measurement tools used by (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28). Chart 4.4.3 is a strong measurement tool for 
effectiveness and performance, which need to be used together with 
CFROTA (Document 5) and other cash flow ratios in the performance 
assessment of the bank.  
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Chart 4.4.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
4.4.1 Standard bank summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Sales Growth (000) 129,911 107,657 99,831 95,840 89,192 
Total Assets (000) 968,991 765,690 625,537 540,566 393,353 
Profit for the year (000) 10,551 8,753 7,244 6,026 4,841 
Cost to income ratio (%) 53.5 56.1 57.5 56.3 57.4 
ROE (%) 25.2 25.2 24.2 22.9 20.3 
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Chart 4.4.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Standard bank is the most profitable bank followed by FNB Chart 4.2.1 
and 4.4.2. Over the five year period, Shareholder value growth 
increased by 146% which reflects a constant shareholder value 
growth. The continuous decline of the cost to income ratio over the 
five years resulted in super performance Appendix 4. Chart 4.4.4 
demonstrates the relationship between cost to income ratio and the 
growth in ROE, which shows the benefits that shareholders are 
enjoying. This has a positive impact on the share price, which 
indicates the growth in shareholder value. 
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4.5 Analysis of Investec   
 
Investec comprising Investec Plc and Investec Limited is an 
international, specialist banking group that provides a diverse range of 
financial products and services to a select client base. Founded as a 
leasing company in Johannesburg in 1974 and acquired a banking 
license in 1980 and was listed in 1986. The inclusion of Investec here 
is as a result of the bank being one of the success stories of owner 
managed banks. The author would like to compare the performance of 
FNB and Investec in supporting the need for participation of owners in 
improving corporate governance practices in banks. 
 
In 2002 Investec implemented a dual listed company’s structure with 
linked companies listed in London and Johannesburg. 2003 saw the 
introduction of a 25.1% BEE partners to Investec Limited. The bank is 
owner managed just like FirstRand and is older then FNB. Although 
the bank has managed to post some good results, has not been able 
to grow its asset base and profitability as FNB. This has been primarily 
as a result of high cost to income ratio and the focus for the high net 
worth clients instead of focusing on the corporate market where there 
are few transactions with high margins. 
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Chart 4.5.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Chart 4.5.1 is a reflection of the relationship of the income to ROE and 
growth in shareholder value. Although the bank is owner managed, its 
operating efficiency is very low due to high operating costs, staff 
compensation to operating income ratio and administration costs. The 
bank has R26 billion worth of total assets, but generated R349 million 
profits in 2006 and R329 million in 2005 a mere 6% growth. 
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Chart 4.5.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Investec has managed to maintain a constant shareholder value 
growth in for the past three years. Chart 4.5.2 gives a reflection of the 
operating margins over the past six years, which is a growth of 2.4% 
as compared with other four major banks with over 15% growth. The 
strategies for the bank need to change and focus on high margin 
strategies. Current strategies have resulted in the bank performing 
below what it should be, considering that FNB was incorporated in 
1998 and has been performing much better than Investec. 
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5 Cross bank analysis 
 
5.1 Context 
 
The context of analyzing the performance of banks is to assess which 
bank has been creating a constant growth in shareholder value in 
answering the research questions and the hypothesis. With the 
resources available for example, total assets, skills and experience of 
directors, the researcher wanted to assess which board is more 
effective in creating shareholder value. Consolidated financial 
statements were used for both banks in SA and Zimbabwe, which 
made comparison much easier. 
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Chart 5.1.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Chart 5.1.1 gives an indication of which bank has been performing 
better than the other using the five conventional accounting 
measurement tools. Although Standard bank has been performing 
above the rest considering the available resources, with total assets of 
over R900 billion, FNB is the most efficient and effective bank 
considering that it has 42% less assets than Standard bank (Chart 
5.1.2), which indicates that Standard Bank has some lazy assets. FNB 
has a higher asset to income ratio as compared to the other banks. 
This ratio shows that Standard Bank has lazy assets as compared to 
FNB.  
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Chart 5.1.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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5.2  Methods for analyzing data 
 
ABSA Shareholder Value Growth 
 
Chart 5.2.1: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
There are many methods of analyzing data, but the researcher 
selected correlation analysis using manual and electronic systems. 
The manual system was used to collect raw data from the annual 
financial statements of all banks, which then resulted in the use of 
electronic system (excel and SPSS) used to analyze the information. 
Correlation coefficient is the measure of how closely related two data 
series are. It measures the direction and extent of linear association 
between two variables argued (DeFusco et al 2004: 377). In analyzing 
data a relationship was realized that exist between total assets, ROE, 
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annual profits and cash flows. The more efficiently the assets are used 
the more profitable the bank becomes argued interviewee 3, 15, 33 
and 36. 
 
Chart 5.2.1 illustrates the growth of value in ABSA since 2003 against 
the growth in diluted earnings. Dividend per share grew year on year 
by 22%, which is an indication of a growth in shareholder value. The 
acquisition of ABSA by Barclays in 2005 resulted in a slow down in 
dividend growth, but accelerated in 2006 to 473 cents per share, 
showing the benefits of the acquisition and the value it brought to 
shareholders argued interviewee 1, 2 and 3. The acquisition was as a 
result of the participation of IDs and NEDs in the strategic formulation 
of the bank. 
 
Chart 5.2.2: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
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Chart 5.2.3: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Charts 5.2.2/3 indicates the constant growth in shareholder value 
delivered by FNB (CAGR of 20%). This growth indicates that 
FirstRand is the most profitable and efficient bank among the four 
major banks and owner managed using the conventional 
accounting tools. Over the years the bank managed to deliver value 
to shareholders by a constant ROE of above industry average of 
20%. FirstRand’s average over the period under review was 4% 
above industry standard argued interviewee 15. FNB assets are 
more productive as they managed to deliver a higher value than 
any other bank under review over the five year period. The impact 
of a lower cost to income ratio is seen here as full employment of 
assets results in a higher return on assets and profit to asset ratio. 
 
From 2002 Nedbank has been performing below market index 
(Chart 5.2.4), there is a big gap between JSE average and the 
bank’s performance. The effects of the near collapse of the bank 
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are still hounding the bank argued interviewees 19, 21 and 22. 
Although there has been significant growth in performance due to 
the turnaround programme by the new management, the bank has 
not delivered the expected return by shareholders.  
 
 
Chart 5.2.4: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
Nedbank has support from its biggest institutional investor Old 
Mutual, which the bank should leverage on as Old Mutual has the 
biggest market share in the insurance industry. Its market share 
should add value to Nedbank if the market is turned into customers 
of Nedbank stated interviewee 34. Chart 5.2.4 shows the historical 
performance of Nedbank, which shows that the board is not 
delivering the value that is expected by shareholders as its 
performance is below market index. 
 
Chart 5.2.5 indicates Standard bank’s growth in shareholder value, 
the CAGR of 19%, which is 1% below FirstRand. Standard bank is 
the biggest bank by assets and market capitalization but has 
delivered an average ROE of 23.56%, which is 0, 04% below 
FirstRand yet FirstRand has 42% less assets than Standard bank. 
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Contribution per asset is very low although the bank has managed 
a constant ROE above industry average of 20%. 
 
Standard Bank Shareholder value growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.2.5: Data source: 2006 Financial Statements 
 
5.3 Corporate governance ranking 
 
Using (Muth and Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28), methodology of measuring 
performance, the author ranked each bank’s performance as 
measured by each component page 4 of this document. Red (1) 
representing the best performing bank in each category. Blue (2) 
being second, green (3) and yellow (4) being the least performing 
bank in that category. FNB has the highest number of reds followed by 
Standard Bank and ABSA, while Nedbank is the least ranked with no 
single red or blue. Nedbank came last on all categories. This scoring 
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was the basis for ranking the banks in table 5, 3.2, where FNB 
became the most effective bank using Muth and Donaldson’s 
performance measurement models. 
 
 
ABSA FNB Nedbank 
Standard 
Bank 
Return on Assets (ROA) 9.23% 28.14% 7.30% 16.77% 
Average Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
        
22.30  24.76      12.08  
               
23.56  
Shareholder wealth 100% 55% 31% 146% 
Sales Growth 56.50% 41.19% 20.82% 45.65% 
Average Cost to Income Ratio 58.16 55.96 68.08 56.16 
     
Ranking 
    
  
1 
   
  
2 
   
  
3 
   
  
4 
   
 
Table 5.3.1: Bank performance scoring 
 
The table below ranks all the banks that have been analyzed and a 
scoring was done using Table 5.3.1 and the responses from 
interviewees as in document 3. The researcher looked at the skills 
and experience of directors, profitability of the banks, asset 
utilization ratio, participation of shareholders and cost to income 
ratio as other basis of measurement. The evidence from table 5.3.1 
and interviewees was used as evidence to prove the ranking on 
Table 5.3.2 below. As shown above Nedbank fell into the last 
quadrant and FirstRand first. This shows that the banks under 
review have different corporate governance structures, which result 
in one bank performing differently than the other. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 68 of 163 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Using these factors, FirstRand and Standard bank are the most 
profitable banks and are highly ranked. Due to shareholder 
participation in FirstRand, Standard bank scored less on 
shareholder participation and asset utilization ratio. The study of 
Investec as another owner managed bank, the factors considered 
seem not to be favoring the bank as the cost to income ratio is very 
high. Using the rating system above, FirstRand was found to have 
the most effective board although all the banks observe codes of 
CG best practice and the King 2 Report. 
 
Corporate Governance Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3.2: Bank Ranking 
 
Financial performance 
 
High Low 
Representative 
board: 
 
Standard Bank 
ABSA 
 
Passive board: 
 
 
Nedbank 
Professional 
board: 
  
FirstRand 
Country 
club board:  
 
• Little Shareholder participation 
• Low levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Stakeholder mapping 
• Active Shareholder participation – 
entrepreneurial focus 
• High levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Stakeholder mapping  
• Entrepreneurial 
Judgment 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Low 
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The evidence from interviewees, financial statements and 
document 3 has been supported by the scoring on Table 5.3.1 
above, which resulted in the ranking on Table 5.3.2.  Each bank 
has been placed in the correct quadrant as a result of the 
quantitative evidence from the financial statements of each bank. 
With a ROA of 7, 3%, ROE of 12, 08%, low Shareholder 
participation and highest cost to income ratio, Nedbank ranked 
least while FNB ranked highest. The quantitative evidence matched 
evidence from the interviewees who argued that ABSA can improve 
its position if it changes its strategy of high volume low margin. 
 
5.4 Answering the hypothesis 
 
a. There is a poor association between a bank’s performance as 
judged by traditional measurement tools (Return on Assets (ROA), 
Return on Equity (ROE), Profit, Shareholder Wealth and Sales 
Growth) and the viability and sound governance of the bank.  
 
The research has proved the null hypothesis that the conventional 
accounting measurement tools (Return on Assets (ROA), Return on 
Equity (ROE), Profit, Shareholder Wealth and Sales Growth) are 
not sufficient measurement tools of board effectiveness as they 
exclude cash generation. The current Global credit crunch is a true 
reflection of the weaknesses in using financial performance tools as 
a measure and disclosure of bank performance. Failure to foretell 
the future of AIG, Fannie Mae, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and 
Freddie Mac is a direct indication of the failure of accounting 
measurement tools. Accounting measurement tools lack other 
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components like growth in cash reserves, future risks, future 
business projections and gearing of the bank. While these tools are 
important measurement tools, there are other additional 
measurement tools which are required to assist these accounting 
tools. The measurement of gearing and liquidity are an important 
factor to be considered when analyzing the performance of the 
board of banks. 
 
b. There is an association between the degree of independence of 
NEDs, Auditors and IDs and the effectiveness of boards. 
 
It was also proved that IDs and NEDs are important stakeholders in 
the corporate governance structures. It was however realized that 
these board members do not spend enough time on bank issues 
and are affected by conflict of interest bringing the debate of 
independence into being. This problem can be solved by making 
sure that board members are governed by their professional boards 
of ethics and code of conduct of the IOD (refer to policy change 
proposals). 
 
Answering the research questions, the research has provided 
evidence that IDs and NEDs fulfill their strategic role and are 
necessary as they play an important role in the governance of the 
bank. They play the watchdog, trustee and pilot of strategy 
formulation, while addressing the three different theories discussed 
on page 2 of the agency, stakeholder and stakeholder theory. In 
these roles the IDs and NEDs assisted in the shareholder value 
creation by applying their skills and experiences, which resulted in 
their appointments. 
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Accreditation, training and experience of IDs, and NEDs are critical 
in complying with ethical issues of banks and formulation of 
strategies. Risk mitigation and full employment of resources can 
only be done if board members are knowledgeable about the 
environment in which banks operate. Employment of different 
techniques in evaluating projects, acquisitions and partnerships 
requires significant level of skills in order to make decisions that 
add value to the bank. The use of accounting measurement tools is 
important in analyzing the past, which information can be used to 
project the future, 
 
c. There is an association between board style (Professional, 
Representative, country club and Passive) (Table 2,4:30) and the 
performance of banks 
 
Table 2, 4: 30 and 5, 3.2: 60 provided a ranking according to the 
results of each bank’s performance in all areas that has been 
analyzed. The results indicate that there is a strong correlation 
between board style and its performance. The UK Minister (Myners 
2008: 19 of the Financial Times) called for changes to be made so 
that bank Chief can be challenged. He further argued that bank 
Chiefs’ lifestyle is part of the problem to the global financial crisis. 
NEDs and IDs contributed to the financial crisis by failing to 
challenge the management of many top banks, stated (Myners 
2008: 19) as he urged institutional investors to take a bigger role in 
training and empowering corporate board members. 
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The training debate comes at a time when boards, particularly in 
the financial services, are coming under fire for failing to curb risky 
practices and high pay. In the same article with Myners, (Olisa 
2008:19), argued that there has been a failure of governance and 
that really centres on NEDs and IDs and their role in making 
capitalism work. Much of the criticism has focused on corporate 
pay. NEDs and IDs have been roundly criticized for personally 
approving their lifestyle (ever-larger compensation packages) and 
these broader pay structures encouraged excessive risk taking.  
 
5.5 Summary of findings   
 
The literature review (Document 2) has reviewed that the legal system 
has failed to cub corporate failures, which has resulted in many 
legislative framework being developed. Legislation has been reactive 
to the Wall Street Crash (1929), The Great Depression (1990/91), the 
Asian Financial Crisis (1997/98) and the Dot.Com (2002) which 
resulted in the development of different legislations and the King 11 
Report (1994) in Africa. The crisis has been a blessing and disguise 
as this assisted African countries with skills transfer as before 1994 
African countries were using UK governance code of best practices. 
 
Corporate governance is an integral part of all banks’ operations 
contributed all respondents. Accordingly, banks are fully committed to 
the principles of the code of corporate practices and conduct set out in 
the (King 11 Report 2002). The purpose of King 11 Report is to 
promote the highest level of corporate governance in SA and 
Zimbabwe stated interviewees 19 and 34. In supporting the code, the 
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directors recognize the need to conduct the enterprises with integrity 
and in accordance with generally accepted corporate practices. Banks 
are committed to creating value for all its stakeholders who are: 
• Shareholders 
o Delivering sustainable earnings growth. 
• Customers 
o Creating lasting and mutually beneficial relationships. 
• Employees 
o Creating a positive, supportive, healthy and diversity-
friendly working environment. 
• The community 
o Being the preferred partners in growing Southern Africa's 
prosperity and developing a culture of positive corporate 
citizenry. 
• Governments and regulators 
o Building a better Africa by supporting transformation and 
the development of financial services markets. 
The scoring above shows the relationship that exists between financial 
performance and qualitative corporate governance structures from 
document 3. The more the five stakeholders stated above are satisfied 
with the board performance, the more the efficient the bank is. If one 
of them complains then it shows that the corporate governance 
structures are not in order. 
 
It was evidenced from the findings of this research that IDs and NEDs 
are important stakeholders in the CG structures of all banks. The 
growth of ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank has been 
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motivated by the participation of IDs and NEDs in the banks’ strategy 
formulation including the acquisitions that positioned ABSA and 
Standard Bank as prominent banks in Africa. IDs and NEDS facilitated 
the acquisition of ABSA by Barclays and the BEE deals that have 
been concluded to date. These deals assisted in the growth of all 
banks and shareholder growth argued all the interviewees. The 
evidence in support of this conclusion comes from document 3, (Demb 
and Neubauer 1992: 51), each bank’s financial statements and 
interviews carried with EDs, IDs and NEDs. 
 
Table 5.3.1: 59 indicate the ranking of each bank in each category. 
FNB out of the six measurement tools scored first in three categories 
(ROA, ROE and Cost to Income Ratio). ROE measures the return on 
capital employed by shareholders, which means in this case, 
shareholders for FNB are getting greater value out of their investment 
more than any other investor in the other banks. Although Chart 5.1.1: 
53 shows that Standard Bank posted higher profits than any other 
bank, ROA reflect otherwise as FNB scored higher on ROA, which 
means that Standard Banks’ assets are not fully employed. There is 
some capacity which is not being utilized by the directors of Standard 
Bank, which is a cost to the bank. 
 
Shareholder wealth creation is reflected by the growth in assets or the 
growth of the balance sheet. Standard Bank as reflected by Chart 
5.1.2 shows that the bank managed to grow its balance sheet by over 
25% year on year. This growth has not resulted in profit and cash 
growth resulting in a lazy balance sheet. These assets need to be fully 
utilized for Standard Bank to realize its full potential. Full employment 
of assets results in lower cost to income ratio, which results in higher 
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profitability of the bank. Charts 4.1.3, 4.2.3, 4.3.3 and 4.4.3 show the 
operating trend of all the four banks and how efficient each bank has 
been over the five years. Constant decline of cost to income ratio is an 
indication of improved operating efficiency. 
 
Table 5.3.2 is a result of the ranking of performance of each bank on 
Table 5.3.1 and other qualitative governance attributes discussed in 
Document 3, which include shareholder activism, skills level, 
independence and transparency.  Quantitatively and qualitatively, FNB 
performed well above the rest making its board a professional board 
as it scored highly in each category. Although all banks have highly 
qualified boards, Nedbank scored lower than any other bank due to its 
lower ROA, ROE and higher cost to income ratios (Table 5.3.1). 
 
The null hypothesis was proved correct on the entire hypothesizes on 
Sec 1.8 by Table 5.3.2 that although all the banks are profitable the 
level of shareholder value creation are different. The failure of the 
traditional measurement tools to predict and identify fraud and crisis 
are some of the reflections that they are not sufficient measurement of 
performance and corporate governance structures. Weakness in 
Shareholder activism, independence and transparency results in poor 
governance structures, which affect performance of the bank as 
reflected by Tables 5.3.1/2. 
 
Director experience and skills were found to be important attributes 
that trigger positively on the conceptual framework as board are forced 
to conduct themselves ethically due to requirements of different 
professional bodies. Accountability, fairness, responsibility and 
transparency are results of a professional board that observes the 
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rights of all stakeholders and create a shared mindset among board 
members, resulting in a bank that performs above industry average 
(Document 2: 25). As (Garratt 2003: 1) argued that, until we see the 
board’s role being professionalized and the supremacy of the board 
being reasserted, we shall not restore full shareholder confidence. 
Confidence can only be restored when all the triggers cause positive 
results on the conceptual framework (Appendix 7). 
 
The triggers that separated the ranking of the banks include 
shareholder participation, application of the stakeholder theory, 
independence and efficient utilization of bank resources there by 
achieving a lower cost to income ratio. Corporate governance practice 
and bank performance improves when the level of independence is 
high and when shareholders participate in the formulation and 
execution of strategies. 
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6 New knowledge 
 
The analysis of banks has shown that IDs and NEDs are important 
components of the bank’s governance process as evidenced by their 
contribution in each bank. They have a legal and professional obligation to 
assist in the formulation of strategies in the bank. The problem is the time 
they have for the bank with its complex structure, hence document 2 raised 
the behaviour of the board of Enron that, “we were meant to believe ….. We 
were misled by management.” Although they have a legal obligation to 
manage risk and improve transparency, their major limiting factor is time they 
spend in order to understand how banks function. 
 
It was agreed with the Chairman of the King 11 Report that executives must 
take responsibility of the risks of the operations of the bank not to pass the 
responsibility to IDs, NEDs, or auditors as they have the stewardship 
responsibility. Shareholders need to rely on the judgement and honest of the 
executive directors; document 3: 43 (Freeman 1984) also supported this 
argument. The board meet at most four times a year this has been observed 
to be insufficient time. There was a general agreement that IDs, NEDs and 
EDs should meet on a monthly basis to review the execution of bank 
strategies and internal controls. Sub-committees needs to meet more often 
and should meet key employees so that there is a fair understanding of the 
operations of the bank. 
 
6.1 Audit Committee 
 
Audit committees are sub-committees of the board responsible for 
assessing the effectiveness of internal controls, risk and 
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implementation of strategies. They are supported by the internal audit 
function who reports directly to the Chairperson of the Audit 
Committee. Their role, the author proposes that be enhanced so that 
they takeover most of the responsibilities of the external audit.  
 
As a result of the complex nature of banks, it takes time for external 
auditors to understand how banks operate and the level of knowledge 
required understanding its functions as a whole. Internal audit should 
be well resourced so that they take the responsibility of managing risk 
in the bank as they spend more time and they are employees of the 
bank. It is to their interest that banks secure their continued 
employment. In order to avoid bullying by management, the head of 
internal audit should report directly to the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee who is not an employee of the bank. This will improve 
transparency and reduce risk as a result of constant internal control 
reviews by staff with knowledge of the operations of the bank. 
 
6.2 Regulatory framework 
 
Changes about to be implemented as a result of the review of the 
Companies Act will have the same negative impact that was caused 
by the (Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002) argued interviewee 33. The 
responsibility and risk that IDs and NEDs carries will result in skilled 
potential board members declining appointment as they cannot have 
personal liability in organizations they do not manage. This change will 
affect the level of skills at board level which will negatively affect 
performance of companies argued interviewee 18. 
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6.3 Financial performance 
 
Chart 5.1.1 indicates that Standard Bank was the most profitable bank 
out of the four banks, while Chapter 4 has reflected the opposite. This 
has reflected that using one measurement tool will not provide proper 
evidence of the performance and efficiency of the bank. Other tools 
like ROA, ROE and Cost to income ratio produced same results, 
which indicate that FNB was the bank that delivered the highest 
shareholder value by providing a higher return on investment. Different 
tools should be used including CFROTA which will be discussed in 
document 5. 
 
6.4 Independent Auditors 
 
The research has shown a significant growth in audit fees, which 
cannot be matched to the value they add. If the business is growing at 
25% and audit fees are growing at over 80%, then there is a mismatch 
of interests argued interviewee 33. Auditors cause negative trigger on 
the conceptual framework (Appendix 7) and shareholder value model. 
Auditors have a professional and statutory responsibility but research 
has shown that there is no much value to shareholders as their role 
can be done by internal audit if properly resourced. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that auditors are affected by conflict of 
interest as they cannot loose income by not protecting the interests of 
executive directors for example the Enron case. Auditors generate 
most of their income from banks and corporate organizations; hence 
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they have defined them as “key clients.” This means that they will do 
everything in their power to retain the client. 
 
Auditing a bank requires a lot of expertise and experience, hence the 
rotation of audit partners and audit firms affect the reduction of risk 
and internal controls. Internal audit function will always be part of the 
bank and will understand the operations of the bank overtime and will 
be able to mitigate the level of risk argued interviewee 18. Internal 
audit and audit committees are positive triggers on the conceptual 
framework and will result in more transparent reporting and 
compliance to the code of best practice. The researcher therefore 
propose a reduction in the functions of the auditors so that they can be 
used as consultants who will assess the level of risks in the bank, 
while the audit committee will also sign the financial statements 
together with independent auditors. 
 
6.5 Statement of new and useful knowledge 
 
“Profit is an opinion, while cash is a fact.” The argument by (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28), of using the conventional methods of 
measuring effectiveness was found not to be sufficient as they do not 
measure the generation of cash. The growth in shareholder value is 
measured by the growth in cash reserves, share price and dividend 
growth argued interviewee 19. 
 
The conventional ratios do not calculate the growth in cash but only 
profit and dividend growth. Liquidity calculation is an important factor 
in identifying the growth of shareholder value. To support this 
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argument the researcher will use a new concept “CFROTA” and cash 
flow to debt ratio in document 5 in order to test whether the increase in 
cash increases shareholder value and whether this will be a correct 
measure of shareholder value growth. A null hypothesis is correct, that 
the conventional accounting measurement tools are not sufficient 
measurement of shareholder value growth and effectiveness of 
directors as they exclude the cash component, while IDs and NEDs 
are required for the effective functioning of the board, through their 
watchdog, trustee and strategy formulation functions.  
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7 Research Integration 
 
Experience and social systems are the major triggers that activate the 
mechanisms on the conceptual framework (Appendix 7), in order for the bank 
to follow the CG principles, which will result in better corporate performance 
that add value to shareholders argued respondents (Advocate Myburgh and 
M King). Like (Nadler 2004: 102 and Leblanc 2004: 437) argued, that the key 
to better CG lies in the working relationships between executive directors, 
managers, IDs and NEDs in the social dynamics of board interaction and in 
the competence, integrity and constructive involvement of individual 
directors.  IDs and NEDs are not necessary as they do not know what is 
happening in the bank due to their limited time they have for the bank and 
their dependence on information from the CEO argued, (Mace 1971 and 
Herman 1981). IDs and NEDs have three responsibilities of being the 
watchdog, trustees and pilots of strategy formulation (Demb and Neubauer 
1992: 51) disagreed with (Mace 1971 and Herman 1981). The author also 
disagrees with (Mace 1971 and Herman 1981) as IDs and NEDs have been 
found to be important triggers for value addition. They argued that the boards 
of today are directed by their professional conduct which requires them to act 
ethically and professionally. They therefore comply with the requirements of 
the code of best practice. 
 
7.1 Summary 
 
Various process variables were cross tabulated with overall 
effectiveness using conventional accounting methods to see if linear 
trends emerged and the data from the various data sets could be 
treated as an effective way of measuring board effectiveness. This 
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was not the case for all variables, as they excluded calculation of cash 
flows, so in the subsequent stepwise logistic regression these 
variables were treated as categorical. The correlation matrix showed 
that all the process variables were significantly correlated with overall 
board effectiveness and with each other. The stepwise logistic 
regression analysis identified four process variables that best 
explained variances in overall board effectiveness. 
 
Shareholder activism was observed to be an important attribute which 
enhance bank performance and improves as shareholders get 
involved in the administration of the bank. FirstRand was seen as a 
good example while Investec did not support this argument as 
Investec has not reached the level of success as FNB. IDs, NEDs and 
management are appointed with no real power to function but wait for 
instructions from the owners argued interviewee 34. This was also 
common in document 2 and the reason why most banks failed. They 
are appointed to make the numbers with no authority argued 
interviewee 33. 
 
The evidence in support of this conclusion comes from (White et al 
2003) who argued that a higher liquidity is an indication of shareholder 
value. Accounting measurement tools have proved to be insufficient in 
measuring the effectiveness of the board as they do not measure the 
gearing and liquidity of the bank. Cash was found to be a true 
measurement of wealth as it is difficult to manipulate cash received 
argued (Barnes 2004: 91). A growth in cash is an indication of 
shareholder value growth. Cash ratios will be tested in document 5 to 
check if there is going to be any variance with the findings in this 
document. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
Conventional accounting measurement tools are important measures of bank 
performance as they give an indication of how the resources are applied in 
creating wealth. The major weakness is that they are subject to manipulation 
argued (Barnes 2004: 91 – 105). Relationships were established during the 
research that there is positive correlation between cost to income ratio, ROE 
and profit for the year. The lower the cost to income ratio the higher the profit 
and higher ROE. There was however no relationship between assets under 
management and profitability of the bank. This shows that there are some 
banks with lazy assets, hence not creating the required shareholder value 
growth. 
 
The bank with the lowest cost to income ratio was graded as the one with the 
most effective board. FirstRand scored highest in almost all measurement 
tools from asset utilization, employee to income ratio, asset to income ratio 
and high average ROE (Appendix 1 to 4). Performance of banks is 
determined by the level of skills, experience, empowerment and shareholder 
participation argued interviewee 19.  
 
(Table 5.3.1: 55) shows the results of the scoring as FNB (1), Standard Bank 
(2), ABSA (3) and Nedbank (4), which resulted in the ranking on Table 5.3.2. 
Empowerment is the most important variable as management is able to 
manage the business units they are responsible for as their own. Banks that 
do not empower their management and staff will always fall bellow the best 
performer. FirstRand has a unique model of empowering its management 
hence performs much better than any other bank in SA and Zimbabwe. 
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8.1 Reflective Critique 
 
There was agreement among the NEDs interviewed that decision 
management that is initiation and implementation of strategies is an 
executive function, whereas decision control that is ratification and 
monitoring is IDs and NEDs’ function. Once there is a clear 
understanding of these roles, transparency will improve argued 
interviewee 18. 
 
The role of auditors failed in this research to yield results that support 
the cost that comes with their engagement (Appendix 1 to 4). Legally 
every public company is required to have auditors, but there has been 
no research that assesses their effectiveness and whether they add 
shareholder value. According to (Turnbull 2006) auditors cannot be 
independent as they have an interest in auditing the bank. This will be 
left for further research, but the current information suggests that 
auditors support negative trigger on the conceptual framework as the 
increase in audit fees does not support the value creation model. 
 
8.2 Looking forward to document 5 
 
Document 2 gave an outline plan for the research that identified 
proposals for document 5. These include testing the relevance of 
auditors, IDS and NEDs. Document 5 will test the hypothesis tested in 
this document and the analysis of the use of CFROTA as a new 
measurement tool to test effectiveness of directors.  
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Document 5 will consolidate issues discussed in document 3 and 4 
and provide answers to the research questions. New knowledge 
discovered during the research will be presented and proposals for 
change of policies and legal requirements will be put forward as the 
author’s contribution to this study. 
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10.1 Appendix 1: ABSA Performance 
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ABSA background 
 
1991 signified the formation of Amalgamated Banks of South Africa 
Limited (Absa) through the merger of UBS Holdings, the Allied and 
Volkskas Groups, and certain interests of the Sage Group. The 
merger was after the near collapse of UBS in 1990. 
In 1992 Absa acquired the entire shareholding of the Bankorp 
Group (which included TrustBank, Senbank and Bankfin), thereby 
extending its asset base even further. In 1997 the name of the 
holding company, Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Limited was 
changed to Absa Group Limited, consisting of three main operating 
divisions. 
  
In 1998 the United, Volkskas, Allied and TrustBank brands were 
consolidated into a single brand, and Absa adopted a new 
corporate identity. In 2005, Barclays, acquired a majority stake in 
Absa as part of its drive to expand its global product and 
international retail and commercial banking businesses in attractive 
markets outside the United Kingdom. 
 
The Absa Group Limited (Absa), listed on the JSE Limited, is one of 
South Africa's largest financial services groups offering a complete 
range of banking, bancassurance and wealth management 
products and services. Absa's business is conducted primarily in 
South Africa and on the Africa continent, where it has equity 
holdings in banks in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
and other countries including United Kingdom, Germany and 
Singapore. 
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At 31 December 2006, Absa had assets of R495 billion, more than 
749 physical outlets in SA, 8, 4 million customers, 7 053 automated 
teller machines and 35,154 permanent employees 
www.absa.co.za. Absa employs a customer-centric business model 
with targeted business units serving specific market segments. The 
Group interacts with its customers through a combination of 
physical and electronic channels. Absa become a subsidiary of 
Barclays Bank PLC on 27 July 2005, when Barclays acquired a 
controlling stake in the Absa Group. Barclays is an international 
financial services group engaged in retail and commercial banking, 
credit card issuing, investment banking, wealth management and 
investment management services. 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated income statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
 
   
Net interest income 
 
14,941 9,341 
  Interest and similar income 29 38,368 23,037 
  Interest expense and similar charges 30 -23,427 -13,696 
Impairment loses on loans and advances 7 -1,573 -569 
Net interest income after imparement loses on loans and advances 13,368 8,772 
Net fee and commission income  10,374 7,086 
  Fee and commission income 31 10,951 7,441 
  Fee and commission expense 31 -577 -355 
Net insurance premium income 32 2,994 1,948 
Net insurance claims and benefits paid 33 -1,319 -797 
Changes in insurance and investment liabilities 34 -748 -526 
Gains and losses from banking and trding activities 35 1,347 855 
Gains and losses from investment activities 36 1,916 1,259 
Other operating income 37 938 548 
Operating income before expenses  28,870 19,145 
Operating expenditure  -17,566 -12,211 
  Operating expenses 38 -16,620 -11,433 
  Impairments 40 -75 -54 
  Indirect taxation 41 -871 -724 
Share of retained earnings from associates and joint ventures 12 113 101 
Operating profit before income tax  11,417 7,035 
Taxation expense 42 -3,151 -2,191 
Profit for the year  8,266 4,844 
    
Attributable to: 
   
  Ordinary equity holders of the group  8,105 4,776 
  Minority interest - ordinary shares  88 68 
  Minority interest - preference shares  73 0 
  
8,266 4,844 
  
  
Basic EPS (cents) 43 1,216.8 721.4 
Diluted EPS (cents) 43 1,154.4 692.7 
Headline earnings 44 7,872.0 4,902.0 
Headline EPS (cents) 44 1,181.8 740.4 
Diluted headline EPS (cents) 44 1,121.3 710.9 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2006    
 
Note 2006 2005 
Assets 
   
Cash, cash balances  2 16,461 15,036 
Statutory liquid asset portfolio 3 20,829 16,289 
Loans and advances to banks 4 21,800 20,805 
Trading assets 5 17,983 23,450 
Hedging assets 5 676 396 
Loans and advances to customers 6 386,174 306,856 
Reinsurance assets 9 390 423 
Other assets 10 12,175 6,762 
Investments 11 13,798 9,904 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 12 693 895 
Intangible assets 13 230 191 
Property and equipment 14 3,750 3,451 
Current tax assets 15 24 17 
Deferred tax assets 16 129 86 
Total assets 
 
495,112 404,561 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Liabilities 
   
Deposits from banks 17 35,156 25,745 
Trading liabilities 18 23,484 20,915 
Hedging liabilities 18 1,902 486 
Deposits due to customers 19 368,449 303,945 
Current tax liabilities 20 1,181 417 
Liabilities under investment contracts 21 5,129 3,459 
Policyholder liabilities under insurance contracts 22 3,187 2,736 
Borrowed funds 23 8,420 6,483 
Other liabilities and sundry provisions 24 10,746 11,812 
Deferred tax liabilities 16 2,537 2,562 
Total liabilities 
 
460,191 378,560 
    
Equity 
   
Capital and reserves 
   
Attributable to ordinary equity holders:    
  Share capital 26 1,338 1,327 
  Share premium 26 2,067 1,875 
  Other reserves 28 412 622 
  Retained earnings  27,876 21,931 
  
31,693 25,755 
Minority interest - ordinary shares  236 246 
Minority interest - preference shares 27 2,992 0 
Total Equity 
 
34,921 26,001 
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Total Equity and Liabilities 
 
495,112 404,561 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated cash flow statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
Note 2006 2005 
Cash flow from operating activities 
   
Interest and commissions received  25,156 15,962 
Insurance premiums and claims  1,675 1,070 
Net trading and other income  1,827 1,239 
Cash payments to employees and suppliers  -15,581 -10,698 
Income taxes paid 45 -3,333 -2,199 
Cash flow from operating profit before changes in      
operating assets and liabilities  9,744 5,374 
  Net decrease/inrease in trading securities  5,187 -1,895 
  Net increase in loans and advances to customers  -80,891 -54,425 
  Net increase in other assets  -16,464 -3,895 
  Net increase in insurance and investment funds  1,373 1,520 
  Net decrease/increase in trading liabilities  3,985 -237 
  Net increase in amounts due to customers and banks  73,915 52,374 
  Net decrease/increase in other liabilities  -865 2,124 
Net cash (utilized)/generated from operating activities -4,016 940 
    
Cash flow from investing activities 
   
Purchase of property and equipment 14 -1,150 -972 
Proceeds from sale of property and equipment  120 192 
Purchase of intangible assets 13 -149 -47 
Proceeds from disposal of intangible assets  7 0 
Acqusition of subsidiaries, net of cash 54 -44 0 
Disposal of subsidiaries, net of cash 54 -133 0 
Disposal of associates, net of cash  745 54 
Acquisition of associates, net of cash  -174 0 
Net (increase/decrease in securities  -1,564 2,749 
  
-2,342 1,976 
Cash flow from financing activities 
   
Issue of ordinary shares  197 281 
Issue of preference shares  2,992 0 
Share buy - back  -17 0 
Proceeds from borrowed funds and debt securities  2,000 1,500 
Repayment of borrowed funds and debt securities  -6 -750 
Dividend paid  -2,367 -2,401 
Net cash generated/(utilized) from financing activities  2,799 -1,370 
  
  
Net (decrease)/increase in cash and cash equivalents  -3,559 1,546 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year  8,343 6,796 
Effect of exchange rate movement on cash equivalents  3 1 
Total cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year 4,787 8,343 
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ABSA Group 
      
 
 
12 months 
Pro forma  
    
Statistics, Returns and 
Capital adequacy five 
year review December  December  March March March March 
 
2006 2005 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares 
in issue listed on the JSE 
(R000) 671,955 666,855 655,055 651,055 651,547 651,547 
Dividend cover (times) 2.5 n/a 2.8 3.8 3.6 2.5 
Dividend yield (%) 3.7 n/a 3.9 3.9 4.9 4.6 
Earnings yield (%) 9.4 9.4 
         
11.0  14.7 17.9 11.5 
Price earnings ratio (times) 10.6 10.6 9.1 6.8 5.6 8.7 
Price - to - book (times) 2.65 2.62 2.11 1.56 1.14 1.07 
Share price (cents) - high 12,615 10,320 8,150 4,700 3,651 4,155 
                            - low 9,650 7,125 4,320 3,000 2,500 2,410 
                            - closing 12,510 10,100 7,540 4,664 2,940 2,530 
Number of shares traded 
(.000) 35,926 33,492 27,892 17,931 13,894 12,081 
Turnover in shares traded 
(%) 
      
326,112      391,557  
    
455,513    457,727  
  
440,314  
  
365,926  
Market capitalization (Rm) 
     
84,061.6     67,352.4  
   
49,391.2  30,365 19,156 16,484 
Dividend cover (cents)          473.0  n/a 295.0       182.0  
      
145.0  
      
116.0  
       
Share statistics per 
ordinary share (cents)       
Basic earnings (cents)       1,216.8  950.3 831 697.5 520.5 260 
Headline (Cents)           7,872  6,282 5,394 4,447 3,441 1,888 
Diluted EPS (cents)       1,154.4  915.9 801.6 691.7 520.5 260 
Dividend paid (cents)          473.0  n/a 295.0 182.0 145.0 116.0 
Return on equity (%) 27.4 25.6 25.3 24.6 21.4 12.9 
Cost to income ratio 54.6 57.0 56.6 57.1 60 60.3 
       
Number of employees        35,154        33,543  
      
32,515      31,658  
    
32,356  
    
35,283  
Revenue per employee ® 0.87 0.76 0.70 0.65 0.56 0.46 
Expenses per employee ®           -0.47          -0.44  
        -
0.39        -0.37  
      -
0.33  
      -
0.27  
Headline earnings per 
employee ®  229.2 190.2 168.1 138.9 101.7 53.2 
Total assets (Rm) 495,112 404,561 347,161 306,848 269,064 247,300 
PBITDA 12,476 8,914 8,666 7,130 5,452 4,972 
Cash Generation 28,658 18,271 11,017 9,293 7,715 6,988 
Audit fees 69 129 70 49 39 32 
Revenue         30,443        25,590        20471 17959 16078 
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22,599  
Profit for the year          8,266  6,337 
       
5,494  4,596 3,461 1,306 
CFROTA 2.52% 2.20% 2.50% 2.32% 2.03% 2.01% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 5.79% 4.52% 3.17% 3.03% 2.87% 2.83% 
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10.2 Appendix 2: FirstRand Bank Performance 
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FNB background 
 
FirstRand was created in April 1998 through the merger of the financial 
service interests of Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited 
(AAC) and RMB Holdings Limited (RMBH). The major companies involved 
at the time were the listed entities, First National Bank Holdings of 
Southern Africa Limited (FNBH) and the Southern Life Association Limited 
(Southern Life), which was controlled by AAC and Momentum Life 
Assurers Limited (Momentum), the holding company of Discovery Health 
Limited and Rand Merchant Bank Limited which was controlled by RMBH 
www.firstrand.co.za. 
 
Momentum was used as the vehicle to effect the merger. In terms of the 
scheme of arrangement, Southern Life and FNBH shareholders received 
675 Momentum shares in exchange for every 100 shares held. In addition, 
Momentum raised R5,1 billion by way of a rights issue in terms of which 
572,7 million shares were issued at a price of 900 cents per share. The 
purpose of the rights issue was to facilitate the elimination of cross-
holdings which existed between Southern Life and FNBH. Momentum 
changed its name to FirstRand Limited and was listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 25 May 1998. A day later a similar 
listing occurred on the Namibia Stock Exchange. The vision was to create 
a new group of companies structured with critical mass to take advantage 
of the convergence of banking and insurance products and services 
without the limitations imposed by minorities in operating companies. 
 
Following pressure from shareholders to concentrate their efforts on 
mining and resources related activities, AAC and its associate De Beers 
undertook to sell their shares when prices were appropriate. De Beers 
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sold their shares in the open market, while AAC reduced their holding in 
FirstRand from 20,4% to 5,25% following a deal with Remgro Limited. 
Remgro exchanged a portion of their newly acquired FirstRand shares for 
shares in RMB Holdings. This exchange allowed RMB Holdings to 
increase its holding in FirstRand from 25% to 32,83%. Remgro retained a 
9,32% interest in FirstRand. AAC disposed of the remainder of its shares 
over a period of time with the last of its shares being sold in December 
2003 www.firstrand.co.za. 
 
In February 2005 the Group sold an effective 10% interest in FirstRand to 
four broad-based empowerment groups, Kagiso Trust, Mineworkers 
Investment Trust (“MIT”), WDB trust and the FirstRand Empowerment 
Foundation (a newly created FirstRand BEE entity, with a mandate for 
broad-based transformation, and black South African FirstRand staff and 
non-executive directors. 
 
The Group selected its BEE partners because they share FirstRand’s 
objectives of enhancing broad-based BEE by addressing the needs of a 
wide constituency. In addition, the BEE partners have excellent 
reputations, successful track records and long standing relations with 
FirstRand and with each other, which will add value to shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
 
FirstRand represents a very different proposition to its peers in that it is 
the only fully integrated financial services group in South Africa. It is also 
the only one of the big-four South African retail, commercial and 
investment banking groups that is “owner-managed”. The three original 
founders, GT Ferreira, Paul Harris and Laurie Dippenaar are all still 
actively involved in the management of the Group and collectively 
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management own 23% of RMB Holdings Limited which in turn owns 
29.5% of FirstRand Limited. 
 
A unique business philosophy 
  
The FirstRand business philosophy has been home-grown, developed and 
ingrained into the Group over the past 25 years and it has its roots in an 
entrepreneurial culture. At its heart is the understanding that people are 
the single most important resource and FirstRand aspires to create an 
environment that attracts and retains entrepreneurial self-starters. 
Although there is a bias for action, the Group aspires to act within the 
context of clearly thought through strategic and operational plans, 
hallmarked by innovative thinking which makes bottom line sense. 
  
Participative, non-hierarchical decision making in the context of vigorous 
debate of the business case, with no holy cows and no barriers to 
communication, lies at the core of the way it does business. This is the 
common value system on which the entire group operates. This 
philosophy creates a liberating owner-manager culture. Strategies are 
owned and delivered on by the profit centre leaders because they 
conceived them. Every one of the Group's many profit centers has a 
strategy to grow market share, revenues and earnings. Each CEO is 
empowered and incentivised to deliver better than his/her budget at the 
end of the year. The structure and business philosophy means that 
FirstRand has many growth stories for onwards argued Nxasana. 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated income statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
 
 Rm Rm 
Net interest income 
 
15,012 13,184 
  Interest and similar income 3 30,395 27,505 
  Interest expense and similar charges 4 -15,383 -14,321 
Impairment loses on loans and advances  -1,411 -706 
Impairment of advances - specific  -1,132 -756 
Impairment of advances - portfolio  -279 50 
Net fee and commission income 5 12,009 9,878 
  Net insurance premium income  14,088 11,835 
  Fee and commission expense  -2,079 -1,957 
Net insurance premium income 6 6,822 7,423 
  Insurance premium revenue  7,758 8,111 
  Premium ceded to reinsurers  -936 -688 
Net claims and benefits paid 7 -6,174 -8,861 
  Gross claims and benefits paid on insurance contract  -6,875 -9,348 
  Reinsurance recoveries  701 487 
Net gains from banking and trading activities 8 4,349 2,187 
Net gains from investment activities 8 19,225 16,003 
Other operating income 8 2,268 1,715 
Increase in value of policyholder liabilities  -17,430 -13,447 
Fair value adjustment to financial liabilities 9 -530 -232 
Net operating income  34,140 27,144 
Operating income before expenses 10 -20,402 -16,836 
  Operating expenditure  -20,344 -16,825 
  Other impairments  -58 -11 
Share of profit of associates and joint venture companies  1,290 1,076 
Income before discontinued operations  15,028 11,384 
Loss on disposal of discontinued operations 37 0 -67 
Operating profit before income tax  15,028 11,317 
Taxation 11 -5,040 -3,610 
Profit for the year  9,988 7,707 
Attributable to: 
   
  Ordinary equity holders of the group  8,825 7,137 
  Minority interest - preference shares  274 68 
Total for equity holders of the company 
 
9,099 7,205 
  Minority interest - ordinary shares  889 502 
Profit for the year  9,988 7,707 
  
  
Basic EPS (cents) 12 171.6 137.3 
Diluted EPS (cents) 12 166.0 134.5 
Headline earnings  156.9 132.4 
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Headline EPS (cents)  157.8 129.3 
Diluted headline EPS (cents)  152.6 126.7 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2006    
 
Note 2006 2005 
Assets 
 
Rm Rm 
Cash and short term funds 13 30,323 24,890 
Money market investments  16,361 11,427 
Advances  291,076 221,851 
  - Originated  236,370 175,475 
  - Held to maturity  698 7,449 
  - Available for sale  538 1,648 
  - Elected fair value  53,470 37,279 
Derivative financial instruments 15 373,934 39,795 
  - Qualifying for hedge accounting  428 811 
  - Held for trading  373,506 38,984 
Investment securities and other investments 16 165,054 125,582 
  - Financial instruments held for trading  28,348 20,728 
  - Investment securities  136,706 104,854 
     * Held to maturity  998 2,880 
     * Available for sale  22,947 16,100 
     * Elected fair value  112,761 85,874 
Non recourse investments  8,794 8,181 
Commodities 16 676 439 
Investment properties 17 6,141 4,172 
Policy loans on insurance contracts  118 0 
Policy loans on insurance contracts  0 530 
Reinsurance assets 18 292 236 
Insurance assets  1,766 1,881 
Loans and receivables 19 6,046 11,548 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 20 5,069 5,707 
Taxation  7 118 
Intangible assets 22 4,076 1,178 
Property and equipment 23 5,011 4,610 
Deferred taxation 24 1,043 594 
    
Total Assets  579,787 462,739 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Liabilities 
   
Deposits  317,840 245,793 
  - Deposits and current accounts  309,304 237,888 
  - Non recourse deposits 16 8,536 7,905 
Short trading positions 26 25,967 19,919 
Derivative financial instruments 15 22,370 30,264 
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  - Qualifying for hedge accounting  257 249 
  - Held for trading  22,113 30,015 
Creditors and accruals  16,848 23,257 
Reinsurance liabilities  24 31 
Policyholders' liabilities under investment contracts 32 93,720 48,844 
Policyholders' liabilities under insurance contracts 33 40,740 49,001 
Liabilities arising to third parties 34 1,725 1,027 
Deferred revenue liability 35 248 0 
Post retirement funding liability 27 1,635 1,733 
Debentures and long - term liabilities 28 10,576 5007 
Provisions 29 2,407 1,567 
Taxation liability  1,024 185 
Deferred taxation 24 5,159 3,877 
Total liabilities  540,283 430,505 
    
Shareholders' equity 
   
Ordinary share capital and share premium 30 3,635 4,396 
Non-cumulative non-redeemable preference shares  4,519 2,992 
Distributable reserves  24,854 20,284 
Non distributable reserves  3,522 2,238 
Total shareholders  36,530 29,910 
Minority interest  2,974 2,324 
    
Total shareholders' equity and liabilities  579,787 462,739 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated cash flow statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
Cash flow from operating activities 
   
Cash receipts from customers 38.2 54,053 47,451 
Cash paid to customers, employees and suppliers 38.3 -27,670 -28,013 
Dividends received  1,327 988 
Dividends paid  -3,651 -2,835 
Net cash flows from operating activities 38.1 24,059 17,591 
Increase in income earning assets 38.4 -98,204 -30,051 
Increase in deposits and other liabilities 38.5 80,280 22,249 
Net cash flows from operating funds  -17,924 -7,802 
Taxation paid 38.6 -3,257 -3,298 
Net cash inflow from operating activities  2,878 6,491 
    
Cash flow from investing activities 
   
Purchase of property and equipment  -1,329 -388 
Proceeds from disposal of equipment  105 0 
Purchase of investments  -46 -10,484 
Proceeds from disposal of investments  319 0 
Proceeds from disposal of subsidiary 38.7 67 1,019 
Purchase of associates  -269 -1,316 
Proceeds from disposal of associates 38.8 907 0 
Purchase of intangible assets  -36 -238 
Net cash outflow from investment activities  -282 -11,407 
  
  
Cash flow from financing activities 
   
Increase in/(repayment of) long - term borrowings  5,469 -693 
Proceeds from share issue  1,526 3,000 
Net cash inflow from financing activities  6,995 2,307 
Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents  9,591 -2,609 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year 38.9 36,317 40,253 
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year  45,908 37,644 
Cash and cash equivalents sold  -52 -1,335 
Cash and cash equivalents bought  828 8 
Total cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year 
 
46,684 36,317 
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FirstRand Group      
      
Statistics, Returns and 
Capital adequacy five year 
review      
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares in 
issue listed on the JSE (R000) 5634.1 5613.6 5476.4 5445.3 5445.3 
Dividend cover (times) 2.45 2.38 1.89 2.37 3.03 
Dividend yield (%) 3.9 3.97 4.51 4.58 3.73 
Earnings yield (%) 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Price earnings ratio (times) 10.78 10.56 9.23 8.50 9.24 
Price - to - book (times) 2.52 2.4 2.30 2.10 1.80 
Share price (cents) - high 2,120 1,480 1,049 815 905 
                            - low 1,365 965 725 597 615 
                            - closing 1,690 1,387 1,019 764 765 
Number of shares traded (.000) 2,771 2,044 2,256 1,986 2,018 
Turnover in shares traded (%) 95.22 77.86 55.80 41.71 41.66 
Market capitalization (Rm) 49,491 25,423 19,701 14,086 15,580 
      
Share statistics per ordinary 
share (cents) 
     
Basic earnings 171.6 137.25 109.3 86.2 82.5 
Diluted EPS 165.96 134.5 106.8 84.5 82.5 
Headline earnings 
     
  - Basic 157.79 129.29 110.3 92.5 86.9 
  - Diluted 152.6 126.7 107.7 90.7 86.9 
Dividend paid 65.99 55.1 46 35 28.5 
 - Interim 32 26.6 19.25 16.5 13.5 
 - Final 33.99 28.5 26.75 18.5 15 
Return on equity (%) 25.1% 25.2% 25.4% 22.6% 25.2% 
Cost to income ratio 53.8 56.6 56.9 57 55.5 
 
     
Number of employees 43 39 36 35 34 
Revenue per employee ® 707 705 650 640 633 
Total assets (Rm) 579,787 462,739 424,821 393,674 374,766 
PBITDA 16,376 12,471 7,711 5,712 4,516 
Cash Generation 24,059 17,591 16,312 15,431 14,678 
Audit fees 97 74 80 62 54 
Profit for the year 8,825 7,137 5,676 4,516 4,495 
Revenue  (Rm) 30,395 27,505 23,417 22,412 21,528 
CFROTA 2.82% 2.70% 1.82% 1.45% 1.21% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 4.15% 3.80% 3.84% 3.92% 3.92% 
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10.3 Appendix 3: Nedbank Performance 
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Nedbank background 
Nedbank Group Limited is a bank holding company, which operates 
as one of the four largest banking groups in South Africa through its 
principal banking subsidiaries, Nedbank Limited and Imperial Bank 
Limited, in which it has a 50,1% interest. The company’s ordinary 
shares have been listed on JSE Limited since 1969. In 1973, 
Nedbank Group Limited was formed from the merger of Syfrets SA 
and Union Acceptances Limited and Nedbank Limited. 
 
The group offers a wide range of wholesale and retail banking 
services through three main business clusters: Nedbank Corporate; 
Nedbank Capital; and Nedbank Retail. Nedbank Group focuses on 
southern Africa, with the group positioned to be a bank for all – both 
from a retail and a wholesale banking perspective. The principal 
services offered by the group are corporate and retail banking, 
property finance, investment banking, private banking, foreign 
exchange and securities trading. Nedbank Group also generates 
income from private equity, credit card acquiring and processing 
services, custodial services, collective investments, trust 
administration, asset management services and bancassurance. 
Imperial Bank focuses mostly on motor vehicle finance, which it 
markets through its Motor Finance Corporation (MFC) brand. In 
addition, it also offers property, medical and aviation finance. 
 
Nedbank Group’s head office is in Sandton, Johannesburg, with 
large operational centres in Durban and Cape Town, which are 
complemented by an extensive branch and support network 
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throughout South Africa and facilities in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe. These facilities are operated through 
Nedbank Group’s eight subsidiary and/or affiliated banks, as well 
as through branches and representative offices in London and on 
the Isle of Man to meet the international banking requirements of 
the group’s South African-based multinational and private clients. 
 
In August, 2006 the group unveiled its much anticipated black 
economic empowerment (BEE) transaction in Namibia which 
resulted in a broad range of black stakeholders acquiring direct 
ownership of N$308 million of the Old Mutual Group's Namibian 
businesses. The transaction incorporated three separate but inter-
dependent BEE transactions for the Old Mutual Group subsidiaries 
in Namibia, namely Old Mutual Namibia, Nedbank Namibia and 
Mutual & Federal Namibia. 
 
At the annual general meeting on 4 May 2005, shareholders 
formally approved the resolution to change the name of the holding 
company from Nedcor Limited to Nedbank Group Limited with 
effect from close of business on 13 May 2005. The group's BEE 
deal 'Eyethu' was announced. The deal broke new ground in the 
area of black economic empowerment as it was the first truly broad-
based deal to be announced with tens of thousands of 
stakeholders. Valued at more than R3 billion, a broad range of 
black stakeholders including employees, retail and corporate 
clients, community groups, strategic black business partners 
(Wiphold and Brimstone) and non-executive directors acquired a 
holding of 9,33 % in the group. 
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2004 was a watershed year for the group as both structural and 
strategic changes were implemented to restore the performance of 
the group and lay a foundation for sustainable growth into the 
future. The group delivered on its commitments including: 
• A thorough balance sheet clean-up and successful R5,15 
billion rights offer 
• Substantially reducing the bank's risk profile, including 
reduced foreign exchange exposure and volatility and reduced 
interest rate risk 
• Increased management accountability with management 
teams restructured and 70 out of the top 100 management in 
new positions 
• Implementation of a clear strategic direction with a three-year 
plan in place with detailed targets 
• A comprehensive restructure, following the strategy, which 
included a devolution of product, processes, credit and branch 
operations from the centre into the line units, the sale of non-
core assets and the decision to integrate Peoples Bank into 
Nedbank 
• The merger was delivered and the group is on track for annual 
synergy savings of R700 million; and  
• Improved management information systems and reporting, 
including improved activity justified transfer pricing, funds 
transfer pricing and capital allocation.  
On 1 January 2003 the new Nedcor Group was formed, combining 
Nedcor, BoE, NIB and Cape of Good Hope Bank into one legal 
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entity. New management structures came into effect allowing these 
entities to become a fully integrated business. The group now has 
banking licenses for Nedbank, Peoples Bank and Imperial Bank in 
South Africa, Gerrard private Bank in the United Kingdom and 
several licenses in the rest of Africa and the Middle East. 
 
On 2 July 2002, the High Court gave its approval for Nedcor to 
acquire all the issued shares and convertible debentures of BoE, 
thereby paving the way for the Nedcor/ BoE merger. This final step 
in the approval process meant that the formation of one of South 
Africa's leading banks with assets of more than R270 billion 
became a reality. This merger heralded a new era in the history of 
BoE and Nedcor. For BoE, it offered the opportunity to continue a 
long and proud tradition of banking excellence and personal 
service. For Nedcor, the financial expertise and the quality of BoE's 
people will continue to further enrich its offering to the public. NIB 
minority shares were acquired by Nedcor Limited in October 2002. 
NIB was delisted. Nedcor Bank Limited changed its name to 
Nedbank Limited in November 2002. 
 
Nedcor Limited and Old Mutual South Africa Limited announced the 
proposed merger of Permanent Bank and Old Mutual Bank to form 
a new banking operation focused on wealth management and 
financial planning in 2002. The merged operation is a custom-built 
bancassurance institution focused on the retail middle market in 
South Africa. Nedcor and Old Mutual each own 50 percent of the 
new bank. The new bank, operating as Old Mutual Bank, was to 
initially offer a full range of deposit and investment accounts, home 
loans, secured loans and other wealth management products. 
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Nedcor Bank acquired FBC Fidelity Bank Limited in 2001. BoE 
Corporation Limited unbundled its shares in BoE Limited and then 
delisted. The unbundling by BoE Corporation Limited of its shares 
in BoE Limited and its subsequent delisting could maybe mentioned 
here, along with the unbundling by BoE Limited of its share in 
RMBH, and the sale of other non-core investments which resulted 
in the challenges that faced the bank in 2002/3. 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Income Statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Interest and similar income 8 28,521 23,234 
Interest expense and similar charges 9 -17,558 -14,705 
Net interest income  10,963 8,529 
Impairement loses on loans and advances 24.1 1,483 1,189 
Income from lending activities  9,480 7,340 
Non - interest revenue 10 9,468 8,469 
Operating income  18,948 15,809 
Total operating expenses  
 
11,886 11,017 
  Operating expenses 11 11,740 10,469 
  Merger and recovery programme expenses 12.1 0 155 
  BEE transaction expenses 12.2 146 393 
Indirect taxation 13 345 223 
Profit from oprations before non - trading and capital items  6,717 4,569 
Non - trading and capital items 14 124 701 
Profit from oprations   6,841 5,270 
Share of profit of associates and joint ventures 28.2 153 167 
Profit before direct taxation  6,994 5,437 
Direct taxation 15.1 1,933 1,140 
Profit for the year  5,061 4,297 
Profit attributable to: 
   
  Equity holders of the parent  4,533 3,836 
  Minority interest - ordinary shareholders  309 233 
  Minority interest - preference shareholders  219 228 
  5,061 4,297 
Basic EPS (cents) 16 1,135 966 
Diluted EPS (cents) 16 1,099 958 
Dividend paid per share (cents) 17.1 394 181 
Dividend declared per share (cents) 17.1 493 290 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Balance Sheetas at 31 December 2006  
  
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Assets 
   
Cash and cash equivalents 18 12,267 11,142 
Other short - term securities 19 25,756 17,014 
Derivative financial instruments 20.1 15,273 16,176 
Government and other securities 22 22,196 22,658 
Loans and advances 
23-
24 308,563 248,408 
Other assets 25 12,468 11,601 
Clients' indebtedness for acceptances  2,577 1,291 
Current taxation receivables 26 161 134 
Investment securities 27 7,155 6,875 
Non - current assets held for sale 29 490 385 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 28 907 657 
Deferred taxation asset 30 120 680 
Investment property 31 158 163 
Property and equipment 32 3,377 3,095 
Long - term employee benefit assets 33 1,444 1,225 
Computer software and capitalized development costs 34 1,266 1,320 
Mandatory reserve deposits with central bank 18 7,039 5,747 
Goodwill 35 3,695 3,687 
Total assets 
 
424,912 352,258 
    
Total equity and liabilities 
   
Ordinary share capital 36.1 395 402 
Ordinary share premium  9,727 10,465 
Reserves  14,994 11,623 
Total equity attributable to equity holders of the 
parent 
 
25,116 22,490 
Minority shareholders' equity attributable to:    
  - Ordinary shareholders  1,202 1,049 
  - Preference shareholders 36.2 3,070 2,770 
Total equity  
 
29,388 26,309 
Derivative financial instruments 20.1 12,904 17,055 
Amounts owed to depositors 37 324,685 261,311 
Other Liabilities 37.4 37,847 32,357 
Liabilities under acceptances  2,577 1,291 
Current taxation liabilities 26 434 466 
Other Liabilities held for sale 29 417 0 
Deferred taxation liabilities 30 1,649 959 
Long - term employee benefit liabilities 33 1,215 1,071 
Investment contract liabilities 38 5,278 4,166 
Long - term debt instruments 39 8,518 7,273 
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Total liabilities 
 
395,524 325,949 
Total equity and liabilities 
 
424,912 352,258 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Cash Flow Statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Cash generated by operations 43.1 9,297 6,898 
Cash received from clients 43.2 37,806 31,329 
Cash paid to clients, employees and suppliers 43.3 
-
28,561 -24,788 
Dividends received on investments  173 140 
Recoveries on loans previously written off  296 226 
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash 
equivalents  -417 -9 
Change in funds for operating activities  -3,739 2,023 
Increase in operating assets 43.4 
-
71,591 -17,986 
Increase in operating liabilities 43.5 67,852 20,009 
Net cash from operating activities before taxation 
 5,558 8,921 
Taxation paid 43.6 -953 -852 
Cash flow from operating activities  4,605 8,069 
    
Cash flow utilised by investing activities 
 
-1,057 -927 
Acquisition of property and equipment  -1,097 -750 
Proceeds on disposal of property and equipment  57 132 
Net disposal(acquisition) of investment banking assets  6 -228 
Net acquisition of investments in associates and other investments -273 -82 
Disposal of investments in subsidiary companies net of cash 43.7 286 1 
Acquisition of investments in subsidiary companies net of cash 43.8 -36 0 
    
Cash flow utilised by financing activities 
 
-1,131 -303 
Ordinary shares (repurchased/issued)  -745 581 
Increase/decrease in long - term debt instruments  1,245 -36 
Shares issued/repurchased by subsidiary company  150 107 
Dividends paid to ordinary shareholders  -1,562 -727 
Preference dividends paid  -219 -228 
    
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents  2,417 6,839 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of year  16,889 10,050 
cash and cash equivalents at the end of year 
 
19,306 16,889 
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Nedbank Group  
    
      
Five year review: Statistics and ratios 
    
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares in issue listed on 
the JSE (R000) 
451,00
0 
443,00
0 
394,00
0 
275,00
0 
271,00
0 
Dividend cover (times) -56 -41    
Dividend yield (%) 3.7% 2.9% 1.5% 3.9% 4.6% 
Earnings yield (%) 8.3% 8.0% 6.2% 0.3% 8.8% 
Price earnings ratio (times) 12 13 16 326 11 
Price - to - book (times) 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Share price (cents) - high 13,950 10,280 7,999 11,850 15,400 
                            - low 9,790 6,700 5,240 5,640 9,500 
                            - closing 13,350 10,000 7,780 6,203 11,110 
Number of shares traded (.000) 191700 168100 245800 216000 143.8 
Turnover in shares traded (%) 48 42.3 68.1 73.7 56.8 
Market capitalization (Rm) 60.2 44.3 30.7 17.1 30.1 
Price earnings ratio 12 13 16 326 11 
Dividend cover (cents) 2.25 2.75 4 0.1 1.9 
Cost to income ratio 58.2 64.8 71.8 80.2 65.4 
      
Share statistics per ordinary share (cents)     
Basic earnings (cents) 1135 966 423 -546 346 
Headline (Cents) 1110 797 483 19 979 
Diluted EPS (cents) 1099 958 422 -545 343 
Dividend paid (cents) 493 290 120 240 515 
Return on equity (%) 18.6% 15.5% 11.0% 0.4% 14.9% 
Price earnings ratio      
 
     
Number of employees 24,034 22,188 21,103 24,205 25,240 
Revenue per employee ® 
788,38
3 
712,50
2 
664,69
2 
466,10
2 
415,76
9 
Expenses per employee ® 
494,54
9 
496,53
0 
518,36
2 
427,35
0 
288,59
0 
Headline earnings per employee ®  
184,53
0 
142,73
5 82,595 2,222 
111,48
6 
Total assets (Rm) 
424,91
2 
352,25
8 
327,84
0 
313,11
3 
324,76
7 
PBITDA 7,616 6,528 1,934 -2,826 -493 
Cash Generation 9,297 6,898 3,978 2,124 1,401 
Audit fees 60 68 64 66 31 
Profit for the year   5,061     4,297    1,882    -1,334  
    
1,078  
CFROTA 1.79% 1.85% 0.59% -0.90% -0.15% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 2.19% 1.96% 1.21% 0.68% 0.43% 
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Standard Bank background 
 
Standard Bank is a South African-based financial services 
company with a global presence. We operate from 17 African 
countries and 21 countries on other continents, including the key 
financial centres of Europe, the Americas and Asia. Standard Bank 
was established as the Standard Bank of British South Africa 
Limited, and incorporated in London in 1862. The word "British" 
was dropped from the title in 1883. Standard Bank Group is listed 
on the JSE Securities Exchange, share code SBK. 
 
In 1962 The Standard Bank of South Africa (SBSA) was formed 
and registered as a South African company, operating as a 
subsidiary of Standard Bank in London (subsequently to become 
Standard Chartered Bank plc). Standard Bank Group was 
established in 1969 as Standard Bank Investment Corporation - the 
holding company of SBSA. Standard Chartered sold its 39% stake 
in Standard Bank Group in 1987, transferring complete ownership 
of the holding company to South Africa. 
 
The re-establishment of Standard Bank's African links began in 
1988, when a branch was set up in Swaziland. In 1992 the group 
opened a Botswana bank and acquired a major African operation: 
the long-established ANZ Grindlays network in Botswana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with minority holdings in 
Ghana and Nigeria. 
 
The group has also continued to expand internationally. Standard 
Bank London was established in 1992 and in the same year 
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operations in Jersey and the Isle of Man were acquired. Two years 
later, the Isle of Man bridgehead was broadened considerably with 
the acquisition of Standard Chartered's banking activities on the 
island. Standard Bank also has a full branch in Taipei and full bank 
status in Russia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Brazil. Standard Bank 
Group completed the acquisition of Jardine Fleming Bank Limited 
(JF Bank) in July 2001. The group has a wide representation which 
spans 18 African countries and 21 countries outside of Africa with 
an emerging markets focus. 
 
Standard Bank's equity is widely dispersed compared to most other 
similar institutions in South Africa. The Public Investment 
Corporation is the biggest beneficial shareholder and holds 13,3% 
of its shares. Other large holders among the more than 25 000 
shareholders are Old Mutual (8, 9%), Tutuwa Group (7,6%), Liberty 
Group (2,8%), Investment Solutions (3,0%) and Sanlam Group 
(2,6%). Non-residents hold approximately 23, 2%. 
 
Standard Bank Group is one of the big four full-service South 
African banks. The group operates in a range of banking and 
related financial services. The group has a wide representation 
which spans 18 African countries and 21 countries outside of Africa 
with an emerging markets focus. 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Income Statement for the year ended 2006 
  
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Income from banking Activities  36,366 28,981 
Net interest income  16,654 13,015 
Interest Income 25.1 50,855 38,625 
Interest expense 25.2 34,201 25,610 
Non - Interest Revenue 25.3 19,712 15,966 
    
Income from Investment and Life Insurance activities  59,344 53,066 
Net Investment premium 25.4 20,066 18,979 
Investment Income and Gains 25.5 37,568 32,240 
Management and Service fee income  1,710 1,847 
    
Total Income  95,710 82,047 
Credit Impairment Charges 25.6 2,733 1,207 
Benefits due to Policyholders  47,896 41,529 
Net Insurance benefits and claims  38,140 32,816 
Fair value adjustment to Policyholders' liabilities under investment 8,276 6,834 
Fair value adjustment on third party fund interests  1,480 1,879 
    
Income  after credit impairment charges and Policyholders' benefits 45,081 39,311 
Operating expenses in banking activities  19,652 16,441 
Staff costs 25.7 11,001 9,370 
Other operating expenses 25.8 8,651 7,071 
    
Operating expenses in investment and life insurance activities 6,486 8,006 
Acquisition costs - insurance and investment contracts  2,413 3,594 
Other operating expenses 25.8 4,073 4,412 
    
Net income before goodwill  18,943 14,864 
Goodwill Impairment 25.9 15 421 
Net income before associates and joint ventures  18,928 14,443 
Share of profits from associates and joint ventures 12 275 226 
Net income before indirect taxation  19,203 14,669 
Indirect taxation 27.1 841 778 
Profit before direct taxation  18,362 13,891 
Direct taxation 27.2 5,852 4,312 
Profit for the year  12,510 9,579 
  Attributable to minorities  1,723 921 
  Attributable to equity holders of the parent  10,787 8,658 
  Attributable to preference shareholders  269 226 
  Attributable to ordinary shareholders  10,518 8432 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 127 of 163 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
    
Basic EPS (cents) 29 864.5 699.7 
Diluted EPS (cents) 29 820.1 668.4 
Dividend per share (cents) 29 320.0 267.0 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Balance Sheet as at 31 December 2006 
   
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Assets 
   
Cash balances with banks 3 74,154 71,244 
Short term negotiable securities 4 29,175 25,931 
Derivative assets 5 100,832 101,502 
Trading assets 6 81,569 38,387 
Investments 7 186,896 147,146 
Investment property 8 13,200 12,637 
Loans and advances 9 448,411 338,773 
Loans and advances to banks 9 35,677 29,805 
Loans and advances to customers 9 412,734 308,968 
Current and deferred taxation 10 1,043 990 
Other assets 11 16,975 13,237 
Non - current assets for disposal 32 0 2,380 
Interest in associates and joint ventures 12 8,584 6,417 
Goodwill and other intangible assets 13 2,910 2,453 
Property and equipment 14 5,242 4,593 
Total Assets 
 
968,991 765,690 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Equity 
 
55,244 41,692 
Equity attributable to ordinary shareholders  43,326 32,931 
Ordinary share capital 15 136 135 
Ordinary share premium 15 2,303 2,107 
Reserves  40,887 30,689 
Preference share capital and premium 15 5,503 2,991 
Minority interest  6,415 5,770 
    
Liabilities 
 
913,747 723,998 
Derivative Liabilities  5 103,122 103,482 
Trading liabilities 17 36,790 21,462 
Deposit and current accounts 18 545,164 413,623 
Deposits from banks 18 48,374 27,584 
Deposits from customers 18 496,790 386,039 
Current and deferred taxation 19 7,880 6,926 
Other liabilities 20 34,323 23,759 
Non - current liabilities for disposal 32 0 1,267 
Policyholders’' liabilities 21 168,898 140,835 
Subordinated debt 22 17,570 12,644 
Total Equity and Liabilities 
 
968,991 765,690 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Cash flow statement for the year ended 2006 
  
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Operating Activities 
   
Cash receipts from customers 31.2 103,353 83,651 
Cash paid to customers, employees and suppliers 31.3 -83,559 -67,415 
Dividends received 31.4 3,969 3,075 
Net cash flows from operating activities 31.1 23,763 19,311 
    
Changes in operating funds 
   
Increase in income - earning assets 31.5 -147,418 -64,271 
Increase in deposits and other liabilities 31.6 142,993 90,457 
Net cash flows (used in/from) operating funds  -4,425 26,186 
Direct taxation paid 31.7 -5,176 -2,419 
    
Investing activities 
   
Capital expenditure - Property  -341 -395 
                             - Equipment, furniture and vehicles  -1,433 -1,153 
                             - Intangibles  -570 -203 
Proceeds from sale of - Property  103 124 
                                 - Equipment, furniture and vehicles  163 187 
Net sale of investment properties  617 281 
Net increase in investments by insurance operations  -12,915 -874 
Acquisition of minority share - unincorporated proprty partnership 0 -856 
Proceeds from sale of subsidiaries 32.1 1,321 0 
Net cash paid on acquisition of subsidiaries 31.8 0 -1,771 
Net disposal of reinsurance assets and other investments  0 73 
Increase in investment in existing subsidiaries  -267 -526 
Net increase in investment in associates  -189 -408 
Net cash flows used in investing activities  -13,511 -5,521 
    
Financing activities 
   
Proceeds from issue of share capital to shareholders  2,811 245 
Net proceeds from issue and repurchase of share capital to minorities 0 24 
Repurchase of company shares  -102 -679 
Increase in subordinated debt  4,682 2,966 
Dividends  -5,204 -4,610 
Net cash flows from/(used in) financing activities  2,187 -2,054 
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents 3,316 2,368 
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents  6,154 37,871 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year  97,175 59,441 
Reclassified to non - current assets for disposal 32 0 -137 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of the year 31.10 103,329 97,175 
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Standard Bank Group 
      
       
Statistics, Returns and Capital adequacy seven year review 
   
       
 
Note 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares in issue listed on the JSE (R000)    
  - weighted average  1,358,415 1,353,382 1,245,786 1,334,099 1,328,192 
  - end of period  1,362,633 1,352,383 1,352,108 1,338,730 1,331,078 
Dividend cover (times)  2.5 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.2 
Dividend yield (%)  3.4 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.1 
Earnings yield (%)  8.4 8.8 8.5 12 13.1 
Price earnings ratio (times)  11.9 11.4 11.8 8.3 7.6 
Price - to - book (times)  2.6 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.5 
Share price (cents) - high  9,650 7,875 6,750 3,960 3,810 
                            - low  6,850 5,750 3,686 2,650 2,595 
                            - closing 21 9,450 7,581 6,580 3,918 3,015 
Number of shares traded (.000)  1,014,873 841,835 892,633 908,179 673,703 
Turnover in shares traded (%)  74.5 62.2 66.0 67.8 50.6 
Market capitalization (Rm) 22 128,769 102,524 88,969 52,451 40,132 
       
Share statistics per ordinary share 
(cents) 
     
Basic earnings (cents) 22 864.5 699.7 581.4 478.1 376.2 
Headline earnings (cents) 20 837.4 702.3 570.3 470.7 396.3 
Diluted EPS (cents)       
Dividend paid (cents) 25 320 267 231.5 151 124 
Return on equity (%)  25.2 25.2 24.2 22.9 20.3 
Cost to income ratio  53.5 56.1 57.5 56.3 57.4 
Price earnings ratio       
Return on ordinary shareholders' equity (%) 25.2 25.2 24.2 22.9 20.3 
Number of employees       
Revenue per employee ®       
Expenses per employee ®       
Headline earnings per employee ®        
Total assets (Rm)  968,991 765,690 625,537 540,566 393,353 
PBITDA  19,463 14,474 10,200 8,946 7,467 
Cash Generation  23,763 19,311 16,550 12,743 10,577 
Audit fees  72 61 49 40 33 
Profit for the year  10,551 8,753 7,244 6,026 4,841 
Revenue (Rm)  129,911 107,657 99,831 95,840 89,192 
CFROTA  2.01% 1.89% 1.63% 1.65% 1.90% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio  2.45% 2.52% 2.65% 2.36% 2.69% 
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Building 4, Harrowdene Office Park 
128 Western Service Road 
Woodmead 2191 
Gauteng 
 
01 October 2009 
 
Interview Respondent 
All Banks, Practitioners and Analysts  
 
Att: Respondent 
 
Subject: Doctorate in Business Administration Research 
 
Introduction 
My name is Cleopas Sanangura, working for ABSA as Consultant: Corporate 
Asset Finance based in Johannesburg (ABSA head office). 
 
I am currently doing a DBA (Doctorate in Business Administration) and the topic I 
am researching on is as follows: Behind the boardroom door. The 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value and the 
effect of shareholder activism in financial service sector in emerging 
markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
My Research Objectives 
a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect good 
corporate governance practices. The factors will be used to assess why 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 133 of 163 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
investors prefer other portfolios and why they perform differently while 
operating in the same environment. Companies to be covered are 
Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard 
Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic. 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
c. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
 
It is a requirement that I have to contact interviews and do some observations on 
how the board contacts itself in executing its duties. I therefore request your 
permission to interview the following board members listed below including 
yourself. As you are the CEO, you have been selected to participate in this 
research and assist me in developing new knowledge on director effectiveness in 
emerging markets in the financial sector in South Africa. I am interested in your 
personal experience, knowledge, observations and opinions in this field.  
 
I want to make it perfectly clear from the onset that complete confidentiality is 
guaranteed and that anything you might say in the course of the interviews will 
remain anonymous. Your contribution may be quoted in the study, but will not be 
attributed to you if need be. I propose that I will be recording all the interviews, for 
the sole reason of having an accurate account for transcribing which I intend to 
do in the next few days. I will wipe off all the tapes as soon as I have transcribed 
them and in the meantime I will be keeping them in a secure place. 
 
I have some open ended questions that I propose to ask, which I am sending 
together with this introductory letter.  There are issues that you may wish to 
contribute to my research, which you can submit under general comments. If you 
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require any clarification at any stage, please do not hesitate to call me. My 
contact details are as follows: 
 
Cleopas Sanangura 
Chief Executive Officer 
Dawn Advisory Services Pty Ltd 
Tel:  +27 86 722 7443 
Fax:  +27 86 538 3268 
Mobile: +27 82 943 8700 
Email: das@dawnadvisory.co.za  
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Research Objectives 
 
a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect 
good corporate governance practices. These factors will be used to 
assess why investors prefer other counters than others and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. 
Companies to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First 
Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic bank. 
 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
 
c. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
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Questionnaires 
 
The Organization and Shareholder Activism 
 
1. Is there a unified articulated organizational purpose shared by owners, 
board members and managers? 
2. What are the major laws and societal customs within which the board 
must act? 
3. Do the policies, procedures and culture make the best use of the board’s 
knowledge, skills and ability as a group? 
4. What are the main causes of Corporate Governance failures in Emerging 
Markets as compared to developed markets? 
5. What are the factors/issues that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness of Corporate Governance? 
6. What is the important corporate governance attributes that influence 
performance of directors in order to meet shareholder expectations? 
7. You mentioned sustainable value creation strategies in the financial 
report. How do you measure them? 
8. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of the 
board’s capabilities? How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs affect 
a director’s willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
9. What has been the participation of shareholder in creating value to the 
bank and how involved are they? 
 
Environment 
1. What makes the bank different from others? 
2. Do policies, procedures and culture make the most of each individual 
director’s knowledge, skills and abilities? 
3. Is there sufficient trust on the board for the most to be made of director’s 
capabilities? 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
Page 137 of 163 
 
Behind the boardroom door. The effectiveness of the board of directors in creating shareholder value and the effect of 
shareholder activism in the financial sector in emerging markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
4. Do relationships encourage the use of the board’s talents by 
management? 
5. Do directors understand how they can put their contacts to work for the 
bank? 
6. If I were to appoint you CEO of another bank what impact will you make? 
7. How has the regulatory framework affected performance of banks in the 
country? 
8. Boards have been characterized as largely ceremonial bodies. What is 
you comment? 
9. How do you manage conflict of interest as it relates to Agency theory and 
stewardship theory? 
10. How has integrated reporting affected how you measure the bank’s 
performance? 
 
Directors 
 
Fit  Key questions 
Human capital/structural capital Do the policies, procedures and culture 
make best use of the board’s knowledge, 
skills and ability as a board?  
Do policies, procedures and culture make 
the most of each individual director’s 
knowledge, skills and abilities? 
Human capital/social capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there sufficient trust on the board for the 
most to be made of directors’ capabilities?  
Do relationships encourage the use of the 
board’s talents by management? Do 
directors understand how they can put their 
contacts to work for the bank? 
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Human capital/cultural capital Do the values, norms and beliefs of the 
board support the best use of the board’s 
capabilities?  
How do the board’s values, norms and 
beliefs affect a director’s willingness to use 
his/her capabilities? 
Social capital/structural capital Do policies, procedures and culture build 
trust in the boardroom?  
• Between the board and managers?  
• Between the board and external 
organisations? 
Social capital/cultural capital Do the values, norms, beliefs of the board 
match those of society (Ubuntu)? 
Do the individuals share values, norms, 
beliefs? 
Do these match management’s values, 
norms, beliefs? 
Structural capital/cultural capital Do policies, procedures, culture match 
societal expectations? 
 
General discussions 
 
1. How do NEDs creating shareholder value and does the bank need them? 
2. What type of qualities do you consider when appointing an individual to 
the board? 
3. Will training and accreditation of directors create value and impact on 
Corporate Governance in the financial service sector and how? 
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4. How is power distributed among board members?  
5. How do you measure individual and collective board performance? 
 
Auditors 
 
1. How do auditors creating shareholder value? 
2. Can the bank operate with external auditors? What value do they add to 
the bank and to shareholders? 
 
Chiefs  
 
1. How are Chiefs selected? 
2. How do you select the Izinduna? 
3. What are their responsibilities? 
4. What is the role of the community in your governance structure? 
5. How do you pay Izinduna and how do you determine their remuneration? 
 
General Comments 
 
1. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of the 
board’s capabilities? 
2. How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs affect a director’s 
willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
3. Do policies, procedures and culture build trust in the boardroom between 
the board, managers and external stakeholders? 
4. How does the Ubuntu concept affect board performance? 
5. Do the values, norms, beliefs of the board match those of society? 
6. Is the Ubuntu concept necessary tool for directors? 
7. Do policies, procedures, culture match societal expectations? 
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10.6 Appendix 6: Interviewee Profiles 
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ABSA Group 
 
1. Dr D C Cronje, Dcom – Non Executive Chairman 
Dr Danie Cronje is 59 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce (Dcom) 
and he is the chairman of ABSA Group since 1987. He is also the 
chairman for Sage Group, ABSA Foundation, ABSA Group Retirement 
Fund, and director of Idion Technology Holdings Ltd. His executive 
career dates back to 1975 when he joined Volkskas, where he held 
various positions in the Merchant Bank division. He became Deputy 
CEO subsequently CEO of ABSA after the name change until 1997. 
Danie has 31 years’ experience with ABSA. 
 
2. Dr S Booysen, CA (SA), Dcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Dr Steve Booysen is 42 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce and is 
Chartered Accountant. He is the CEO for ABSA Group since 2004. 
After completing his articles with Ernst and Young in 1983 he became 
a lecturer in accounting at the University of South Africa until 1988. He 
was appointed Senior Manager: Finance at TrustBank until 1994 when 
he was appointed General Manager: Group Finance at ABSA. He later 
joined ABSA Corporate and Merchant Bank where he rose to Deputy 
Operating Executive, the Group Executive Director before he was 
appointed Group CEO. 
 
3. J H Schindehutte, Bcom (Hons), CA (SA), HDip Tax – CFO 
Jacques is 46 years old and is the CFO for ABSA Group after joining 
the group in 1999 as Group Executive: Finance. He is responsible for 
Group Finance, office of the General Counsel, Group Economic 
Research, Investor Relations and Group Secretariat. He served his 
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articles with Ernst and Young before joining Portnet and Transnet until 
1999. 
 
4. Dr D Baloyi, PHD (International Education Development) – 
Independent NED 
Danisa is 50 years old and she is an Independent board member of 
ABSA Group since 2004. She currently sits on 8 boards and she is an 
Executive Director of the National Black Business Caucus. 
 
5. A S Du Plessis, Bcom, CA (SA), HDip Tax, AMP – Independent 
NED 
Attie is 62 years old and has been an Independent director since 1992. 
He chairs the Group Audit, Group Risk, Credit, and Board Lending 
Committees. He is also Chairman for Gencor Ltd, Sanlam Ltd, KWV 
Group Ltd and various other companies besides being an Executive 
Director for Sankop Ltd. 
 
6. L W Maasdorp, BA, Msc Economics – NED 
Leslie is 39 years old appointed in 2004 as a non-executive director 
representing the interests of the BEE Company Batho Bonke 
consortium. He is Chairman of Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority, South 
Africa Weather Services and sit on the boards of Coega Development 
Corporation, Johannesburg Property Company and Yard Capital 
 
7. T M C Sexwale, Certificate in Business Studies - NED 
Tokyo is 53 years old appointed to the ABSA Group board in 2001 
representing the BEE consortium Batho Bonke. He is the owner and 
Executive Chairman of Mvelaphanda Holdings Pty Ltd, Chairman of 
Northam Platinum Ltd, Trans Hex Group Ltd, Gold Fields Ltd, former 
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member of the ANC National Executive Committee and Premier of 
Gauteng. 
 
8. Group Secretariat – W R Somerville, ACIS, ACMA, Dip Corp Law 
William is 49 years old and is the Group Company Secretary since 
1990. 
 
FirstRand Group 
 
10  T Ferreira Bcom (Hons) B (B&A), MBA – Non Executive Chairman 
Gerrit is 59 years old and has been involved in the financial services 
sector since graduating from the University of Stellenbosch.  He 
started his career at the Bank of Johannesburg and was a co-founder 
of Rand Consolidated Investments (“RCI”) in 1977.  RCI acquired 
control of Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he was elected as 
executive chairman.  When RMB Holdings was founded in 1987 he 
was appointed chairman, a position which he still holds.  Following the 
formation of First Rand in 1998 he was appointed non-executive 
chairman.  He is a member of the Council of the University of 
Stellenbosch. 
 
Directorships 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee Remuneration committee. 
First Rand Bank Holdings – Chairman Glenrand MIB Momentum 
Group RMB Holdings – Chairman VenFin. 
 
11  L Dippenaar  CA (SA), Mcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Lauritz is 58 years old and he graduated from Pretoria University, 
qualified as a chartered accountant with Aiken & Carter (now KPMG) 
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and spent three years with the Industrial Development Corporation 
before becoming co-founder of Rand Consolidated Investments 
(“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 
and he became an executive director.  He was appointed managing 
director in 1988, which position he held until 1992 when RMB Holdings 
(“RMBH”) acquired a controlling interest in Momentum Life Assurers, 
the fifth largest insurance company in South Africa at that rime.   He 
was appointed as executive chairman of that company, a position he 
held until being appointed chief executive officer of First Rand in 1998. 
Directorships 
FirstRand – memberships Audit committee Executive committee – 
chairman 
Discovery Holdings – Chairman First Rand Bank Holdings Momentum 
Group – Chairman OUTsurance – Chairman RMB Asset Management 
RMB Holdings. 
 
12 P K Harris MCom – Chief Executive Officer 
Paul is 57 years old and has graduated from the University of 
Stellenbosch and joined the Industrial Development Corporation where 
he served for a number of years.  He was a co-founder of Rand 
Consolidated Investments (“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of Rand 
Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he became an executive director 
of the bank.  He spend four years in Australia where he founded 
Australian Gilt Securities (later to become RMB Australia) and returned 
to South Africa in 1991 where he was appointed deputy managing 
director of RMB.  In 1992 he took over as managing director and chief 
executive officer.  He has been chief executive officer of FirstRand 
Bank Holdings since July 1999. 
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Directorship 
FirstRand – membership’s Executive committee 
FirstRand Bank Holdings, Momentum Group, Remgro Limited, RMB 
Holdings. 
 
13 K C Shubane BA (Hons); MBA – Independent NED 
Khehla is 51 years old and graduated at University of the 
Witwatersrand.  Prior to this he was a student at the University of the 
North where his studies were terminated following his arrest for 
political activities, conviction and sentence which he served on Robben 
Island.  Upon his released he was employed at Liberty Life for a short 
time. He served on various political organizations until joining the 
Centre for Policy Studies in 1988.  He is an author and has co-
authored several political publications and is a member of the board of 
the Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand memberships – Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee 
FCB South African, Newhco, Nurcha, RMB Holding.  
 
14 J P Burger Bcom (Hons), CA (SA) 
Johan is 48 years old and he is the founding member of the bank. He 
has been with the bank since its incorporation as the CFO. 
 
15 S E Nxasana Bcom, Bcompt (Hons), CA (SA) – CEO FirstRand 
Banking Group 
Sizwe is 49 years old, he started his career at Unilever. In 1989, he 
established Sizwe & Company, the first black owned audit practice in 
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Kwazulu Natal. In 1996, he became the founding partner of Nkonki 
Sizwe Ntsaluba, the first black owned national firm of accountants and 
was national Managing Partner until 1998 when he joined Telkom SA 
as Chief Executive Officer. He held this position until 2005. 
 
His experience in the financial sector includes being a NED of NBS 
Boland Bank, DBSA from 1995 to 1998, and Chairman of Mesele-
Hoskens Insurance Group from 1994 to 1996. He joined the board of 
FirstRand Bank Holdings in 2003 and was appointed CEO from 2006. 
During the same year he was appointed a NED of FirstRand. 
 
Board membership: FirstRand Executive Committee, Zenex Trust 
 
16 N N Gwagwa BA (Fort Hare); MTRP (Natal); MSc (cum laude) 
(London); PhD (London) – Independent NED 
Nolulamo is 47 years old.  She worked as a town planner in the 
private, public and NGO sector between 1981 and 1986, whereafter 
she proceeded to further her studies.  In 1992 she joined the University 
of Natal as a senior lecture in the Department of Town and Regional 
Planning.  In 1995 she was appointed as a deputy director general in 
the national Department of Public Works, where she was responsible 
for the national public works programme and the transformation of the 
construction industry.  From 1998 to 2003 she was the chief executive 
office of the Independent Development Trust.  She is currently an 
independent development consultant. 
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Directorship 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee; Financial sector charter and transformation monitoring 
committee. 
ACSA, Development Bank of South Africa. 
 
17 S  E N Sebotsa LLB (Hons); LSE; MA (McGill); SFA – NED 
Sonja is 34 years old.  Her studying areas were Law, Business and 
Economics.  She started her career in investment banking at Deusche 
Morgan Grenfell Johannesburg in 1997 working on M & A transactions, 
privatizations and BEE deals.  She left Deutsche Bank almost six years 
later, after having spent some time working in their London and Tokyo 
offices.  Leaving Deutsche Bank as a Vice President in late 2002 she 
took up an executive position with the WDB Group where her role 
largely involves negotiating and executing BEE transactions on behalf 
of the WDB’s sole shareholder, the WDB Trust. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – membership Directors’ affairs and governance committee 
Adcorp Holdings, Makalani Holdings, Paracon Holdings, Willis South 
Africa. 
 
18 M W King CA (SA); FCA – Independent NED and Chairman of the 
King 11 Report 
He is 69 years old. He graduated at the University of Witwatersrand as 
a lawyer.  He qualified as a chartered accountant with Deloittes.  In 
1961 he joined Union Acceptances and was deputy managing director 
from 1972 to 1974.  He left to join Anglo American Corporation of SA, 
and was finance director from 1979 to 1997.  He became executive 
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deputy chairman in 1997, executive vice-chairman of Anglo American 
plc in 1999, and retired in May 2001.  He served on the board of 
Barclays Bank DCO South Africa, whose name was changed in 1987 
to First National Bank of Southern Africa. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – membership Audit committee – Chairman Directors’ 
affairs and governance committee Remuneration committee. FirstRand 
Bank Holdings, African Rainbow Minerals, Sturrock and Robson 
Holdings, The Tongaat-Hulett Group 
 
Nedbank Group 
 
19 Dr R J Khoza, BA (Hons) Psychology (UNIN), MA Markerting 
Management (University of Lancaster), EngD (University of 
Warwick), IPBM-IMD (Lausanne), PMD (Havard) – Non Executive 
Chairman 
 
Reuel is 58 years old, a businessman, a director of companies, was 
appointed to the Nedbank board in 2005. He is a Chairman of Aka 
Capital, Nedbank Group, Corobrik, NEPAD Business Foundation and 
Murray and Robberts Cementation. He is also a board member of 
Nampak Limited, Protea Hospitality Group, Old Mutual Plc and Gold 
Reef Resorts Limited. Reuel is also a president of the Institute of 
Directors and in this capacity served on the King 11 Committee on 
Corporate Governance. He is founder of the Black Management Forum 
and former Chairman of Eskom.  
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20 M L Ndlovu, Dip LR (Unisa), MAP (Wits), EDP (North West), AMP 
(Havard) – NED Vice Chairman 
 
Maduke is 56 years old, was appointed to the Nedbank board in 1994. 
He is a director of 20 companies besides being a member of four 
committees. 
 
21 T A Boardman, Bcom, CA(SA) CEO 
 
Thomas is 58 years old, was appointed in 2002 to turnaround the bank 
after its near collapse. He was previously CEO and executive director 
of BOE Limited and before that he was a director of Boardmans and 
Sam Newman Limited and BOE International Holdings Limited and 
Northwind Investments. He is a NED of Mutual and Federal Insurance 
Company Limited a subsidiary of Nedbank and The Banking 
Association of South Africa. 
 
22 M Brown, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Financial Director 
 
Mike is 41 years old, after qualifying as a CA at Deloitte and Touche he 
joined NBS Treasury department in 1993. He then moved to BOE 
corporate as General Manager and was later appointed MD in 1999. 
After the merger of Nedbank and BOE in 2002 he was appointed MD 
of Property and Asset Finance. 
 
In June 2004 Mike was appointed FD and executive director of 
Nedbank Group. His area of responsibility include Asset and Liability 
Management, Group capital management, Tax, Financial reporting, 
and investor relations. 
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23 T C P Chikane, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Independent NED 
 
Thenjiwe is 42 years old, was appointed to the board in 2006 and she 
is the CEO of MGO Consulting. She was previously Head of the 
Gauteng Department of Finance and Economic Affairs and she is a 
board member of Development Bank of Southern Africa, PetroSA and 
State Information Technology Agency 
 
24 Prof B De Lacy Figaji, Bsc (Eng) Dip Tertiary Edu Med, DEd 
(Coventry University), DLitt (hc) (California) 
 
Prof Brian is 63 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002. Brian is 
the Chairman of HHO Africa Pty Ltd, I & J Limited, MARIB Holdings. 
He is a board member of PetroSA, Cape Lime Pty Limited, ASSET 
(Educational Trust) (Trustee), Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and a former Vice – Chancellor of the Peninsula Technikon. 
 
25 G T Serobe, Bcom (Unitra), MBA (Rutgers) 
 
Gloria is 48 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002 and she is 
the CEO of Wipcapital. She is the founder and executive director of 
WIPHOLD. She was previously the executive director, finance at 
Transnet and serves on the boards including JSE Limited, FSC 
Council, Old Mutual Life Assurance Company South Africa Limited. 
 
Standard Bank Group 
 
26 Cooper, CA (SA) – Non Executive Chairman 
Derek is 66 years old and was appointed Chairman since 1993. He is 
also Chairman of Standard Bank Africa, Liberty Group and Liberty 
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Holdings, Standard Bank Plc and president of Business Leadership 
South Africa. 
 
27 J Maree, Bcom, MA (Oxford) PMD (Harvard) – Chief Executive 
Officer 
Jacko is 51 years old and was appointed CEO in 1997. He is a director 
of Standard Bank, Liberty Group, Liberty Holdings, Stanbic Africa 
Holdings, SBIC Investments SA, Standard International SA and 
Chairman of Standard Bank Plc. 
 
28 S Macozoma, BA, (Unisa) BA (Hons) (Boston) - NED 
Saki is 49 years old, a businessman and he is a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of many companies including 
Standard Bank Group, The Standard Bank of SA, Liberty Group, 
Liberty Holdings, Deputy Chairman of Safika Holdings, Chairman of 
Andisa Capital, Cahirman of Business Trust, Chairman Lliso 
Consulting, Chairman of Stalib, Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 2 and VW 
South Africa. He sits on different committees within the companies he 
is a board member. 
 
29 C Ramaphosa, BProc (Unisa) - NED 
Cyril is 54 years old, a businessman and a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of Standard Bank Group, Standard 
Bank South Africa, Alexander Forbes, Macsteel Holdings, Mondi South 
Africa, MTN Group (Chairman), MTN International (Chairman), SAB 
Miller, SASRIA, Shanduka Holdings (Chairman), The Bidvest Group 
(Chairman) and Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 1 
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30 Dr C Strauss, BA, PHD (Rhodes), MS(Cornell), AMP (Havard), 
FIBSA, DEcon (hc) (Rhodes, Dsc (hc) (Pretoria) 
Conrad is 71 years old and was appointed to the board of Standard 
Bank Group in 1984. He is a board member of Standard Bank Group, 
Standard Bank SA, African Oxygen and Hans Merensky Holdings. 
 
31 K Moroka, BProc, (Uni of the North), LLB (Wits) 
Kgomotso is 52 years old and was appointed to the board of Standard 
Bank Group in 2003. She is a director of Standard Bank Group, 
Standard Bank SA, Electronic Media Network (M-Net), Gobodo 
Forensic and Investigative Accounting (Chairperson) New Seasons 
Investments Holdings and South African Breweries. 
 
32 S Ridley, Bcom (Natal), CA(SA), AMP (Oxford) 
Simon is 51 years old and he joined the group in 1999 and was 
appointed Financial Director in 2002. 
 
Other Corporate Governance Practitioners 
 
33 Advocate J Myburgh 
 
John is 52 years old and trained as a lawyer and was admitted to the 
bench 32 years ago. He chairs a lot of boards and is a member of the 
SARB advisory board and he is a lecturer of law. 
 
34 T Dixon 
 
Tony is 53 years old and he is an executive director of the IOD. He is 
an advisor and sits on different boards. Tony is also a lecture of 
Corporate Governance 
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35 Dr G Gono 
 
Gono started his career as a tea boy. After graduating with a diploma 
with the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and administrators, he 
joined CBZ until he became the CEO. He graduated with an MBA 
before being appointed governor. 
 
36 T Mboweni 
 
Tito Mboweni is the eighth Governor of the South African Reserve 
Bank. He succeeded Dr. Christian Lodewyk Stals on 8 August 1999. 
The youngest of three children, Tito Mboweni was born on 16 March 
1959. He grew up in Tzaneen in Limpopo, he graduated with an Msc in 
Economics. 
 
 
37 RBZ Registrar of Banks 
 
 
38 SARB Registrar of Banks 
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Internal attributes 
• Skills mix 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Participation 
• Management 
interest 
• CEO influence 
• Power distribution 
• Internal systems 
• Employees 
 
 Corporate 
financial 
performance 
 Shareholder 
value growth 
 Bank survival 
and growth 
 CFROTA 
growth 
Board 
Effectiveness 
Nature of the Board 
• Gender composition 
• Stewardship Theory 
• Agency Theory 
• Knowledge and 
experience 
• Conflict of interest 
• Ethical issues 
• Communities 
Board continuous 
development 
• Qualification 
• Experience 
• Remuneration 
• Motivation 
• Teamwork 
• CSR issues 
• Culture 
External attributes 
• Ownership 
structure 
• Development of 
strategies 
• Evaluation 
Committee 
• Board affairs 
Committee 
• Government 
policies 
• Independent 
Auditors 
• Independent 
Directors 
• Independent 
Consultancy 
• Other 
stakeholders 
Internal influence 
• Internal Audit 
• Audit Committee 
• Board composition 
• Financial control 
• NED 
• Mission 
• Vision 
• Strategy 
External 
influence 
• Shareholder 
activism 
• Regulatory 
framework 
• PESTI 
• Power 
distribution 
 
Mechanisms Triggers Outcome 
Corporate  
performance 
C.G principles 
 Fairness 
 Transparency 
 Accountability 
 Responsibility 
(Document 1: 5) 
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Board Effectiveness Model: Adopted from Document 2: 25 
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Definitions 
Adverse selection: a situation where sellers have information that buyers do not 
(or vice versa) about aspect of product quality or an individual 
Board–management social capital: is the store of goodwill that exists between 
the members of the board and individual senior managers, most notably 
the CEO 
Corporate Governance: the rules and incentives by which the board of a bank is 
directed and controlled to maximize the profitability and long term 
shareholder value while taking into account the interests of other 
legitimate stakeholders (Stone et al 1998) 
Cronbach coefficient alpha is used to measure the mean reliability estimates 
for all possible ways of splitting the set whilst keeping it intact 
Cultural Capital: is a very general theory, in the sense that it attempts to 
construct explanations for things like differential educational achievement 
in a way that combines a wide range of differing influences 
Extra-corporate social capital: relates to a relationship between corporate 
actors (i.e. board members and external parties who can supply resources 
such as finance, information, key inputs, etc.), but the nature and extent of 
resources that the external party can supply 
Heuristic process: helping to learn, guiding in investigation or a science, 
philosophy, using or obtained by exploration of possibilities rather than by 
following set rules 
Intellectual capital: refers to all resources that determine the value and the 
competitiveness of an enterprise 
Intra-board social capital: is the “store” of goodwill that exists between board 
members and will determine the productivity of exchanges between board 
members 
Logistic regression: is model used for prediction of the probability of occurrence 
of an event by fitting data to a logistic curve 
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Moral Hazard: a special case of information asymmetry, a situation in which one 
party in a transaction has more information than another 
Multi-item scale:  is a measurement scale that gathers opinions about an object 
on a number of dimensions and the data can be collated to produce a 
combined rating 
Paradigm: is an overall conceptual framework within which a researcher may 
study (Guba and Lincolin 1994:  105, Perry et al 1999:16) 
Parallel-form is where participants replying to the same construct have a high 
correlation 
Praxis: the practice of a field of study, as opposed to the theory 
Split-half is where participants are divided into two equal camps and estimate 
correlations between the camps is done 
Social capital: refers to the implicit and tangible set of resources available to the 
board by virtue of social relationships or an economic idea that refers to 
the connections between individuals and entities that can be economically 
valuable 
Structural capital:  Competitive intelligence, formulas, information systems, 
patents, policies, processes, etc., that result from the products or systems 
the firm has created over time 
Regression analysis: is a statistical tool for the investigation of relationships 
between variables. It includes any techniques for modeling and analyzing 
several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
Test-retest is where the test is repeated and found to be consistent  
Ubuntu: is the African value system, which emphasizes the collective over the 
individual good, the principles of mutual interdependence and co-
existence, the spirit of humanity, based on the premise that the individual 
is entitled to respect because of his cordial coexistence with others, a 
hierarchical political ideology, but one based on an inclusive system of 
consultation at various levels.   
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1 Background Information 
 
Corporate governance has been an integral part of business practices, 
beginning with the creation of corporate structures and the distinction 
between owners and managers. The “agency problem” relationship between 
owners, and directors who represent the owners began to become 
formalized in economic literature in the 1930s.  In more recent years, 
corporate governance has established a greater standalone identity as a field 
of study and as an area of risk. The wide wake of damage and 
disenfranchisement caused by recent corporate failures has made corporate 
governance not just a concern for investors, Governments, financial markets, 
but an issue of political economy on a global basis. 
 
Corporate governance became a matter of current public debate, following 
the controversy surrounding the collapse and financial distress of many 
markets including (China 2002), (Hong Kong 2002), (Russia 2003), (UK 
1991), (SA 1997/8), (Zimbabwe 2005) (US, Wall Street Crash 1929 and 
2002), (the current global financial crisis 2008/9: Subprime and the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers) and the resultant impact on shareholder value. The 
debate revolves around matters such as agency relationships, disclosure of 
executive remuneration, independence, transparency, relevance of audit, 
board composition, financial control and reporting, directors’ fiduciary duties 
and shareholder activism. Recent reports in the media and markets, 
(www.businessday.co.za, www.fingaz.co.zw, www.theindependent.co.zw  
www.thestar.co.za and www.mail&guardian.co.za) have cited ineffective 
corporate governance, conflict of interest and poor internal controls as a 
major cause of corporate failures. 
 
The crisis reflects a breakdown in the fundamental bargain on which 
business has been operated since ownership first diverged from 
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management. The agency relationship has worked well in some corporations 
but failure has become fashionable. The concepts that have underpinned the 
discussion will provide the tool kit to address issues pertaining to corporate 
governance and competitive advantage in emerging markets in fulfilling the 
conduct of the research process, research objectives in confirming the 
conceptual framework.  
 
Regulatory bodies have responded with the passing into law of regulations, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the USA, and recommendations 
that the companies subscribe to best practice and principles detailed in 
various reports, including the King Reports I (1994), II (2002) and III (2009) 
on corporate governance in South Africa and the combined code of corporate 
governance in the UK. The reputation and governance of a corporation 
translate into a “governance premium” argued (Millson and Ward 2004), 
(consulting firm McKinney & company 2002), corporate governance can be 
measured and translated into higher price/earnings multiples and other 
improved metrics (Howell and Hibbard 2002). A report by OECD (1999: 22) 
confirms this, concluding the adherence to practices of good corporate 
governance will help to improve the confidence of investors, may reduce the 
cost of capital and may induce more stable sources of capital for example the 
acquisition of ABSA by Barclays, acquired at a multiple of 8, which was 2 
basis points above actual multiple (ABSA 2004 financial statements). 
 
Although a host of theory driven rationales suggest a relationship between 
board of directors, size and firm performance, the literature provides no 
consensus about the direction of that relationship (Dalton et al 1999: 674). 
Board size is another issue for which there is no apparent consensus 
because they represent the bulk of the empirical studies that have been 
conducted in the area of Corporate Governance (Johnson et al 1996: 431). 
Both researchers and practitioners have focused largely on the conflicts of 
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interest between managers and shareholders and on the conclusion that 
more independent oversight of management is better than less. Independent 
governance structures are both prescribed in agency theory and sought by 
shareholder activists as reflected in the results of scholarly research 
(Schliefer and Vishny 1997, Daily et al 2003). 
 
Nearly two decades of research find little evidence that board independence 
enhances board effectiveness, studies have, however found a negative effect 
(Westphal 2002: 6). The most important predictor of director effectiveness is 
not independence, but strategic experience that matches the company’s 
needs. Evidence that director experience is critical to board effectiveness is 
relatively new argued (Westphal 2002: 6). However, evidence that board 
independence has neutral to negative effects on board effectiveness is not 
(Leblanc 2004: 436). Corporate governance can be an important competitive 
tool used to maximise a company’s performance, increase a company’s 
potential to encourage capital investment and positively influence a country’s 
ability to attract foreign investment argued (Naidoo 2002: 1). It remains an 
essential ingredient for nurturing trust and business confidence. The King II 
Report (2002) is premised on the philosophy that governance in any context 
must reflect the value system of the society in which it operates (Ubuntu), 
which means there is no universally applicable corporate governance model 
than to just base on accountability, responsibility, and transparency when 
assessing the effectiveness of directors (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 
1999:27). 
 
The King II Report (2002) (now super-ceded by the King 3 Report 2009) 
incorporates an African value system, which emphasises the collective over 
the individual good, the principles of mutual interdependence and co-
existence, the spirit of humanity, (ubuntu) based on the premise that the 
individual is entitled to respect because of his cordial coexistence with 
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others, a hierarchical political ideology, but one based on an inclusive system 
of consultation at various levels.  Integrating this approach into corporate 
governance implies a shift in organisational emphasis from a decision 
making hierarchy to one that is more consultative and consensus based. 
Ubuntu value system is against corruption and unethical conduct of both 
directors and community leaders. 
 
The former Minister of Finance of SA in his speech argued that, “in the same 
way as man was charged with the responsibility to act as the guardian of the 
planet for future generations, directors and managers are tasked with 
preserving the growing value, not for themselves but for stakeholders of the 
future (Ubuntu ...),” argued (Manuel 2002: 1). The crisis of American and 
British corporate responsibility is not “moral cancer” (Patterson 2000), 
instead, it is something more practical and amenable to treatment argued 
(Martin 2002).  
 
1.1 Thesis focus 
 
Since 1994 (that is from the time SA became an independent state) 12 
banks failed in SA and 8 in Zimbabwe. BCCI was operating in both 
countries (Document 2: Appendix 1). The impact of a failure of a bank 
to any economy is huge as evidenced by the failure of Lehman Brothers 
in 2009. From the beginning of the 20th century, studies of business 
structures and management procedures were carried out and business 
managers increased their knowledge and understanding of how to 
achieve results beneficial to both shareholders (owners) and other 
stakeholders. The modern industrial capitalist system has developed 
with significant advances from that time, developing organisational 
structure, management skill and culture systems within enterprises 
(Daft, 1997). 
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Banks are controlled by boards of directors who represent the interests 
of all stakeholders. Banks perform differently while operating in the 
same macro and micro economic environment. The behaviour, 
association, independency, experience and skills of board members 
seem to determine the future of any organization. The focus of this 
study is therefore to understand what makes boards effective or 
ineffective resulting in bank success or failures. The study will provide 
an analysis of the factors that contribute to the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of different bank boards and how to measure the two. 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance Developments 
 
First to explore the structural and strategic implications of the 
separation of ownership and control were Berle and Means (1932) 
stated (Clarke 2004: 154). The separation of ownership and control 
leaves shareholders with little or no control over the actions of a 
company’s managers argued (Berle and Means, 1932: 8). In response, 
shareholders attempt to protect their investment by using a variety of 
control mechanisms, (Targett, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). They wrote in the preface of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property that “It was apparent to any thoughtful 
observer that the American corporation had ceased to be a private 
business device and had become an institution” stated (Clarke 2004: 
155).  
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Figure 1.1. Adapted from (Clarke 2004: 155): Regulation in the United States 
 
This discovery was after the corporate scandals in the US in 1929 
called the US Wall Street Crash , which resulted in the first corporate 
governance legislation called Glass – Steagall Act (1932) (figure 1.1) 
resulting in the development of more legislation and recently the  
Sarbanes – Oxley Act (2002) after the collapse of WorldCom and 
Enron. The first report in the UK was the Cadbury Report (1992), 
(Document 2: 8 figure 1) followed by a few others as per figure 1.1 and 
1.3 including the King 1, 2, and 3 Reports in Africa.  Corporate 
governance literature has since grown up to date but these have been 
reactive to scandals hence not adding value to shareholders argued 
(King 2009). 
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South Africa developed its own compliance framework, [The King I 
Report (1994), King 2 Report (2002 and King 3 Report (2009)] in order 
to force compliance in corporate organizations by making the 
requirements of the (King Reports (1994, 2002 and 2009) compulsory 
to all organizations listed on the JSE. Zimbabwe also adopted the King 
II Report although the country is being affected by poor governance. A 
lot of research has been done in both countries in different sectors 
including (OCED 2004) in Zimbabwe and (Myburgh 2003) in the 
banking sector in South Africa. 
 
1.3 Gaps in Corporate Governance 
 
Recent accounting scandals (Fidentia, AIG, Fannie Mae, and Lehman 
Brothers) are the product of multiple failures of auditing, corporate 
governance, accounting, risk management and of the market. In 
discussing any factors that have led to failure, this research provides 
insights on regulatory inadequacies that contributed to these problems. 
At the centre is human failure – in particular greed and weakness of 
internal controls. Reforms in progress are briefly examined, with the 
caveat that no reforms will ever fully cater for human weakness. 
 
Corporate governance refers to the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. It can also be described as the balance of 
power reflecting the rights of owners, managers, lenders and other 
stakeholders (employees, government, etc.) argued (Prof. Brennan 
2002: 1). When that balance of power is inappropriate – for example, 
where there is excessive dominance by one individual such as the chief 
executive or company chairman – governance may be hampered and 
problems may emerge. Separation of ownership and control of 
companies also gives rise to information asymmetry between different 
stakeholders on the one hand and company management on the other. 
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Financial reporting bridges that information gap yet it also creates 
corporate governance gaps through lack of transparency.  
 
 
Figure 1-2: Gap Analysis in Corporate Governance: Adapted from 
(Nicholson and Kiel 2004: 451) 
 
The longer arrow signifies that a board’s potential is dictated by the 
human capital of its members working together under optimal conditions 
– the level of knowledge, skills and experience that the board can bring 
to bear if it were to function perfectly. The second arrow (shorter one) 
represents the performance of a hypothetical board. As illustrated, a 
board’s actual performance will always be less than its potential 
performance. It is the other three sub-domains of intellectual capital – 
social capital, cultural capital and structural capital – that will determine 
the size of the performance gap. 
 
The value of a bank is made of physical, financial and intangible assets, 
of which within these assets, directors utilize these resources for the 
growth of the bank. Social networks that include people who trust and 
assist each other can be a powerful asset. These relationships between 
individuals and firms can lead to a state in which each will think of the 
other when something needs to be done. Along with economic capital, 
social capital is a valuable mechanism in economic growth. The 
integration of intellectual, social, cultural and structural capital are tools 
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boards of the banks under review utilize in line with the requirements of 
Ubuntu. The success of a bank relies on these forms of capital. 
Effective utilization of these resources results on the effectiveness of 
the board. 
   
Since board members can add value to the firm by providing access to 
scarce resources such as information (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986), 
capital (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988), power (Scott, 1991) and industry 
contacts (Pfeffer, 1972), the second component of a board’s intellectual 
capital is its social capital. Social capital refers to the implicit and 
tangible set of resources available to the board by virtue of social 
relationships (Gabbay and Leenders, 1999: 3), which creates value 
through Government, friendship, family, cultural and business networks. 
 
To determine a board’s social capital we need to understand the key 
relationships held by board members, the nature of these relationships 
(e.g. is there a high degree of trust?) and the resources that are 
available as a result of these relationships. Since the level of analysis is 
the board, there are four types of social capital in every board residing 
both within and outside the company.  
1. There is intra-board social capital: This capital is the “store” of 
goodwill that exists between board members and will determine 
the productivity of exchanges between board members.  
2. Board–management social capital: As with the intra-board social 
capital, this is the store of goodwill that exists between the 
members of the board and individual senior managers, most 
notably the CEO. The level of capital in this relationship will 
determine the effectiveness of exchanges between the board 
and management.  
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3. Extra-corporate social capital: This element of social capital is 
more complex than the other two because not only does it relate 
to a relationship between corporate actors (i.e. board members 
and external parties who can supply resources such as finance, 
information, key inputs, etc.), but the nature and extent of 
resources that the external party can supply. In a government 
corporation, for example, social capital may involve the 
information a director can garner from his or her contacts within a 
relevant bank department. In this example it is both the nature of 
the relationship between the parties (i.e. the director and the 
employee) and the attractiveness of the resource (in this case 
the information that can be gathered legally and ethically) that is 
important. 
4. Structural capital or the board’s explicit and implicit codified 
knowledge (Bontis, 1998: 65): Structural capital includes the 
various procedures, policies, routines, processes and methods 
the board has developed for the success of the bank. This 
structural capital can be codified and/or tacit and can be broadly 
categorised as a routine, a policy or element of board culture. 
The first categorisation of structural capital, routines, includes 
mechanical aspects of the governance function such as how the 
board papers are developed, how the agenda is compiled, how 
minutes are taken and distributed, and so on. These routines can 
be either explicit (i.e. documented) or implicit (i.e. 
undocumented, but a known expectation).  
 
The second categorisation is board policies. Board policies are concise 
statements regarding the board’s expectations with respect to specific 
issues ranging from behavioural/ethical expectations to more routine 
matters. These policies are generally recorded in either the minutes of 
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the meeting when the policy is passed or consolidated into a board 
charter or policy manual argued (Nicholson and Kiel 2004: 451). 
Consequently, board policies tend to be explicit.  
 
The final component of the board’s intellectual capital is its cultural 
capital or the resources captured through social identification with the 
values, norms and rules sanctioned by the dominant institutions (Lin, 
2001: 43). Board culture is a term used to describe the underlying 
values, beliefs and norms of the board (Schein, 1992). This will tend to 
be implicit and govern “the way we do things around here” (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1988,: 4). Together, the routines, policies and culture of the 
board set out a shared set of structures that can minimise (or 
conversely exacerbate) the processes of the board. In the case of 
governance, values would include expectations of transparency and 
honesty. It is subtly different from social capital in two ways.  
 
First, cultural capital is captured by virtue of social identification (i.e. the 
identities or social categories by which people define themselves, for 
example gender, qualification or occupation (Tajfel, 1981)), not of 
relationships (although in certain circumstances there will be an overlap 
of the two). Second, cultural capital deals with the degree to which 
board members share norms, values and rules within the operating 
environment, not each other (as in board culture). The board’s 
“embeddedness” in the predominant culture can allow it access to 
resources to impact the transformation process. For instance, individual 
board members’ reputation for honesty can allow them access to 
sensitive information even where they do not share a direct relationship 
with the person who is providing the information (which, by definition, is 
a requirement of social capital). 
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Boards can therefore be conceptualised as a set of five components – 
the human, social and cultural capital of individual directors and the 
social and structural capital of the board as a whole. These are 
therefore linked to how each bank can perform as these are resources 
which have to be exploited for the benefit of all stakeholders. The value 
of the proposed framework, however, does not lie so much in identifying 
these various components stated (Nicholson and Kiel 2004: 452). 
Rather, it lies in identifying the nature of the interaction between them, 
the dynamics and relationships between the various components that 
result in the functioning of the board.  
 
1.4  Ethical Issues and Scene Setting 
 
The effectiveness of boards of directors (or lack thereof) has become a 
global concern. Corporate collapses, fraud cases, shareholder suits or 
questionable strategic decisions are attracting attention to the top 
decision making body of the corporation, (the board of directors) argued 
(Heracleous 2001: 165). In an attempt to raise the standards of 
corporate governance process, “codes of best practices” have been 
drawn up by several countries, global institutions and institutional 
investor organizations in order to set some discipline in the contact of 
directors. 
 
The concept of “corporate governance” as a distinct field within 
corporate or company law is relatively new. SA, Zimbabwe and other 
countries have generally not developed single unitary bodies of law to 
address corporate governance, but rather corporate governance 
practices have emerged from overlapping concerns arising under 
corporate and securities laws, regulatory and administrative concerns of 
market institutions such as securities exchange. Only recently have 
regulators, academics and practitioners begun to pay attention to the 
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adequacy of the regulatory environment in promoting effective 
corporate governance practice argued (Milbourne 2004: 165). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-3 Adapted from Clarke (2004: 157): Regulation in the UK 
 
 
A lot of effort has been put in by different institutions as indicated in 
Figure 1.1: and 1.3 above in trying to instil discipline and ethical conduct 
in the behaviour of directors and shareholders. The deviation of 
ownership and control rights has resulted in corporate governance crisis 
being cyclical as each code tried to address certain problems and yet 
more problems will continue to surface argued (Claessens et al 2000). 
 
1.5 Chapter by chapter review 
 
Chapter 1 gives an overview of the corporate governance issues 
affecting South Africa and Zimbabwe and identified the gaps that exist 
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in the banks. Strategic and research questions will be discussed in 
section two of this document together with a summary of all the 
previous documents. The theory of corporate performance and director 
effectiveness will be summarized in order to understand how conflict of 
interest, stewardship, independence and transparency affect directors 
in their role and their effectiveness. 
 
A critical literature review and a conceptual framework will be discussed 
in section 3, which will result in the research methods being analysed in 
section 4.  The findings and analysis thereof will be done in section 5, 
which will result in section 6, which will suggest some policy changes in 
trying to solve the corporate governance paradox. Research integration 
will be the second last chapter, which will result in conclusion in section 
9.  
 
1.6 Chapter Summary 
 
An effective board is one that can successfully execute the role set 
required of it argued (Nicholson and Kiel 2004). Therefore a 
sophisticated understanding of roles, independence and the interplay 
between the roles and the bank’s environment is central to any 
assessment of board effectiveness. 
 
Board effectiveness is affected by certain cultural issues discussed on 
page 20, agency dilemmas and association matrix (document 3: 
Diagram 6.1: 54). The corporate governance crisis discussed in 
document 2 is as a result of these issues and the legal framework has 
been trying to cope with the changes. The research questions will assist 
in trying to formulate strategies in order to find solutions to these 
dilemmas. 
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2 Research Map 
 
In the previous documents comprising this DBA, the author sought evidence 
from qualitative and quantitative studies for heuristic processes (helping to 
learn or guiding in investigation) in the ways, in which information was 
sought, evaluated and used (Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4). Document 1 
introduced the research proposal, which defined the definition, rules, and 
principles of corporate governance, how they affect the financial sector in SA 
and Zimbabwe. The origins and developments of this research started with 
Berle and Means (1932) who were the first to explore the structural and 
strategic implications of the separation of ownership and control. This has left 
shareholders with little or no control over the actions of a company’s 
managers argued (Berle and Means 1932: 8). In response, shareholders 
attempt to protect their investment by using a variety of control mechanisms, 
(Targett, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, et al 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
“It was apparent to any thoughtful observer that the American corporation 
had ceased to be a private business device and had become an institution” 
stated (Clarke 2004: 155).  
 
Critical literature review was the theme of document 2, which analysed the 
contributions by different researchers, who introduced different theories and 
themes like agency, stewardship, stakeholder theories and shareholder 
activism. An analysis of different countries was done in order to compare 
how different markets are affected by legal framework, separation of 
ownership, owner managed firms, effectiveness of the board, independence 
and transparency. It was noted that evolution of corporate governance in 
USA, Europe and Asia had a positive impact (transfer of knowledge) on 
South Africa and Zimbabwe as these countries followed the same trend of 
events. Most corporates in SA and Zimbabwe have listings on the JSE, LSE, 
NYSE, HKSE and TSE affecting how best practice issues are addressed. 
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The collapse of most of the US (The Wall Street Crash 1929), UK (The Great 
Depression 1987-1991) and (SA financial crisis 1998) companies had 
negative impact to SA and Zimbabwe as they had subsidiaries operating in 
these countries for example BCCI affecting the liquidity of these countries, 
which resulted in the development of a conceptual framework (document 2: 
25). 
 
Most of the research to date focused on roles and duties of directors, while 
document 3 focused on the effectiveness and independence of the board 
and auditors. Corporate failures continued to happen yet there are corporate 
governance structures that put reliance on IDs, NEDs and auditors. It 
focuses on the relationship between independence and transparency of 
directors and auditors in executing their fiduciary duties. The proposition was 
that transparency can be increased and information asymmetry reduced, if 
NEDs, IDs and Auditors are independent. Independence is meant that they 
do not have any conflict of interest with any of the stakeholders concerned in 
the financial sector.  
 
Document 4 drilled down on the quantitative factors that affect board 
effectiveness and provided the evidence from the actual performance of 
banks both qualitatively and quantitatively. Document 4 produced a ranking 
using quantitative data from the financial statements of all banks over five 
years using Muth and Donaldson’s (1998: 5 - 28) theory. The results were 
almost similar to the ranking in document 3, while document 5 will use a new 
tool (CFROTA) in order to try and justify the findings of document 3 and 4. 
Document 4’s ranking will be compared to this document’s findings. 
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Figure 2-1: Developed for this research - Research map 
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affected by different triggers. Independency, transparency, behaviour, skills 
and experience are critical components of this research as the researcher 
tries to find out how these themes affect the effectiveness of the board. 
 
Document five will focus on understanding what makes boards effective or 
ineffective resulting in bank success or failures. Existing literature will be 
used to assist the researcher to understand the gaps that still exist in the 
governance literature as well as on the performance of directors. Figure 2.1 
provides the road map and guideline to this study. 
 
2.1 Research problem 
 
Empirical research [McNulty and Pettigrew (1996), Dalton et al (1998), 
Cornforth (2001), Kazanjian (2000)] confirms that the relationship 
between structural independence – for example the separation of chair 
and CEO, having a majority of outside, supposedly independent 
directors, the size of the board – and corporate financial performance, is 
mixed at best. This is hardly surprising. To be self-critical of the 
academic work done in this area, trying to distil a relationship between 
governance and performance – from outside of a boardroom – is 
analogous to trying to find out what makes a sports team effective by 
sitting in a cafeteria reading the sports pages, without entering the 
arenas or locker-rooms or interviewing the game’s great teams and 
players. A board, in its simplest terms, is a decision-making body. How, 
when and why boards act, or fail to act, is best determined by observing 
boards in action, in real time, and by engaging in depth interviews and 
intense dialogue with directors themselves – ‘the actors’ (Leblanc 2004: 
437).  
 
Essentially the thesis examines the effectiveness of the board of 
directors in executing their fiduciary duties and how they are affected by 
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independence. What happens behind the boardroom door (during board 
meetings) will be an area of interest as the researcher attempt to link 
corporate governance with corporate financial performance and the 
relationship between board behaviour and firm performance, as the 
literature provides no consensus about the direction of that relationship 
(Dalton et al 1999: 674). There are key questions in the field that are yet 
unanswered or not addressed with sufficient particularity as to form the 
bedrock of drawing a quantitative association – or possibly a causal 
relationship – between boards and corporate financial performance. 
These questions tend to focus, not surprisingly, on the inner workings of 
boards – how things happen within board and committee meetings in 
real time, and off-line. Obtaining these data is not an easy undertaking, 
given the difficulty of negotiating access to study the “black box” of 
corporate governance. 
 
2.2 Research issues 
 
What constitutes board effectiveness, what constitutes director 
effectiveness, the relationship between independent governance 
structure and corporate performance is still a grey area. In order to 
determine with greater particularity the nature of board effectiveness 
and the relationship between this construct and corporate financial 
performance, there are three fundamental areas that need to be 
addressed by corporate governance researchers. Unfortunately, or 
fortunately, there are at present more questions than answers within 
each of these areas. 
 
• The independence of judgement, competencies and behaviours 
of the chairman of the board – in short the “selection” of chair, 
not merely the “separation” of chair and CEO 
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• The behavioural “posture” of the CEO within the boardroom 
• The effectiveness of individual directors, including their 
independence of mind, competencies and behaviours, not just 
their “regulatory” independence 
• The most important predictor of director effectiveness is not 
independence, but strategic experience that matches the 
company’s needs (Sonnenfeld 2002: 109). The researcher will 
analyse these predictors of effectiveness in this document as 
stated by Sonnenfeld (2002:109). Previous documents have 
found out that both independence and experience are important 
themes for a board to be effective. 
 
2.3 Research objectives 
 
a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness 
of board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe in the financial service sector and to investigate 
themes that affect good corporate governance practices. The 
themes will be used to assess why investors prefer other 
investment portfolios and why the portfolios perform differently 
while operating in the same environment. Companies to be covered 
are Barclays – (ABSA), Standard Bank – (Stanbic Bank), First Rand 
Bank – (CBZ), Nedbank – (MBCH). 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
c. To establish if strategic experience, training and accreditation of 
directors can improve corporate governance practice in the financial 
sector. 
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2.4 Research questions  
 
Drawing from the literature, three strategic research questions were 
formulated as: 
2.4.1 Strategic Questions 
 
• What is the best way to measure bank’s financial 
performance? 
• What is the best way to assess Corporate Governance in the 
banks in SA and Zimbabwe?  
• What factors/themes need to be managed in order to 
improve Corporate Governance in the financial sector? 
 
2.4.2 Research Questions 
 
a. How well did the banks perform financially and in terms of 
their Corporate Governance best practice?  
b.  Is there any connection between board performance and the 
following themes of Corporate Governance?  
I. Transparency 
II. Independence 
III. Level of strategic experience/training 
IV. Shareholder activism 
c. What can boards do to bridge the Shareholder expectation 
gap? 
 
2.5 Research justification 
 
Reflecting investor expectations, (Larcker et al. 2004) research 
attempts to relate firm performance and corporate governance, with 
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little convincing evidence found to date. Although more recent work 
considerably expands the governance factors examined, it has only 
been able to find relationships with a minority of those factors (Bebchuk 
et al. 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004, Cremers and Nair, 2005; Gompers 
et al. 2003). There are mixed findings on the direction of causality 
between firm performance and corporate governance (Chidambaran et 
al. 2006; Core et al. 2006; Lehn et al. 2005). These findings bring into 
question whether it is reasonable to expect to find a relationship 
between firm performance and corporate governance, and prompts a 
critical examination of the premise on which that research is based. As 
Merino et al. (1987: 749) has observed “If posited relations do not 
isomorphically map to actual events, then a theory lacks ex ante 
descriptive power and the results of empirical tests become less 
meaningful”. 
 
This research questions the assumption that good governance (as 
proxied by board of director variables) will lead to enhanced 
shareholder value. It is suggested that there is an expectation gap 
between what stakeholders expect (e.g. investors, regulators, 
researchers, the media, and the public) and what boards of directors 
can reasonably contribute. This study critiques this premise/assumption 
by analysing the gap and looking at what any board can do to meet 
these expectations. However, it is acknowledged that research design 
flaws also contribute to problems of prior research attempting to relate 
firm performance and corporate governance. 
 
The role of boards of directors is then considered. The confusion as to 
the role of the board, and the conflicting role of boards, are highlighted 
as these are likely to contribute to an expectation gap. The existence of 
performance gap and expectation gap resulted in the researcher finding 
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justification in the need to study these gaps. Failure of banks in SA and 
Zimbabwe between 1994 and 2006 became a problem for the two 
Governments and the researcher felt it necessary to analyse how 
performance of banks differs while operating in the same environment. 
It became necessary to look at the leadership of the banks’ 
effectiveness in managing the banks, which resulted in the author 
analysing different themes which affect corporate governance practice. 
 
2.6 Research Process 
 
The basic assumption of this study has been that, what happens behind 
the boardroom door remains a mystery until one goes behind the 
boardroom door to find out what happens inside. The performance of 
board members and the valuation of their performance is an interesting 
theme in the Corporate Governance research. The author followed the 
research process, which analysed each stage as defined by Kumar 
(1998). 
 
This study proceeded through eight stages portrayed in Figure 2.1. 
Operational steps (signified by arrows), were taken to conduct the 
study. Theories were needed to carry out these steps (identified by 
rectangles). Intermediary steps (signified by circles) were needed to 
complete stages of research design (Kumar, 1998: 17). Once the 
research problem was formulated, the appropriate investigation was 
decided upon. The interviews were then ready to be actioned. 
Participant choice of research was a cross-sectional design. This is 
‘best suited when aimed at finding out the prevalence of a 
phenomenon, situation, problem, attitude or issue, by taking a cross 
section of a population’ (Babbie, 1989: 89). The result gives an overall 
picture of the situation as it stands at the time. The survey undertaken, 
looked to discover the existence of a phenomenon, not to measure 
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change; therefore a cross-sectional population design was chosen as 
suitable to examine the issues under consideration. 
 
2.7 Selecting the sample of banks 
 
The researcher identified four major banks operating in SA and 
Zimbabwe (document 1 and 3: 13) using the basis that all the four 
banks operate in SA and Zimbabwe. The four banks observe the 
requirements of the (King 2 Report 2002); they are all listed on the JSE 
and ZSE. We take sample for one or two reasons argued (DeFusco et 
al 2004: 286) and here the reason being to narrow down the population 
so that the study  can be economically efficient. Selected banks were 
ABSA (Barclays), FirstRand Bank (FNB) (CBZ), Nedbank (MBCH) and 
Standard Bank (Stabic Bank) as they operate in both countries.  
 
Within these banks, the researcher selected CEOs, Financial Directors 
and Chairman for Audit Committees as respondents to this document’s 
questionnaires and each was interviewed. This sample is representative 
of the total population during the research, as they are the board 
members responsible for the preparation of the financial statements. 
 
2.8 Requirements from interviewees 
 
Respondents were selected based on either their position in the bank or 
in society. Researchers and Market analysts were included in the 
respondents list as a result of their contribution to this field of study. 
Some of the requirements were: 
 
• Chairman 
The Chairman of each bank was required to discuss his relationship 
with the board, executive directors, the role of Audit Committee, 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
25 
 
External Auditors, independency and how the bank operates. They 
also gave an insight into the environment in which banks operate 
and how the environment affects corporate governance practices. 
 
• CEO 
Each CEO was required to discuss his relationship with the board, 
the history of the bank, performance and its future outlook. The 
issues of skills, training and politics were discussed 
 
• Financial Director 
The financial director of each bank was required to provide the 
financial statements and giving explanations on the bank’s financial 
performance. Most of the activities which have a financial impact 
were discussed. 
 
• Independent Directors 
Experienced and independent board practitioners, whose 
experience is vital for championing the strategic direction of the 
bank. They also represented all other stakeholders of which the 
researcher could get independent opinions. 
 
 
• Non-Executive Directors 
Their role as representatives of shareholders is important. NEDs 
plays an important role especially on social and cultural networks. 
  
• Chairman of Audit Committee 
Responsible for internal controls, compliance reporting, risk 
management and the role of auditors (internal and external). 
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• Company Secretary 
Discussed the legal framework in which banks operate and how 
boards function. 
 
• CG Practitioners 
Authorities in this field, people who have done some work or 
research in this field for example Mr M King and Advocate Myburgh 
 
• Market Analysts 
They provided inside information and the historical performance of 
banks.  
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3 Literature review and Conceptual framework 
 
A number of theories of board behaviour have been propounded over a long 
period, dating back as far as the 18th century. A succinct review of these is 
provided by Stiles and Taylor (2001: 371 - 375), but three main theories are 
of relevance to this study. Agency Theory focuses on the agent–principal 
relationship to further our understanding of the governing board. The agency 
relationship is a contract under which one or more persons, the principals, 
engage another person, the agent, to perform some services on their behalf. 
This involves delegating authority to the agent. Agency theory incorporates 
important assumptions about managerial behaviour being self-interested, 
prone to moral hazard and evincing bounded rationality (Simon, 1976). 
According to (Stiles and Taylor 2001), the theory regards the board of 
directors as an instrument of control.  
 
Stewardship Theory propounds that there is no conflict of interest between 
managers and owners and that to be successful the organisation requires a 
structure that allows coordination to be achieved most effectively. 
Stewardship Theory, in contrast to Agency Theory, recognises a range of 
non-financial motives of managers found in the occupational psychology 
literature, for example need for advancement and recognition, intrinsic job 
satisfaction, respect for authority and the work ethic argued (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998: 5 -10).  
 
The emergence of   Stakeholder Theory, according to (Gay 2002: 36), was 
prompted by the growing recognition by boards of the need to take account 
of the wider interests of society. He lists the essential premises upon which 
Stakeholder Theory rests, citing (Jones and Wicks 1999: 206), as being: the 
corporation has relationships with many constituent groups (stakeholders) 
that affect, and are affected by, its decisions; the theory is concerned with the 
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nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes and 
focuses on managerial decision-making; the interests of all legitimate 
stakeholders have intrinsic value, and no set of interests is assumed to 
dominate the other. 
 
Summarising a long history of academic debate, (Stiles and Taylor 2001) 
pointedly note, “The view that one theory by itself does not illuminate the 
whole spectrum of board endeavour receives strong support from 
examination of their [emphasis added] shortcomings”. Presciently, 
(Pettigrew: 1992: 178) opined that: 
 
. . . the study of boards and their directors has not been helped by over-
ambitious attempts to link independent variables such as board composition 
to outcome variables such as board and firm performance. The research 
agenda . . . need not be guided just by studies testing the explanatory power 
of agency theory or theories of managerial hegemony. The task is perhaps a 
simpler one, to. . . . provide some basic descriptive findings about boards 
and their directors.  
 
Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by 
separation of incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship 
theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of 
these roles. Results of an empirical test by Donaldson and Davis (1991) fail 
to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory. 
“The gap between the contributions of theory and what practitioners are 
interested in seems to be widening (Tricker 1994: 55). Both Agency and 
Stewardship studies typically do not reflect the dynamics of governance – the 
interplay of power, conflict and ideology”. This study is an attempt to narrow 
that gap. Whilst it seeks to provide some new evidence about the utility of 
three extant theories, its principal aim is to present evidence about real board 
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practice alongside the company performance with which it is associated. It 
should, therefore, be of value to practising directors, regulators and 
academics and it might illuminate a new direction in which theory might 
usefully be developed.  
 
3.1 Study to test the theories 
 
Although the author was unable to find in the literature any studies of 
the link between board practice and subsequent company performance, 
several studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between 
board composition and company performance. An article by (Korac-
Kakabadse et al. 2001: 24) states, 
. . . the analysis of 40 years of data from 159 studies, carried out by 
Dalton and Daily, concluded that there is no clear evidence of a 
substantive relationship between board composition and financial 
performance, irrespective of the type of performance indicators, the size 
of the firm or the manner in which board composition is measured. . . . 
most empirical studies are not theory driven and, of those that are, most 
are focused on structural dimensions of the board with only speculative 
inference of board behaviour. 
 
However, one study has been selected for replication, because the 
researchers concerned formulated a number of hypotheses to test the 
validity of Agency and Stewardship Theories. (Muth and Donaldson 
1998: 5 28), gathered data on the performance of 145 Australian 
companies in different sectors between 1992 and 1994 on the following 
measures: 
• Return on Assets (ROA) 
• Return on Equity (ROE) 
• Profit 
• Shareholder Wealth 
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• Sales Growth 
 
They performed a factor analysis on the data and identified two 
independent performance factors: Profit Performance and Shareholder 
Wealth. Sales Growth, a single item, did not load onto either factor but 
the authors believe that, if a second Sales Growth item had been 
entered, Sales Growth would have probably constituted a third factor.  
 
Regarding board composition, they gathered data on ten variables 
relating to Chairman duality; number of executive, NED and total 
directors; Interest Alignment; Age; Tenure (mean); External 
Organisation and Director; Internal Director; and, highest number of 
Director links. Again, a factor analysis on these variables produced two 
independent factors which they named:  
 
Board Independence: consisting of Chairman duality; board size; 
proportion of NEDs; interest alignment with owners and average age of 
directors. 
 
Network Connections: consisting of average number of external 
organisation links; average number of external director links; average 
number of internal director links and highest number of links of an 
individual director. 
 
In order to test their hypotheses, the two board structure (composition) 
factors were correlated with the two company performance factors. 
Their main findings were that “the Agency theory predictions relating to 
performance were not upheld, while those of stewardship theory were 
supported” (Muth and Donaldson, 1998: 26). In particular, significantly 
better results were achieved by companies whose boards had fewer 
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independent directors (NEDs) and where the roles of Chairman and 
CEO were combined. Smaller boards almost exclusively composed of 
executive directors seemed to protect shareholders’ interests better 
than larger boards with a high proportion of NEDs. They concluded by 
advocating replication studies in the US and UK to see if their results 
stood up in countries with different boardroom structures and 
composition. 
 
In a review of Muth and Donaldson’s study, (Hunt 1998) draws attention 
to the importance of their results in respect of board theories, corporate 
governance codes of best practice, and points out that the study “has 
reminded us that there is a dearth of research on how boards actually 
work”. 
  
3.2 Director independence and Corporate Performance 
 
The extent to which boards and non-executive directors are 
independent varies depending upon business or personal associations 
with senior management (Mace, 1986; Patton and Baker, 1987: 10). As 
a consequence, no common consensus exists as to a unique definition 
for independence. 
 
Arguably, improvements in the independence of corporate boards ought 
to yield improvements in corporate performance. Independent directors 
are expected to be more effective in monitoring managers, thereby 
reducing the agency costs and risk arising from the separation of 
ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) in day-to-day 
company management. Empirical evidence challenges the conventional 
wisdom that board independence produces better corporate 
performance (Bhagat and Black, 1997: 1212, 2002: 231), stated that 
there is no evidence that companies with more independent boards 
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perform better than other companies, which is in agreement with the 
findings of (Korac-Kakabadse et al. 2001: 25). Studies of outsider ratios 
and corporate performance have produced correlations ranging from 
positive (Pearce and Zahra, 1992) to negative (Beatty and Zajac, 
1994:313 -330). Some studies have found zero or near-zero effects 
(Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994:554 - 561). Yermack (1996: 185) found a 
negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
and corporate performance. Further doubt was cast by two UK studies 
(Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998: 383; Laing and Weir, 1999) which failed 
to find a relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors 
and corporate performance.  
 
Another researcher has reported that a higher ratio of executive, not 
outside directors, is associated with higher R&D spend (Baysinger et 
al., 1991: 101), greater likelihood of CEO dismissal in times of financial 
crises (Ocasio, 1994: 285) and higher firm performance (Pearce, 1983: 
298). These studies argue that executive directors, who have access to 
full information about their companies, are in a better position than 
outside directors to make decisions about critical areas of operation and 
performance. On the other hand, the contrasting executive-dominated 
board is seen as a device for management entrenchment; there have 
been calls for boards to have a “substantial majority” of independent 
directors. Yet there are numerous anecdotes where apparently 
independent boards have not prevented shareholder wealth destruction, 
(e.g. Enron had 15 “independent” directors on its 17-member board) 
(Paltrow, 2002; United States Senate, 2002). 
 
Proponents of board reform have long advocated non-executive director 
representation as a means of increasing the independence and 
effectiveness of boards (Bacon and Brown, 1973; Dayton, 1984: 34; 
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Waldo, 1985). However, defining “independence” and applying 
appropriate criteria to selecting non-executive directors is a question of 
judgement. What one person considers independent, the next person 
may not. 
 
A UK survey (KPMG, 2002) of views on independence found that 
directors should not: 
• Represent a specific shareholder or other single interest group 
(96 per cent)  
• Participate in company share option or performance-related 
remuneration schemes (93 per cent)  
• Have conflicting or cross directorships (89 per cent); or  
• Have significant financial or personal ties to the company or its 
management which could interfere with the director’s loyalty to 
shareholders (96 per cent). 
 
Furthermore, far more respondents considered directors not to be 
independent where they had been employees for more than five years 
(64 per cent). By contrast, only 25 per cent of respondents considered 
directors to lose their independent status when they had served as a 
director for more than five years. 
 
3.3 New information on Corporate Governance 
 
“Modern firms suffer from a separation of ownership and control. These 
firms are run by managers (agents), who are accountable to dispersed 
shareholders (principals).  The question is how to ensure that managers 
follow the interests of shareholders in order to reduce costs associated 
with principal-agent theory. To do that, principals have to deal with two 
problems: 
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• Face an adverse selection problem, that is they must select the 
most capable managers with shareholder interest 
• They are also confronted with a moral hazard problem that is 
how to adequately motivate the managers to put forth the 
appropriate effort and make decisions aligned with shareholder 
interests.” (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe 2006: 610 - 611) 
 
This scenario fits into the discussed principal-agent paradigm discussed 
in document 2: 38 and document 3: 3, which (Barako et al 2006: 111 – 
112), argued that there is a positive association between the presence 
of audit committee and corporate disclosure practices, which reduces 
agents costs as a result of added transparency. The presence of an 
audit committee is associated with reliable financial reporting, such as, 
reduced incidence of errors, irregularities and other indicators of 
unreliable reporting stated (Mcmullen 1996: 87, Barnes 2004: 96). The 
researcher is in agreement with McMullen (conceptual framework, 
document 2: 25). Audit committees recently are viewed as monitoring 
mechanisms that enhance the audit attestation function of external 
financial reporting. 
 
Markarian et al (2007: 295) argued that global financial markets appear 
to affect not only competition and corporate strategy but also the way in 
which the companies cope with conflict of interest between owners and 
directors. This has led to shareholders adopting the active shareholder 
role; institutional investors have become more active participants in the 
governance of their corporate holdings argued (Carleton et al 1998: 
1335, Gillian and Starks 2000: 276). During the 1990s in all the OECD 
countries, institutional investors increased their activism and started 
seeking for a governance model that protects the interests of minority 
shareholders. As a consequence, it seems that the different corporate 
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governance models are shifting towards a non-Anglo-Saxon model 
characterized by an increased relevance of internal mechanisms of 
control and disclosure regarding governance practices. The non-Anglo-
Saxon model advocates for smaller boards, independent mechanism of 
control, more independent directors, more independent audit, 
nominating, audit and remuneration committees. Shareholders are 
advocating for more power to recruit and dismiss directors. 
 
3.3.1 Factors to test the effectiveness of board of directors  
 
Institutional investors have grown in power and influence 
during the last few years and have exerted tremendous 
influence on the companies in which they invest (Webb 2002: 
67). Document 3 and 4 established that Shareholders are now 
more actively involved in the formulation of bank strategies 
than before for example FNB Shareholders are involved in the 
administration of the bank. Investors are willing to pay a 
premium of up 27% when investing in a well-structured 
organization argued, (Garratt 2003, Kakabadse 2002 and 
Frederikson 1992). Well-structured organization means an 
organization that observes best corporate governance 
practices.  The reputation and governance of corporations 
translate into a “governance premium,” which (McKinsey and 
Company 2002) measured and found that it translates into 
higher price/earnings (P/E) ratio and other improved metrics, 
(Levitt 1999, Howell and Hibbard 2002: 7).  
 
The new conceptual framework highlighted the mechanisms 
that are required to be triggered in order for the banks to be 
effective and creating shareholder value (Chart 3.1). Some of 
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which are skills and experience of directors, culture, 
understanding of regulatory framework and the environment in 
which banks operate. This together creates a governance 
process that banks must follow for them to attract investment 
and be able to create premium for shareholder return argued 
(Kakabadse 2002). 
 
The OECD (1999) concluded that adherence to best practice 
of good corporate governance will help to improve the 
confidence of investors, may reduce the cost of capital and 
more stable sources of capital. Adherence to best practice of 
good governance, together with Chart 3.1 results in an 
effective board. The author agrees with the conclusion by the 
OECD (1999) as well governed banks are attractive to 
investors for example the acquisition of ABSA by Barclays Plc. 
in 2005 and Standard Bank by Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) in 2008. The model developed by Ingley 
and Van der Walt (2001: 178 – 179) (Chart 3.1) creates a 
bank that is attractive to investors and creditors as it results in 
an effective board, which all the four banks were found to be 
complying with. 
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Chart 3.1: Source: Ingley and Van der Walt (2001: 179) – Effective board 
 
3.4 Corporate Governance literature in the financial sector 
 
Financial service sector is a critical part of any economy and is 
particularly significant in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the core being the 
historic city of Johannesburg, one of the world’s leading business hub. 
Banks provide deposits and loan facilities for personal and corporate 
customers, making credit and liquidity available in adverse market 
conditions and providing access to the nations’ payments systems 
argued (Handley-Schachler et al 2007: 628). 
 
Recent corporate collapses and malpractices within the financial sector 
(Document 2: Appendix 1) suggest that, despite SA financial markets 
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being semi – developed and relatively sophisticated, there has been 
sufficient system weaknesses to enable episodes of financial company 
malfeasance. The main cases are BCCI, Saambou Bank Ltd, TA Bank 
of South Africa Ltd, The Business Bank Ltd, Barbican Bank and Trust 
Bank. Corporate governance became an integral part of all banks’ 
operations. Accordingly, banks became fully committed to the principles 
of the code of corporate practices and conduct set out in The King 11 
Report (2002). The purpose of King 11 Report is to promote the highest 
level of corporate governance in SA and Zimbabwe. In supporting the 
code, the directors’ recognize the need to conduct the enterprises with 
integrity and in accordance with generally accepted corporate practices 
as defined by the relationship in Chart 3.1 above.  
 
As a result of the crisis in the sector from 1991, the banks were required 
to identify and meet the requirements of different stakeholders as in 
Chart 3.1 argued (Handley-Schachler et al 2007: 628). The four major 
banks became committed to creating value for all its stakeholders who 
are: 
• Shareholders 
Delivering sustainable capital and earnings growth. 
• Customers 
Creating lasting and mutually beneficial relationships. 
• Employees 
Creating a positive, supportive, healthy and diversity-
friendly working environment. 
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• The community 
Being the preferred partners in growing Southern Africa's 
prosperity and developing a culture of positive corporate 
citizenry. 
• Governments and regulators 
Building a better Africa by supporting transformation and 
the development of financial services markets. 
Principal Primary 
Agent 
Relationship 
with the Bank 
Objectives of Principal 
Ordinary 
Shareholder 
• Non 
Executive 
Chairman 
• IDs 
• NEDs 
• EDs 
• Ownership 
• Agents manage 
the bank 
• Investment or capital growth 
• Cash generation 
• Dividend growth 
Preference 
Shareholder 
• Non 
Executive 
Chairman 
• IDs 
• NEDs 
• EDs 
• Manage bank 
liquidity 
• Ability to 
service the loan 
• To receive a specified annual 
dividend on capital invested 
Holder of 
Bonds or 
Debentures 
• Bank 
or 
board 
• Debtor, 
Creditor 
• To receive a specified annual 
dividend on capital invested 
each year 
Depositor • Bank • Unsecured 
creditors with 
right to 
repayment 
• Safe custody of funds 
• Disburse funds on demand 
• To receive interest depending 
on market forces 
Account • Bank • Unsecured • Safe custody of funds 
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Principal Primary 
Agent 
Relationship 
with the Bank 
Objectives of Principal 
Holder creditors with 
right to 
repayment 
• Disburse funds on demand 
Contributor 
to managed 
funds 
Bank – Fund 
Manager 
Agent to agent as 
Fund Manager is 
agent of the 
investor 
• Maximize profits 
• High return due to 
diversification 
Table 1: Stakeholder association in the banking sector: Adapted from: (Handley-
Schachler et al 2007: 625) 
 
3.5 Measuring bank performance 
 
There exists a multitude of options for measuring corporate progress, 
including those pertaining to financial and non-financial performance. In 
the case of the latter, and for studies of this type, preference is 
frequently given to those concerned with shareholder returns: for 
instance, (Muth and Donaldson 1998) use the accounting-based Return 
on Equity. Perhaps the most popular measure, recently, has been Total 
Shareholder Return (TSR), also used by Muth and Donaldson but 
described as Shareholder Wealth. TSR is derived by adding the 
dividend income enjoyed by shareholders to the change in the market 
value of their investment over a prescribed period of time, e.g. one year. 
Inevitably, however, the efficacy of this measure suffers from the 
vagaries of the Stock Market, including misalignment between 
reasonable shareholders’ expectations and underlying business 
fundamentals. This phenomenon was particularly acute during the 
dotcom boom of 1999 to 2002 Dulewicz and Herbert (2004: 265) – a 
key period for this study. Notwithstanding this difficulty, a more 
compelling reason for rejecting TSR is that it fails to gauge directly the 
efficiency with which company leaders generate profits from the assets 
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with which they are entrusted, irrespective of how those profits are 
delivered to shareholders, via dividends or capital appreciation.  
 
The model which is primary measure of bank performance is 
designated Cash Flow Return to Total Assets (CFROTA) Dulewicz and 
Herbert (2004: 265). This ratio was selected for three, principal reasons. 
First, its numerator circumvents the impact of two, variously 
contentious, accounting policies (concerning depreciation of fixed 
assets and amortisation of goodwill) and provides a close proxy for the 
company’s cash flow. Second, its denominator gives expression to the 
total value of all (conventional) assets that, de facto, the company’s 
management deem necessary to conduct their business – however 
these are financed (by shareholders and others). Fraser – Sampson 
(2007: 71) argued that earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization (PBITDA) is claimed to be a pure cash flow measure since 
it excludes non cash flow items such as depreciation and amortization. 
In other words it eliminates the effect of both financial structuring and 
accounting policy and decisions.  
 
Finally, by combination of these two variables, the researcher has a 
plausibly robust measure of the efficiency mustered by the banks’ 
leaders in marshalling the resources with which they have been 
entrusted. CFROTA is similar though not identical to Muth and 
Donaldson’s Return on Assets; and the researcher has not replicated 
their use of Profit (Margin) on the grounds that it is itself a component of 
Return on Assets. For the sake of comprehension, the author preferred 
to use (with due caution) the single dependent variable CFROTA rather 
than Muth and Donaldson’s Profit Performance (PP) factor, which 
incorporates three interconnected measures all carrying similar 
accounting limitations. 
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However the argument put forward by Dulewicz and Herbert (2004: 
265) and Fraser – Sampson (2007: 71) is not strictly true. While 
EBITDA is a better indicator of likely cash flow than any of the other 
earnings measures the researcher has found out that it does not take 
into account things such as required capital expenditure and working 
capital. Of course a purist would say that this point is well understood 
and that all EBITDA is supposed to be is a “top line” entry from which to 
start cash flow calculations as it is cash flow that increases shareholder 
value. 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004: 265) defined CFROTA (per cent) as: 
 
 
Formula 1: Calculation of CFROTA 
 
This ratio was calculated by reference to financial year-end data for 
each of the years 2002 - 2006, inclusive. In a small number of cases, 
due, for example, to changes of accounting period, interpolative 
estimates were made to obtain year-on-year comparability. Also, in the 
case of Banks – for which FAME (a finance database) data were 
unavailable – a proxy (Real Return on Equity) was employed in place of 
CFROTA.  
 
In addition to CFROTA, the author employed one further measure of 
company performance namely, Sales Turnover (hereafter “Sales”). This 
was selected in order to explore the relevance of bank size and growth 
to the investigation. In particular, the researcher was interested in the 
presence of any evidence that might resonate with the pursuit of these 
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outcomes as management objectives, in their own right. For instance, 
Agency theory might lead us to postulate that management teams or, 
indeed, boards that enjoyed vacuous governance regimes would be 
disposed to pursue objectives encapsulating motives of power or 
reputation more immediately compelling than shareholder interests. 
Sales data was tabulated for each financial year ending during the 
period 2002–2006, inclusive (Appendix 1 to 4). 
 
Finally, the author has not adjusted CFROTA (and Sales) data for 
business cycle, sectoral or other external influences. Although these 
exogenous variables must be assumed to have some impact on banks 
performance, the contention is that they cannot, realistically, be 
separated from the plethora of internal variables, including board 
composition and practice, capable of influencing that performance. 
Lending to small and medium business was not considered as this is a 
market for all banks although some banks are more risk taking than 
others. 
 
Why people wonder why we add back interest expense it’s because we 
are going to use it to compare firms based on enterprise value (White et 
al 2003: 151, Brigham and Houston 1998: 78). In the EV calculation we 
include net debt. Some banks have too much debt while others have 
less. If we do not also add back interest expense to EBITDA, we will get 
a distorted view. We have to add back interest to earnings so that we 
are comparing apples with apples. 
 
For the same reason we add back tax, primarily because debt levels 
have an impact on taxes, since tax is deductible. By adding these two 
items back, we can reasonably compare different banks without 
allowing financing decisions. (White et al 2003: 152) added that, EBITA 
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is computed by adding depreciation and amortization expense to 
earnings before interest and taxes. It is often used as a measure of 
cash flow, but suffers from some limitations in that it ignores: 
• Variations in accounting methods 
• Cash required for working capital 
• Debt service and other fixed charge requirements 
• The need to maintain productive capacity 
 
3.6 Ubuntu 
The word Ubuntu has its origin in the Bantu Languages of Southern 
Africa, and they’re many possible translations in English for Ubuntu, 
humanity towards other, I am what I am because of what we are, a 
person is a person because of other person. An attempt at a longer 
definition of Ubuntu was made by (Archbishop  Tutu 1999) when he 
argued that, a person with ubuntu is open and available to others, 
affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and 
good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from 
knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished 
when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or 
oppressed. 
Mandela (1994)
 
explained Ubuntu as “a traveller through our country 
would stop at a village, and he didn't have to ask for food or for water. 
Once he stops, the people give him food, entertain him. That is one 
aspect of Ubuntu but Ubuntu has various aspects. Ubuntu does not 
mean that people should not enrich themselves. The question therefore 
is: Are you going to do so in order to enable the community around you 
to improve?” 
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Ubuntu is seen as one of the founding principles of the new Africa’s 
governance, and is connected to the idea of an African renaissance. In 
the political sphere, the concept of ubuntu is used to emphasize the 
need for unity or consensus in decision-making, as well as the need for 
a suitably humanitarian ethic to inform those decisions. 
 
As noted above, Ubuntu is difficult to define succinctly, but the author 
will draw on a few definitions of Ubuntu to illustrate his breadth of 
interpretation. Louw (2001) describes the concept of Ubuntu within the 
following phrase: “Umuntu ungumuntu ngabanye abantu” (Nguni 
languages of Zulu and Xhosa). The phrase roughly translated into 
English would mean; “A person is a person through other persons”. 
 
This encapsulates the concepts of “humanity”, “humanness” and even 
“humane-ness” and expresses respect and compassion to others 
argued (Louw, 2001). Broodryk (2002) states that Ubuntu is essentially: 
“An ancient African worldview based on the values of intense 
humanness, caring, respect, compassion, and associated values 
ensuring a happy and qualitative human community live in a spirit of 
family.” Ubuntu could also be described as a community-based mindset 
in which the welfare of the group is greater than the welfare of a single 
individual in the group (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 1999:27). 
“Ubuntu” is an African worldview and is driving much of Africa’s values 
and social thinking (Broodryk, 2004). Ubuntu has also been described 
as an African phenomenon and an accurate reflection of Africa’s 
historical cultural, legislative and social systems. The term Ubuntu 
features very largely in several well-known African agenda’s such as 
the African Renaissance and the Millennium Action Plan (Jana, 2001). 
Beyond that Ubuntu is becoming a globalising concept that is being 
seriously considered as an alternative to “extractive capitalism” (Van 
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Binsbergen, 2002). Ubuntu is currently being driven and marketed by 
the political powers and intellectual elite of many countries in Africa as 
the solution to the poverty, political strife; conflict of interest, ethnic 
conflict experienced in Africa and is an “awakening” of true africanness. 
This is especially true of post-1994 South Africa where the political 
leadership is looking for an ideology to press into service to build a new 
society. Above that, Ubuntu is seen as an answer to conflict resolution 
and Restorative Justice (Anderson, 1999; Van Binsbergen, 2001). 
 
3.6.1 Ubuntu Concept 
 
Human beings are recognised as being all equal, sharing a 
common basic brotherhood, having the right to life, respect 
for authority and finding their ultimate meaning and purpose 
within communities. The last attribute is in stark contrast to 
the extreme individualism and self-centredness of Western 
cultures. Ubuntu dictates that boards should act responsibly, 
taking the stewardship role where self-centredness is not 
acceptable.  
 
The literature review confirms that Communalism comes 
across as a foundational cornerstone of Ubuntu. It would be 
accurate in stating that Ubuntu is communalism in the most 
fundamental sense of the word. According to 
Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko (1999:27) communalism is the 
core value of Ubuntu and implies that the interests of the 
individual are subordinate to that of the group. The 
communalist group will focus the interests of each individual 
member towards those activities and behaviours that will 
ensure the good of the group. Communalism furthermore 
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believes that once the good of the group is ensured, the 
benefits will flow through to each individual member. 
 
Another associated concept of Ubuntu communalism is that 
of collective solidarity, meaning that individuals will focus 
their interests, activities, and loyalties of their own accord, in 
line with the group’s cause and well-being (Mokgoro, 1997). 
Each individual realises that he is part of a group and that 
the group depends on his skills, inputs, labour and loyalty in 
order to survive. The communalist lifestyle also places within 
each individual a strong sense of belonging – arguably one 
of the strongest needs in humans today. The communalist 
lifestyle thus provides each member a sense of purpose and 
security in relation to that group.  
 
The strong collective thinking of Ubuntu implies that the 
individual members of the group cannot imagine ordering 
their lives individualistically without the consent of his family, 
clan or tribe (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko: 1999:27). The 
communalist lifestyle goes so far in that children are not the 
sole responsibility of the parents alone, but are the 
responsibility of the extended family and entire clan of adult 
members. Individuals are taught, by experience, that an 
individual cannot live alone or manage life by himself; he 
needs the collective wisdom and experience of others in 
order to become his best. By becoming his best he also will 
benefit the group as a whole. 
 
One observation about the communalist nature of Ubuntu is 
that it is sustainable at a local village level, but is difficult to 
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exercise beyond the boundaries of everyday relationships. 
Individuals have a limited capacity to relate to other people in 
terms of sheer numbers of relationships, and since 
relationships are a cornerstone to Ubuntu, the practice of 
Ubuntu occurs primarily within the boundaries of the 
individual’s primary relationships. This does not mean that 
Ubuntu’s ethos and culture are not carried over to other 
areas, but that it is practised in localities by individuals in 
groups that know each other well (Scorgie, 2004). 
 
According to (Mbigi and Maree 1995:2) the individual owes 
his existence to others because “you are because I am” and 
“I am because you are” (cited in Brack et al, 2003). This is 
interpreted from the Ubuntu statement, “people are people 
through other people”. Bhengu (1996) says that in the 
context of Ubuntu, a man cannot exist of himself, by himself, 
or for himself (cited in Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 1999). 
Therefore man exists in a social cluster and has an 
interpersonal nature, a nature dependent on others to help 
define and distinguish. The strong communalist and 
interdependent nature of Ubuntu has established the virtues 
of patience, hospitality, loyalty, respect, sociability, and 
sharing among its adherents (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 
1999:27). Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko further explain that 
people bound within high-context cultures are strongly 
interdependent and deeply involved in each other’s lives. 
This means that individuals become entwined with other 
members of the family, clan or tribe over their lifetime in a 
series of obligations and expectations. The social value of 
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interdependence is taught in many African proverbs 
(Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 1999): 
• A man here, a man there means no fear. (We can 
achieve anything if we support one another.) 
• The sickness of the eye is the sickness of the nose. 
(Your neighbour’s problem is your problem.) 
• A neighbour is a sibling. (Care for your neighbours as 
family.) 
3.6.2 Locus of Corporate Governance 
Locus of control is a personality construct referring to an 
individual's perception of the locus of events as determined 
internally by his/her own behaviour versus fate, luck, or 
external circumstances. Some research McCombs, (1991: 6) 
suggests that what underlies the internal locus of control is 
the concept of "self as agent." This means that our thoughts 
control our actions and that when we realize this executive 
function of thinking we can positively affect our beliefs, 
motivation, academic and professional performance. "The 
self as agent can consciously or unconsciously direct, select, 
and regulate the use of all knowledge structures and 
intellectual processes in support of personal goals, 
intentions, and choices." "The degree to which one choose to 
be self-determining is a function of one's realization of the 
sources of agency and personal control” (McCombs 1991: 7). 
In other words, we can say to ourselves, "I choose to direct 
my thoughts and energies toward accomplishment or 
success of the bank. I choose not to be daunted by my 
anxieties or feelings of inadequacy." 
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Within psychology, Locus of Control is considered to be an 
important aspect of personality.  More simply: Do you 
believe that your destiny is controlled by yourself or by 
external forces (such as fate, God, or powerful others) 
argued (Rotter 1966).  Thus, locus of control is 
conceptualised as referring to a unidimensional continuum, 
ranging from external to internal: 
 
External Locus of 
Control 
Individual believes that 
his/her behaviour is 
guided by fate, luck, or 
other external 
circumstances  
Internal Locus of 
Control 
Individual believes that 
his/her behaviour is 
guided by his/her 
personal decisions and 
efforts. 
 
Table 2: Rotter, J. (1966): Locus of control 
The full name Rotter gave the construct was Locus of 
Control of Reinforcement.  In giving it this name, Rotter was 
bridging behavioural and cognitive psychology.  Rotter's 
view was that behaviour was largely guided by 
"reinforcements" (rewards and punishments) and that 
through contingencies such as rewards and punishments, 
individuals come to hold beliefs about what causes their 
actions.  These beliefs, in turn, guide what kinds of attitudes 
and behaviours people adopt when managing 
organizations.  This understanding of Locus of Control is 
consistent, for example, with Zimbardo (1985: 275), whose 
belief about whether the outcomes of our actions are 
contingent on what we do (internal control orientation) or on 
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events outside our personal control (external control 
orientation). 
 
In general, it seems to be psychologically healthy to 
perceive that one has control over those things which one 
is capable of influencing.  In simplistic terms, a more 
internal locus of control is generally seen as desirable 
director behaviour in the banking industry in SA and 
Zimbabwe.  Having an Internal locus of control can also be 
referred to as "self-agency", "personal control", "self-
determination," which resulted in the locus of corporate 
governance. 
In view of Table 22: this document seeks to investigate how 
incentive mechanisms can help principals to get a return on 
their exchanges with management. Director’s effort can be 
associated with the incentives available or recognition. In 
terms of transaction cost economics, corporate governance 
deals with the institutions that may help to minimize the 
transaction costs of the managerial agency problem. The 
reduction in agency costs may result in more transparency 
and strong internal controls. The impact of the 
stewardship/Ubuntu theory will be felt as management will 
not only be after self-interest but recognition through 
contribution to the bank and position in society (Figure 2 
above). 
 
A higher cost to income ratio is an indication of a profitable 
bank which will result in a higher CFROTA. A CFROTA 
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growth result in the growth of shareholder value as cash 
reserves will be available to the bank. This change in matrix 
will result in efficient banks which continue to create above 
shareholder expectation. All the five stakeholders will be 
satisfied with the effective performance of the banks, which 
support the new conceptual framework as mechanisms for 
lower costs will trigger outcomes which create shareholder 
value. 
3.6.3 CG Cultural factors in SA and Zimbabwe 
 
Ubuntu is essentially an African philosophy of life, which 
reflects the African approach and worldview when 
considering cultural, social and political aspects of life 
(Justice Mokgoro 1997). Furthermore Justice Mokgoro states 
that Ubuntu is a metaphor that describes group solidarity in 
such a way that the survival of the group depends on this 
solidarity of individuals to the group. The individual’s 
existence and identity is relative to the group and is defined 
by the group as well. This is in stark contrast to the Cartesian 
notion of individuality that states, “I think, therefore I am”. The 
Ubuntu notion of individuality is more complex and multi-
facetted and suggests a multiplicity of “I’s” – one for each 
relationship the Ubuntu individual is involved in (Louw, 1999). 
According to Van Binsbergen (2002) Ubuntu recognises the 
following four attributes of human beings: 
• Human dignity and equality, universal brotherhood 
and sacredness of life (Corruption and fraud not 
acceptable in an Africa society. Individuals are 
expected to respect others and not deprive them of 
benefits created by the banks.) 
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• “Being” is the most desirable state of life (i.e. 
community-based living) 
 
It is therefore under this premise that Ubuntu is enshrined in 
respect for others, elders and people in authority. Respect for 
others means the removal of self-centredness and 
selfishness. Ubuntu as a concept promotes good governance 
and transparency. Systems of capitalism influences boards 
to act in contrast with their principles argued (Tutu 2009). It is 
within this line that Stewardship and Ubuntu are similar 
theories that promote good corporate governance. 
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The Corporate Governance problem 
 
 
Examples of conditions, mechanisms and managerial transaction costs 
 
 
Transaction conditions 
 
Incentive mechanisms 
 
Managerial transaction costs 
 
Environment conditions 
 Asymmetric information 
 Complexity / uncertainty 
 Difficulty in measuring 
 Asset specificity 
 Duration / frequency 
 
Behavioural conditions 
 Opportunism 
 Bounded rationality 
 Risk aversion  
 
 
 
 Decision systems 
 Performance monitoring 
systems 
 Remuneration systems 
 Bankruptcy systems 
 Ownership structures 
 Creditor structures 
 Capital structures 
 Market for corporate control 
 Market for management 
services 
 Product market competition 
 
 Monitoring costs 
 Perquisite consumption 
 Pet projects 
 Free cash flow dispersion 
 Hampered capital access 
 Replacement resistance 
 Resistance to profitable 
liquidation or merger 
 Power struggles 
 Excessive risk taking 
 Self-dealing transfer pricing 
 Excessive diversification 
increases risk 
 Excessive growth strains 
resources 
 
Marsh et al 1996 - Copyright 1997-2008, ViamInvest. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  
 
Chart 3.2: Locus of corporate governance - www.encycogov.com  
 
 
Flow of management services 
 
Managerial transaction costs 
 
Transaction conditions  
such as asymmetric information and risk aversion 
Incentive mechanisms  
such as ownership structure 
facilitate the exchange 
 
Agents 
The people who administrate 
the corporate resources:  
     The board 
 
Principals 
The people who control the 
management: Typically the 
equity owners 
 
Flow of managerial remuneration 
Production costs 
and related inverse 
effects 
 
Other kinds of 
transaction costs and 
related inverse effects  
 
Financial performance 
 
Inverse effects  
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3.6.4 Ubuntu versus Stewardship and Agency Theory 
 
The proverbs above indicate the strong bonds of intimacy, 
mutual support and interdependence found in true Ubuntu 
societies (monarchies). Davis et al (1997) argues against the 
opportunistic self – interest assumption of agency theory, 
claiming that managers are motivated by “a need to achieve, 
to gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing 
inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility, 
authority and thereby gain recognition from peers and 
bosses. This perspective recognizes a range of non-financial 
motives for managerial behaviour and it supports the active 
school (Document 2: 30), arguing that the strategic role of 
the board contributes to this overall stewardship of the 
company argued (Hugg 1998: 101, Stiles and Taylor 2001). 
Traditional (monarchies and chieftainships) communities are 
societies where Ubuntu is practiced. Directors can practice 
the Ubuntu concept if they observe traditional values as 
explained by Van Binsbergen (2002) above. There is a 
relationship between Ubuntu, Stakeholder Theory and The 
Stewardship Theory, which if directors adopt these concepts, 
then the level of fraud, manipulation of financial statements 
and misrepresentation may be reduced in the financial sector 
in SA and Zimbabwe argued interviewee 34. 
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3.7  Critiquing the theories 
 
 
Comparison Stewardship 
Theory 
Ubuntu Theory Agency Theory 
Manager as Stewards Stewards Agents 
Approach to 
governance 
Sociological and 
psychological 
Communalism Economic 
Model of man 
behaviour 
Collectivistic, pro-
organizational and 
trustworthy 
Collectivistic, 
trustworthy and 
respect 
Individualistic, 
opportunistic and 
self-serving 
Managers 
motivated by 
Principal 
objectives 
Principal 
objectives and 
community 
development 
Their own 
objectives 
Manager – 
Principal interest 
Convergence Convergence Divergence 
Structures that Facilitate and 
empower 
Facilitate and 
empower 
Monitor and 
control 
Owners’ attitude Risk propensity Risk propensity Risk aversion 
The Principal-
Manager 
relationships relay 
on 
Trust (The 
willingness to be 
vulnerable) 
Trust (the 
willingness to 
serve the 
community) 
Control (the 
unwillingness to 
be vulnerable) 
Motivation Higher order 
needs (Growth, 
achievement, self-
actualization and 
intrinsic 
Community 
upliftment 
(Empowerment, 
growth, self-
actualization) and 
intrinsic 
Lower order 
needs 
(Physiological, 
security, 
economic) and 
extrinsic 
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Social comparison Principal Principal Other managers 
Identification High value 
commitment 
Belonging and 
high value 
commitment 
Low value 
commitment 
Power Personal (Expert, 
and referent) 
Personal 
(Inheritance, 
expert, and 
referent) 
Institutional 
(Legitimate, 
coercive and 
reward) 
Management 
philosophy 
Involvement 
oriented 
Collective 
solidarity 
Control oriented 
Risk orientation Trust Trust Control 
Time frame Long term Life Short term 
Objective Performance 
enhancement 
Performance 
enhancement and 
development 
Cost control 
Cultural 
differences 
Collectivism, low 
power distance 
Collectivism Individualism, high 
power distance 
 
Figure 3-1: Critical analysis of the theories 
 
Managers choose to behave as stewards or agents. Their choice is 
contingent on their psychological motivations and perceptions of the 
situation argued (Vargas Sanchez 2004). There is a strong correlation 
between Stewardship and Ubuntu theories (Figure 2), while these 
contrast with Agency theory (Figure 2). If the executive’s motivations fit 
the model of man underlying Stewardship theory, empowering 
governance structures and mechanisms are appropriate. Thus, a 
Steward’s autonomy should be deliberately extended to maximize the 
benefits of a Steward, because he or she can be trusted (Figure 2). 
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In this case, the amount of resources that are necessary to guarantee 
pro-organizational behaviour from an individualistic agent are 
diminished, because a Steward is motivated to behave in ways that are 
consistent with organizational or societal objectives. Indeed, control can 
be potentially counterproductive, because it undermines the pro-societal 
or organizational behaviour of the Steward, by lowering his or her 
motivation (Vargas Sanchez 2004). 
 
3.8 The Conceptual Framework 
 
Following Dulewicz et al. (1995), who studied corporate boards, 
(Cornforth 2001: 219) conceptualised board performance in terms of a 
simple input-output model. The main outputs of the board are the 
various functions or tasks the board performs to create value. Drawing 
on various normative models of board effectiveness, particularly (Ingley 
and Van der Walt 2001: 179, Garratt 1996: 83), five broad roles are 
defined: strategic direction and policy making; external accountability 
and relations with stakeholders; supervising and supporting 
management; stewardship of the organisation's resources; and board 
maintenance. Compliance with these functions will result in boards 
being effective (Chart 3.1). The author adopted this model and 
improved it in line with the Conceptual Framework in Document 2: 25. 
 
Context/Inputs 
 
The main inputs are listed in Chart 3.1, which are the social cultural 
requirements for a board to operate effectively. These inputs are 
transformed or triggered into outcomes through the board's 
mechanisms (structures and processes). Values and conduct of the 
board is determined by the moral behaviour of individual board 
members (Ubuntu), which results in those behaviours being triggered to 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
59 
 
achieve better performance of the bank and meeting the requirements 
of the code of best practice. 
 
New Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3.3: Input – Triggers – Outcome Model 
 
 
Mechanisms 
 
Mechanisms describe what it is about programmes and interventions 
that bring about any effects. Mechanisms are often hidden, rather as 
the workings of a clock cannot be seen but drive the patterned 
movements of the hands. This realist concept tries to break the lazy 
linguistic habit of basing evaluation on the question of whether 
‘programmes work’. In fact, it is not programmes that work but the 
resources they offer to enable their subjects to make them work. This 
process of how subjects interpret and act upon the intervention 
Inputs/context 
(Board) 
• Board skills 
• Experience 
• Time 
• Ethics 
• Culture 
• Auditors 
• Analysts 
• Regulatory 
Framework 
• Board 
committees 
• PESTI 
• Entrepreneurship 
• Ubuntu 
• Stewardship 
Mechanisms  
(Structure, Systems, 
Processes and 
Control)  
• Internal controls 
• Audit & risk 
committees 
• Board size & 
composition 
• Reporting 
• Independence 
• Accountability 
• Diversity 
• Shareholder 
Activism 
• Internal locus 
• External locus 
Positive outcomes 
(Board effectiveness) 
• Zero complains from 
all stakeholders 
• CFROTA 
• Management support 
and advise 
• Transparency 
• Shareholder value 
growth (P/E) 
• Dividend growth 
• Director behaviour 
• Chart 3.1 
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stratagem is known as the programme ‘mechanism’ and it is the pivot 
around which realist research revolves. 
 
The author was influenced heavily by the work of (Bradshaw et al. 
1992: 227 – 248, Pawson and Tilley 2004: 65 - 216) in conceptualising 
board mechanisms and internal controls. Board structures are 
conceptualised as processes that have become formalised and 
codified, and that subsequently constrain board processes and 
behaviour, for example board size, the existence of sub-committees, 
the frequency of meetings and the existence of job descriptions for 
board members argued (Cornforth 2001: 219). Bradshaw et al. (1992: 
227 – 248) researched on inputs that needs to be triggered to create 
effectiveness while Pawson and Tilley (2004: 65 - 216) looked at board 
effectiveness. Board processes include how board meetings are 
conducted, the clarity of board roles, the extent to which a common 
vision for the organisation exists, the ability to manage conflict within 
the board and between the board and staff, the quality of 
communication between the board and staff, and whether boards and 
managers periodically review how they work together. 
 
Outcome 
 
The key point here is that ‘the measure’ is not the basic unit of analysis 
for understanding causation. A measure may work in different ways or, 
in realist parlance, they may trigger different mechanisms. Mechanisms 
also explain a programme’s failure or success, of course, so to this list 
we might add some adverse processes, which can cause negative 
triggers to the board’s effectiveness. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
61 
 
The result of the bank being considered to be following the 
requirements of the code of best practice is as a result of zero 
complains from all stakeholders and increase in CFROTA argued 
interviewee 3. If there are no complaints from all stakeholders, that 
means the bank, has an effective board, which is independent and 
transparent, argued the Chairman of the King 2 Report (2002). 
Stewards look after the flock so that none of the sheep get lost. In the 
same way directors are required to act as Stewards who look after the 
assets of the bank for the benefit of all Stakeholders. Ubuntu requires 
that, those in leadership must respect the communities they serve 
including taking care of the assets for the benefit of society not for 
themselves. 
 
3.9 Themes influencing the conceptual framework 
 
• Independence 
 
The proposition that directors should [“act”] independently of 
management, through a thoughtful and diligent decision-making 
process has been a major preoccupation of corporate governance 
scholars for several decades argued (MacAvoy and Millstein 2003: 
1553). Indeed, the need for active, independent boards has 
become conventional wisdom (OECD 2004: 49 and King 3 Report 
2009: Chapter 5). Boards of directors should include a balance 
between EDs, NEDs and IDs argued (Krambia – Kapardis and 
Psaros 2006: 129). The basis of their argument is to avoid 
dominance from individuals or one set of directors, which will 
influence decisions that the board will take. 
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• Banks Transparency 
 
During the 1990s in all the OECD countries, institutional investors 
increased their involvement in the administration of companies 
(activism) and started asking for a governance model that protects 
the interests of all shareholders argued (Bloommestein and Funke 
2001 and OECD 2004:29 - 57). Transparency and accountability 
are the cornerstones of the emerging model (the non-Anglo-Saxon 
Model), which have assumed new and different meanings within 
this emerging global model of corporate governance. The causes 
of convergence in governance practices include the globalization of 
markets, where institutional investors insist on international norms 
of governance, especially in regard to transparency, reporting and 
the rights of minority shareholders argued (Nestor and Thompson 
2000). Banks’ operating practice needs to be made public 
especially, the lending practice, profit margins, investments and 
derivatives. The current financial crisis was caused by derivative 
trading argued interviewee 3 
 
• Shareholder Activism – Entrepreneurship 
 
There are matters typically requiring shareholders’ action, which, 
by their very nature, should be approved by the board before 
submission to shareholders, which means board members and 
shareholders must have the necessary skills for them to make 
effective decisions (Koontz 1967: 75-6). Although shareholders can 
exercise their voting rights, in reality these rights are not only 
expensive to exercise but also to enforce and are susceptible to 
managerial interference by coercing shareholders to support them 
and concealing information from their opponents argued 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
63 
 
(Pomeranz 1998: 25, Monks 2002 a and c, Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  
 
• Stewardship/Ubuntu 
 
The opportunistic self – interest assumption of agency theory, 
claiming that managers are motivated by “a need to achieve, to 
gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing 
inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility, authority 
and thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses argued (Davis 
et al 1997: 20). This perspective was supported ... (Hugg 1998), 
Stiles and Taylor 2001) saying it recognizes a range of non-
financial motives for managerial behaviour and it supports the 
active school theory, arguing that the strategic role of the board 
contributes to this overall stewardship of the company. Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) agree with above researchers saying that insider 
– dominated boards contribute a depth of knowledge, expertise 
and commitment to the firm which facilitates an active strategic 
role. Following this theory, the question is that why do we continue 
to have corporate scandals especially the current global financial 
crisis while Ubuntu and Stewardship provides otherwise? There is 
need to practice these theories in order to reduce the risk and bank 
failures. 
 
• Skills and experience 
 
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing 
ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to 
function argued (Fitzgerald 1936). The failure of a bank is an 
indication of directors not having Fitzgerald’s “first-class 
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intelligence” (SA and Zimbabwean banks: Document 2: Appendix 
1). Many are scared and confused by idea of having to cope with 
uncertainty and instead crave certainty argued (Garratt 1996). 
Effective directors have to have a mindset that allows them to be 
comfortable handling high levels of uncertainty, while maintaining 
both their sense of direction and their moral stance. The learning 
board model developed by Garratt (2003) has proved effective in 
bringing directors from a rudimentary understanding of their roles, 
tasks and duties to becoming a more professional board as 
evidenced by the reduction of corporate failures in SA and 
Zimbabwe since 2006.  
 
Private equity partnerships are primarily concerned with the 
strength of the management team of the respective company 
argued (Millson and Ward 2004: 81) which is a reflection of the 
requirement for skilled directors. Millson and Ward’s indicate an 
overwhelmingly strong preference for an experienced board whose 
members have together achieved success and or who have 
previously worked in the same industry in which shareholders 
would want to invest. They also argued that investors strongly 
avoid companies where the board has little prior experience in the 
industry or technology. This argument supports the author’s 
conceptual framework and answers the research question that 
board members need to be trained and accredited for them to be 
appointed to the board. 
 
• Systems, Culture and ethics 
 
The Anglo-Saxon Model is portrayed as a model in which owners 
are deeply separated from control. They sale their share “vote with 
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their feet” if they are not comfortable with how the bank is being 
managed. This system needs to be replaced by the non-Anglo-
Saxon Model where shareholder activism is high stated (Markarian 
et al 2007: 296). The combination of shareholder activism and 
Ubuntu will create strong transparent boards argued interviewees 4 
and 5. 
 
• Internal controls 
 
The European Commission has been active in promoting the Audit 
Committee concept in order to create a fair internal market. They 
argued that Audit Committees have developed into essential 
committees of the boards of directors. In view of recent and current 
accounting scandals, special emphasis need to be placed on the 
Audit Committee with a view to fostering the key role it should play 
in the supervision of the audit function and reporting. Audit 
Committees are expected to have an important role in ensuring 
high standards in organizational reporting that underpin confidence 
in financial markets. 
 
• Regulatory framework 
 
The financial exuberance that arrived in the 1980s was halted in 
the market crash of 1987, and later high interest rates precipitated 
a series of high profile corporate collapses in 1991, including 
Robert Maxwell’s MMC, Polly Peck and the BCCI, whose primary 
commercial activity turned out to be money laundering. 
 
Public confidence and trust in the efficiency and reliability of the 
governing structures of industry was severely shaken in that each 
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of these corporations received healthy audit reports shortly prior to 
their collapse (Clarke and Bostock, 1994).  Consequent concerns 
included the standards of the audit and accountancy professions 
(Cadbury report 1992); the lack of accountability disclosure and 
transparency of boards to shareholders (Monks and Minow, 1991); 
concerns over the adequacy of board structures and processes 
(Lorsch and Maclver, 1989); the quality of directoral competencies; 
the apparent lack of corporate social responsibility; the 
destabilizing impact of the growth of merger and acquisition 
activities (Pound 1992: 83) the short - term basis of corporate 
performance (Gregg 1993: 2) the spate of business fraud; and the 
evident weakness of corporate self-regulation. 
 
These problems were exacerbated by the development of more 
complex corporate structures and, as a result, modern company 
law was unable to keep pace with modern corporate reality (Hopt, 
1984: 1338). As one of the greatest proponents of active corporate 
governance, Sir Adrian Cadbury’s report published in (1992) was 
to have considerable influence not just in the UK, but in many other 
countries around the world that adopted similar corporate 
governance codes of practice with the inspiration of Cadbury, and 
in similar circumstances. 
 
Further UK reforms of corporate governance followed the Cadbury 
code, with the Greenbury Report (1995) proposing guidelines for 
director remuneration; the Hampel Report (1998) focusing on 
disclosure and best practice; the Combined Code (1998) outlining 
a mandatory disclosure framework; and the Turnbull Report (1999) 
offering advice on compliance with mandatory disclosure.  This 
was followed by a three year inquiry Modern Company Law 
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Review, which for the first time addressed the fundamentals of the 
reform of company law, which in the UK was particularly 
antiquated.  However, any sense that universally improved 
standards of corporate governance were gradually bringing greater 
stability and security in international equity investments was 
abruptly dispelled by the looming Asian financial crisis 1998. 
 
3.10 Critical Analysis of the literature 
 
Four major theories have been discussed in the literature, [(Agency, 
Stiles and Taylor 2001: 371), (Stewardship, Muth and Donaldson 1998: 
5), (Stakeholder, Gay 2002: 36) and (Ubuntu, Kwamwangamulu and 
Nkonko 1999: 27)]. Both Agency and Stewardship studies typically do 
not reflect the dynamics of governance – the interplay of power, conflict 
and ideology”. However, the only theory which is not in line with the rest 
is the Agency theory. The other three are aligned in that they do not 
only look at monetary rewards but other factors like respect, co-
existence, self-actualization to mention but a few. 
 
Muth and Donaldson (1998:5), Gay (2002: 36) and Kwamwangamulu 
and Nkonko (1999: 27) argued that board structure should not be 
influence by agency costs but self-actualization and sense of belonging. 
The level of fraud and corporate failures will be reduced and the 
communities will benefit from strong good leadership. Board of directors 
will enjoy the respect from the communities in which they operate from. 
Respect is an important theme that directors need to earn through their 
conduct of business and way of reporting. 
 
Transparency will reduce information asymmetry and improve flow of 
information from the banks to investors, other stakeholders and the 
corporate governance structures will improve as per the research 
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question. Board independence will be a result of banks being 
transparent thereby reducing the levels of risk and shareholder value 
will always grow, hence creating shareholder value. Non alignment of 
rewards (agency theory) to societal contribution (stewardship and 
Ubuntu theories) separates the misalignment of agents and principals, 
resulting in the later theory being preferred by modern researchers 
(Section 2.4.2). 
 
3.11 Summary of the literature review 
NEDs and IDs have a fiduciary duty to formulate strategy, supervise, 
monitor and in addition have an advisory responsibility. Tricker (1994) 
referred these roles as “performance” and “conformance.” The 
performance roles refers to those roles that should contribute to the 
overall performance of the bank, include roles such as contributing 
know-how, expertise, and external information as well as networking, 
representing the bank and adding status. 
The concept of Ubuntu is an important factor in how African people are 
brought up. The issues of respect, ownership, responsibility, values, 
social thinking, unity or consensus in decision-making, accountability to 
the society are critical as they cascade into the literature of 
management and governance. These values determine how directors 
behave, make decisions and how they manage resources of the bank in 
order to achieve competitive advantage. 
The world needs a system of corporate governance that sets standards 
to maintain confidence in the system, but which nonetheless respects 
national traditions (Ubuntu), while permitting them to evolve under the 
influence of market forces. Doing business in another country, as well 
as investing in its firms, should not be a complex task. A certain set of 
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minimum standards or "benchmarks" are required rather than a specific 
corporate governance system. This is applicable not only to the EU 
countries but even more to the Accession Countries (African and Asian 
countries), whose corporate governance systems are still relatively 
immature.  
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4 Methodology and Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is often stated that there are different kinds of research, depending on 
various dimensions such as those put forward by Ticehurst and Veal 
(2000), whose three dimensions of context, theme and methodology can 
be usefully applied to areas such as business research. The emphasis in 
business research is clearly one based mainly on praxis (field of study), it 
is therefore reasonable to expect approaches adopted within the 
business domain to be different from those, for example, in the purely 
academic domain. The differences might be quite fundamental or 
somewhat subtle (Figure 4.1), but nevertheless they lead to important 
differences in the respective approaches taken to address the particular 
research issues. The importance of adopting a suitable research 
approach is vital, as far as the contemporary manager is concerned, for 
ensuring comprehensive, valid and practical outcomes. Nevertheless, in 
any research, care must be taken to ensure that the approach followed is 
so structured as to provide a solid link between concepts and data 
(Punch 1998). Broadly speaking there are two main types of research 
paradigms (Easterby et al. 1991), namely: 
• positivist or scientific 
• non-positivist or phenomenological. 
 
To proceed in collecting data, empirical research requires the linkage of 
practical indicators to concepts, and the epistemology of the research may 
use more than one approach or method (Punch 1998: 47) (Figure 4.1). 
There are various methods within each research domain but they broadly 
fall within two 
categories: 
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• quantitative, which is generally numerical 
• qualitative, which is mostly non-numerical  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Source: Ticehurst and Veal (2000) 
 
Qualitative or empirical, non-numeric, information is at one end of a 
continuum whilst numerical quantitative data is at the other. Separating 
these two methods in figure 4.1 are a number of alternate paradigms 
(Ticehurst and Veal 2000: 18). According to Cavana (2001), quantitative 
designs are generally associated with deductive or positivist research and 
qualitative design with inductive or non-positivist research. However, some 
overlap is becoming more common and acceptable (Page and Meyer 
2000). Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation of the research 
processes in the two domains. 
 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, views humans as complex and 
unpredictable. That is, they are less stable than the physical world. Central 
to the idea of qualitative research is the development of a deep 
understanding of human behaviour to reveal people’s values, interpretive 
schemes and belief systems (Cavana et al 2001).  
Quantitative research is the classic scientific and experimental approach, 
which deals extensively with numbers in an objective fashion. It strives to 
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identify universal laws of nature in order that theories thus developed can 
be used to accurately explain and predict special phenomena. There are 
many other variations in between that form a continuum from one extreme 
to the other (Ticehurst and Veal 2000). The researcher used a variety of 
these methodologies in this research as per figure 4.1. 
 
4.2 Chapter overview  
 
Research design is a plan, structure and strategy of an investigation, 
prepared specifically to obtain answers to research questions (Kumar, 
1998: 76). Chart 4.1 illustrate a chapter overview, explaining subsections 
and describing three research paradigms, while selecting and justifying 
the realism paradigm for this research. Section 4,3 discusses the 
philosophical basis of this research, giving different perspective by 
different researchers. 
 
The rest of the chapter discusses the research design, justifying the use 
of the realism paradigm within a combined quantitative and qualitative 
research methodology. Research strategy and the assessment of the 
issues affecting the quality of this research are discussed at the near end 
of this chapter. Data collection methods is discussed on section 4.4, 
where the case selection, questionnaire design and data collection 
methodology are explained. Section 4.5 present methods used to 
analyse data, examine ethical considerations and explain limitations of 
the methodology. 
 
4.2.1 Chapter Objectives and Structure 
 
The objectives of this chapter are to: 
• justify the use of a realism paradigm 
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• justify quantitative research methodology 
• justify qualitative methodology 
• discuss research strategy 
• discuss research methodologies 
• discuss research quality 
• explain and review data analysis used 
• identify ethical considerations and limitations of this study 
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4.2.2 The Research 
 
The research information was used to establish the effectiveness 
and performance of different boards of directors. Tests were done 
to establish the associations, independency, transparency of 
directors and auditors and how they affect performance of the 
banks. Different methods were used to rank the effectiveness of 
directors in each category as indicated in document 3 and 4. As 
mentioned earlier the method had its own limitations as some of 
the required information could not be made available. 
 
4.2.3 Philosophical Issues 
 
The epistemological paradigms of interpretivism or 
phenomenology and positivism that constitute the philosophical 
poles of management research were the subject of considerable 
discussion in Document 3 and 4. However it should not be inferred 
from this document’s being based on both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods that the author, though not being 
hermeneutically inclined, has assumed a positivist stance in its 
commission. The investigative processes reported here do indeed 
involve the establishment of theories and the construction of 
hypothesis that amount to the “normal process under a positivist 
paradigm” (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 56) but as (Jankowicz 2005: 
122) cautions:  
“it is very important not to confuse […] two distinctions: that 
between positivist versus interpretivist ontology and 
epistemology on the one hand and between qualitative 
versus quantitative on the other.” 
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According to (Collins and Hussey 2003: 47) there is ‘considerable 
blurring’ between the positivist and interpretive philosophies. The 
same authors went on to contend that, 
‘the positivist and phenomenological paradigms are two 
extremes and very few people would operate within their 
pure forms. There are […] not just two paradigms but a 
whole range.’ (Collis and Hussey, 2003: 51), hence the 
author chose the phenomenological paradigms. 
 
Within this range is the stance to which the author intuitively leans, 
that of realism. The adopting of this position is not based on a 
desire to ‘cop out’ by evading the extremes, like voting the DA as 
an alternative to ANC and SACP, but on the inherent nature of the 
realist position. 
 
Realism, suggests (Fisher 2004: 15): 
“retains many of the ambitions of positivism but recognizes, 
and comes to terms with, the subjective nature of research 
and the inevitable role of values in it. Realism still aims to 
be scientific but makes fewer claims to knowledge that 
perfectly mirrors the objects of study.” 
 
According to (Saunders et al. 2003: 85) realism: 
“shares some philosophical aspects with positivism [but] 
also recognizes that people themselves are not objects to 
be studied in the style of natural science. [It] recognizes the 
importance of […] subjective reality [in] seeking to 
understand broader social forces, structures of processes.” 
 
 
(Bryman and Bell 2003: 15) argues that, 
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“realism shares […] two features with positivism [empirical 
and critical realism]: a belief that the natural and social 
sciences can and should apply the same [kinds] of 
approach to collection of data and to explanation, and a 
commitment to the view that there is an external reality to 
which scientists direct their attention (in other words, there 
is a reality that is separate from our description of it).” 
These authors argue that realist philosophy is by no means 
unusual in management research, which they suggest is 
“often a mixture between positivist and interpretivist, 
perhaps reflecting the stance of realism.” “Epistemological 
realist believes that universals have a reality that [is] 
independent of how people talk about them” Argued 
(Saunders et al., 2003: 85). (Fisher 2004: 218). It is within 
this context that the researcher took an independent view 
on factors that affect corporate governance and the 
behaviour of directors. 
 
The researcher took this stance after recognizing that corporate 
governance and strategy cannot be measured and studied in the 
same way as can physical and chemical processes.  In 
establishing this stance the author was somewhat taken aback by 
(Jankowicz’s 2005: 110) bald assertion that ‘[p]ositivism is realist,’ 
Reading on it seemed that he was using the term to reflect the 
ontological basis of positivism, viz. a reality of truths that exist 
independently and are discoverable by anyone adopting a given 
analytical procedure. This contrasts with the sense in which the 
author had understood the use of realism, namely that it conveys 
the importance of being realistic in seeking knowledge about 
complex organizational entities and contexts.  
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Easterby-Smith et al. (2002: 32) used realism in contradistinction 
to relativism in terms of the ontological basis of the positivist 
epistemology of science. They define traditional realism as the 
stance holding that, 
“the world is concrete and external, and […] science can 
only progress through observations that have a direct 
correspondence to the phenomena being investigated.” 
 
Their applying the contrasting position of relativism to social 
science seems to cover the same terrain as the descriptions of 
realism previously cited, to the point of implicit synonymity. They 
describe critical realism, which according to (Fisher 2004: 16), 
“shares the ambitions of realism” as a ‘variant of the relativist 
position’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 33). For (Easterby-Smith et 
al 2002: 33), the subjectivity of knowledge is inherent in the 
relativist stance; according to them adherents of the position 
regard facts as ‘depending on the viewpoint of the observer.’ The 
methodological implications of relativism are that: 
‘the assumed difficulty of gaining direct access to ‘reality’ 
means that multiple perspectives will normally be adopted, 
both through ‘triangulation’ of methods and through 
surveying viewpoints and experiences of large sample of 
individuals.’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 34)    
 
It is within the philosophical framework of realism/relativism that 
this stage of the project was launched. It appears to offer 
substantial congruence between the outlook of the researcher and 
the sphere to be researched. 
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4.3 Research design 
 
Once the research objectives are defined, the research design can be 
planned argued (Cavana et al 2001) figure 4.3. In Chapter 3 a 
conceptual framework was developed and mechanisms identified to find 
solution for the corporate governance problem at hand. Chapter 4, 
examines the elements of the research design to demonstrate how data 
was gathered and analysed (Sekaran 2003: 117). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Source: Cavana et al (2001: 107) 
 
Research is defined by Clover and Balsley (1974: 1) as “the process of 
methodically obtaining accurate answers to significant questions by the 
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performance of different banks) and qualitative (relating to the level of 
board experience). 
 
4.3.1 Research Design Alternatives 
 
Social phenomena are generally complex, therefore choosing the 
right design for a research project is vital when looking for 
answers to research questions and controlling relevant variables. 
How the study goes about answering the questions will 
determine the outcome of the study and “the more variability, the 
more likely differences between groups will be detected,” argued 
(Miller and Salkind 2002:19). Research design is a master plan 
which specifies the methods and procedures for collecting and 
analysing data argued (Zikmund 1997: 48). There are three main 
types of research: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory or 
casual. The nature of research is a consequence of the type of or 
combination of studies to be carried out argued (Cavana et al 
2001). 
 
Exploratory research is, “initial research conducted to clarify and 
define the nature of the problem” argued (Zikmund 1997: 37). 
Exploratory studies are a “valuable means of finding out what is 
happening and gaining insights to assess phenomena in a new 
light” argued (Saunders et al 2000: 97). This research does not 
look for conclusive evidence to determine a course of action. 
Rather an indication was sought, that by examining the 
contribution IDs and NEDs make and their effectiveness. 
 
Descriptive research is “designed to describe the characteristics 
of a population or phenomena” (Zikmund 1997: 38). The 
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objective is “to portray an accurate profile of a person, events 
and situations” (Saunders et al 2000: 97). This is often carried 
out to describe characteristics of groups within an organization or 
community (Sekaran 2003: 121). 
 
Explanatory or casual research establishes that an activity 
occurs as a direct consequence of a particular activity (Zikmund 
1997: 40). This type of study is carried out to explain the nature 
of relationships between variables (Saunders et al 2000: 98) or 
establish differences amongst, or the independence of two or 
more factors in a situation (Sekaran 2003: 124). In this research, 
the relationship of variables considered, was the association 
matrix of directors and how they affect their effectiveness and 
independence. Thus the type of research carried out was both 
exploratory and descriptive. 
 
4.3.2 Justification of Qualitative Research 
 
The mid-18th century historian Grambattista Vico introduced the 
concept of a qualitative approach to research. Vico wrote that 
“only people can understand people and they do this through a 
faculty called intuitive understanding” (McDaniel and Gates 1993: 
187). To identify the assumptions of qualitative research (Cavana 
et al 2001: 133-4_ cited work of Maykut and Morehouse (1994), 
where they differ from the traditional positivist assumptions. First, 
qualitative research emphasises understanding people and 
taking a perspective stance, rather than making statistical 
assumptions. Second, the aim is to discover patterns of 
behaviour, which cannot be investigated through positivist 
methods. The technique’s aim is to “come to terms with the 
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meaning rather than the frequency of more or less naturally 
occurring phenomenon (Ticehurst and Veal 2000: 94). The 
emphasis is on directors’ interpretations of their environments, 
and others’ behaviour argued (Bryman 1989: 29). 
 
In this research, a qualitative approach was incorporated into 
research to determine qualitative issues of governance, 
perceptions, attitudes, culture, feelings and motivations 
(document 3) towards performances of banks. This study was 
not only carried out to identify and quantify what happens behind 
the boardroom door, but to establish and understand the 
conduct, behaviour, attitudes, requirements of an effective board. 
The South African Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
requires each bank to disclose qualitative performance 
information. This includes environmental and corporate social 
responsibility information. In addition the qualitative information 
seeks to develop knowledge by “linking the accounts people give 
to an underlying body of theory” (Jankowicz 1995: 173). 
 
4.3.3 Justification of Quantitative Research 
 
Much research involves data that are quantifiable to assist in 
answering research questions in producing a research strategy 
(quantitative data) stated (Saunders et al 2000: 326). It is a set of 
constructs, definitions and propositions presenting systematic 
views of phenomena specifying relationships between construct 
explaining phenomena (Creswell 1994: 82). Some of the models 
used to define board member relationships included among 
others the Logistic regression, regression analysis and co-
efficient of variation. These models assist in explaining the 
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relationship between board members and bank performance and 
testing the strength or weakness of the relationship. The intent of 
this research was to relate contributions, relationships of IDs, 
NEDs to the performance and success of banks. Variables in the 
Conceptual Framework above, developed from different models 
in the literature review were incorporated into the interviews to 
work within deductive methodology of this research.  
 
The formula for calculating the logistic regression is as on 
Formula 2. The ‘input’ is z and the ‘output’ is f(z). The variable z 
represents the exposure to some set of independent variables, 
while f(z) represents the probability of a particular outcome, given 
that the set of explanatory variables. The variable z is a measure 
of total contribution of all the independent variables used in the 
model. 
 
Formula 2: Logistic regression formula 
 
4.3.4 Consolidation of Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
 
Combined approaches within the same piece of work may be 
possible and often advantageous to researchers argued 
(Saunders et al 2000: 90). Table 4.4 summarises some of the 
major differences between deductive and inductive approaches 
to research. 
 
This combined study uses deductive positive approach, 
collecting secondary data (financial statements) to form a theory 
and develop themes to test. There are four major reasons for 
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using combined qualitative and quantitative methodologies. First, 
address the studies within the realism paradigm, explaining 
theory construction and building, rather than testing and 
verification. Second, (develop deeply into the problem) to gain an 
understanding of the phenomenon (Perry et al 1999: 10-22). To 
achieve this, a rigorously tested theory is developed, concluding 
in deduction of an issue between two or more events which may 
be tested and modified if required as well as inductive theory 
building through interviews and data analysis argued (Saunders 
et al 2000: 78-88). 
 
Qualitative emphasises Quantitative emphasises 
Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to 
events 
Scientific principles 
A close understanding of 
research context 
Moving from theory to data 
The collection of qualitative data The need to explain causal 
relationships and association 
matrix between variables 
(regression analysis) 
 The collection of quantitative 
data 
 The application of controls to 
ensure validity of data 
 The operating of concepts to 
ensure clarity of definition 
A more flexible structure to 
permit changes of research 
emphasis as the research 
A highly structured approach 
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Qualitative emphasises Quantitative emphasises 
progresses 
A realisation that the researcher 
is part of the research process 
Researcher independent of what 
is being researched 
Less concerned with the need to 
generalise 
The necessity to select samples 
of sufficient size in order to 
generalise conclusions 
 
Figure 4-4: Source: Saunders et al (2000: 91) 
 
Third, the construction of theory builds, so that the association 
matrix identified are categorised with the goal being isolated and 
precise definitions of categories determine these associations. 
Finally, this research deals with a field that has been previously 
overlooked, where researchers have focused on other fields of 
management argued (Saunders 2000: 78-88).  This approach 
suites this type of research as both qualitative and quantitative 
themes affect the performance of banks. A combination study 
(document 3 and 4), where each bank was individually the object 
of study including multiple sources of information are used as 
instruments to illustrate these themes (Miller and Salkind 2002: 
162). Using a realism paradigm is thus justifiably suitable for this 
research. The problem covers, “how, why, who, what and where” 
questions over contemporary events (Yin 1994, Saunders et al 
2000) requiring little or no control over behaviour of directors or 
events as illustrated by figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4-5: Source: Developed from Yin (1994) 
 
4.3.5 Research Methods Justification 
 
The methods chosen to carry out this study were interview 
based, survey, use of literature and documentary evidence as 
appropriate. Because of the number of issues raised by the 
research questions and the need to associate them with current 
corporate governance practice in SA and Zimbabwe. The 
researcher decided to conduct an action research as it 
complements and "puts flesh on the bones" of a survey (Bell, 
1987: 11), adding an important third dimension – actual practice 
– to theory and figures (financial performance). There was need 
for the researcher to participate in the governance process of the 
banks by attending some of the board meetings and strategy 
sessions. 
 
The study attempts to identify the gaps that exist in the corporate 
governance field in SA and Zimbabwe. This will be benchmarked 
by progress made in other countries, for example, US, UK and 
other developed nations. In order to do this exploration, data was 
collected and assimilated from formal and informal observation, 
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field notes, vignettes and reference to profiles, market and 
financial reports. 
 
The primary data will be annual financial statements for all the 
four major banks for the period 2002 to 2006. Market analysis 
reports and research by different corporate governance 
researchers will be used in this research. The survey is 
described by Edwards & Talbot (1999: 88) as being like an onion, 
with data from questionnaires similar to peeling off some outer 
layers of skin, but being supplemented by interviews to get to the 
in-depth layers. The study, has provided the core on to which 
others build layers of data, the survey seemed a useful method 
to adopt to complement it. 
 
Bell (1987: 13) has suggested that a representative selection of 
the population can be targeted by a survey, which was the 
intention when the author developed the research questions. 
Questionnaire one targeted the financial performance of all the 
major four banks and their subsidiaries in SA and Zimbabwe, of 
which the source of the data was the financial statements. 
Questionnaire two looked at qualitative information, especially on 
reporting independence, skills level, shareholder activism and 
transparency. Questionnaire three targeted at analysing the gap 
that exist between board expected performance and actual 
performance. 
 
Interviews were carried out, and the respondents were mostly 
NEDs, IDs, Chiefs and corporate governance practitioners.  
These interviews were semi-structured to allow some 
comparable data to be collected, but also to allow the individual 
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interviewee some freedom to expand on points as they chose 
and elaborate on their specialist interest. 
 
4.4 Data Collection 
 
The examination of type and sources of data for realism methodology is 
necessary. Saunders et al (2000: 224) cited categorises defined by 
Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994), by types of data generated through 
participants as primary, secondary and experiential. Primary 
observations are those activities noted as they happen. They are data 
specifically collected in research where researcher is the primary user 
(Ticehurst and Veal 2000: 82), called first-hand collection of data for a 
specific purpose. This is information from focus groups or respondents 
relating to the study, whose opinions on the topic are sought. A recorder 
was used to collect data from respondents then send to a company 
outsourced to transcribe the data into text. 
 
Secondary data are sources in existence, such as company records, 
government publications or academic papers (Sekaran 2003: 219). 
Secondary data could also be collected from earlier primary research, but 
may be used a second time in current research. For this research, it was 
possible to approach data not fully exploited by original collectors of the 
data and from a different aspect. Experiential data are observations and 
feelings of the observer (Saunders et al 2000: 225). These experiential 
factors may be collected as a result of observations with multiple 
participants (Cavana et al 2001). An important factor in choosing a data 
collection method is dependent on the level of personal involvement of 
the researcher, rather than a desire to produce qualitative or quantitative 
data (McNeill 1986: 113). 
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4.4.1 Banks Selection Process 
 
In this research, the unit of analysis was the bank and events 
that followed since 2002 to 2006 and subsequent events leading 
to the current global financial crisis. Collected data came from 
four major banks as a result of a consolidated qualitative 
(document 3) and quantitative (document 4) studies and the 
product was analysed together with information from secondary 
and experiential data to offer some conclusions on the 
performance of the four banks. Case studies should be evaluated 
in terms of adequacy of theoretical inferences generated and 
tested against comparable contexts argued (Yin 1994 and 
Bryman 1989: 170).  Most combined qualitative and quantitative 
study involves more than one method of data collection argued 
(Bryman 1989: 175). Post research events including the current 
financial crisis and its impact to SA and Zimbabwe are some of 
the new positive developments that affect the findings of this 
research. Although the researcher at the time of this research 
was employed by one of the banks, his objective was not 
affected due to academic independence. More so most of the 
information used in this research was quantitative published 
financial statements which the researcher could not manipulate. 
 
In order to ensure the research was valid, reliable and relevant, it 
was necessary to develop a sampling strategy for the choice of a 
good cross-section from corporate governance practitioners, 
board members and other stakeholders. The sample population 
was divided into clusters according to the position of the director 
and his/her background, which are, CEOs, CFOs, NEDs, IDs 
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EDs, Company Secretaries, lawyers, Economists, Market 
Analysts, Central Bank Governors and their Deputies. 
 
4.4.2 Interview Questionnaire Design 
 
A well designed questionnaire will provide accurate and usable 
data argued (Cavana et al 2001: 226). To maximize the potential 
to provide accurate and usable data, the questionnaires were 
designed using three principles: careful questionnaire wording, 
applying categorisation, scaling, coding of the responses and 
overall appearance of the questionnaire was of the highest 
quality (Cavana et al 2001: 227, Sekaran 2003: 237). These 
three aspects, illustrated on figure 4.6 show the breakdown of the 
process. The purpose of each question considered the adequate 
measurement of that variable. The type and form of question 
depended on whether the information related to a research 
objective variable, skills, experience, independence and other 
perceptions (Chart 3.3: Inputs).  
 
The interview questions were in two parts, those set for board 
members (EDs, IDs and NEDs) of a particular bank, and the 
second part was for practitioners, Market Analysts and 
Economists (Chart 3.3: Mechanisms). In order to achieve the 
research objectives, the design of the interview instrument 
questionnaires considered all aspects of the research problem. 
 
The primary data collection mechanism in this research was an 
interview instrument. The design was essential to isolate 
competency-skills taught and method of delivery by the first 
population (EDs, IDs, NEDs and Auditors) and address issues 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
91 
 
noted in figure 4.6 and the outcomes (Chart 3.3: Outcomes). It 
was necessary to identify how each bank practices the 
governance processes before embarking on the second stage of 
interviewing practitioners, Analysts, Lawyers and Economists. 
The questions were very clear and unambiguous, the type and 
form of questions endeavoured to give the clearest answer. In 
general open-ended questions were used which made it very 
difficult to code, but more information was collected as 
respondents were not limited to yes and no answers. 
 
The sequence of questions, were devised to cross check emotive 
answers for consistency and in order to assist the respondents 
progress through the questionnaire with ease and comfort 
(Sekaran 2003:243). Figure 4.6 concerns the principles of 
measurement that ensures the data collected are appropriate to 
test the issues (Cavan et al 2001: 234). The researcher 
personally collected all the data and was involved in every 
instance, thus whilst no details were left out. 
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Principles of the Questionnaire design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6: Source: Cavana et al (2001: 238) – Questionnaire design 
 
4.5 Data (qualitative and quantitative) analysis 
 
Data analysis was completed in series of steps (Creswell 1994: 122) and 
is explained in detail in figure 4.7 (Siegel 1997: 515). These steps were 
first preparing for analysis, getting a feel for the data, testing “goodness” 
of data and testing the themes (figure 4.7), (Sekaran 2003: 301). The 
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results have been presented in a table form indicating information as 
output, thus familiarising the researcher with recorded data (Jankowicz 
1995: 190).  
 
From the beginning of the study, four banks were selected as a 
representative sample of the financial sector in SA and Zimbabwe. Within 
the banks 32 respondents were identified together with four corporate 
governance practitioners. All the interviewees were available for 
interviews during the research period of this document unlike during the 
first four documents. Performance data on these four banks were sought 
through the collect of all annual financial statements for the period 2002 
to 2006 focusing on performance and corporate governance processes 
of each bank. 
 
In order to take account of the time lags between previous board practice 
and subsequent boards and bank performance, the proportionate 
changes in CFROTA and sales after each year were calculated relating 
back to the base year 2002. The formula used was: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formula 3: Proportionate changes in CFROTA 
 
A factor analysis was then conducted on these variables (Appendix 1 to 
4, 7, 8, 9 and Section 5.3), which produced a clear separation between 
CFROTA and accounting figures that produce ROE ratio. These factors 
Performance in 
year X – 
Performance in 
2002 
Performance in 
2002 
% Change = 
X 100 
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were used in all the analysis of the bank performance to reflect the 
various changes over the five year period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-7: Source: Sekaran (2003: 301) – Data analysis 
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version 10. The standardised variable option was used to standardise the 
aggregate indicator ratings and principal components analysis of 
“Varimax rotation” was the method of factor analysis used for the 
calculations (Appendix 7). Pearson correlation coefficients (DeFusco et 
al 2004: 146) were computed to relate board and bank performance data 
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board performances in high and low performing banks. Figure 4.7 is a 
flow diagram showing steps taken before data is analysed to test the 
themes. Step one prepares data for analysis whilst steps two to four 
cover analysing data. 
 
This analysis is rooted in deductive, qualitative approach. The object is to 
express the world as it is understood by the subject (Saunders et al., 
2000: 95). In this study, the observations come from the questionnaire 
and the opinions of the participants/respondents. 
 
Quantitative survey analysis may be considered in two distinct groups, 
categorical and quantifiable (Saunders et al., 2000: 328). Categorical 
data cannot be measured, but can be classified or ranked. In this study, 
the types of banks, board members, qualifications and experience of 
respondents are categorised. This data can be further sub-divided into 
descriptive (or nominal) and ranked (or ordinal) (Saunders et al., 2000: 
328). Quantifiable data are those that may be numerically measured, 
such as percentages (cost to income ratio, profit margin, CFROTA, etc. 
These offer continuously quantifiable data. Discrete data can be 
measured precisely, such as the behaviour of IDs, NEDs and Auditors.  
 
4.5.1 Preparing Data for Analysis 
 
It may be seen by bank questionnaire (Appendix 5) and 
respondent profile (Appendix 6), that to ensure analysis was 
straightforward, consequences of coding were considered at the 
time the questionnaire was being formulated (Sekaran, 2003: 
305). For example, each bank respondent as prefixed by the 
name of the bank followed by numbers.  To verify consistency, 
the questionnaire scattered contiguous questions in different 
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areas of the questionnaire. The answers were then consolidated 
and analysed together to confirm or rebuff the responses offered 
in the questionnaire. After collection, the data is keyed into the 
analysis program and to achieve this, all the stages of figure 4.7 
are actioned (Sekaran, 2003: 302). 
 
4.5.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
The three objectives of data analysis noted in figure 4.7, are 
expanded below, step 2 (getting a feel for the data), step 3 
(testing for goodness of data) and step 4 (testing the issues 
developed for the research). Data analysis is the application of 
logic to understand and interpret data collected (Zikmund, 1997: 
57). In this research IDs, NEDs, EDs, CG practitioners and 
Market Analysts were surveyed to establish a connection 
between behaviour and independency of directors. A multivariate 
analysis design, which allows the simultaneous investigation of 
more than two variables (behaviour and independency) 
(Zikmund, 1997: 657), was chosen to analyse the data. SPSS 
(version 11), statistical analysis tools were used to test the 
assumptions and analyse data, (Coakes & Steed, 1999). 
 
Getting a feel for the data 
 
When analysing the relationships and behaviour of board 
members the researcher had to calculate the mean of the data 
and variance, regression, logistic regression, this presented an 
overview of how the participants responded to each question. 
The information gained from these ratios showed that the scales 
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were sufficiently graded to give a significant result (Sekaran, 
2003: 306). 
 
Testing for goodness of data 
 
Goodness of data is tested for reliability and validity as noted in 
section 4.5. In this research, convergent validity, which 
establishes the degree of correlation in the results and 
discriminatory validity establishes when two different concept are 
not correlated and do not converge (Cavana et al., 2001: 321) 
was used. Once the initial feel showed that the information was 
credible, the goodness of fit was established to lend credibility to 
the succeeding analyses and findings (Sekaran, 2003). The test 
was to determine ‘how well an observed set of data fits an 
expected set of data’ (Mason & Lind, 1996: 576). 
 
Testing the issues developed for the research 
 
Finally, once the data was sorted and the goodness of measure 
established, it was possible to test the issues through the use of 
the SPSS software as noted in 4.5 (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
4.5.3 Use of computer software 
 
There are a number of qualitative data analysis programs 
available – such as ATLAS/ti, NUD*IST, and SPSS (Ticehurst & 
Veal, 2000). They store, organise and process data and it was 
necessary to choose the most suitable for the study in question. 
Because of the amount of data, a statistical package was useful 
to analyse the data. From the programs noted, Non-numerical 
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Unstructured Data Indexing, Search and Theorising (NUD*IST) 
was the qualitative package used, whilst Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for analysing survey data 
(Ticehurst & Veal, 2000). SPSS was chosen to analyse data for 
this research survey. However, whilst the SPSS program was 
used to seek patterns within the data, as there were only a 
relatively small number of cases, in order for the richness and 
depth of meaning to be extrapolated, additional software was not 
considered necessary. 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
 
Nottingham Business School’s Ethics Committee reviews research 
surveys to protect the individual, the institution and collective 
welfare and rights of participants. In addition committees protect 
Universities and researchers from inadvertent moral or legal risks 
by considering the principles of respect for persons, beneficence, 
and justice (Weatherby, 2003). 
 
In this research, individual answers or scores were of relevance, for 
the analysis of each bank as each interview was an event which 
affects the whole bank and the researcher ensured the anonymous 
nature of the surveys (where the respondent did not require his/her 
disclosure), thus ensuring that there were no ethical considerations 
to consider. In addition, participants had the rationale of the survey 
explained and were able to cease their participation at any time 
without reason. 
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4.6.1 NBS Graduate Research - Ethics requirements 
 
The Ethics Committee of NBS is advised that respondents 
considered the anonymity of the survey and that participants 
agreed that their names be disclosed.  Section 1.9 of the 
National Statement provides for consent in the form of the 
returned survey questionnaire. The information implies 
consent to use the data in the research project as: 
  
“Where consent to participate is required, research must be 
so designed that each participant’s consent is clearly 
established, whether by a signed form, return of a survey, 
recorded agreement for interview or other sufficient means”. 
4.6.2 Anonymity and confidentiality 
 
All participants were selected by the researcher among each 
bank directors, practitioners and market analysts. The 
researcher informed all participants about the survey 
individually. The survey was not anonymous, as all 
participants were willing to contribute to this research as they 
felt that not much research has been done in Africa in this 
field. Only interested parties took part in the surveys as some 
selected directors declined to participate. The researcher 
relied on two guidelines found in the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans to design the 
research with informed consent assumed from the filling out 
of the survey form.  
 
1. Participants were told that completion of the survey 
means that data will be used in the study. 
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2. All individuals were identified in a proper manner as 
they all choose to be identified. 
 
There were no potential risks (emotional, physical, economic, 
privacy, legal) envisaged for the participants. There were 
also no risks, harms, stresses, discomfort or other matters 
likely to affect the participants as this field is not yet well 
researched in Africa. 
 
4.7 Limitations of combined quantitative and qualitative study 
methodology 
 
Formulation of a research strategy requires judgement, particularly 
in view of the use of resources. Full consideration is given both to 
the data and its analysis (Ticehurst & Veal, 2000: 38-39). The 
limitations resulted from the choice of strategy are offered not to 
diminish the quality of the research, but to indicate the significance 
of the methodology (Cooper & Schindler, 2001: 616). In this 
research, the conclusions are valid and assessable within their 
boundaries. 
4.7.1 Location 
 
Using qualitative research studies in Africa is very difficult 
due to travel arrangements, where some locations do not 
have flights.  However interviews were made easier due to 
availability of video conference and tele-communication 
facilities. In addition, the research method enabled detailed 
information from multiple sources, which allowed collection of 
in depth verifiable evidence (Cooper & Schindler, 2001: 138).  
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4.7.2 Timing 
 
Information gathered for research was to assess the 
effectiveness and performance of the four boards of directors 
of the selected banks and data was collected over a period 
of five years (2002 – 2006). Application of independence and 
transparency was also assessed. Conditions may change 
over time since 2006. 
4.7.3 Time and budget 
 
The researcher had a small budget and had to do all the 
interviews personally within a limited timeframe. The result 
meant that whilst all participants had an equal opportunity to 
attend interviews and answer the questionnaires, a limit of 
the number of participants was set to enable the researcher 
to work within a set time frame. 
 
4.8 Summary  
 
Chapter 4 considered aspects of methodology used in this 
research and consequently justified each aspect of the study, 
which investigated the effectiveness of the boards of 
directors of the four major banks in SA and Zimbabwe. The 
realism paradigm incorporated a triangulation of research 
methods to create knowledge about external reality (Perry et 
al., 1999). In the study, the type of research used was a 
combination of exploratory and descriptive research to clarify 
and define the nature of the problem and to describe the 
characteristics of a population (Zikmund, 1997). Due to the 
nature of the deductive testing, the researcher used both 
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qualitative and quantitative methods, with surveys conducted 
in two different countries through observation, surveys, and 
interviews with valid, reliable and practical results using a 
cross - section of individuals in the banks and analysts. 
Thus, the qualitative study methodology used a realism 
paradigm with an in-depth quantitative survey on two 
populations covering all active variables and operational 
constructs. 
The mixture of theory and data requires a critical analysis, 
which requires methodologies that unpack the norm. 
Practical experience implies that, whereas positivists take 
the view those scientists conceptualization of reality actually 
directly reflects that reality, realists argue that the scientists’ 
conceptualization is simply a way of knowing that reality. The 
chosen methods are a systematic attempt to express in 
thought the structures and ways of acting of things that exist 
and act independently of thought. 
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5 Data analysis 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the research project design and techniques used to 
collect and analyse data. The data collection methodology was a 
combination of a quantitative survey instrument and a qualitative study 
protocol. The technique employed was considered to support statistical data 
analysis, for a methodology appropriate for analysing banks performance. 
 
In chapter 5, data from the research instruments are analysed to determine 
results relating to the research questions, data quality and the effectiveness 
of the board of each bank as measured by the qualitative and quantitative 
data provided by the respondents. Chapter 5 is divided into four parts that is 
the performance of each bank (ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank 
including their subsidiaries in SA and Zimbabwe) is analysed.  
 
Data was interpreted using the chi-square test (Wegner 2008: 359 – 372, 
Buglear 2007: 279 - 304) to test for differences between categorical variables 
using cross tabulation techniques to check differing percentages for 
significant differences between banks  using 7- point Likert scale questions 
(Appendices 7 to 9) (Wegner 2008: 22). Tools such as Laspeyres price 
index, mean and coefficient of variation (DeFusco et al 2004, Newbold 1991) 
were used to analyse the growth and price of shareholder values. 
Interviewee 19 stated that numbers are all we have to work with; we should 
constantly remind ourselves that they do not paint a perfect picture (Fraser – 
Sampson 2007: 2). This argument support the argument that financial 
statements have been an aid to corporate scandals and fraud as they can be 
engineered to reflect what the preparer want to report on (information 
asymmetry) argued interviewee 34. Time series (regression trend 
coefficients) regression and correlation are the tools used to interpret the 
relationship that exists in the boards and the performance of banks. 
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Financial ratios are used to compare risk and return of different banks in 
order to help equity investors and creditors make intelligent investment and 
credit decisions (White et al 2003: 111). Such decisions require both an 
evaluation of changes in performance over time for a particular investment 
and a comparison among all firms within a single industry at a specific point 
in time. The information needs and appropriate analytical techniques used for 
investment and credit decisions depend on the decision maker’s time 
horizon. Equity investors are interested in the long term earning power of a 
firm. As the equity investor bears the residual risk (defined as the return from 
operations after all claims from suppliers, employees and creditors have 
been satisfied), it requires a return commensurate to that risk. Thus, analysis 
by the equity investor needs to be the most comprehensive and it subsumes 
the analysis carried out by other users, hence investors need to use different 
methods to measure future cash flow return, growth and future value creation 
capability of the company, which is why this chapter analysis the financial 
performance of the four banks. 
 
5.1 Research Findings  
 
Secondary data was used in this research (published financial 
statements) as they became the primary source of information. In 
analysing the financial statements, using CFROTA and other tools, the 
Financial Directors were the main contacts and respondents to the 
researcher’s questions (Appendix 1 to 4). Muth and Donaldson’s (1998: 
5 – 28) concepts used in document 4 were also used in this document 
together with CFROTA by Dulewicz and Herbert (2004: 265) in order to 
compare and contrast the two concepts as to which one is the best way 
of measuring board effectiveness. The two models (CFROTA and 
ROCE) were tested and the results are reflected in document 4 Table 
5.3.1 and document 5 Table 10. The philosophy that, “profit is an 
opinion and cash is a fact,” was tested during the research and was 
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found out that CFROTA is a better measurement of growth of cash and 
value measurement out of the two models. The weakness though is that 
CFROTA does not take into account working capital and capital 
expenditure requirements of each bank. 
 
5.1.1 Re-interpretation of earlier findings 
 
Corporate governance has assumed an increasingly important 
place in the banking industry. The board as an ultimate 
decision making body, as they formulate the strategies but 
cannot be linked to corporate performance although they take 
the overall responsibility for the bank’s performance argued 
interviewee 36. Observations during the research period 
indicated that skills and experience were found to be critical 
for the success of the bank and shareholder confidence. 
Document 3: 54, highlighted the associations that exist within 
the CG field and the impact they have on transparency and 
independence. The scramble for scarce resources and self-
enrichment were found to be the major factors affecting the 
governance system in the financial sector in SA and 
Zimbabwe. The independence of Auditors and IDs is very 
important for the bank’s compliance with CG best practice 
(Minor 199). 
 
The shareholding perspective as an orthodox and dominant 
approach to the understanding of corporate governance has 
its ideological and theoretical origin in the fundamental 
mentality of individual private ownership rights as the 
foundation of capitalism. Traditional wisdom is that private 
ownership is fundamental to a desirable social order and to 
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development of an efficient economy and thus private 
ownership rights are inviolable to corporate governance. This 
belief was the major cause of bank failures as owners 
operated banks as personal private business, which resulted 
in the banks failing to reach the maturity levels, hence collapse 
as a family owned bank. Abusive insider trading and related 
party transactions were the major causes of these failures 
both in SA and Zimbabwe stated interviewee 38 (Document 2: 
Appendix 1). 
 
The themes discussed so far indicates that the role of the 
board is instrumental in good corporate governance as per 
requirements of Minor (1999) and King III Report (2009). The 
task is characterized by the pressure of responsibility, limited 
time and distance from operations of the bank, which the 
board is set to direct and control. Board appraisals are 
prescribed by the King III Report (2009), Principles for CG in 
Zimbabwe (1999), UK Combined Code and other codes of 
governance applicable to Southern Africa. Board evaluation 
can help the board to tune its contribution to the sustained 
success of the bank. Board appraisals (Document 3, Table 
6.2: 49) can be useful as part of the development of a strategic 
plan for board or director development and performance 
measurement consistent with the bank’s strategic plan: vision, 
mission and goals. 
 
A matrix of findings, (Document 4: Table 2.3: 30) ranked the 
banks according to their financial performance. Themes were 
categorized into high and low. FirstRand scored highest on 
most measurement tools followed by Standard Bank, ABSA 
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and Nedbank was last. FirstRand resembled a professional 
board while Standard Bank and ABSA resembled a 
representative, which is an indication of high performance and 
compliance to most tested themes. The argument by Cornforth 
(2001: 219) states the failure by directors to satisfy all 
stakeholders is due to a conflict of interest, hence an adoption 
of the stewardship/Ubuntu theories will mitigate the level of 
self-centeredness among directors. The emergence of 
stakeholder theory (Gay 2002) was prompted by the growing 
recognition by boards of the need to take account of the wider 
interests of society. The interests of all legitimate stakeholders 
have intrinsic value and no set of interests is assumed to 
dominate the other. 
 
Using (Muth and Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28), methodology of 
measuring performance, the author ranked each bank’s 
performance as measured by each component (Document 4, 
Table 5.3.1: 59). Red (1) representing the best performing 
bank in each category. Blue (2) being second, green (3) and 
yellow (4) being the least performing bank in that category. 
FNB has the highest number of reds followed by Standard 
Bank and ABSA, while Nedbank is the least ranked with no 
single red or blue. Nedbank came last on all categories. This 
scoring was the basis for ranking the banks, where FNB 
became the most effective bank using Muth and Donaldson’s 
performance measurement models (Figure 12). As a result of 
this scoring, the results were recorded on a ranking of high 
and low taking into consideration most the CG themes, which 
included transparency, independence and director experience. 
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The judgement column highlighted the CG themes being 
measured 
 
5.1.2 ABSA Financial Performance  
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Chart 5.1: Data Sources: Absa Financial Statements 
 
Interviewee 1, 2 and 3 argued that Absa has succeeded in 
maintaining its earnings momentum over the past five years. 
This was through further diversification of earnings, 
improvements in operational efficiency and continued growth 
arising from its strong market position in the retail banking. 
Interviewee 3 stated that the growth in the retail bank and its 
contribution to the group (59%) year on year has resulted in 
the constant growth in CFROTA. Absa’s strategy of high 
volumes low margins creates a saving culture, which results in 
the bank managing a large chuck of cash, which generates 
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more cash for the bank’s balance sheet (Chart 5.1) argued 
interviewee 3. 
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Chart 5.2: Data Source: Absa Financial Statements 
 
Cash to asset growth is an indication of real growth of the 
shareholder value in assets that cannot easily be manipulated 
by the directors argued interviewee 3. The exponential growth 
in 2006 was as a result of the cash injection (free cash flow) 
after the acquisition of Absa by Barclays, meaning to say there 
was a cash reserve for organic growth which has assisted 
Absa in its diversification and acquisitions into Africa which are 
projected to increase cash generation by 2009 (21%) argued 
interviewee 1. 
 
As a result of Absa strategy of high volume and low margins, 
the bank has managed to penetrate the new lucrative black 
market which was previously not banked argued interviewees 
2, 4 and 7. The use of depositors’ money in creating value for 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
110 
 
shareholders has been Absa’s focus in the previous three 
years, which has resulted in Absa turning around the deposits 
hence creating more cash reserves argued interviewee 3 and 
6 as depicted in Chart 5.3.  
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Chart 5.3: Data Source: Absa Financial Statements 
 
Chart 5.3 is comparable to document 4: Chart 4.1.4 which is a 
comparison of CFROTA and ROE.  ROE shows a higher 
return as compared to CFROTA due to the shenanigans which 
exists in the preparation of financial statements. CFROTA is a 
better measurement of shareholder value growth as it is not 
affected by changes in accounting policies and changes in 
estimates stated interviewee 3. The numerator and the 
denominator of CFROTA are not easily influenced by financial 
engineering hence it’s a better measurement of shareholder 
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value creation argued (Dulewicz and Herbert 2004). CFROTA 
shows a smooth constant growth of shareholder value, which 
is an indication of the tool not being influenced by changes in 
accounting policy.  
 
Depositors money is a liability to the bank, hence reduces the 
value of the bank’s balance sheet. As a result of the bank 
using depositors’ money to generate more cash, there is no 
correlation between CFROTA and cash to assets ratio (Chart 
5.3). The decline in cost to income ratio (document 4: Chart 
4.1.3/4) is evidenced in Chart 5.3. The efficiencies created by 
lower operating costs create more cash reserves stated 
interviewee 3. 
5.1.3 FirstRand Financial Performance  
 
FirstRand’s performance to 2006 represents the continuation 
of a track record of excellent growth and returns to 
shareholders argued interviewee 12. Interviewees 10, 11 and 
12 stated that, the results show a compound annualized 
growth rate of 21% in earnings and 23% in dividends and has 
maintained a ROE above industry standard. Net profit margin 
(49%) is higher as a result of income from investment 
activities. It is not as a result of trading results. Chart 5.4 is a 
reflection of the real growth in shareholder value as a result of 
the exponential growth in cash reserves argued interviewee 
14. 
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Chart 5.4: Data Source: FNB Financial Statements 
 
The decrease in cash to asset ratio in 2004 and 2005 was as 
a result of the bank’s growth strategy to invest in new value 
adding assets, which resulted in a big jump in cash reserves in 
2006 stated interviewees 12, 15 and 15. The cash to assets 
ratio (Chart 5.5) is in line with the asset growth (document 4: 
Chart 4.2.1), which means the bank has a strong balance 
sheet supported by strong cash generation capacity argued 
interviewees 14, 15 and 17. 
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Asset Growth Analysis
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Chart 5.5: Data Source: FNB Financial Statements 
 
From 2005, there is a trend beginning to build that reflect a 
relationship between operational efficiency which results in 
strong cash generation capacity and balance sheet growth 
(document 4: Chart 4.2.1). The cost to income ratio (document 
4: Chart 4.2.3) is seen here as a very important tool in 
managing the bank’s performance and shareholder value 
creation. 
 
Interviewee 14 argued that the bank operates in the top 
quadrant of the most efficient and profitable businesses in the 
world, thus delivering superior value for shareholders. Chart 
5.6 is a true reflection of his argument supported by the 
scoring (Table 9). 
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Chart 5.6: Data Source: FNB Financial Statements 
 
5.1.4 Nedbank Financial Performance 
 
The bank has been on a recovery programme since 2003, 
when new board was appointed and since then some benefits 
have been achieved. The next challenge for the bank is to 
claim its position as one of the leading banks in Africa argued 
interviewee 19. Shareholder value creation has been the 
board’s main focus, which has resulted in great improvement 
in the bank’s performance resulting in the major shareholder 
(Old Mutual) refusing to dispose the bank argued interviewees 
21 and 22. 
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Chart 5.7: Data Sources: Financial Statements 
 
Interviewees 21 and 22 stated that, period 2003 to date has 
seen a significant growth in CFROTA (Chart 5.7), which has 
been used to finance the growth in assets (Chart 5.8). The 
challenges facing the bank is the investment required in order 
to improve cash generation capacity and branch network. This 
will take a bit of time but the bank is in the right track in 
creating shareholder value argued interviewee 19. 
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Chart 5.8: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
As depicted by Chart 5.9 there is no strong correlation 
between CFROTA and cash to assets ratio due to capital 
requirement to grow the bank. The positive outcome of these 
tools is that there has been growth and the empowerment 
partners have managed to create value for the bank argued 
interviewee 22. Support from the major shareholder during 
trying times has assisted the bank in positioning itself as a 
major player in Africa. Although Nedbank is the fourth largest 
bank by capitalization in SA and Zimbabwe, the bank is 
positioning itself to be the pre-eminent bank in Africa by 2015 
argued interviewee 19. 
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Chart 5.9: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
5.1.5 Standard Bank Financial Performance 
 
Standard Bank is one of the oldest banks in Africa and the 
biggest by market capitalization (USD18 billion) and asset 
base (USD139 billion) as at end of 2006 (Standard Bank 
Financial Statements 2006).  Chart 5.10 shows a near 
stagnant level of cash generation (CFROTA below 2%), which 
is a reflection of a lazy balance sheet. The assets are growing 
(document 4: Chart 4.4.1) yet generating the almost same 
level of cash. The shareholder value has not been growing 
significantly. 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
118 
 
CFROTA Analysis
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Period
G
ro
w
th
 
%
CFROTA
Linear (CFROTA)
 
Chart 5.10: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
The period 2003 and 2004 saw the CFROTA declining, while 
at the same time cash to assets ratio following. This shows the 
strong correlation between these two tools. Interviewees 27 
and 32 argued that this was due to near recession during this 
time after a period of high interest rates and high inflation. The 
bank’s performance was marginally offset by modest growth 
from operations in the rest of Africa, mainly due to higher 
credit losses in a period of increased spend on skills and 
systems needed to significantly expand the product base 
argued interviewees 26 and 27. 
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Chart 5.11: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
Chart 5.11 shows declining cash to assets ratio due to 
continuous capital investments into emerging markets, which 
has resulted in new assets not generating much cash as they 
are not mature yet argued interviewee 32. Although there is 
not much growth in cash reserves Standard Bank has 
managed a ROE of 25.2% which is 5.2% above industry 
standard. Chart 5.12 shows that there is a strong correlation 
between CFROTA and cash to asset ratio, which has shown a 
decline due to the bank’s capital projects in emerging markets. 
There is great potential that Standard Bank will be a target for 
an acquisition soon due to its position in Africa and Asia stated 
interviewee 29. The effects of a lower cost to income ratio are 
evidenced here, as it results in higher CFROTA, which is an 
indicator of shareholder value creation. 
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Chart 5.12: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
5.2 Cross bank analysis  
 
A business will always have an amount piled up in “money to be 
collected” (Mayer 2007: 17). This is called accounts receivable, and you 
can easily find it on a company’s balance sheet. The difference 
between earnings and cash flow: “earnings do not repay loans – cash 
flow does.” It is important for any bank to look beyond earnings and 
figure out the cash flow – the cycle of collections and disbursements. At 
times those cycles can vary widely; in fact a bank that otherwise 
appears profitable can suddenly find itself in a cash crunch. 
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CFROTA Analysis
-1.50%
-1.00%
-0.50%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
Period
G
ro
w
th
 
% ABSA
FNB
Nedbank
Standard Bank
 
Chart 5.13: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
 
Chart 5.13 is a result of the bank that generated the highest CFROTA 
each year from 2002. Since 2002 Absa generated the highest CFROTA 
until 2004 when FirstRand took over. FirstRand and Standard Bank’s 
shareholder value was constantly growing until the FirstRand took over 
the leadership position in 2005. This is a reverse of document 4’s 
findings that showed Standard Bank having a ROE above all banks 
(document 4: 51). The consistency that is shown by Absa, FirstRand 
and Standard Bank (Table 7) is very important for shareholders and 
investors. Nedbank has shown a significant growth in CFROTA since its 
near collapse in 2000/3 and the board is confident that soon Nedbank 
will be a force driving the industry argued interviewee 19. 
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2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
ABSA 2.52% 2.35% 2.32% 2.03% 2.01% 
FNB 2.82% 2.70% 1.82% 1.45% 1.21% 
Nedbank 1.79% 1.85% 0.59% -0.90% -0.15% 
Standard Bank 2.01% 1.89% 1.63% 1.65% 1.90% 
 
Table 3: CFROTA Ratio Analysis 
 
CFROTA’s limitations are not significant as other historical 
measurement tools. There is no better tool that can be used to measure 
future performance or cash requirements. It is a tool which should be 
recommended to all the banks to use so that proper comparison can be 
done by shareholders and investors argued interviewee 35. 
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Chart 5.14: Data Source: Financial Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
123 
 
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
ABSA 5.79% 3.85% 3.03% 2.87% 2.83% 
FNB 4.15% 3.80% 3.84% 3.92% 3.92% 
Nedbank 2.19% 1.96% 1.21% 0.68% 0.43% 
Standard 
Bank 2.45% 2.52% 2.65% 2.36% 2.69% 
 
Table 4: Cash to Assets Ratio Analysis 
 
 
5.3 CFROTA Links in banks 
 
Section 5.1 of this research analysed the findings of the performance of 
all the four banks in SA and Zimbabwe. The consolidated findings of the 
study are shown on Appendix 7 where factor analysis was used for the 
calculation to test the relationship between the board and bank 
performance using CFROTA as a tool of measurement. As can be 
seen, a few variables were statistically significantly related to each 
performance measure. The number of EDs excluding the Chairman and 
the average tenure of NEDs were related significantly to CFROTA. 
Contribution of IDs, NEDs and EDs is assessed, which reflects the 
revenue and cash generation capabilities of different boards. Thus, the 
greater the number of EDs and the experience of IDs, NEDs, the better 
the performance of the bank. These were then assessed against the 
banks’ structure, objectives, mission and vision. 
 
Comparisons on board variables were carried out using the t-tests, of 
which the results are shown in Appendix 7: Table B. No differences 
were found between banks when assessing the growth in revenue and 
CFROTA as there is a strong correlation between revenue generation 
and CFROTA. In view of the results in Appendix 7: Table A and B, the 
researcher explored the links between ratings of CFROTA, cost to 
income ratio and revenue, of which the correlation coefficient was 
calculated for each of the themes and 33 indicators (28%) showed 
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statistically significant correlations (Appendix 7 &: Table 7C). Appendix 
7’s results is an indication that CFROTA is a strong measure of board 
effectiveness as it measures all areas of business as compared to Muth 
and Donaldson (1998)’s tools of measurement. 
 
5.4 Board mechanisms, structure and output  
 
Data analysis consisted of three broad phases (Appendix 9) which are: 
1. Cross tabulations: Various likert scales were examined to see if 
they could be treated as continuous and decisions made about 
how to treat bank performance data; 
2. Correlations: Correlations were computed to examine the 
degree of association between the independent variables and 
the overall effectiveness of the boards; 
3. Stepwise logistic regression: Assessment to analyse which 
factors best explained variations in board effectiveness. 
 
In order to assess what was the most appropriate measure of 
effectiveness to use, the researcher compared two measures 
(effectiveness and multi-item scale), which measured how effectively 
different board functions were performed (board structures). The 
relationship between this average measure and overall effectiveness 
was examined using correlation and regression analysis. The two 
measures were strongly related (Table 3). Also the stepwise logistic 
regression was conducted in order to understand which variable had 
the most impact on the effectiveness of the boards. The results are 
shown on Table 4. The variables that have a significant impact on 
overall effectiveness were at the p<0.05 level. 
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The regression analysis shows five components that best explain 
judgements of overall effectiveness. In order of importance they are – 
how effectively the board carries out the following functions: setting the 
bank’s mission and values, helping fund the business or other 
resources, financial reporting, reviewing and deciding strategic direction 
and reviewing board performance. Together these themes account for 
about 61% of the variation in overall effectiveness. 
 
Variables 
Simple 
odds 
95% 
Confidence 
Adjusted 
odds Significant 
95% 
Confidence 
 
ratio interval ratio level interval 
Effect 1 8.02 5.47 - 11.75 
                     
3.17            0.001  1.65 - 6.07 
Effect 2 9.02 6.02 - 13 .52 
                     
2.20            0.020  1.13 - 4.27 
Effect 3 5.35 3.87 - 7.40 
                     
2.95                   -    1.72 - 5.07 
Effect 4 8.77 5.72 - 13.46 
                     
2.19            0.014  1.17 - 4.10 
      Key and notes 
     Pseudo R2 = 61% 
    Number of 
respondents 41 
    Effect 1 Setting and understanding the bank's mission and values 
 Effect 2 Revising and deciding the bank's strategic direction 
 Effect 3 Overseeing the financial reporting of the bank 
  Effect 4 Reviewing board performance and its effectiveness 
 * Simple odds ratio estimates are based on all respondents available at the 
time 
 
  Table 5: Regression showing board effectiveness 
 
 
Appendix 8 is an indication of the results of the findings of the effect of 
board structures on board effectiveness. The findings were that, board 
effectiveness is strongly related to how effective the board members are 
judged to have performed during their evaluation (Document 3: Table 
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6.3: 65). In particular regression analysis suggested that how well 
boards performed five functions mentioned above (Appendix 8) was 
most important in testing the overall effectiveness of each board. 
 
5.5 Ubuntu as a CG measurement tool 
 
l
Ubuntu Board Structures:
strategic asset of the company, 
collectively and individually core 
existence of the board
Community up-liftment through 
working together
Respect for all stakeholders
Good governance
The Right Structures: 
Community structure 
Transparency
The right People: 
Respect for others 
and property rights
The Right follow 
Through:
Accountability
Evaluation of 
performance
The Right 
Remuneration:
Performance driven 
and disclosure 
The Right Process:
Systems in the bank
The Right 
community 
Culture
The Right attitudes: 
Control and 
monitoring
The Right Information: 
Tool to manage the bank 
and disclosure to 
community
 
Figure 5-1: Ubuntu governance architecture developed for this study 
 
There is diversity in the composition of the board of directors in the 
banking sector, which has both positives and negatives. The positives 
include African directors have a good understanding of the Ubuntu 
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governance processes while the foreign directors do not understand the 
concepts. Two Chiefs where included in the list of respondents in order 
to understand the Ubuntu governance process. Figure 14 is the 
outcome of these two interviews, which the Chiefs call a governance 
evaluation tool. Chiefs are compared to the directors of the bank as 
they also have their governance processes which are similar to 
companies. Chiefs rule together with the assistance of (directors) 
Izinduna/Magota/Inkosi/Isibonda/Machinda who assist them to run and 
manage the Chieftainship.  
 
Theme Criteria Mean Min Max 
The right structure 30 44.20% -2.40% 68.20% 
The right people 12 45.10% 0.00% 80.00% 
The right culture 16 73.00% 14.30% 95.00% 
The right attitudes 21 72.60% 29.20% 100.00% 
The right information 12 63.70% -11.10% 92.30% 
The right processes 23 65.90% 28.60% 84.80% 
The right remuneration 7 38.20% 0.00% 62.50% 
The right follow through 11 18.00% -50.00% 100.00% 
Total 132 
   
     Table 6: Findings of banks board's evaluation 
 
The structure as per Figure 5.1 is a governance tool (Appendix 8) which 
advocates for good governance, accountability and transparency driven 
from social cultural upbringing of the African people argued interviewee 
37 and 38 (Appendix 10). Communities are the beneficiaries of good 
governance argued interviewee 38 (Appendix 10). Figure 14 was 
developed after interviewing the two Chiefs (Appendix 7) and this tool 
was applied to all the boards of the four banks. Using this evaluation 
tool different criterion were explored and classified into Table 4 themes. 
The boards of directors were then scored on 132 aggregated themes.  
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Table 4, 5 and Figure 5.1 provides the overall findings of the four banks 
using the Ubuntu concept. Due to regulatory framework in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, which was put after the collapse of many banks from 
1991 to 2005 (Document 2: Appendix 1), higher results were scored on 
right culture and right attitudes. The worst themes are the right 
remuneration as discussed in section 5.5 and follow through. These 
themes show negative results, indicating that some boards did not 
satisfy a majority of sub-criteria. Using the Ubuntu model in the banks, 
weaknesses were identified in the following areas, structure, people, 
information dissemination, processes, remuneration and follow through 
(evaluation of individual board member performance).  
 
5.6 Power of Executive Directors 
 
Document 3’s major finding was the power that accumulates to the 
CEO as a result of the historical performance of the bank. Section 5.1 
highlights the historical performance of the four banks, which has 
resulted in the CEOs being considered as the engines of growth and 
value creation. The result was the growth in their remuneration against 
the decline of employee wages argued interviewee 36 (Appendix 10). 
Table 4 is an indication of the reward CEOs of the four banks received 
over the years in recognition of the value which was created during the 
time they were occupying the positions. 
 
Bank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) R.(000) 
ABSA 3 600 5 400 6 670 8 700 11 500 19 500 22 100 13 500 
FNB 2 800 4 800 5 200 6 700 8 800 10 400 11 500 10 600 
Nedbank 3 200 4 900 6 400 8 700 9 900 15 320 26 000 43 000 
Standard 
Bank 3 400 4 990 7 800 9 400 12 100 14 200 16 800 18 200 
 
Table 7: Published Bank CEO Remuneration 
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According to figures released in the Bargaining Indicators 2009 
publication, brought out by the Labour Research Services, executive 
director salaries rose 11.6% on average, those of chief executive 
officers (CEOs) increased by on average 14% and non-executive 
directors saw their fees rise by 15%. The average low-wage worker saw 
an increase of 10.1% in 2008. 
 
Author Taal (2009), in her Directors' Fees Survey 2009, notes that in 
2008 the average annual remuneration for an executive director was 
R6, 439, 000; chief executive officers received R10, 460, 000, which is 
below the salaries of CEOs of banks and non-executive directors 
earned R522, 000. A low-wage worker would therefore have to work 
16.5 years, 203 years and 330 years to earn what an average non-
executive director, executive director and CEO respectively were paid in 
2008. 
 
The 70 CEOs in the sample earned a total of R732, 221, 000 in 2008 
and the 282 executive officers took home a collective R1, 822, 339, 
000. The 655 non-executive directors collectively earned R341, 614, 
000 for their part-time work. All of these figures exclude gains made on 
long-term incentives which can increase a director’s package 
substantially when it is exercised. 
In the current economic climate, workers are not alone. Outrage among 
shareholders at the vast fees directors pay themselves may result in 
calls for shareholder input on what and how executive pay is decided. 
While shareholders often represent other corporate, rather than worker, 
interests, their complaints do keep the spotlight on this area of 
inequality and it should be an avenue that unions are prepared to utilise 
to push the cause of the workers. 
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5.7 Board performance gaps 
 
Section 1.3 highlighted that there are different forms of capital that 
create the expectation gap. The findings were in line with the existing 
gaps in the corporate governance field. Section 5.1 list quantitative 
findings for all the banks, which reflect the gaps that exist within the 
governance system in SA and Zimbabwe which are caused by 
structural capital. Section 5.2 has findings that are defined by cultural 
and social capital, which if not complied with will widen the gap. CEO 
power is another major factor that increases the gap, as CEOs are no 
longer accountable to the shareholders and other stakeholders as per 
the findings on section 5.5 and Table 6. 
 
Appearance Reality 
Shareholders’ interests are 
secured through the election of 
directors who protect their 
interests 
Shareholder action with respect to the 
election of directors can best be described 
as ‘coerced ratification’. No matter how 
shareholders vote, those individuals listed 
on management proxy are elected 
The preponderance of directors 
are ‘independent’ according to the 
rules of JSE, ZSE and IOD 
Boards of directors are self-perpetuating. 
The CEO has at least the power to veto 
nominees, but usually actively participates 
in the selection process. Membership is 
highly valued and those selected are 
conscious of benefit conferred on them 
Most boards have compensation 
committees comprised entirely of 
‘independent’ directors 
How can anyone be considered 
‘independent’ of someone to whom they 
are personally beholden? 
Best practice requires the use of 
‘professional’ compensation 
The realities of a successful professional 
practice include not being perceived as 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
131 
 
 
Table 8: Reality of findings 
 
5.8 Measurement of Board effectiveness  
 
Chart 5.14 and Table 8 compares cash to asset ratio, which shows a 
constant growth in Absa and FirstRand. 2006 saw Absa’s ratio shorting 
up as a result of the capital injection by Barclays during the acquisition. 
Every measurement tool has seen FNB leading the pack.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consultants insensitive to the needs of those in whose 
gift lies your selection 
The ‘free market’ ensures that 
competitive factors control the 
levels of CEO pay 
There is no ‘free market’ in top executive 
compensation. CEOs control the critical 
stages of the process, including 
Government and professional accounting 
treatment 
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5.8.1 Bank quantitative scoring  
 
 ABSA FNB Nedbank Standard 
Bank 
Leadership development 
profile score 
H 
 
H 
 
H 
 
H 
 
Shareholder Activism M H M M 
Operating Profit margin (%) 29.8 49.4 23.6 36.1 
Net Profit Margin (%) 21.5 32.9 17.7 24.6 
Cash to Assets Ratio (%) 5.8 4.2 2.2 2.5 
Cost to income ratio (%) 54.6 53.8 58.2 53.5 
ROCE (%) 27.4 25.1 18.6 25.2 
CFROTA (%) 2.5 2.8 1.8 2.0 
EPS (cents) 1216.8 171.6 1 135 864.5 
Key Ranking 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
H High performance 
M 
Medium 
performance 
 
Table 9: Bank Performance Ranking 
 
5.8.2 Bank qualitative scoring  
 
CG is important for protecting investors’ interests, but also for 
reducing systemic market risks and maintaining financial stability 
(Zhuang et al 2000). A study of Southern African banks by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa in 2007 indicates that the 
weakness of corporate governance in African countries is related 
to a highly concentrated ownership structure, weak board of 
directors, excessive Government intervention, under-developed 
capital markets and a weak regulatory framework. 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
133 
 
CG themes ABSA FNB Nedbank 
Standard 
Bank 
Shareholder Activism 
3 5 4 3 
Director independence 3 2 3 3 
Bank transparency 4 4 4 4 
Board experience 4 5 4 4 
Entrepreneurial 3 5 4 3 
Board/management 
relationship 4 4 4 4 
Skills level 4 5 4 4 
Training  5 5 5 5 
Stakeholder rights 3 3 3 3 
Total 33 38 35 33 
 
Table 10: Sources: Banks’ board evaluation 
 
Table 10 is a result of categorical data that cannot be measured but can 
be ranked or classified (Section 4.6). The assessment of these issues 
was done by the boards through themes in Table 10 using a scoring of 
1 to 5, one being the weakest and five the highest score. These themes 
were found to have an effect on each bank’s performance. The low 
score affects the governance structures of the bank while affecting its 
performance. A governance assessment was also done in order to 
analyse the governance and systems that triggers the effectiveness of 
the board. Table 10 illustrates the findings in all the banks under review, 
which is an indication of the strong regulatory enforcement by the 
respective Central Banks. The inputs are the new Central Bank and 
King 3 Report requirements, which stipulate the skills level each board 
member must have, required training, independence and reporting. The 
outputs are in sync with a performing bank which operates effectively. 
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Inputs Structures Processes Outputs (Functions) 
Right mix of 
skills and 
experience 
• Size of the 
board 
• Frequency 
of meetings 
Common vision 
(Shared mindset): 
• The board and 
management 
share common 
vision of what the 
bank is trying to 
achieve 
• The board and 
management 
share common 
vision of how it 
should go about 
achieving its goals 
Strategy and policy 
making: 
• Setting the bank’s 
mission and values 
• Reviewing and deciding 
the bank’s strategic 
direction 
• Setting organizational 
policies 
Board 
members 
have time to 
do the job 
• Percentage 
of board 
members 
that usually 
attend 
meetings 
Clear roles and 
responsibilities: 
• The board has a 
clear  
understanding of 
its role and 
responsibilities 
Stewardship:  
• Overseeing the financial 
management of the 
bank 
• Ensuring the bank has 
adequate financial 
systems and 
procedures 
• Monitoring bank 
performance and taking 
action when required 
Board 
members are 
involved in 
the reporting 
in order to 
improve on 
transparency 
• Presence or 
absence of 
formal sub-
committees 
Regular review: 
• The board and 
management 
periodically review 
how they are 
working together 
Supervising and 
management support: 
• Selecting and 
monitoring the bank’s 
CEO, EDs and senior 
staff 
• Supporting and advising 
management 
Board • Availability Communication:  Board maintenance: 
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members are 
independent 
of written 
job 
descriptions 
for board 
members 
• Communication 
between the board 
and management 
is good 
• Misunderstandings 
are rare between 
the board and 
management 
• Recruiting new 
board members 
• Reviewing board 
performance and 
ensuring it works 
well 
Shareholders 
playing a role 
at board 
level 
• Availability 
of induction 
or training 
for new 
board 
members 
Managing conflict: 
• The board and 
management are 
able to solve 
conflict between 
themselves 
constructively 
• Board members 
are able to resolve 
conflict between 
themselves 
constructively 
External relations and 
accountability: 
• Ensuring that the 
bank fulfils its legal 
obligations 
• Ensuring 
accountability to the 
bank’s stakeholders 
• Representing the 
interests of 
stakeholders in the 
bank 
• Taking charge 
when things go 
wrong 
• Acting as a link with 
important groups 
the bank deals with 
• Representing the 
bank externally 
• Helping to raise 
funds or other 
resources for the 
bank 
 
  
 
Meetings practices: 
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• The board has 
adequate 
notice of 
important 
issues to be 
discussed at 
board 
meetings 
• Board 
meetings have 
a clearly 
structured 
agenda 
• Important 
items are 
prioritised on 
the agenda 
• Board 
meetings run 
on for too long 
• It is clear who 
has 
responsibility 
for following 
up actions 
agreed by the 
board 
• The board has 
trouble 
reaching 
conclusions 
 
Table 11: Governance process in banks  
 
Shareholder activism and entrepreneurship are some of the major 
themes, which were found to be of importance for the success of each 
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bank. The banks that failed (document 2: Appendix 1), most of them 
were as a result of shareholder interference, where banking practice 
where not followed. Too much shareholder involvement affects the 
administrative function of the ED and at the same time affecting 
performance of the bank. FNB scored the highest in this category as a 
result of the fact that the founders of the bank are still involved 
administratively and at board level. 
 
The King 3 report on corporate governance in Southern Africa became 
necessary because of the new Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’) 
and changes in international governance trends. This Report, referred 
to as King III, was compiled by the King Committee with the help of the 
King subcommittees. There is always a link between good governance 
and compliance with law. Good governance is not something that exists 
separately from the law and it is entirely inappropriate to unhinge 
governance from the law (The King Committee 2009). The starting point 
of any analysis on this topic was the duty of directors and officers to 
discharge their legal duties. These duties are grouped into two 
categories, namely: the duty of care, skill and diligence, and the 
fiduciary duties. As far as the body of legislation that applies to a 
company is concerned, corporate governance mainly involves the 
establishment of structures and processes, with appropriate checks and 
balances that enable directors to discharge their legal responsibilities, 
and oversee compliance with legislation. 
 
Central Banks in SA and Zimbabwe have made it compulsory for any 
bank to comply with the King 3 Report and its practice notes. The notes 
requires that board members be highly qualified, must be trained on 
banking regulations and should go through an induction programme. 
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This has resulted in some of the findings during this research the same 
as they are mandatory.  Chart 5.14 is a true reflection of these findings. 
 
 
Chart 5.15: CG themes ranking 
 
Chart 5.15 is a ranking of Table 10 (Board assessment), which showed 
similar results on all banks except FNB which scored a 2 on director 
independence due to the fact that the bank is the only bank which is 
owner managed. Although the board members may be independent, 
but by the fact that they are the founders of the bank resulted in a lower 
score. Other banks’ board members are former EDs of the same bank. 
They meet the threshold of the cool off period of three years after being 
an executive of the bank. There is also perception that their 
independence is affected by that association. 
 
5.9 Logistic regression model 
 
To examine the cross-sectional relationship between transparency, 
independence, experience, shareholder activism involvement in banks’ 
CG
 
ra
n
ki
n
g 
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performance and independent variables, the researcher used logistic 
regression analysis (Table 12) although the sample was small. The 
author used logistic regression analysis because dependent variable 
(transparency) is a categorical dichotomy and therefore the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression analysis was considered inappropriate 
for estimating the parameters (Field, 2000). As Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996) show, given a dichotomous dependent variable, logistic 
regression analysis yields estimators that are asymptotically efficient 
and normally distributed, and thus making it feasible to construct 
appropriate large sample confidence bounds and tests of hypothesis for 
parameters. The following logistic regression model was therefore 
estimated: 
 
Transparency = + +  + Bdsize +  + 
 +  +  +  +  + 
Cash +  +   (1) 
Where: (1) Transparency takes the value 1 if independent directors are 
the majority and 0 otherwise; 
(2)  = Regression coefficients; 
(3)  = Error term and; 
(4)  etc. are independent variables defined in 
Table 
 
Equation 1: Regression Model 
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Operational definitions of independent variables included in the study 
Variable Operational definition Acronym 
1. Transparency 
characteristics 
  
Board member 
independency 
Percentage of independent 
directors 
Indbm 
Size of the board Number of independent board 
members 
Bdsize 
2. Board of directors’ 
characteristics 
  
 
Proportion of 
Independent 
Directors 
Number of Independent directors 
divided by total number of all 
directors on the bank’s board of 
directors at the preceding annual 
report date. 
PropInd 
Proportion of Non-
executive 
Directors 
Number of non-executive 
directors divided by total number 
of all directors on company’s 
board of directors at the 
preceding annual report date. 
PropNed 
3. Performance 
characteristics 
  
Revenue generation   
Gearing Long-term debt divided by long-
term loans plus shareholders’ 
equity at the end of interim 
period. 
Gear 
Cash Dummy variable coded 1 if bank 
reported a growth in cash 
deposits; 0 otherwise. 
Cash 
Profit Dummy variable coded 1 if bank 
reported a profit before interest 
and tax; 0 otherwise. 
Profit 
TechMARK Listing Dummy variable coded 1 if bank 
listed on JSE’s financial market; 
0 otherwise 
TechMARK 
Table 12: Logistic regression model 
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5.9.1 Descriptive statistics: Continuous variables 
 
Continuous 
Variables 
Director 
Involvement (n=30) 
Mean  
Director no 
Independent (n=65) 
Mean 
Mann-Whitney 
U-test 
 
(Standard dev)  (Standard dev)  (P-value) 
Indbm 0.09 0.69 -0.086 
 
-0.025 -0.121 0.000 
Bdsize 3.392 2.841 -6.559 
 
-0.984 -1.134 0.000 
PropInd 0.523 0.451 -0.136 
 
-0.131 -0.15 0.000 
PropNed 0.069 0.192 -0.048 
 
-0.121 -0.204 0.000 
Revenue 584.49 76.92 6.819 
 
-949.82 -144.45 0.000 
Gear 0.733 0.687 -2.850 
 
-2.24 -1.759 0.000 
Cash 0.954 0.871 -2.821 
 
-1.25 -1.87 0.000 
Profit 1509.44 114.73 8.020 
 
-2602.96 -142.65 0.000 
Table 13: Regression analysis outcomes 
 
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
used in the logistic regression analysis. The figure also includes the 
results of Mann-Whitney U tests comparing the means of values of 
continuous variables between the group that involve ID and those that 
are not. 
 
As the statistics indicate, there are several significant differences 
between banks that engage more ID and those that do not. On average 
banks that engage more IDs have lower number of NEDs (PropNed) 
and also lower executive directors’ shareholding (ExDshares). The 
mean shareholding of IDs and executive directors’ shareholding for 
banks involving IDs is 1% and 6.9%, compared with 6.1% and 19.2% 
for those not engaging more IDs, respectively. 
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The rest of the themes scored similar results due to the regulatory 
framework setup by the Central Banks. Board experience was one 
theme with different results due to some board members who do not 
have a first degree and are not experienced in this sector. Stakeholder 
rights are observed by all banks. Compliance to these requirements 
results in better performance of the bank as the CG structures assist 
bank performance. 
 
5.9.2 Corporate Governance overall matrix 
 
Ranking was done using CFROTA and Ubuntu architecture in 
this document, while document 4 used ROCE and other tools 
developed by Muth and Donaldson (1998: 5 – 28) which resulted 
in the ranking of Figure 8-1. Table 14 was developed in order to 
categorize banks according to their level to corporate 
governance best practice (Document 4: 3.4). The four 
categorizes were discussed with all respondents and agreed as a 
good rating tool as it incorporates major activities of boards. 
Table 10 is an outcome of Table 9 which ranked FirstRand board 
as a professional board due to its high standards of corporate 
governance. ABSA followed FirstRand while Standard Bank 
dropped to a country club board, where collegiality is an 
important component of the constitution of the board. Nedbank 
remained lowest.  
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Table 14: Bank matrix position - developed for this research  
 
Table 14 is an outcome of Table 9, 10, 11 and Chart 5.15 that 
shows board effectiveness in each category as per the ranking of 
Table 9 and results from interviews which are shown below 
(Table 11 and 14). Table 14 highlights the required structure of 
the board including skills level, board member involvement and 
roles, which is then categorized into the four levels (Table 10). 
FNB is high on all categorizes while ABSA and Standard Bank 
have some lows which does not affect the effectiveness of the 
board significantly. Nedbank is still in the change process after 
the near collapse in 2003. 
CFROTA 
 
High Low 
Representative 
board: 
 
ABSA 
Standard Bank 
 
 
Passive board: 
 
Professional 
board: 
  
FirstRand 
Country 
club board:  
Nedbank 
 
 
• Little Shareholder participation 
• Low levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Stakeholder mapping 
• Revenue and cash generation 
• ROCE 
• Cost to income ratio 
• Shareholder Activism 
• ROCE 
• High levels of board experience, 
skills and development programmes 
• Technical and professional 
• Level of independence 
• Level of transparency 
• Entrepreneurial 
• Revenue and cash generation 
• Cost to income ratio 
Judgment 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
Low 
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Each bank has realized that change is the only constant, hence 
has to be managed by up skilling the directors and employees 
argued interviewee 33. FirstRand ranked first in almost all 
categories followed by Absa, Standard Bank and Nedank last. 
EPS was not used as a measure of effectiveness as it is 
influenced by accounting shenanigans and as reflected the 
ranking is directly opposite to the other tools. As a result of 
Nedbank’s growth in cash reserves and cash generating 
capacity, its ranking moved from a country club board (document 
4: 57) to a representative board.  
 
5.10 Corporate governance and the financial crisis in SA and Zimbabwe 
 
The credit crunch, and the resulting crisis among leading financial 
institutions in Southern Africa, is increasingly presented as a crisis of 
corporate governance. However, although current problems are to an 
extent indicative of shortcomings in the global financial architecture, 
they should not be interpreted as reflecting dysfunction in the broader 
Southern Africa, USA and Europe corporate governance models where 
values-based principles are followed and governance is applied, not 
only in form but also in substance.  
 
Consequently, it is essential that Southern Africa policymakers focus 
their response to the crisis on the underlying sources of the problem, 
including any defects in the financial regulatory framework (both in 
Southern Africa and globally). Populist calls for more general legislative 
corporate governance reform must be treated with the appropriate 
caution (King III Report 2009). 
 
Critics of Southern Africa’s light regulatory touch often suggest that 
emulation of the more ‘robust’ US approach would improve corporate 
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governance standards, and thereby reduce the risk of systemic 
economic crises in the future. However, it is worth remembering that the 
US is the primary source of the current financial crisis. SOX – with all of 
its statutory requirements, for rigorous internal controls – have not 
prevented the collapse of many of the leading names in US banking 
and finance (King III Report 2009). The introduction of the National 
Credit Act (NCA) 34 of 2005 assisted in reducing the level of exposure, 
hence minimized the impact of the credit crunch in Southern Africa. 
There has not been any bank failure in South Africa and Zimbabwe 
since the advent of the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
5.11 New and useful knowledge – King 3 Report 2009 
 
“Profit is an opinion, while cash is a fact.” The argument by (Muth and 
Donaldson 1998: 5 - 28), of using the conventional methods of 
measuring effectiveness was found not to be sufficient as they do not 
measure the generation of cash, which is a true measurement of wealth 
and value creation. The growth in shareholder value is measured by the 
growth in cash reserves, price earnings ratio (PE) and dividend growth 
argued interviewee 19. 
 
The conventional ratios do not calculate the growth in cash but only 
profit and dividend growth, which are subject to manipulation. Liquidity 
calculation is an important factor in identifying the growth of shareholder 
value. To support this argument the researcher used a new concept 
“CFROTA” and cash flow to debt ratio in this document in order to test 
whether the increase in cash increases shareholder value and whether 
this will be a correct measure of shareholder value growth. A null 
hypothesis is correct, that the conventional accounting measurement 
tools are not sufficient measurement of shareholder value growth and 
effectiveness of directors as they exclude the cash component, while 
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IDs and NEDs are required for the effective functioning of the board, 
through their watchdog, trustee and strategy formulation functions. 
CFROTA and the scorecard are important tools to use when measuring 
performance and effectiveness of boards of directors in the banks. 
 
5.11.1 Leadership, sustainability and corporate citizenship 
 
The philosophy of this research revolves around leadership, 
sustainability and corporate citizenship. To facilitate an 
understanding of the thought process, debate and changes, 
the King III Report (2009), highlighted key aspects of 
corporate governance: 
 
I. Good governance is essentially about effective 
leadership. Leaders should rise to the challenges of 
modern governance. Such leadership is characterised by 
the ethical values of responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency and based on moral duties that 
find expression in the concept of Ubuntu. Responsible 
leaders direct company strategies and operations with a 
view to achieving sustainable economic, social and 
environmental performance. 
II. Sustainability is the primary moral and economic 
imperative of the 21st century. It is one of the most 
important sources of both opportunities and risks for 
businesses. Nature, society, and business are 
interconnected in complex ways that should be 
understood by decision-makers. Most importantly, current 
incremental changes towards sustainability are not 
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sufficient – we need a fundamental shift in the way 
companies and directors act and organise themselves. 
III. The concept of corporate citizenship which flows from the 
fact that the company is a person and should operate in a 
sustainable manner. Sustainability considerations are 
rooted in the South African and Zimbabwean 
Constitutions which are the basic social contract that 
South Africans and Zimbabweans have entered into. The 
Constitutions imposes responsibilities upon individuals 
and juristic persons for the realisation of the most 
fundamental rights. 
 
The King III Report (2009) highlighted three key aspects of 
corporate governance which are important for sustainability 
and value creation for the banks. Good governance, 
sustainability and corporate citizenship are all impeded in the 
Ubuntu concept and for any bank to gain competitive 
advantage, these recommendation are critical tools. 
 
5.11.2 The link between governance principles and law 
 
There is always a link between good governance and 
compliance with law. Good governance is not something that 
exists separately from the law and it is entirely inappropriate to 
unhinge governance from the law. The starting point of any 
analysis on this research is the duty of directors and officers to 
discharge their legal duties. These duties are grouped into two 
categories, namely: the duty of care, skill and diligence, and the 
fiduciary duties. As far as the body of legislation that applies to 
a company is concerned, corporate governance mainly involves 
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the establishment of structures and processes, with appropriate 
checks and balances that enable directors to discharge their 
legal responsibilities, and oversee compliance with legislation. 
 
In addition to compliance with legislation, the criteria of good 
governance, governance codes and guidelines will be relevant 
to determine what is regarded as an appropriate standard of 
conduct for directors. The more established certain governance 
practices become, the more likely a court would regard conduct 
that conforms with these practices as meeting the required 
standard of care. Corporate governance practices, codes and 
guidelines therefore lift the bar of what are regarded as 
appropriate standards of conduct. Consequently, any failure to 
meet a recognised standard of governance, albeit not 
legislated, may render a board or individual director liable at 
law. 
 
5.12 Expansion of knowledge and models 
 
Personal mastery developed during the period of this project is 
irrelevant if it’s not utilized and shared in the communities. The Ubuntu 
model is a theory that requires expansion and development especially 
in non-African jurisdiction. The project will benefit countries like the USA 
where company failures are becoming normal. The Unity for Africa on 
CG, Business Schools and companies the researcher will be advising 
will benefit from the models developed here (CFROTA, Ubuntu, 
Stewardship and Stakeholder Theories) will be used as the foundation 
of good CG.  
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5.13 Summary of Findings 
 
“High performance operating processes are necessary but not sufficient 
for enterprise success (Kaplan and Norton 2008: 1). You can have the 
best processes in the world, but if your governance process does not 
provide the direction and course correction required to achieve your 
goals, success is a matter of luck.” The most successful bank is the one 
with sound governance process, where there is little information 
asymmetry and less complains from all stakeholders. FNB proved 
(quantitatively and qualitatively) that owner managed banks who follow 
the rules, can lead the pack as evidenced from documents 3, 4 and 5, 
which shows the evidence that shareholder activism is a an important 
theme  for the bank to achieve better performance and value creation. 
 
Promoters of the bank have the vision of where and how they would like 
to position the bank. Their involvement in decision making and policy 
formulation is critical for the success of the bank. Reduction of agency 
costs from the governance process can improve protection of 
stakeholder interests when shareholders are involved in the 
administration of the bank. The opportunistic self – interest assumption 
of agency theory, claiming that managers are motivated by “a need to 
achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through successfully performing 
inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility, authority and 
thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses’’ (Davis et al 1997: 20). 
Hugg (1998), Stiles and Taylor (2001) supported this perspective saying 
it recognizes a range of non-financial motives for managerial behaviour 
and it supports the active school, arguing that the strategic role of the 
board contributes to this overall stewardship of the company. Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) agree with above researchers saying that insider – 
dominated boards contribute a depth of knowledge, expertise and 
commitment to the firm which facilitates an active strategic role. 
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Until we see the board’s role being professionalized and the supremacy 
of the board being reasserted, we shall not restore full shareholder 
confidence in business, public leaders or the markets (Garratt 2003: 1). 
While the management literature is accepting the value of performance 
appraisals, there is disagreement in the governance literature as to the 
role, value and contribution of board appraisals to board effectiveness 
(Ingley and Van Der Walt 2002). Typically, performance evaluation is 
concerned with assessing board function and processes which will bring 
back the confidence. TSE guideline 5 provides that, “every board of 
directors should implement a process to be carried out by the 
nominating committee or audit committee for assessing the 
effectiveness of the board as a whole, the committees of the board and 
the contribution of individual directors” (Kazanjin 2000). 
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6 King III Recommendations 
 
 
The researcher participated in the development of The King III Report 
(2009) which recommended that:  
I. Inclusivity of stakeholders is essential to achieving sustainability and 
the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders must be 
taken into account in decision-making and strategy. 
 
II. Innovation, fairness, and collaboration are key aspects of any 
transition to sustainability – innovation provides new ways of doing 
things, including profitable responses to sustainability; fairness is 
vital because social injustice is unsustainable; and collaboration is 
often a prerequisite for large scale change. Collaboration should not, 
however, amount to anti-competitiveness. 
 
III. Social transformation and redress from colonialism are important 
and should be integrated within the broader transition to 
sustainability. Integrating sustainability and social transformation in a 
strategic and coherent manner will give rise to greater opportunities, 
efficiencies, and benefits, for both the company and society. 
 
IV. King III explicitly required companies to implement the practice of 
sustainability reporting as a core aspect of corporate governance. 
Since 2002, sustainability reporting has become a widely accepted 
practice and South Africa and Zimbabwe are emerging market 
leaders in the field (partially due to King II and the emergence of 
initiatives such as the JSE, ZSE’s Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) index which was the first of its kind in an emerging market). 
King III supports the notion of sustainability reporting, but makes the 
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case that whereas in the past it was done in addition to financial 
reporting it now should be integrated with financial reporting. 
 
All the major banks are compliant with the King III Report (2009) as 
stated above. There are a few areas of CG that makes the banks 
perform differently which each board need to look at. As per the findings 
FNB has the most effective board followed by ABSA, Standard Bank 
and Nedbank respectively. Three of the tasks in this area of research 
held significant association with bank performance. Thus, boards more 
disposed to acknowledge the potential to improve their abilities in 
determining the vision, values, aspirations, ethics and policies for the 
banks might expect to enjoy superior, ensuring financial performance. 
But, they were less sanguine about enhancing their performance in 
determination of bank objectives, even though their current practice on 
this task could be construed as counter-productive. 
 
The main investigation was on the main to look for the best possible 
way of measuring shareholder value, bank performance and board 
effectiveness. Two tools of measurement were found to be more 
suitable that is CFROTA and the scorecard. The traditional 
measurement tools were found to be insufficient as evidenced by the 
current financial crisis. If these were enough the credit crunch would 
have been detected beforehand, which could have prevented Lehman 
Brothers from collapsing. 
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7 Policy Options 
 
The analysis of banks has shown that IDs and NEDs are important 
components of the bank’s governance process as evidenced by their 
contribution in each bank. They have a legal and professional obligation to 
assist in the formulation of strategies in the bank. The problem is the time 
they have for the bank with its complex structure, hence document 2 raised 
the behaviour of the board of (Enron 2002) that, “we were meant to believe 
….. we were misled by management.” Although they have a legal obligation 
to manage risk and improve transparency, their major limiting factor is time 
available to them in order to understand how banks function. 
 
It was agreed with the Chairman of the King 3 Report (interviewee 35) 
(Appendix 10) that executives must take responsibility of the risks of the 
operations of the bank not to pass the responsibility to IDs, NEDs, or auditors 
as they have the stewardship responsibility. Shareholders need to rely on the 
judgement and honest of the executive directors; (document 3: 43; Freeman 
1984) also supported this argument. The board meet at most four times a 
year (excluding sub-committee meetings) this has been observed to be 
insufficient time. The author therefore proposes that the IDs and NEDs be 
used as a consultative board to advise the executives as a result of their 
expertise. 
 
7.1 Auditors and Audit Committees 
 
The current UK (ISS Corporate Governance Policy 2008) states that 
any change of auditors, whether agreed by the board as part of a 
periodic planned review or for any other reason, should be explained 
and justified to shareholders. Auditors have been the trustees of 
shareholders wealth since the separation of ownership and control, but 
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they have also caused governance problems (Enron 2002, WorldCom 
200, TA Bank of Southern Africa, Trust Bank and document 2: 
Appendix 1) argued interviewee 33. In an effort to reduce risk, the ISS 
Governance policy has proposed new changes including periodic re-
tendering (to maintain auditor objectivity), auditor’s limited liability and 
auditor rotation but this has not worked argued interviewees 35 and 
36. These changes have failed to bring sanity in the governance 
processes as in some cases auditors have short changed 
shareholders, hence the involvement of audit committees is very 
critical for safeguarding shareholder value. 
 
Audit committees are sub-committees of the board responsible for 
assessing the effectiveness of internal controls, risk and 
implementation of strategies. They are supported by the internal audit 
function who reports directly to the Chairperson of the Audit 
Committee. Their role, the author proposes that be enhanced so that 
they take over most of the responsibilities of the external audit.  
 
As a result of the complex nature of banks, it takes time for external 
auditors to understand how banks operate and the level of knowledge 
required understanding its functions as a whole. Internal audit should 
be well resourced so that they take the responsibility of managing risk 
in the bank as they spend more time and they are employees of the 
bank. It is to their interest that banks secure their continued 
employment. In order to avoid bullying by management, the head of 
internal audit should report directly to the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee who is not an employee of the bank. This will improve 
transparency and reduce risk as a result of constant internal control 
reviews by staff with knowledge of the operations of the bank. 
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7.2 Regulatory Framework 
 
Changes about to be implemented as a result of the review of the 
Companies Act will have the same negative impact that was caused 
by the (Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002) argued interviewee 33. The 
responsibility and risk that IDs and NEDs carries will result in skilled 
potential board members declining appointment as they cannot have 
personal liability in organizations they do not manage. This change will 
affect the level of skills at board level which will negatively affect 
performance of companies argued interviewee 18. The author then 
recommends a deregulation of the financial service sector to allow free 
market play as continuously regulating the industry will affect 
performance and at the same time losing investor confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
156 
 
8 Research Integration 
 
Experience and social systems are the major triggers that activate the 
mechanisms on the conceptual framework, in order for the bank to follow the 
CG principles, which will result in better corporate performance that add 
value to shareholders argued interviewees 33, 34, 35 and 36. Key to better 
CG lies in the working relationships between executive directors, 
shareholders, managers, IDs and NEDs in the social dynamics of board 
interaction and in the competence, integrity and constructive involvement of 
individual directors (Nadler 2004: 102 and Leblanc 2004: 437).  IDs and 
NEDs are not necessary as they do not know what is happening in the bank 
due to their limited time they have for the bank and their dependence on 
information from the CEO (Mace 1971 and Herman 1981). Demb and 
Neubauer (1992: 51) disagreed saying that IDs and NEDs have three 
responsibilities of being the watchdog, trustees and pilots of strategy 
formulation. They argued that the boards of today are directed by their 
professional conduct which requires them to act ethically and professionally. 
They therefore comply with the requirements of the code of best practice. 
There is strong dependency on all stakeholders to be involved in the 
governance process especially those (audit committees) that assist in 
improving transparency. These board dynamics produced the findings that 
the governance of banks is a process which requires many variables for a 
board to be effective, which creates capacity to be able to meet set 
objectives. 
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8.1 Banks Corporate Governance Process 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1: Effective bank linkages - results of this study 
 
The process of board effectiveness is triggered by the level of skills and 
experience at board level argued interviewee 19. Document 3 quoted 
Garratt (2003) as an advocate for a learning and innovative board, 
which are the results of this research. Figure 8-1 is a consolidation of all 
the findings (qualitative and quantitative). The regulatory framework, 
four effects and five components discussed above are the baseline that 
triggers the eight themes (Ubuntu practice) to create an effective board. 
Appendix 7, 8 and 9 findings supports this tool as a tool that can be 
used to audit existence and effectiveness of the corporate governance 
systems in the banks. 
 
8.2 Reflective Critique 
 
There was agreement among the NEDs interviewed that decision 
management that is initiation and implementation of strategies is an 
executive function, whereas decision control that is ratification and 
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monitoring is IDs and NEDs’ function. Once there is a clear 
understanding of these roles, transparency will improve argued 
interviewee 18. 
 
The role of auditors failed in this research to yield results that support 
the cost that comes with their engagement (Appendix 1 to 4). Legally 
every public company is required to have auditors, but there has been 
little research that assesses their effectiveness and whether they add 
shareholder value. According to (Turnbull 2006) auditors cannot be 
independent as they have an interest in auditing the bank. This will be 
left for further research, but the current information suggests that 
auditors support negative trigger on the conceptual framework as the 
increase in audit fees does not support the value creation model. 
 
Man exists in a social cluster and has an interpersonal nature, a 
nature dependent on others to help define and distinguish. The strong 
communalist and interdependent nature of Ubuntu has established the 
virtues of patience, hospitality, loyalty, respect, sociability, and sharing 
among its adherents, which is in line with the stewardship theory. 
Individuals become entwined with other members of the family, clan or 
tribe over their lifetime in a series of obligations and expectations. The 
social value of interdependence is taught in many African proverbs, 
which needs to be taught in the corporate environment: 
• A man here, a man there means no fear. (We can achieve 
anything if we support one another.) 
• The sickness of the eye is the sickness of the nose. (Your 
neighbour’s problem is your problem.) 
• A neighbour is a sibling. (Care for your neighbours as 
family.) 
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The proverbs above indicate the strong bonds of intimacy, mutual 
support and interdependence found in true Ubuntu societies. This 
perspective recognizes a range of non-financial motives for 
managerial behaviour and it supports the active school (Document 2: 
30), arguing that the strategic role of the board contributes to this 
overall stewardship of the company argued (Hugg 1998: 101, Stiles 
and Taylor 2001). 
 
8.3 Summary 
 
The various process variables were cross tabulated with overall 
effectiveness using conventional accounting methods and CFROTA to 
see if linear trends emerged and the data from the various data sets 
could be treated as an effective way of measuring board effectiveness. 
CFROTA seems to be the most effective way of measuring bank 
performance, while the scorecard is the most effective way of 
measuring the effectiveness of CG practices in the banks. This was 
not the case for all variables, as they excluded calculation of cash 
flows, so in the subsequent stepwise logistic regression these 
variables were treated as categorical. The correlation matrix showed 
that all the process variables were significantly correlated with overall 
board effectiveness and with each other. The stepwise logistic 
regression analysis identified four process variables that best 
explained variances in overall board effectiveness. 
 
The researcher’s finding confirms that, Shareholder activism was 
observed to be an important attribute which enhance bank 
performance and improves as shareholders get involved in the board 
activities (Policy formulation). FirstRand was seen as a good example 
of an owner manage bank that has high corporate governance 
standards that has resulted in its success. IDs, NEDs and 
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management are appointed with no real power to function but wait for 
instructions from the owners argued interviewee 34. This was also 
common in document 2 and the reason why most banks failed. There 
are appointed to make the numbers with no authority argued 
interviewee 33. 
 
The evidence in support of this conclusion comes from (White et al 
2003) who argued that a higher liquidity is an indication of shareholder 
value. Accounting measurement tools have proved to be insufficient in 
measuring the effectiveness of the board as they do not measure the 
gearing and liquidity of the bank. Cash was found to be a true 
measurement of wealth as it is difficult to manipulate cash received 
argued (Barnes 2004: 91). A growth in cash is an indication of 
shareholder value growth.  
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9 Conclusion 
 
The board as an ultimate decision making body, formulate strategies but their 
performance cannot be linked to corporate performance although they take 
the overall responsibility for the bank’s performance (Dulewicz et al 1995). 
The decision making process is very critical for the success of any of the four 
banks, covering strategy formulation; execution and implementation are 
some of the factors that are important for the bank to improve performance. 
Board experience, skills, diversity and the up bring of board members 
(Ubuntu) has been observed to be important as to how board members 
respect different stakeholders. The research attempted to present a 
framework and processes (although not definitive) to assist researchers, 
boards, investors and other stakeholders to conceptualise how boards 
should work and how they create shareholder value. 
 
Ubuntu is seen as one of the founding principles of the new Africa’s 
governance (Figure 5.1), and is connected to the idea of an African 
renaissance and respect for each other and property rights (sections 3.6 and 
3.7). In the political sphere, the concept of ubuntu is used to emphasize the 
need for unity or consensus in decision-making, as well as the need for a 
suitably humanitarian ethic to inform those decisions. Ubuntu is essentially: 
“An ancient African worldview based on the values of intense humanness, 
caring, respect, compassion, and associated values ensuring a happy and 
qualitative human community live in a spirit of family” Stated (Broodryk 
2002). Ubuntu could also be described as a community-based mind-set in 
which the welfare of the group is greater than the welfare of a single 
individual in the group (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko, 1999:27). Individualism 
support self-centeredness, which promotes corruption, while Ubuntu is a 
concept that support togetherness, equal distribution of resources, 
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accountability to the community and the use of resources for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. 
 
Communalism is that of collective solidarity, meaning that individuals will 
focus their interests, activities, and loyalties of their own accord, in line with 
the group’s cause and well-being (Mokgoro, 1997). Each individual realises 
that he/she is part of a group and that the group depends on his/her skills, 
inputs, labour and loyalty in order to survive. The communalist lifestyle also 
places within each individual a strong sense of belonging – arguably one of 
the strongest needs in humans today. The communalist lifestyle thus 
provides each member a sense of purpose and security in relation to that 
group. The strong collective thinking of Ubuntu implies that the individual 
members of the group cannot imagine ordering their lives individualistically 
without the consent of his family, clan or tribe (Kwamwangamulu & Nkonko: 
1999:27). Ubuntu is enshrined in the principles of good governance, 
stewardship and good practice. 
 
This research sought to draw a lesson for designing major reforms of CG in 
the future. It recalls the key events leading to the recent seismic shift in CG 
policies applicable to African public corporations, and identifies the four 
sources of policy changes – the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, new listing 
requirements, governance processes, and judicial opinions (CG theories and 
about perennial CG issues). It presents a synthetic overview of the numerous 
reforms, which at the most general level aim to fix the audit process, increase 
board independence, transparency, performance and improve disclosure of 
information. It pauses to identify the vast territory of unchanged CG rules that 
are still left to state law, and then examines some of the empirical studies 
that bear on whether the governance reforms can be confidently predicted to 
have strong positive results for investors.  
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The research suggests an irony: studies about the impacts of the most costly 
reforms, those concerning audit practices and board independence, are fairly 
inconclusive or negative, while studies about proposals for shareholder 
empowerment and reduction of managerial entrenchment indicate that 
changes in these areas - which in general are only atmospherically 
supported by the SOX-related changes - could have significant positive 
impacts. Admittedly, the general evidence for mandatory disclosure does 
suggest that the new round of enhanced disclosures, which are only 
moderately costly, will have good effects. A new approach for the next crisis-
generated reform movement is based on the notion that bandwagons are 
unavoidable, but their motivating impact can be leveraged and their bad 
effects alleviated by good statutory design but not over regulation of the 
sector. 
 
Three of the tasks in this research held significant association with bank 
performance. Thus, boards are more disposed to acknowledge the potential 
to improve their abilities in determining the vision, culture, values, aspirations 
and policies for the business might expect to enjoy superior, ensuring 
financial performance.  They were less sanguine about enhancing their 
performance in the determination of bank objectives, even though their 
current practice on this task could be construed as counter-productive. The 
explanation could be that some boards are reluctant – perhaps by dint of 
inherited custom and practice – to concede that the route to better 
performance is reduction in their level of engagement …. by devolving more 
responsibility to management? 
 
It is hoped this research will assist boards, investors and researchers to 
investigate the complexities of boardroom life, assist policy makers develop 
laws and regulations which will improve firm performance and help boards 
and their advisors to develop and maintain effective boards. The role of 
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auditors in the shareholder value creation model requires further research as 
the belief that they add value needs to be tested against the cost of audit 
fees and corporate failures we have seen. 
 
‘The success of companies in the 21st century is bound up with three 
interdependent sub-systems – the natural environment, the social and 
political system and the global economy. Global companies play a role in all 
three and they need all three to flourish.’ This is according to Tomorrow’s 
Company, UK. In short, planet, people and profit are inextricably intertwined. 
A key challenge for leadership is to make sustainability issues mainstream. 
Strategy, risk, performance and sustainability have become inseparable; 
hence the phrase ‘integrated reporting’ which is used throughout this 
research. The achievement of best practice in sustainability and integrated 
reporting is only possible if the leadership of a company embraces the notion 
of integrated sustainability performance and reporting. There are some 
examples of visionary leadership in this area. Tomorrow’s Company for 
example, recognises that tomorrow’s global company should ‘expand its view 
of success and redefine it in terms of lasting positive impacts for business, 
society and the environment’. Sustainability is, however, about more than just 
reporting on sustainability. It is vital that companies focus on integrated 
performance. The board’s role is to set the tone at the top so that the 
company can achieve this integrated performance. 
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ABSA background 
 
1991 signified the formation of Amalgamated Banks of South Africa 
Limited (Absa) through the merger of UBS Holdings, the Allied and 
Volkskas Groups, and certain interests of the Sage Group. The 
merger was after the near collapse of UBS in 1990. 
In 1992 Absa acquired the entire shareholding of the Bankorp 
Group (which included TrustBank, Senbank and Bankfin), thereby 
extending its asset base even further. In 1997 the name of the 
holding company, Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Limited was 
changed to Absa Group Limited, consisting of three main operating 
divisions. 
  
In 1998 the United, Volkskas, Allied and TrustBank brands were 
consolidated into a single brand, and Absa adopted a new 
corporate identity. In 2005, Barclays, acquired a majority stake in 
Absa as part of its drive to expand its global product and 
international retail and commercial banking businesses in attractive 
markets outside the United Kingdom. 
 
The Absa Group Limited (Absa), listed on the JSE Limited, is one of 
South Africa's largest financial services groups offering a complete 
range of banking, bancassurance and wealth management 
products and services. Absa's business is conducted primarily in 
South Africa and on the Africa continent, where it has equity 
holdings in banks in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
and other countries including United Kingdom, Germany and 
Singapore. 
  
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
180 
 
At 31 December 2006, Absa had assets of R495 billion, more than 
749 physical outlets in SA, 8, 4 million customers, 7 053 automated 
teller machines and 35,154 permanent employees www.absa.co.za. 
Absa employs a customer-centric business model with targeted 
business units serving specific market segments. The Group 
interacts with its customers through a combination of physical and 
electronic channels. Absa become a subsidiary of Barclays Bank 
PLC on 27 July 2005, when Barclays acquired a controlling stake in 
the Absa Group. Barclays is an international financial services 
group engaged in retail and commercial banking, credit card 
issuing, investment banking, wealth management and investment 
management services. 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated income statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
 
   
Net interest income 
 
14,941 9,341 
  Interest and similar income 29 38,368 23,037 
  Interest expense and similar charges 30 -23,427 -13,696 
Impairment loses on loans and advances 7 -1,573 -569 
Net interest income after imparement loses on loans and advances 13,368 8,772 
Net fee and commission income  10,374 7,086 
  Fee and commission income 31 10,951 7,441 
  Fee and commission expense 31 -577 -355 
Net insurance premium income 32 2,994 1,948 
Net insurance claims and benefits paid 33 -1,319 -797 
Changes in insurance and investment liabilities 34 -748 -526 
Gains and losses from banking and trding activities 35 1,347 855 
Gains and losses from investment activities 36 1,916 1,259 
Other operating income 37 938 548 
Operating income before expenses  28,870 19,145 
Operating expenditure  -17,566 -12,211 
  Operating expenses 38 -16,620 -11,433 
  Impairments 40 -75 -54 
  Indirect taxation 41 -871 -724 
Share of retained earnings from associates and joint ventures 12 113 101 
Operating profit before income tax  11,417 7,035 
Taxation expense 42 -3,151 -2,191 
Profit for the year  8,266 4,844 
    
Attributable to: 
   
  Ordinary equity holders of the group  8,105 4,776 
  Minority interest - ordinary shares  88 68 
  Minority interest - preference shares  73 0 
  
8,266 4,844 
  
  
Basic EPS (cents) 43 1,216.8 721.4 
Diluted EPS (cents) 43 1,154.4 692.7 
Headline earnings 44 7,872.0 4,902.0 
Headline EPS (cents) 44 1,181.8 740.4 
Diluted headline EPS (cents) 44 1,121.3 710.9 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2006    
 
Note 2006 2005 
Assets 
   
Cash, cash balances  2 16,461 15,036 
Statutory liquid asset portfolio 3 20,829 16,289 
Loans and advances to banks 4 21,800 20,805 
Trading assets 5 17,983 23,450 
Hedging assets 5 676 396 
Loans and advances to customers 6 386,174 306,856 
Reinsurance assets 9 390 423 
Other assets 10 12,175 6,762 
Investments 11 13,798 9,904 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 12 693 895 
Intangible assets 13 230 191 
Property and equipment 14 3,750 3,451 
Current tax assets 15 24 17 
Deferred tax assets 16 129 86 
Total assets 
 
495,112 404,561 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Liabilities 
   
Deposits from banks 17 35,156 25,745 
Trading liabilities 18 23,484 20,915 
Hedging liabilities 18 1,902 486 
Deposits due to customers 19 368,449 303,945 
Current tax liabilities 20 1,181 417 
Liabilities under investment contracts 21 5,129 3,459 
Policyholder liabilities under insurance contracts 22 3,187 2,736 
Borrowed funds 23 8,420 6,483 
Other liabilities and sundry provisions 24 10,746 11,812 
Deferred tax liabilities 16 2,537 2,562 
Total liabilities 
 
460,191 378,560 
    
Equity 
   
Capital and reserves 
   
Attributable to ordinary equity holders:    
  Share capital 26 1,338 1,327 
  Share premium 26 2,067 1,875 
  Other reserves 28 412 622 
  Retained earnings  27,876 21,931 
  
31,693 25,755 
Minority interest - ordinary shares  236 246 
Minority interest - preference shares 27 2,992 0 
Total Equity 
 
34,921 26,001 
    
Total Equity and Liabilities 
 
495,112 404,561 
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ABSA Group    
    
Consolidated cash flow statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
Note 2006 2005 
Cash flow from operating activities 
   
Interest and commissions received  25,156 15,962 
Insurance premiums and claims  1,675 1,070 
Net trading and other income  1,827 1,239 
Cash payments to employees and suppliers  -15,581 -10,698 
Income taxes paid 45 -3,333 -2,199 
Cash flow from operating profit before changes in      
operating assets and liabilities  9,744 5,374 
  Net decrease/inrease in trading securities  5,187 -1,895 
  Net increase in loans and advances to customers  -80,891 -54,425 
  Net increase in other assets  -16,464 -3,895 
  Net increase in insurance and investment funds  1,373 1,520 
  Net decrease/increase in trading liabilities  3,985 -237 
  Net increase in amounts due to customers and banks  73,915 52,374 
  Net decrease/increase in other liabilities  -865 2,124 
Net cash (utilized)/generated from operating activities -4,016 940 
    
Cash flow from investing activities 
   
Purchase of property and equipment 14 -1,150 -972 
Proceeds from sale of property and equipment  120 192 
Purchase of intangible assets 13 -149 -47 
Proceeds from disposal of intangible assets  7 0 
Acqusition of subsidiaries, net of cash 54 -44 0 
Disposal of subsidiaries, net of cash 54 -133 0 
Disposal of associates, net of cash  745 54 
Acquisition of associates, net of cash  -174 0 
Net (increase/decrease in securities  -1,564 2,749 
  
-2,342 1,976 
Cash flow from financing activities 
   
Issue of ordinary shares  197 281 
Issue of preference shares  2,992 0 
Share buy - back  -17 0 
Proceeds from borrowed funds and debt securities  2,000 1,500 
Repayment of borrowed funds and debt securities  -6 -750 
Dividend paid  -2,367 -2,401 
Net cash generated/(utilized) from financing activities  2,799 -1,370 
  
  
Net (decrease)/increase in cash and cash equivalents  -3,559 1,546 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year  8,343 6,796 
Effect of exchange rate movement on cash equivalents  3 1 
Total cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year 4,787 8,343 
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ABSA Group 
      
 
 
12 months 
Pro forma  
    
Statistics, Returns and 
Capital adequacy five 
year review December  December  March March March March 
 
2006 2005 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinaryshares 
in issue listed on the JSE 
(R000) 671,955 666,855 655,055 651,055 651,547 651,547 
Dividend cover (times) 2.5 n/a 2.8 3.8 3.6 2.5 
Dividend yield (%) 3.7 n/a 3.9 3.9 4.9 4.6 
Earnings yield (%) 9.4 9.4 
         
11.0  14.7 17.9 11.5 
Price earnings ratio (times) 10.6 10.6 9.1 6.8 5.6 8.7 
Price - to - book (times) 2.65 2.62 2.11 1.56 1.14 1.07 
Share price (cents) - high 12,615 10,320 8,150 4,700 3,651 4,155 
                            - low 9,650 7,125 4,320 3,000 2,500 2,410 
                            - closing 12,510 10,100 7,540 4,664 2,940 2,530 
Number of shares traded 
(.000) 35,926 33,492 27,892 17,931 13,894 12,081 
Turnover in shares traded 
(%) 
      
326,112      391,557  
    
455,513    457,727  
  
440,314  
  
365,926  
Market capitalization (Rm) 
     
84,061.6     67,352.4  
   
49,391.2  30,365 19,156 16,484 
Dividend cover (cents)          473.0  n/a 295.0       182.0  
      
145.0  
      
116.0  
       
Share statistics per 
ordinary share (cents)       
Basic earnings (cents)       1,216.8  950.3 831 697.5 520.5 260 
Headline (Cents)           7,872  6,282 5,394 4,447 3,441 1,888 
Diluted EPS (cents)       1,154.4  915.9 801.6 691.7 520.5 260 
Dividend paid (cents)          473.0  n/a 295.0 182.0 145.0 116.0 
Return on equity (%) 27.4 25.6 25.3 24.6 21.4 12.9 
Cost to income ratio 54.6 57.0 56.6 57.1 60 60.3 
       
Number of employees        35,154        33,543  
      
32,515      31,658  
    
32,356  
    
35,283  
Revenue per employee ® 0.87 0.76 0.70 0.65 0.56 0.46 
Expenses per employee ®           -0.47          -0.44  
        -
0.39        -0.37  
      -
0.33  
      -
0.27  
Headline earnings per 
employee ®  229.2 190.2 168.1 138.9 101.7 53.2 
Total assets (Rm) 495,112 404,561 347,161 306,848 269,064 247,300 
PBITDA 12,476 8,914 8,666 7,130 5,452 4,972 
Cash Generation 28,658 18,271 11,017 9,293 7,715 6,988 
Audit fees 69 129 70 49 39 32 
Revenue         30,443        25,590  
      
22,599  20471 17959 16078 
Profit for the year          8,266  6,337        4,596 3,461 1,306 
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5,494  
CFROTA 2.52% 2.20% 2.50% 2.32% 2.03% 2.01% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 5.79% 4.52% 3.17% 3.03% 2.87% 2.83% 
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FNB background 
 
FirstRand was created in April 1998 through the merger of the financial 
service interests of Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited 
(AAC) and RMB Holdings Limited (RMBH). The major companies involved 
at the time were the listed entities, First National Bank Holdings of 
Southern Africa Limited (FNBH) and the Southern Life Association Limited 
(Southern Life), which was controlled by AAC and Momentum Life 
Assurers Limited (Momentum), the holding company of Discovery Health 
Limited and Rand Merchant Bank Limited which was controlled by RMBH 
www.firstrand.co.za. 
 
Momentum was used as the vehicle to effect the merger. In terms of the 
scheme of arrangement, Southern Life and FNBH shareholders received 
675 Momentum shares in exchange for every 100 shares held. In addition, 
Momentum raised R5,1 billion by way of a rights issue in terms of which 
572,7 million shares were issued at a price of 900 cents per share. The 
purpose of the rights issue was to facilitate the elimination of cross-
holdings which existed between Southern Life and FNBH. Momentum 
changed its name to FirstRand Limited and was listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 25 May 1998. A day later a similar 
listing occurred on the Namibia Stock Exchange. The vision was to create 
a new group of companies structured with critical mass to take advantage 
of the convergence of banking and insurance products and services 
without the limitations imposed by minorities in operating companies. 
 
Following pressure from shareholders to concentrate their efforts on 
mining and resources related activities, AAC and its associate De Beers 
undertook to sell their shares when prices were appropriate. De Beers 
sold their shares in the open market, while AAC reduced their holding in 
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FirstRand from 20,4% to 5,25% following a deal with Remgro Limited. 
Remgro exchanged a portion of their newly acquired FirstRand shares for 
shares in RMB Holdings. This exchange allowed RMB Holdings to 
increase its holding in FirstRand from 25% to 32,83%. Remgro retained a 
9,32% interest in FirstRand. AAC disposed of the remainder of its shares 
over a period of time with the last of its shares being sold in December 
2003 www.firstrand.co.za. 
 
In February 2005 the Group sold an effective 10% interest in FirstRand to 
four broad-based empowerment groups, Kagiso Trust, Mineworkers 
Investment Trust (“MIT”), WDB trust and the FirstRand Empowerment 
Foundation (a newly created FirstRand BEE entity, with a mandate for 
broad-based transformation, and black South African FirstRand staff and 
non-executive directors. 
 
The Group selected its BEE partners because they share FirstRand’s 
objectives of enhancing broad-based BEE by addressing the needs of a 
wide constituency. In addition, the BEE partners have excellent 
reputations, successful track records and long standing relations with 
FirstRand and with each other, which will add value to shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
 
FirstRand represents a very different proposition to its peers in that it is the 
only fully integrated financial services group in South Africa. It is also the 
only one of the big-four South African retail, commercial and investment 
banking groups that is “owner-managed”. The three original founders, GT 
Ferreira, Paul Harris and Laurie Dippenaar are all still actively involved in 
the management of the Group and collectively management own 23% of 
RMB Holdings Limited which in turn owns 29.5% of FirstRand Limited. 
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A unique business philosophy 
  
The FirstRand business philosophy has been home-grown, developed and 
ingrained into the Group over the past 25 years and it has its roots in an 
entrepreneurial culture. At its heart is the understanding that people are 
the single most important resource and FirstRand aspires to create an 
environment that attracts and retains entrepreneurial self-starters. 
Although there is a bias for action, the Group aspires to act within the 
context of clearly thought through strategic and operational plans, 
hallmarked by innovative thinking which makes bottom line sense. 
  
Participative, non-hierarchical decision making in the context of vigorous 
debate of the business case, with no holy cows and no barriers to 
communication, lies at the core of the way it does business. This is the 
common value system on which the entire group operates. This 
philosophy creates a liberating owner-manager culture. Strategies are 
owned and delivered on by the profit centre leaders because they 
conceived them. Every one of the Group's many profit centers has a 
strategy to grow market share, revenues and earnings. Each CEO is 
empowered and incentivised to deliver better than his/her budget at the 
end of the year. The structure and business philosophy means that 
FirstRand has many growth stories for onwards argued Nxasana. 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated income statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
 
 Rm Rm 
Net interest income 
 
15,012 13,184 
  Interest and similar income 3 30,395 27,505 
  Interest expense and similar charges 4 -15,383 -14,321 
Impairment loses on loans and advances  -1,411 -706 
Impairment of advances - specific  -1,132 -756 
Impairment of advances - portfolio  -279 50 
Net fee and commission income 5 12,009 9,878 
  Net insurance premium income  14,088 11,835 
  Fee and commission expense  -2,079 -1,957 
Net insurance premium income 6 6,822 7,423 
  Insurance premium revenue  7,758 8,111 
  Premium ceded to reinsurers  -936 -688 
Net claims and benefits paid 7 -6,174 -8,861 
  Gross claims and benefits paid on insurance contrct  -6,875 -9,348 
  Reinsurance recoveries  701 487 
Net gains from banking and trading activities 8 4,349 2,187 
Net gains from investment activities 8 19,225 16,003 
Other operating income 8 2,268 1,715 
Increase in value of policyholder liabilities  -17,430 -13,447 
Fair value adjustment to financial liabilities 9 -530 -232 
Net operating income  34,140 27,144 
Operating income before expenses 10 -20,402 -16,836 
  Operating expenditure  -20,344 -16,825 
  Other impairments  -58 -11 
Share of profit of associates and joint venture companies  1,290 1,076 
Income before discontunuedd operations  15,028 11,384 
Loss on disposal of discontinued operations 37 0 -67 
Operating profit before income tax  15,028 11,317 
Taxation 11 -5,040 -3,610 
Profit for the year  9,988 7,707 
Attributable to: 
   
  Ordinary equity holders of the group  8,825 7,137 
  Minority interest - preference shares  274 68 
Total for equity holders of the company 
 
9,099 7,205 
  Minority interest - ordinary shares  889 502 
Profit for the year  9,988 7,707 
  
  
Basic EPS (cents) 12 171.6 137.3 
Diluted EPS (cents) 12 166.0 134.5 
Headline earnings  156.9 132.4 
Headline EPS (cents)  157.8 129.3 
Diluted headline EPS (cents)  152.6 126.7 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated balance sheet as at 31 December 2006    
 
Note 2006 2005 
Assets 
 
Rm Rm 
Cash and short term funds 13 30,323 24,890 
Money market investments  16,361 11,427 
Advances  291,076 221,851 
  - Originated  236,370 175,475 
  - Held to maturity  698 7,449 
  - Available for sale  538 1,648 
  - Elected fair value  53,470 37,279 
Derivative financial instruments 15 373,934 39,795 
  - Qualifying for hedge accounting  428 811 
  - Held for trading  373,506 38,984 
Investment securities and other investments 16 165,054 125,582 
  - Financial instruments held for trading  28,348 20,728 
  - Investment securities  136,706 104,854 
     * Held to maturity  998 2,880 
     * Available for sale  22,947 16,100 
     * Elected fair value  112,761 85,874 
Non-recourse investments  8,794 8,181 
Commodities 16 676 439 
Investment properties 17 6,141 4,172 
Policy loans on insurance contracts  118 0 
Policy loans on insurance contracts  0 530 
Reinsurance assets 18 292 236 
Insurance assets  1,766 1,881 
Loans and receivables 19 6,046 11,548 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 20 5,069 5,707 
Taxation  7 118 
Intangible assets 22 4,076 1,178 
Property and equipment 23 5,011 4,610 
Deferred taxation 24 1,043 594 
    
Total Assets  579,787 462,739 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Liabilities 
   
Deposits  317,840 245,793 
  - Deposits and current accounts  309,304 237,888 
  - Non recourse deposits 16 8,536 7,905 
Short trading positions 26 25,967 19,919 
Derivative financial instruments 15 22,370 30,264 
  - Qualifying for hedge accounting  257 249 
  - Held for trading  22,113 30,015 
Creditors and accruals  16,848 23,257 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
192 
 
Reinsurance liabilities  24 31 
Policyholders' liabilities under investment contracts 32 93,720 48,844 
Policyholders' liabilities under insurance contracts 33 40,740 49,001 
Liabilities arising to third parties 34 1,725 1,027 
Deferred revenue liability 35 248 0 
Post retirement funding liability 27 1,635 1,733 
Debentures and long - term liabilities 28 10,576 5007 
Provisions 29 2,407 1,567 
Taxation liability  1,024 185 
Deferred taxation 24 5,159 3,877 
Total liabilities  540,283 430,505 
    
Shareholders' equity 
   
Ordinary share capital and share premium 30 3,635 4,396 
Non-cumulative non-redeemable preference shares  4,519 2,992 
Distributable reserves  24,854 20,284 
Non distributable reserves  3,522 2,238 
Total shareholders  36,530 29,910 
Minority interest  2,974 2,324 
    
Total shareholders' equity and liabilities  579,787 462,739 
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FirstRand Group    
    
Consolidated cash flow statement for the year ended 31 December 2006  
 
Note 2006 2005 
Cash flow from operating activities 
   
Cash receipts from customers 38.2 54,053 47,451 
Cash paid to customers, employees and suppliers 38.3 -27,670 -28,013 
Dividends received  1,327 988 
Dividends paid  -3,651 -2,835 
Net cash flows from operating activities 38.1 24,059 17,591 
Increase in income earning assets 38.4 -98,204 -30,051 
Increase in deposits and other liabilities 38.5 80,280 22,249 
Net cash flows from operating funds  -17,924 -7,802 
Taxation paid 38.6 -3,257 -3,298 
Net cash inflow from operating activities  2,878 6,491 
    
Cash flow from investing activities 
   
Purchase of property and equipment  -1,329 -388 
Proceeds from disposal of equipment  105 0 
Purchase of investments  -46 -10,484 
Proceeds from disposal of investments  319 0 
Proceeds from disposal of subsidiary 38.7 67 1,019 
Purchase of associates  -269 -1,316 
Proceeds from disposal of associates 38.8 907 0 
Purchase of intangible assets  -36 -238 
Net cash outflow from investment activities  -282 -11,407 
  
  
Cash flow from financing activities 
   
Increase in/(repayment of) long - term borrowings  5,469 -693 
Proceeds from share issue  1,526 3,000 
Net cash inflow from financing activities  6,995 2,307 
Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents  9,591 -2,609 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year 38.9 36,317 40,253 
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year  45,908 37,644 
Cash and cash equivalents sold  -52 -1,335 
Cash and cash equivalents bought  828 8 
Total cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year 
 
46,684 36,317 
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FirstRand Group      
      
Statistics, Returns and 
Capital adequacy five year 
review      
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares in 
issue listed on the JSE (R000) 5634.1 5613.6 5476.4 5445.3 5445.3 
Dividend cover (times) 2.45 2.38 1.89 2.37 3.03 
Dividend yield (%) 3.9 3.97 4.51 4.58 3.73 
Earnings yield (%) 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Price earnings ratio (times) 10.78 10.56 9.23 8.50 9.24 
Price - to - book (times) 2.52 2.4 2.30 2.10 1.80 
Share price (cents) - high 2,120 1,480 1,049 815 905 
                            - low 1,365 965 725 597 615 
                            - closing 1,690 1,387 1,019 764 765 
Number of shares traded (.000) 2,771 2,044 2,256 1,986 2,018 
Turnover in shares traded (%) 95.22 77.86 55.80 41.71 41.66 
Market capitalization (Rm) 49,491 25,423 19,701 14,086 15,580 
      
Share statistics per ordinary 
share (cents) 
     
Basic earnings 171.6 137.25 109.3 86.2 82.5 
Diluted EPS 165.96 134.5 106.8 84.5 82.5 
Headline earnings 
     
  - Basic 157.79 129.29 110.3 92.5 86.9 
  - Diluted 152.6 126.7 107.7 90.7 86.9 
Dividend paid 65.99 55.1 46 35 28.5 
 - Interim 32 26.6 19.25 16.5 13.5 
 - Final 33.99 28.5 26.75 18.5 15 
Return on equity (%) 25.1% 25.2% 25.4% 22.6% 25.2% 
Cost to income ratio 53.8 56.6 56.9 57 55.5 
 
     
Number of employees 43 39 36 35 34 
Revenue per employee ® 707 705 650 640 633 
Total assets (Rm) 579,787 462,739 424,821 393,674 374,766 
PBITDA 16,376 12,471 7,711 5,712 4,516 
Cash Generation 24,059 17,591 16,312 15,431 14,678 
Audit fees 97 74 80 62 54 
Profit for the year 8,825 7,137 5,676 4,516 4,495 
Revenue  (Rm) 30,395 27,505 23,417 22,412 21,528 
CFROTA 2.82% 2.70% 1.82% 1.45% 1.21% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 4.15% 3.80% 3.84% 3.92% 3.92% 
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Nedbank background 
Nedbank Group Limited is a bank holding company, which operates 
as one of the four largest banking groups in South Africa through its 
principal banking subsidiaries, Nedbank Limited and Imperial Bank 
Limited, in which it has a 50,1% interest. The company’s ordinary 
shares have been listed on JSE Limited since 1969. In 1973, 
Nedbank Group Limited was formed from the merger of Syfrets SA 
and Union Acceptances Limited and Nedbank Limited. 
 
The group offers a wide range of wholesale and retail banking 
services through three main business clusters: Nedbank Corporate; 
Nedbank Capital; and Nedbank Retail. Nedbank Group focuses on 
southern Africa, with the group positioned to be a bank for all – both 
from a retail and a wholesale banking perspective. The principal 
services offered by the group are corporate and retail banking, 
property finance, investment banking, private banking, foreign 
exchange and securities trading. Nedbank Group also generates 
income from private equity, credit card acquiring and processing 
services, custodial services, collective investments, trust 
administration, asset management services and bancassurance. 
Imperial Bank focuses mostly on motor vehicle finance, which it 
markets through its Motor Finance Corporation (MFC) brand. In 
addition, it also offers property, medical and aviation finance. 
 
Nedbank Group’s head office is in Sandton, Johannesburg, with 
large operational centres in Durban and Cape Town, which are 
complemented by an extensive branch and support network 
throughout South Africa and facilities in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe. These facilities are operated through 
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Nedbank Group’s eight subsidiary and/or affiliated banks, as well as 
through branches and representative offices in London and on the 
Isle of Man to meet the international banking requirements of the 
group’s South African-based multinational and private clients. 
 
In August, 2006 the group unveiled its much anticipated black 
economic empowerment (BEE) transaction in Namibia which 
resulted in a broad range of black stakeholders acquiring direct 
ownership of N$308 million of the Old Mutual Group's Namibian 
businesses. The transaction incorporated three separate but inter-
dependent BEE transactions for the Old Mutual Group subsidiaries 
in Namibia, namely Old Mutual Namibia, Nedbank Namibia and 
Mutual & Federal Namibia. 
 
At the annual general meeting on 4 May 2005, shareholders 
formally approved the resolution to change the name of the holding 
company from Nedcor Limited to Nedbank Group Limited with 
effect from close of business on 13 May 2005. The group's BEE 
deal 'Eyethu' was announced. The deal broke new ground in the 
area of black economic empowerment as it was the first truly broad-
based deal to be announced with tens of thousands of 
stakeholders. Valued at more than R3 billion, a broad range of 
black stakeholders including employees, retail and corporate 
clients, community groups, strategic black business partners 
(Wiphold and Brimstone) and non-executive directors acquired a 
holding of 9,33 % in the group. 
 
2004 was a watershed year for the group as both structural and 
strategic changes were implemented to restore the performance of 
the group and lay a foundation for sustainable growth into the 
future. The group delivered on its commitments including: 
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• A thorough balance sheet clean-up and successful R5,15 
billion rights offer 
• Substantially reducing the bank's risk profile, including 
reduced foreign exchange exposure and volatility and reduced 
interest rate risk 
• Increased management accountability with management 
teams restructured and 70 out of the top 100 management in 
new positions 
• Implementation of a clear strategic direction with a three-year 
plan in place with detailed targets 
• A comprehensive restructure, following the strategy, which 
included a devolution of product, processes, credit and branch 
operations from the centre into the line units, the sale of non-
core assets and the decision to integrate Peoples Bank into 
Nedbank 
• The merger was delivered and the group is on track for annual 
synergy savings of R700 million; and  
• Improved management information systems and reporting, 
including improved activity justified transfer pricing, funds 
transfer pricing and capital allocation.  
On 1 January 2003 the new Nedcor Group was formed, combining 
Nedcor, BoE, NIB and Cape of Good Hope Bank into one legal 
entity. New management structures came into effect allowing these 
entities to become a fully integrated business. The group now has 
banking licenses for Nedbank, Peoples Bank and Imperial Bank in 
South Africa, Gerrard private Bank in the United Kingdom and 
several licenses in the rest of Africa and the Middle East. 
 
On 2 July 2002, the High Court gave its approval for Nedcor to 
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acquire all the issued shares and convertible debentures of BoE, 
thereby paving the way for the Nedcor/ BoE merger. This final step 
in the approval process meant that the formation of one of South 
Africa's leading banks with assets of more than R270 billion 
became a reality. This merger heralded a new era in the history of 
BoE and Nedcor. For BoE, it offered the opportunity to continue a 
long and proud tradition of banking excellence and personal 
service. For Nedcor, the financial expertise and the quality of BoE's 
people will continue to further enrich its offering to the public. NIB 
minority shares were acquired by Nedcor Limited in October 2002. 
NIB was delisted. Nedcor Bank Limited changed its name to 
Nedbank Limited in November 2002. 
 
Nedcor Limited and Old Mutual South Africa Limited announced the 
proposed merger of Permanent Bank and Old Mutual Bank to form 
a new banking operation focused on wealth management and 
financial planning in 2002. The merged operation is a custom-built 
bancassurance institution focused on the retail middle market in 
South Africa. Nedcor and Old Mutual each own 50 percent of the 
new bank. The new bank, operating as Old Mutual Bank, was to 
initially offer a full range of deposit and investment accounts, home 
loans, secured loans and other wealth management products. 
 
Nedcor Bank acquired FBC Fidelity Bank Limited in 2001. BoE 
Corporation Limited unbundled its shares in BoE Limited and then 
delisted. The unbundling by BoE Corporation Limited of its shares 
in BoE Limited and its subsequent delisting could maybe mentioned 
here, along with the unbundling by BoE Limited of its share in 
RMBH, and the sale of other non-core investments which resulted 
in the challenges that faced the bank in 2002/3. 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Income Statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Interest and similar income 8 28,521 23,234 
Interest expense and similar charges 9 -17,558 -14,705 
Net interest income  10,963 8,529 
Impairement loses on loans and advances 24.1 1,483 1,189 
Income from lending activities  9,480 7,340 
Non - interest revenue 10 9,468 8,469 
Operating income  18,948 15,809 
Total operating expenses  
 
11,886 11,017 
  Operating expenses 11 11,740 10,469 
  Merger and recovery programme expenses 12.1 0 155 
  BEE transaction expenses 12.2 146 393 
Indirect taxation 13 345 223 
Profit from oprations before non - trading and capital items  6,717 4,569 
Non - trading and capital items 14 124 701 
Profit from oprations   6,841 5,270 
Share of profit of associates and joint ventures 28.2 153 167 
Profit before direct taxation  6,994 5,437 
Direct taxation 15.1 1,933 1,140 
Profit for the year  5,061 4,297 
Profit attributable to: 
   
  Equity holders of the parent  4,533 3,836 
  Minority interest - ordinary shareholders  309 233 
  Minority interest - preference shareholders  219 228 
  5,061 4,297 
Basic EPS (cents) 16 1,135 966 
Diluted EPS (cents) 16 1,099 958 
Dividend paid per share (cents) 17.1 394 181 
Dividend declared per share (cents) 17.1 493 290 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Balance Sheetas at 31 December 2006  
  
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Assets 
   
Cash and cash equivalents 18 12,267 11,142 
Other short - term securities 19 25,756 17,014 
Derivative financial instruments 20.1 15,273 16,176 
Government and other securities 22 22,196 22,658 
Loans and advances 
23-
24 308,563 248,408 
Other assets 25 12,468 11,601 
Clients' indebtedness for acceptances  2,577 1,291 
Current taxation receivables 26 161 134 
Investment securities 27 7,155 6,875 
Non - current assets held for sale 29 490 385 
Investments in associates and joint ventures 28 907 657 
Deferred taxation asset 30 120 680 
Investment property 31 158 163 
Property and equipment 32 3,377 3,095 
Long - term employee benefit assets 33 1,444 1,225 
Computer software and capitalized development costs 34 1,266 1,320 
Mandatory reserve deposits with central bank 18 7,039 5,747 
Goodwill 35 3,695 3,687 
Total assets 
 
424,912 352,258 
    
Total equity and liabilities 
   
Ordinary share capital 36.1 395 402 
Ordinary share premium  9,727 10,465 
Reserves  14,994 11,623 
Total equity attributable to equity holders of the 
parent 
 
25,116 22,490 
Minority shareholders' equity attributable to:    
  - Ordinary shareholders  1,202 1,049 
  - Preference shareholders 36.2 3,070 2,770 
Total equity  
 
29,388 26,309 
Derivative financial instruments 20.1 12,904 17,055 
Amounts owed to depositors 37 324,685 261,311 
Other Liabilities 37.4 37,847 32,357 
Liabilities under acceptances  2,577 1,291 
Current taxation liabilities 26 434 466 
Other Liabilities held for sale 29 417 0 
Deferred taxation liabilities 30 1,649 959 
Long - term employee benefit liabilities 33 1,215 1,071 
Investment contract liabilities 38 5,278 4,166 
Long - term debt instruments 39 8,518 7,273 
Total liabilities 
 
395,524 325,949 
Total equity and liabilities 
 
424,912 352,258 
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Nedbank Group  
  
    
Consolidated Cash Flow Statement for the year ended 31 December 2006 
 
 
Note 2006 5005 
  
Rm Rm 
Cash generated by operations 43.1 9,297 6,898 
Cash received from clients 43.2 37,806 31,329 
Cash paid to clients, employees and suppliers 43.3 
-
28,561 -24,788 
Dividends received on investments  173 140 
Recoveries on loans previously written off  296 226 
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash 
equivalents  -417 -9 
Change in funds for operating activities  -3,739 2,023 
Increase in operating assets 43.4 
-
71,591 -17,986 
Increase in operating liabilities 43.5 67,852 20,009 
Net cash from operating activities before taxation 
 5,558 8,921 
Taxation paid 43.6 -953 -852 
Cash flow from operating activities  4,605 8,069 
    
Cash flow utilised by investing activities 
 
-1,057 -927 
Acquisition of property and equipment  -1,097 -750 
Proceeds on disposal of property and equipment  57 132 
Net disposal(acquisition) of investment banking assets  6 -228 
Net acquisition of investments in associates and other investments -273 -82 
Disposal of investments in subsidiary companies net of cash 43.7 286 1 
Acquisition of investments in subsidiary companies net of cash 43.8 -36 0 
    
Cash flow utilised by financing activities 
 
-1,131 -303 
Ordinary shares (repurchased/issued)  -745 581 
Increase/decrease in long - term debt instruments  1,245 -36 
Shares issued/repurchased by subsidiary company  150 107 
Dividends paid to ordinary shareholders  -1,562 -727 
Preference dividends paid  -219 -228 
    
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents  2,417 6,839 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of year  16,889 10,050 
cash and cash equivalents at the end of year 
 
19,306 16,889 
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Nedbank Group  
    
      
Five year review: Statistics and ratios 
    
 
2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinaryshares in issue listed on 
the JSE (R000) 
451,00
0 
443,00
0 
394,00
0 
275,00
0 
271,00
0 
Dividend cover (times) -56 -41    
Dividend yield (%) 3.7% 2.9% 1.5% 3.9% 4.6% 
Earnings yield (%) 8.3% 8.0% 6.2% 0.3% 8.8% 
Price earnings ratio (times) 12 13 16 326 11 
Price - to - book (times) 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.8 
Share price (cents) - high 13,950 10,280 7,999 11,850 15,400 
                            - low 9,790 6,700 5,240 5,640 9,500 
                            - closing 13,350 10,000 7,780 6,203 11,110 
Number of shares traded (.000) 191700 168100 245800 216000 143.8 
Turnover in shares traded (%) 48 42.3 68.1 73.7 56.8 
Market capitalization (Rm) 60.2 44.3 30.7 17.1 30.1 
Price earning ratio 12 13 16 326 11 
Dividend cover (cents) 2.25 2.75 4 0.1 1.9 
Cost to income ratio 58.2 64.8 71.8 80.2 65.4 
      
Share statistics per ordinary share (cents)     
Basic earnings (cents) 1135 966 423 -546 346 
Headline (Cents) 1110 797 483 19 979 
Diluted EPS (cents) 1099 958 422 -545 343 
Dividend paid (cents) 493 290 120 240 515 
Return on equity (%) 18.6% 15.5% 11.0% 0.4% 14.9% 
Price earning ratio      
 
     
Number of employees 24,034 22,188 21,103 24,205 25,240 
Revenue per employee ® 
788,38
3 
712,50
2 
664,69
2 
466,10
2 
415,76
9 
Expenses per employee ® 
494,54
9 
496,53
0 
518,36
2 
427,35
0 
288,59
0 
Headline earnings per employee ®  
184,53
0 
142,73
5 82,595 2,222 
111,48
6 
Total assets (Rm) 
424,91
2 
352,25
8 
327,84
0 
313,11
3 
324,76
7 
PBITDA 7,616 6,528 1,934 -2,826 -493 
Cash Generation 9,297 6,898 3,978 2,124 1,401 
Audit fees 60 68 64 66 31 
Profit for the year   5,061     4,297    1,882    -1,334  
    
1,078  
CFROTA 1.79% 1.85% 0.59% -0.90% -0.15% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio 2.19% 1.96% 1.21% 0.68% 0.43% 
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11.4 Appendix 4 – Standard Bank performance 
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Standard Bank background 
 
Standard Bank is a South African-based financial services company 
with a global presence. We operate from 17 African countries and 
21 countries on other continents, including the key financial centres 
of Europe, the Americas and Asia. Standard Bank was established 
as the Standard Bank of British South Africa Limited, and 
incorporated in London in 1862. The word "British" was dropped 
from the title in 1883. Standard Bank Group is listed on the JSE 
Securities Exchange, share code SBK. 
 
In 1962 The Standard Bank of South Africa (SBSA) was formed 
and registered as a South African company, operating as a 
subsidiary of Standard Bank in London (subsequently to become 
Standard Chartered Bank plc). Standard Bank Group was 
established in 1969 as Standard Bank Investment Corporation - the 
holding company of SBSA. Standard Chartered sold its 39% stake 
in Standard Bank Group in 1987, transferring complete ownership 
of the holding company to South Africa. 
 
The re-establishment of Standard Bank's African links began in 
1988, when a branch was set up in Swaziland. In 1992 the group 
opened a Botswana bank and acquired a major African operation: 
the long-established ANZ Grindlays network in Botswana, Kenya, 
Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with minority holdings in 
Ghana and Nigeria. 
 
The group has also continued to expand internationally. Standard 
Bank London was established in 1992 and in the same year 
operations in Jersey and the Isle of Man were acquired. Two years 
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later, the Isle of Man bridgehead was broadened considerably with 
the acquisition of Standard Chartered's banking activities on the 
island. Standard Bank also has a full branch in Taipei and full bank 
status in Russia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Brazil. Standard Bank 
Group completed the acquisition of Jardine Fleming Bank Limited 
(JF Bank) in July 2001. The group has a wide representation which 
spans 18 African countries and 21 countries outside of Africa with 
an emerging markets focus. 
 
Standard Bank's equity is widely dispersed compared to most other 
similar institutions in South Africa. The Public Investment 
Corporation is the biggest beneficial shareholder and holds 13,3% 
of its shares. Other large holders among the more than 25 000 
shareholders are Old Mutual (8, 9%), Tutuwa Group (7,6%), Liberty 
Group (2,8%), Investment Solutions (3,0%) and Sanlam Group 
(2,6%). Non-residents hold approximately 23, 2%. 
 
Standard Bank Group is one of the big four full-service South 
African banks. The group operates in a range of banking and 
related financial services. The group has a wide representation 
which spans 18 African countries and 21 countries outside of Africa 
with an emerging markets focus. 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Income Statement for the year ended 2006 
  
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Income from banking Activities  36,366 28,981 
Net interest income  16,654 13,015 
Interest Income 25.1 50,855 38,625 
Interest expense 25.2 34,201 25,610 
Nono - Interest Revenue 25.3 19,712 15,966 
    
Income from Investment and Life Insurance activities  59,344 53,066 
Net Investment premium 25.4 20,066 18,979 
Investment Income and Gains 25.5 37,568 32,240 
Management and Service fee income  1,710 1,847 
    
Total Income  95,710 82,047 
Credit Imparement Charges 25.6 2,733 1,207 
Benefits due to Policyholders  47,896 41,529 
Net Insurance benefits and claims  38,140 32,816 
Fair value adjustment to Policyholders' liabilities under investment 8,276 6,834 
Fair value adjustment on third party fund interests  1,480 1,879 
    
Income  after credit impairement charges and Policyholders' 
benefits 45,081 39,311 
Operating expenses in banking activities  19,652 16,441 
Staff costs 25.7 11,001 9,370 
Other operating expenses 25.8 8,651 7,071 
    
Operating expenses in investment and life insurance activities 6,486 8,006 
Acquisation costs - insurance and investment contracts  2,413 3,594 
Other operating expenses 25.8 4,073 4,412 
    
Net income before goodwill  18,943 14,864 
Goodwill Impairement 25.9 15 421 
Net income before associates and joint ventures  18,928 14,443 
Share of profits from associates and joint ventures 12 275 226 
Net income before indirect taxation  19,203 14,669 
Indirect taxation 27.1 841 778 
Profit before direct taxation  18,362 13,891 
Direct taxation 27.2 5,852 4,312 
Profit for the year  12,510 9,579 
  Attributable to minorities  1,723 921 
  Attributable to equity holders of the parent  10,787 8,658 
  Attributable to preference shareholders  269 226 
  Attributable to ordinary shareholders  10,518 8432 
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Basic EPS (cents) 29 864.5 699.7 
Diluted EPS (cents) 29 820.1 668.4 
Dividend per share (cents) 29 320.0 267.0 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Balance Sheet as at 31 December 2006 
   
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Assets 
   
Cash balances with banks 3 74,154 71,244 
Short term negotiable securities 4 29,175 25,931 
Derivative assets 5 100,832 101,502 
Trading assets 6 81,569 38,387 
Investments 7 186,896 147,146 
Investment property 8 13,200 12,637 
Loans and advances 9 448,411 338,773 
Loans and advances to banks 9 35,677 29,805 
Loans and advances to customers 9 412,734 308,968 
Current and deferred taxation 10 1,043 990 
Other assets 11 16,975 13,237 
Non - current assets for disposal 32 0 2,380 
Interest in associates and joint ventures 12 8,584 6,417 
Goodwill and other intangible assets 13 2,910 2,453 
Property and equipment 14 5,242 4,593 
Total Assets 
 
968,991 765,690 
    
Equity and liabilities 
   
Equity 
 
55,244 41,692 
Equity attributable to ordinary shareholders  43,326 32,931 
Ordinary share capital 15 136 135 
Ordinary share premium 15 2,303 2,107 
Reserves  40,887 30,689 
Preference share capital and premium 15 5,503 2,991 
Minority interest  6,415 5,770 
    
Liabilities 
 
913,747 723,998 
Derivative Liabilities  5 103,122 103,482 
Trading liabilities 17 36,790 21,462 
Deposit and current accounts 18 545,164 413,623 
Deposits from banks 18 48,374 27,584 
Deposits from customers 18 496,790 386,039 
Current and deferred taxation 19 7,880 6,926 
Other liabilities 20 34,323 23,759 
Non - current liabilities for disposal 32 0 1,267 
Policyholders' liabilities 21 168,898 140,835 
Subordinated debt 22 17,570 12,644 
Total Equity and Liabilities 
 
968,991 765,690 
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Standard Bank Group 
   
    
Consolidated Cash flow statement for the year ended 2006 
  
 
Note 2006 2005 
  
Rm Rm 
Operating Activities 
   
Cash receipts from customers 31.2 103,353 83,651 
Cash paid to customers, employees and suppliers 31.3 -83,559 -67,415 
Dividends received 31.4 3,969 3,075 
Net cash flows from operating activities 31.1 23,763 19,311 
    
Changes in operating funds 
   
Increase in income - earning assets 31.5 
-
147,418 -64,271 
Increase in deposits and other liabilities 31.6 142,993 90,457 
Net cash flows (used in/from) operating funds  -4,425 26,186 
Direct taxation paid 31.7 -5,176 -2,419 
    
Investing activities 
   
Capital expenditure - Property  -341 -395 
                             - Equipment, furniture and vehicles  -1,433 -1,153 
                             - Intangibles  -570 -203 
Proceeds from sale of - Property  103 124 
                                 - Equipment, furniture and vehicles  163 187 
Net sale of investment properties  617 281 
Net increase in investments by insurance operations  -12,915 -874 
Acquisition of minority share - unincorporated property partnership 0 -856 
Proceeds from sale of subsidiaries 32.1 1,321 0 
Net cash paid on acquisition of subsidiaries 31.8 0 -1,771 
Net disposal of reinsurance assets and other investments  0 73 
Increase in investment in existing subsidiaries  -267 -526 
Net increase in investment in associates  -189 -408 
Net cash flows used in investing activities  -13,511 -5,521 
    
Financing activities 
   
Proceeds from issue of share capital to shareholders  2,811 245 
Net proceeds from issue and repurchase of share capital to 
minorities 0 24 
Repurchase of company shares  -102 -679 
Increase in subordinated debt  4,682 2,966 
Dividends  -5,204 -4,610 
Net cash flows from/(used in) financing activities  2,187 -2,054 
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents 3,316 2,368 
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents  6,154 37,871 
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year  97,175 59,441 
Reclassified to non - current assets for disposal 32 0 -137 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of the year 31.10 103,329 97,175 
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Standard Bank Group 
      
       
Statistics, Returns and Capital adequacy seven year review 
   
       
 
Note 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Number of ordinary shares in issue listed on the JSE (R000)    
  - weighted average  1,358,415 1,353,382 1,245,786 1,334,099 1,328,192 
  - end of period  1,362,633 1,352,383 1,352,108 1,338,730 1,331,078 
Dividend cover (times)  2.5 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.2 
Dividend yield (%)  3.4 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.1 
Earnings yield (%)  8.4 8.8 8.5 12 13.1 
Price earnings ratio (times)  11.9 11.4 11.8 8.3 7.6 
Price - to - book (times)  2.6 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.5 
Share price (cents) - high  9,650 7,875 6,750 3,960 3,810 
                            - low  6,850 5,750 3,686 2,650 2,595 
                            - closing 21 9,450 7,581 6,580 3,918 3,015 
Number of shares traded (.000)  1,014,873 841,835 892,633 908,179 673,703 
Turnover in shares traded (%)  74.5 62.2 66.0 67.8 50.6 
Market capitalization (Rm) 22 128,769 102,524 88,969 52,451 40,132 
       
Share statistics per ordinary share 
(cents) 
     
Basic earnings (cents) 22 864.5 699.7 581.4 478.1 376.2 
Headline earnings (cents) 20 837.4 702.3 570.3 470.7 396.3 
Diluted EPS (cents)       
Dividend paid (cents) 25 320 267 231.5 151 124 
Return on equity (%)  25.2 25.2 24.2 22.9 20.3 
Cost to income ratio  53.5 56.1 57.5 56.3 57.4 
Price earnings ratio       
Return on ordinary shareholders' equity (%) 25.2 25.2 24.2 22.9 20.3 
Number of employees       
Revenue per employee ®       
Expenses per employee ®       
Headline earnings per employee ®        
Total assets (Rm)  968,991 765,690 625,537 540,566 393,353 
PBITDA  19,463 14,474 10,200 8,946 7,467 
Cash Generation  23,763 19,311 16,550 12,743 10,577 
Audit fees  72 61 49 40 33 
Profit for the year  10,551 8,753 7,244 6,026 4,841 
Revenue (Rm)  129,911 107,657 99,831 95,840 89,192 
CFROTA  2.01% 1.89% 1.63% 1.65% 1.90% 
Cash to Total Assets Ratio  2.45% 2.52% 2.65% 2.36% 2.69% 
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11.5 Appendix 5 – Interviewee profile 
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ABSA Group 
 
1. Dr D C Cronje, Dcom – Non Executive Chairman 
Dr Danie Cronje is 59 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce (Dcom) 
and he is the chairman of ABSA Group since 1987. He is also the 
chairman for Sage Group, ABSA Foundation, ABSA Group Retirement 
Fund, and director of Idion Technology Holdings Ltd. His executive 
career dates back to 1975 when he joined Volkskas, where he held 
various positions in the Merchant Bank division. He became Deputy 
CEO subsequently CEO of ABSA after the name change until 1997. 
Danie has 31 years experience with ABSA. 
 
2. Dr S Booysen, CA (SA), Dcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Dr Steve Booysen is 42 years old with a Doctorate in Commerce and is 
Chartered Accountant. He is the CEO for ABSA Group since 2004. 
After completing his articles with Ernst and Young in 1983 he became 
a lecturer in accounting at the University of South Africa until 1988. He 
was appointed Senior Manager: Finance at TrustBank until 1994 when 
he was appointed General Manager: Group Finance at ABSA. He later 
joined ABSA Corporate and Merchant Bank where he rose to Deputy 
Operating Executive, the Group Executive Director before he was 
appointed Group CEO. 
 
3. J H Schindehutte, Bcom (Hons), CA (SA), HDip Tax – CFO 
Jacques is 46 years old and is the CFO for ABSA Group after joining 
the group in 1999 as Group Executive: Finance. He is responsible for 
Group Finance, office of the General Counsel, Group Economic 
Research, Investor Relations and Group Secretariat. He served his 
articles with Ernst and Young before joining Portnet and Transnet until 
1999. 
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4. Dr D Baloyi, PHD (International Education Development) – 
Independent NED 
Danisa is 50 years old and she is an Independent board member of 
ABSA Group since 2004. She currently sits on 8 boards and she is an 
Executive Director of the National Black Business Caucus. 
 
5. A S Du Plessis, Bcom, CA (SA), HDip Tax, AMP – Independent 
NED 
Attie is 62 years old and has been an Independent director since 1992. 
He chairs the Group Audit, Group Risk, Credit, and Board Lending 
Committees. He is also Chairman for Gencor Ltd, Sanlam Ltd, KWV 
Group Ltd and various other companies besides being an Executive 
Director for Sankop Ltd. 
 
6. L W Maasdorp, BA, Msc Economics – NED 
Leslie is 39 years old appointed in 2004 as a non-executive director 
representing the interests of the BEE Company Banke consortium. He 
is Chairman of Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority, South Africa Weather 
Services and sit on the boards of Coega Development Corporation, 
Johannesburg Property Company and Yard Capital 
 
7. T M C Sexwale, Certificate in Business Studies - NED 
Tokyo is 53 years old appointed to the ABSA Group board in 2001 
representing the BEE consortium Batho Bonke. He is the owner and 
Executive Chairman of Mvelaphanda Holdings Pty Ltd, Chairman of 
Northam Platinum Ltd, Trans Hex Group Ltd, Gold Fields Ltd, former 
member of the ANC National Executive Committee and Premier of 
Gauteng. 
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8. Group Secretariat – W R Somerville, ACIS, ACMA, Dip Corp Law 
William is 49 years old and is the Group Company Secretary since 
1990. 
 
FirstRand Group 
 
10  T Ferreira Bcom (Hons) B (B&A), MBA – Non Executive Chairman 
Gerrit is 59 years old and has been involved in the financial services 
sector since graduating from the University of Stellenbosch.  He started 
his career at the Bank of Johannesburg and was a co-founder of Rand 
Consolidated Investments (“RCI”) in 1977.  RCI acquired control of 
Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he was elected as executive 
chairman.  When RMB Holdings was founded in 1987 he was 
appointed chairman, a position which he still holds.  Following the 
formation of First Rand in 1998 he was appointed non-executive 
chairman.  He is a member of the Council of the University of 
Stellenbosch. 
 
Directorships 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee Remuneration committee. 
First Rand Bank Holdings – Chairman Glenrand MIB Momentum 
Group RMB Holdings – Chairman VenFin. 
 
11  L Dippenaar  CA (SA), Mcom – Chief Executive Officer 
Lauritz is 58 years old and he graduated from Pretoria University, 
qualified as a chartered accountant with Aiken & Carter (now KPMG) 
and spent three years with the Industrial Development Corporation 
before becoming co-founder of Rand Consolidated Investments 
(“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of Rand Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 
and he became an executive director.  He was appointed managing 
director in 1988, which position he held until 1992 when RMB Holdings 
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(“RMBH”) acquired a controlling interest in Momentum Life Assurers, 
the fifth largest insurance company in South Africa at that rime.   He 
was appointed as executive chairman of that company, a position he 
held until being appointed chief executive officer of First Rand in 1998. 
 
Directorships 
 
FirstRand – memberships Audit committee Executive committee – 
chairman 
Discovery Holdings – Chairman First Rand Bank Holdings Momentum 
Group – Chairman OUTsurance – Chairman RMB Asset Management 
RMB Holdings. 
 
12 P K Harris MCom – Chief Executive Officer 
 
Paul is 57 years old and has graduated from the University of 
Stellenbosch and joined the Industrial Development Corporation where 
he served for a number of years.  He was a co-founder of Rand 
Consolidated Investments (“RCI”).  RCI acquired control of Rand 
Merchant Bank (“RMB”) in 1985 and he became an executive director 
of the bank.  He spend four years in Australia where he founded 
Australian Gilt Securities (later to become RMB Australia) and returned 
to South Africa in 1991 where he was appointed deputy managing 
director of RMB.  In 1992 he took over as managing director and chief 
executive officer.  He has been chief executive officer of FirstRand 
Bank Holdings since July 1999. 
 
Directorship 
 
FirstRand – membership’s Executive committee 
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FirstRand Bank Holdings, Momentum Group, Remgro Limited, RMB 
Holdings. 
 
13 K C Shubane BA (Hons); MBA – Independent NED 
Khehla is 51 years old and graduated at University of the 
Witwatersrand.  Prior to this he was a student at the University of the 
North where his studies were terminated following his arrest for political 
activities, conviction and sentence which he served on Robben Island.  
Upon his released he was employed at Liberty Life for a short time. He 
served on various political organizations until joining the Centre for 
Policy Studies in 1988.  He is an author and has co-authored several 
political publications and is a member of the board of the Centre for 
Policy Studies. 
 
Directorship 
 
FirstRand memberships – Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee, FCB South African, Newhco, Nurcha, RMB Holding.  
 
14 J P Burger Bcom (Hons), CA (SA) 
Johan is 48 years old and he is the founding member of the bank. He 
has been with the bank since its incorporation as the CFO. 
 
15 S E Nxasana Bcom, Bcompt (Hons), CA (SA) – CEO FirstRand 
Banking Group 
Sizwe is 49 years old, he started his career at Unilever. In 1989, he 
established Sizwe & Company, the first black owned audit practice in 
Kwazulu Natal. In 1996, he became the founding partner of Nkonki 
Sizwe Ntsaluba, the first black owned national firm of accountants and 
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was national Managing Partner until 1998 when he joined Telkom SA 
as Chief Executive Officer. He held this position until 2005. 
 
His experience in the financial sector includes being a NED of NBS 
Boland Bank, DBSA from 1995 to 1998, and Chairman of Mesele-
Hoskens Insurance Group from 1994 to 1996. He joined the board of 
FirstRand Bank Holdings in 2003 and was appointed CEO from 2006. 
During the same year he was appointed a NED of FirstRand. 
 
Board membership: FirstRand Executive Committee, Zenex Trust 
 
16 N N Gwagwa BA (Fort Hare); MTRP (Natal); MSc (cum laude) 
(London); PhD (London) – Independent NED 
 
Nolulamo is 47 years old.  She worked as a town planner in the private, 
public and NGO sector between 1981 and 1986, whereafter she 
proceeded to further her studies.  In 1992 she joined the University of 
Natal as a senior lecture in the Department of Town and Regional 
Planning.  In 1995 she was appointed as a deputy director general in 
the national Department of Public Works, where she was responsible 
for the national public works programme and the transformation of the 
construction industry.  From 1998 to 2003 she was the chief executive 
office of the Independent Development Trust.  She is currently an 
independent development consultant. 
 
Directorship 
FirstRand – memberships Directors’ affairs and governance 
committee; Financial sector charter and transformation monitoring 
committee. 
ACSA, Development Bank of South Africa. 
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17 S  E N Sebotsa LLB (Hons); LSE; MA (McGill); SFA – NED 
 
Sonja is 34 years old.  Her studying areas were Law, Business and 
Economics.  She started her career in investment banking at Deusche 
Morgan Grenfell Johannesburg in 1997 working on M & A transactions, 
privatizations and BEE deals.  She left Deutsche Bank almost six years 
later, after having spent some time working in their London and Tokyo 
offices.  Leaving Deutsche Bank as a Vice President in late 2002 she 
took up an executive position with the WDB Group where her role 
largely involves negotiating and executing BEE transactions on behalf 
of the WDB’s sole shareholder, the WDB Trust. 
 
Directorship 
 
FirstRand – membership Directors’ affairs and governance committee 
Adcorp Holdings, Makalani Holdings, Paracon Holdings, Willis South 
Africa. 
 
18 M W King CA (SA); FCA – Independent NED and Chairman of the 
King 11 Report 
 
He is 69 years old. He graduated at the University of Witwatersrand as 
a lawyer.  He qualified as a chartered accountant with Deloittes.  In 
1961 he joined Union Acceptances and was deputy managing director 
from 1972 to 1974.  He left to join Anglo American Corporation of SA, 
and was finance director from 1979 to 1997.  He became executive 
deputy chairman in 1997, executive vice-chairman of Anglo American 
plc in 1999, and retired in May 2001.  He served on the board of 
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Barclays Bank DCO South Africa, whose name was changed in 1987 
to First National Bank of Southern Africa. 
 
Directorship 
 
FirstRand – membership Audit committee – Chairman Directors’ 
affairs and governance committee Remuneration committee. FirstRand 
Bank Holdings, African Rainbow Minerals, Sturrock and Robson 
Holdings, The Tongaat-Hulett Group 
 
Nedbank Group 
 
19 Dr R J Khoza, BA (Hons) Psychology (UNIN), MA Markerting 
Management (University of Lancaster), EngD (University of 
Warwick), IPBM-IMD (Lausanne), PMD (Havard) – Non Executive 
Chairman 
 
Reuel is 58 years old, a businessman, a director of companies, was 
appointed to the Nedbank board in 2005. He is a Chairman of Aka 
Capital, Nedbank Group, Corobrik, NEPAD Business Foundation and 
Murray and Robberts Cementation. He is also a board member of 
Nampak Limited, Protea Hospitality Group, Old Mutual Plc and Gold 
Reef Resorts Limited. Reuel is also a president of the Institute of 
Directors and in this capacity served on the King 11 Committee on 
Corporate Governance. He is founder of the Black Management Forum 
and former Chairman of Eskom.  
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20 M L Ndlovu, Dip LR (Unisa), MAP (Wits), EDP (North West), AMP 
(Havard) – NED Vice Chairman 
 
Maduke is 56 years old, was appointed to the Nedbank board in 1994. 
He is a director of 20 companies besides being a member of four 
committees. 
 
21 T A Boardman, Bcom, CA(SA) CEO 
 
Thomas is 58 years old, was appointed in 2002 to turnaround the bank 
after its near collapse. He was previously CEO and executive director 
of BOE Limited and before that he was a director of Boardmans and 
Sam Newman Limited and BOE International Holdings Limited and 
Northwind Investments. He is a NED of Mutual and Federal Insurance 
Company Limited a subsidiary of Nedbank and The Banking 
Association of South Africa. 
 
22 M Brown, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Financial Director 
 
Mike is 41 years old, after qualifying as a CA at Deloitte and Touche he 
joined NBS Treasury department in 1993. He then moved to BOE 
corporate as General Manager and was later appointed MD in 1999. 
After the merger of Nedbank and BOE in 2002 he was appointed MD 
of Property and Asset Finance. 
 
In June 2004 Mike was appointed FD and executive director of 
Nedbank Group. His area of responsibility include Asset and Liability 
Management, Group capital management, Tax, Financial reporting, 
and investor relations. 
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23 T C P Chikane, Bcom (Hons), CA(SA) Independent NED 
 
Thenjiwe is 42 years old, was appointed to the board in 2006 and she 
is the CEO of MGO Consulting. She was previously Head of the 
Gauteng Department of Finance and Economic Affairs and she is a 
board member of Development Bank of Southern Africa, PetroSA and 
State Information Technology Agency 
 
24 Prof B De Lacy Figaji, Bsc (Eng) Dip Tertiary Edu Med, DEd 
(Coventry University), DLitt (hc) (California) 
 
Prof Brian is 63 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002. Brian is 
the Chairman of HHO Africa Pty Ltd, I & J Limited, MARIB Holdings. 
He is a board member of PetroSA, Cape Lime Pty Limited, ASSET 
(Educational Trust) (Trustee), Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and a former Vice – Chancellor of the Peninsula Technikon. 
 
25 G T Serobe, Bcom (Unitra), MBA (Rutgers) 
 
Gloria is 48 years old, was appointed to the board in 2002 and she is 
the CEO of Wipcapital. She is the founder and executive director of 
WIPHOLD. She was previously the executive director, finance at 
Transnet and serves on the boards including JSE Limited, FSC 
Council, Old Mutual Life Assurance Company South Africa Limited. 
 
Standard Bank Group 
 
26 Cooper, CA (SA) – Non Executive Chairman 
Derek is 66 years old and was appointed Chairman since 1993. He is 
also Chairman of Standard Bank Africa, Liberty Group and Liberty 
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Holdings, Standard Bank Plc and president of Business Leadership 
South Africa. 
 
27 J Maree, Bcom, MA (Oxford) PMD (Harvard) – Chief Executive 
Officer 
Jacko is 51 years old and was appointed CEO in 1997. He is a director 
of Standard Bank, Liberty Group, Liberty Holdings, Stanbic Africa 
Holdings, SBIC Investments SA, Standard International SA and 
Chairman of Standard Bank Plc. 
 
28 S Macozoma, BA, (Unisa) BA (Hons) (Boston) - NED 
Saki is 49 years old, a businessman and he is a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of many companies including 
Standard Bank Group, The Standard Bank of SA, Liberty Group, 
Liberty Holdings, Deputy Chairman of Safika Holdings, Chairman of 
Andisa Capital, Cahirman of Business Trust, Chairman Lliso 
Consulting, Chairman of Stalib, Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 2 and VW 
South Africa. He sits on different committees within the companies he 
is a board member. 
 
29 C Ramaphosa, BProc (Unisa) - NED 
Cyril is 54 years old, a businessman and a board member of 12 
companies. He is a board member of Standard Bank Group, Standard 
Bank South Africa, Alexander Forbes, Macsteel Holdings, Mondi South 
Africa, MTN Group (Chairman), MTN International (Chairman), SAB 
Miller, SASRIA, Shanduka Holdings (Chairman), The Bidvest Group 
(Chairman) and Tutuwa Strategic Holdings 1 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
224 
 
30 Dr C Strauss, BA, PHD (Rhodes), MS(Cornell), AMP (Havard), 
FIBSA, DEcon (hc) (Rhodes, Dsc (hc) (Pretoria) 
 
Conrad is 71 years old and was appointed to the board of Standard 
Bank Group in 1984. He is a board member of Standard Bank Group, 
Standard Bank SA, African Oxygen and Hans Merensky Holdings. 
 
31 K Moroka, BProc, (Uni of the North), LLB (Wits) 
 
Kgomotso is 52 years old and was appointed to the board of Standard 
Bank Group in 2003. She is a director of Standard Bank Group, 
Standard Bank SA, Electronic Media Network (M-Net), Gobodo 
Forensic and Investigative Accounting (Chairperson) New Seasons 
Investments Holdings and South African Breweries. 
 
32 S Ridley, Bcom (Natal), CA(SA), AMP (Oxford) 
 
Simon is 51 years old and he joined the group in 1999 and was 
appointed Financial Director in 2002. 
 
 
Other Corporate Governance Practitioners 
 
33 Advocate J Myburgh 
 
John is 52 years old and trained as a lawyer and was admitted to the 
bench 32 years ago. He chairs a lot of boards and is a member of the 
SARB advisory board and he is a lecturer of law. 
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34 T Dixon 
 
Tony is 53 years old and he is an executive director of the IOD. He is 
an advisor and sits on different boards. Tony is also a lecture of 
Corporate Governance 
 
35 Prof Bob Garratt  
 
Prof Bob Garratt is the Chairman of the international corporate 
governance expert, author and professor extraordinaire at the USB.  
Prof Bob Garratt is a company chairman, consultant and academic 
working on corporate governance, board and director performance, 
and strategic thinking issues. He is based in London and works on five 
continents. His consulting experience of board and business issues 
covers organisations from large corporates to family businesses, 
professional practices, parastatals, non-profit organisations, central 
governments and local communities.  
 
He is a founder member of The Commonwealth Association for 
Corporate Governance. He is on the Chartered Accreditation 
Committee, Examinations Board, leads the Developing Strategic 
Thought programmes, and is an External Examiner of the Institute of 
Directors, London. He helped to form the China-EEC Management 
Programme in Beijing in 1983 (the first Chinese MBA), and The 
Learning Symposium group. He has worked with many financial 
services institutions including the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority on 
corporate governance for Banking Supervisors, and is working with the 
IMF in Washington on its governance.  
 
He is visiting professor at the Cass Business School, City University, 
London, where his work spans the Centre for Research in Corporate 
Governance, and the Centre for Leadership, Learning and Change. He 
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is professor extraordinaire at the University of Stellenbosch Business 
School.  
 
In 2002 he won the Shareholder Value corporate governance essay 
prize sponsored by the European Business Forum and PwC/IBM; and 
in 2004 The Academy of Corporate Governance, Hyderabad, Writing 
Excellence prize. His books include: The Fish Rots From The Head: 
The Crisis in our Boardrooms (1996 and 2003); Developing Strategic 
Thought (ed) (1994 and 2003); Learning to Lead (1991); The Learning 
Organisation: Developing Democracy At Work (2000); and Twelve 
Organising Capabilities: Valuing People At Work (2000). Thin On Top: 
Why Corporate Governance Matters was published in 2003. He is on 
the Editorial Advisory Boards of Journal of Business Studies; 
Development and Learning in Organisations; Action Learning, and 
Organisations and People.  
 
36 Prof Mervyn King  
 
Prof. King is a Senior Counsel and former Judge of the High Court of 
South Africa. He has chaired and has been a director of several 
companies listed on the Johannesburg, London and Luxembourg 
Stock Exchanges. He is chairman of the King Committee on Corporate 
Governance, chairman of the board of the Global Reporting Initiative, 
president of the Advertising Standards Authority, a member of the 
Securities Regulation Panel, past president of the Commonwealth 
Association of Corporate Governance, a former governor of the 
International Corporate Governance Network and a member of the 
Private Sector Advisory Group to on Corporate Governance the World 
Bank. He is professor extraordinaire in the College of Economic and 
Management Sciences at the University of South Africa. 
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37 King G Zwelithini 
King Goodwill Zwelithini was born in July 1948 at Nongoma in KwaZulu 
Natal. He is the eldest son of King Cyprian and his second wife, Queen 
Thomo. He was educated at the Bekezulu College of Chiefs and then 
privately tutored. He lived at his father's official residence at 
Khethomthandayo and received formal instruction in traditional Zulu 
customs. In 1968 his father died and a regent was appointed to look 
after the administration of the Royal affairs while Zwelithini completed 
his education. A heated debate ensued between the South African 
government and the KwaZulu royal family over the choice of regency.  
Zwelithini was installed as the eighth Monarch of the Zulus at a 
traditional ceremony at Nongoma on 3 December 1971, attended by 20 
000 people. The country's constitution made the King's role ceremonial 
and subject to the authority of the Chief Minister, Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi. Tensions arose between the two leaders. 
 
38 M G Buthelezi 
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was born on 27 August 1928 into the Zulu 
royal family. His mother was the daughter of King Dinizulu, and 
granddaughter of King Cetshwayo. His grandfather Myamana 
Buthelezi was Prime Minister to King Cetshwayo. As the first-born son 
he was first in line to the Buthelezi chieftainship. From 1934 to 1943 he 
was a pupil at the Impumalanga Primary School. He went on to study 
at Adams College in Amanzimtoti where he matriculated. 
Buthelezi studied History and Bantu administration at the Fort Hare 
University in 1948. It was at this University that his short-lived 
involvement in liberation politics developed. Here he met Professor Z K 
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Mathews (who was to make an impression on him) and through him, 
Robert Sobukwe, African National Congress (ANC) Youth League 
leader, and other African nationalist liberation leaders such as Robert 
Mugabe. In 1950 he took part in the student protests against the visit of 
Governor General G Brand Van Zyl, and as a result was expelled from 
the University. His academic progress was however not seriously 
hampered because the University of Natal allowed him to attend 
lectures and sit for the Fort Hare examinations. 
In 1951 he found clerical work in the Department of Bantu 
Administration. The following year he married Irene Mzila, a nurse, and 
they had three sons and four daughters. In 1953 he returned home to 
become Chief of the Buthelezi clan. Though his subjects did not refute 
this status, the government only recognised him as Chief in 1957. Until 
then he was seen as Acting Chief. In 1970, he became Chief Executive 
Officer of the Kwazulu Territorial Authority, which the government 
intended to serve as a transitional authority towards full homeland 
independence. However, Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi refused to 
accept this lowered status of Kwazulu. He was also instrumental in the 
formation of the South African Black Alliance in which he was joined by 
the Labour Party and the KwaNgwane Homeland leader. Internal strife 
subsequently led to the collapse of the alliance.  
 
39 Dr G Gono 
 
Gono started his career as a tea boy. After graduating with a diploma 
with the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and administrators, he joined 
CBZ until he became the CEO. He graduated with an MBA before 
being appointed governor. 
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40 T Mboweni 
 
Tito Mboweni is the eighth Governor of the South African Reserve 
Bank. He succeeded Dr. Christian Lodewyk Stals on 8 August 1999. 
The youngest of three children, Tito Mboweni was born on 16 March 
1959. He grew up in Tzaneen in Limpopo; he graduated with an Msc in 
Economics. 
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11.6 Appendix 6 – Research questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Building 4, Harrowdene Office Park 
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128 Western Service Road; Woodmead 2191; Gauteng 
 
01 October 2009 
 
Interview Respondent 
All Banks, Practitioners and Analysts  
 
Att: Respondent 
 
Subject: Doctorate in Business Administration Research 
 
Introduction 
My name is Cleopas Sanangura, working for ABSA as Consultant: Corporate 
Asset Finance based in Johannesburg (ABSA head office). 
 
I am currently doing a DBA (Doctorate in Business Administration) and the topic I 
am researching on is as follows: Behind the boardroom door. The 
effectiveness of board of directors in creating shareholder value and the 
effect of shareholder activism in financial service sector in emerging 
markets. Corporate Governance in South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
My Research Objectives 
d. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect good 
corporate governance practices. The factors will be used to assess why 
investors prefer other portfolios and why they perform differently while 
operating in the same environment. Companies to be covered are 
Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard 
Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic. 
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e. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
f. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
 
It is a requirement that I have to contact interviews and do some observations on 
how the board contacts itself in executing its duties. I therefore request your 
permission to interview the following board members listed below including 
yourself. As you are the CEO, you have been selected to participate in this 
research and assist me in developing new knowledge on director effectiveness in 
emerging markets in the financial sector in South Africa. I am interested in your 
personal experience, knowledge, observations and opinions in this field.  
 
I want to make it perfectly clear from the onset that complete confidentiality is 
guaranteed and that anything you might say in the course of the interviews will 
remain anonymous. Your contribution may be quoted in the study, but will not be 
attributed to you if need be. I propose that I will be recording all the interviews, for 
the sole reason of having an accurate account for transcribing which I intend to 
do in the next few days. I will wipe off all the tapes as soon as I have transcribed 
them and in the meantime I will be keeping them in a secure place. 
 
I have some open ended questions that I propose to ask, which I am sending 
together with this introductory letter.  There are issues that you may wish to 
contribute to my research, which you can submit under general comments. If you 
require any clarification at any stage, please do not hesitate to call me. My 
contact details are as follows: 
 
 
Cleopas Sanangura 
 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
233 
 
 
 
 
Chief Executive Officer 
Dawn Advisory Services Pty Ltd 
Tel:  +27 86 722 7443 
Fax:  +27 86 538 3268 
Mobile: +27 82 943 8700 
Email: das@dawnadvisory.co.za  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Objectives 
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a. The primary objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of 
board of directors in creating shareholder value in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the financial sector and to investigate factors that affect 
good corporate governance practices. These factors will be used to 
assess why investors prefer other counters than others and why they 
perform differently while operating in the same environment. 
Companies to be covered are Barclays – ABSA, Standard Bank, First 
Rand Bank, Nedbank, Standard Chartered Bank, Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe (CBZ) and Stanbic bank. 
 
b. To establish whether the appointment of Auditors and independent 
directors creates shareholder value and increase transparency 
 
c. To establish if training and accreditation of directors can improve 
corporate governance practice in the financial sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaires 
 
The Organization and Shareholder Activism 
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1. Is there a unified articulated organizational purpose shared by owners, 
board members and managers? 
2. What are the major laws and societal customs within which the board must 
act? 
3. Do the policies, procedures and culture make the best use of the board’s 
knowledge, skills and ability as a group? 
4. What are the main causes of Corporate Governance failures in Emerging 
Markets as compared to developed markets? 
5. What are the factors/issues that shareholders take into account when 
considering the existence and effectiveness of Corporate Governance? 
6. What is the important corporate governance attributes that influence 
performance of directors in order to meet shareholder expectations? 
7. You mentioned sustainable value creation strategies in the financial report. 
How do you measure them? 
8. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of the 
board’s capabilities? How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs affect 
a director’s willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
9. What has been the participation of shareholder in creating value to the 
bank and how involved are they? 
 
Environment 
1. What makes the bank different from others? 
2. Do policies, procedures and culture make the most of each individual 
director’s knowledge, skills and abilities? 
3. Is there sufficient trust on the board for the most to be made of director’s 
capabilities? 
4. Do relationships encourage the use of the board’s talents by 
management? 
5. Do directors understand how they can put their contacts to work for the 
bank? 
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6. If I were to appoint you CEO of another bank what impact will you make? 
7. How has the regulatory framework affected performance of banks in the 
country? 
8. Boards have been characterized as largely ceremonial bodies. What is 
you comment? 
9. How do you manage conflict of interest as it relates to Agency theory and 
stewardship theory? 
10. How has integrated reporting affected how you measure the bank’s 
performance? 
 
Directors 
 
Fit  Key questions 
Human capital/structural capital Do the policies, procedures and culture make 
best use of the board’s knowledge, skills and 
ability as a board?  
Do policies, procedures and culture make the 
most of each individual director’s knowledge, 
skills and abilities? 
Human capital/social capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there sufficient trust on the board for the 
most to be made of directors’ capabilities?  
Do relationships encourage the use of the 
board’s talents by management? Do directors 
understand how they can put their contacts to 
work for the bank? 
Human capital/cultural capital Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board 
support the best use of the board’s 
capabilities?  
How do the board’s values, norms and beliefs 
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affect a director’s willingness to use his/her 
capabilities? 
Social capital/structural capital Do policies, procedures and culture build trust 
in the boardroom?  
• Between the board and managers?  
• Between the board and external 
organisations? 
Social capital/cultural capital Do the values, norms, beliefs of the board 
match those of society (Ubuntu)? 
Do the individuals share values, norms, 
beliefs? 
Do these match management’s values, norms, 
beliefs? 
Structural capital/cultural capital Do policies, procedures, culture match societal 
expectations? 
 
General discussions 
 
1. How do NEDs creating shareholder value and does the bank need them? 
2. What type of qualities do you consider when appointing an individual to 
the board? 
3. Will training and accreditation of directors create value and impact on 
Corporate Governance in the financial service sector and how? 
4. How is power distributed among board members?  
5. How do you measure individual and collective board performance? 
 
Auditors 
 
1. How do auditors creating shareholder value? 
2. Can the bank operate with external auditors? What value do they add to 
the bank and to shareholders? 
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Chiefs  
 
1. How are Chiefs selected? 
2. How do you select the Izinduna? 
3. What are their responsibilities? 
4. What is the role of the community in your governance structure? 
5. How do you pay Izinduna and how do you determine their remuneration? 
 
 
General Comments 
 
1. Do the values, norms and beliefs of the board support the best use of the 
board’s capabilities? 
2. How do the group’s values, norms and beliefs affect a director’s 
willingness to use his/her capabilities? 
3. Do policies, procedures and culture build trust in the boardroom between 
the board, managers and external stakeholders? 
4. How does the Ubuntu concept affect board performance? 
5. Do the values, norms, beliefs of the board match those of society? 
6. Is the Ubuntu concept necessary tool for directors? 
7. Do policies, procedures, culture match societal expectations? 
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11.7 Appendix 7 – CFROTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measurement of CFROTA 
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CFROTA CFROTA Revenue Revenue Weighting
Number of Executive Directors (including Chairman) 0.16 0.12 -0.14 -0.15 3
Number of Executive Directors (excluding Chairman) 0.22 0.29 -0.06 -0.06 3
Number of NEDs (including Chairman) -0.09 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 3
Number of NEDs (excluding Chairman) 0.09 0.04 -0.28 -0.3 3
Number of  Directors (including Chairman) 0.03 0.15 -0.13 -0.12 3
Number of  Directors (excluding Chairman) 0.05 0.21 -0.2 -0.22 3
Proportion of NEDs  (including Chairman) -0.19 -0.05 0.06 -0.09 2
Proportion of NEDs  (excluding Chairman) -0.08 -0.16 -0.31 -0.32 2
NED: Executive ratio (excluding Chairman) -0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.09 2
tenure
Chairman`s tenure 0.09 0.07 -0.15 -0.14 5
Executive`s average tenure (excluding Chairman) -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.06 5
Executive`s average tenure (including Chairman) -0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.1 5
NED average tenure (excluding Chairman) 0.11 0.11 -0.16 -0.18 5
NED average tenure (including Chairman) 0.3 0.2 -0.19 -0.19 5
average tenure of all directors 0.06 0.12 -0.14 -0.17 5
Reward
Average pay of all Directors -0.07 -0.08 -0.19 -0.18 4
% of equity held by all Directors 0.16 0.04 0.23 0.39 4
N 75-80 67 75-80 67
Note:
N Number of themes
* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level  
Table 7A 
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Group N Weighting
Mean Std.Dev t df Sig level
separate Chairman/CEO
SALES YES 69 -0.01 1.04 -0.31 77 0.75 1
NO 10 0.09 0.64
CFROTA YES 69 0.07 1.04 1.67 77 0.1
NO 10 -0.49 0.46
Executive/non-executive chairman
SALES Exec Chairman 43 0.04 1.25 0.41 77 0.68
NED 36 -0.05 0.6
CFROTA ED 43 -0.17 0.54 -1.69 77 0.1
ID CHAIRMAN 36 0.2 1.34
Proportion of NEDs:33%
SALES >=33% 62 -0.02 1.03 -0.42 76 0.68 2
<33% 16 0.1 0.94
CFROTA >=33% 62 -0.09 0.58 -1.52 76 0.13
<33% 16 0.34 1.94
Proportion of NEDs:50%
SALES >=50% 38 0.06 1.24 0.51 76 0.61 2
<33% 40 -0.05 0.73
CFROTA >=50% 38 -0.11 0.4 -0.91 76 0.37
<33% 40 0.1 1.35
No. of NEDs
CFROTA Low 28 2.93 1.78 -0.33 53 0.74 3
High 27 3.07 1.41
No. of Exec. Directors
CFROTA Low 28 3.32 1.36 -2.03 54 0.05 3
High 28 4.18 1.76
Total no. of Directors
CFROTA Low 28 7.18 2.44 -1.38 54 0.17 3
High 28 8.11 2.59
NEDs: average tenure
SALES >=3 Years 51 -0.01 1.16 -0.26 74 0.79 5
<3 Years 25 0.06 0.64
CFROTA >=3 Years 51 -0.03 0.46 1.31 74 0.19
<3 Years 25 -0.21 0.72
SALES >=4 Years 38 -0.2 0.46 -1.86 74 0.07 5
<4 Years 38 0.23 1.33
CFROTA >=4 Years 38 -0.08 0.38 0.09 74 0.93
<4 Years 38 -0.09 0.7
SALES >=6 Years 19 -0.28 0.2 -1.46 74 0.15 5
<6 Years 57 0.11 1.15
CFROTA >=6 Years 19 -0.08 0.46 0.1 74 0.92
<6 Years 57 -0.09 0.59
Audit Committee
SALES YES 54 -0.09 0.66 -1.15 76 0.25 15
NO 24 0.2 1.52
CFROTA YES 54 -0.06 0.59 -0.94 76 0.35
NO 24 0.17 1.59
Remuneration Committee
SALES YES 54 -0.08 0.66 -1.09 76 0.28 15
NO 24 0.19 1.53
CFROTA YES 54 -0.1 0.54 -1.35 76 0.18
NO 24 0.24 1.62
Note:
N Number of themes
Group statistics t-test for equality of means
 
Table 7B 
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Significant correlations (=<.05) between board potential on indicators and 
bank performance (CFROTA Factor) 
Vision, Mission and Values   
CFROTA 
Determine the bank’s vision and mission to guide and set the pace for its 
operations and future development. 
 
Are the vision and mission:  
0.26* 
• Relevant & practical  
• Likely to attract the continuing support of shareholders and other 
stakeholders?  
0.28* 
• Endorsed by all other board members?  0.26* 
• Championed by the entire board throughout the organisation?  0.25* 
Determine the values and aspirations to be promoted throughout the 
bank’s operations, now and in the future. 
 
Are the values and aspirations:  
0.29** • Sufficiently robust to withstand conflicts requiring clarification or 
resolution?  
• Balanced and sensitive to the various interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders?  
0.25* 
Determine and review bank objectives to match the mission and values, 
and to form the basis of company strategy. 
 
Are the company’s objectives: 
• Challenging, realistic and attainable?  0.25* 
• Clearly stated and measurable?  0.24* 
Determine, support and enforce bank policies. 
 
Are the company policies:  
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• Monitored and reviewed regularly?  0.28* 
Strategy and Structure 
 
Ensure that the bank’s organisation structure and capability are 
appropriate for implementing its chosen strategies. 
Does the board:  
0.24* • Ensure fair, short and long-term, performance related rewards?  
Supervision of Management 
 
Adopt performance measures to monitor implementation of strategy, 
policies and plans, and legal and fiduciary obligations affecting the 
business and the board. 
Do the performance measures generate information which is:  
0.25* • Able clearly to identify and explain variances between planned and actual 
performance?  
• Timely enough to allow corrective decisions and actions to be taken?  0.27* 
Ensure that internal control procedures provide valid and reliable 
information for monitoring operations and performance. 
 
Are the internal controls:  
0.29** • Guided by ‘best practice’ standards recommended by relevant 
professional bodies?  
• Established for all relevant features of the company’s activities, including 
legal and fiduciary duties?  
0.31** 
• Understood, and recognised as crucial by all board members?  0.29** 
• Resourced and reviewed for their integrity and reliability?  0.24* 
• Integrated with internal and external audits?  0.27* 
Delegate authority to management, and monitor and evaluate its 
implementation of policies, strategies and business plans. 
 
Are the powers and responsibilities delegated to management: 
 
• Unambiguous and, where appropriate, complemented by the ‘Reserved 
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Powers of the Board’?  0.24* 
• Understood clearly by members of the board and senior management?  0.25* 
Is the monitoring and review of management: 
• Undertaken in a manner likely to engender managers’ commitment and 
support?  
0.24* 
• Regular and thorough?  0.24* 
• Based on succinct and accurate reporting?  0.25* 
• Designed to cover at least profitability, cash flow, investment and risk?  0.24* 
• Focused on causes and consequences of important variances from plan?  0.33** 
• Geared to the protection of key assets and the promotion of competitive  0.25* 
• Guaranteed to ensure that bad news is relayed quickly and honestly?  0.26* 
• Compared with best practice and improved if necessary?  0.29** 
• Designed to ensure that necessary corrective actions are realistic and 
achieved?  
0.29** 
Ensure senior management’s successes and failures are communicated to 
them, and appropriate rewards, sanctions and training are implemented. 
 
Does the Board: 
Communicate its conclusions to members of the management team quickly and 
effectively,  
Whether directly or by delegation? 
0.30** 
Responsibility to Shareholders and Other Stakeholders 
 
 
Monitor relations with shareholders and other stakeholders by the prescription, 
use and evaluation of appropriate information. 
Are the systems, methods and evaluation:  
Capable of identifying problems and opportunities early enough to stimulate 
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prompt action?  0.28* 
Ensure that communications with shareholders, other stakeholders and 
the general public are effective. 
 
Are these communications:  
0.25* 
Concerning vision, mission, values and policies led by the directors (or clearly 
delegated)?  
Likely to meet legitimate expectations, in terms of quality, quantity and timing?  0.23* 
In accordance with the needs of commercial security and Stock Exchange 
compliance requirements, where appropriate? 
0.23* 
 
Note: 
.* Correlation significant at the 0.05level 
.** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level 
Table 7C 
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11.8 Appendix 8 – Board mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Board structures and performance 
Inputs/Mechanisms Structures Processes Outputs 
The right mix of skills 
and experience 
• Size of board 
• Frequency of 
meetings 
Common vision: 
• The board and 
management 
share a common 
vision of what the 
bank is trying to 
achieve 
• The board and 
management 
share a common 
vision of how it 
Strategy and Policy 
Making: 
• Setting the 
organisation's 
mission and 
values 
• Reviewing and 
deciding the 
bank's strategic 
direction 
• Setting 
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should go about 
achieving its goals 
organisational 
policies, e.g. 
health and safety, 
equal 
opportunities 
Board members have 
the time to do the job 
well 
• Percentage of 
board members 
that usually 
attend meetings 
Clear roles and 
responsibilities: 
• The board has a 
clear 
understanding of 
its role and 
responsibilities 
Stewardship or 
Ubuntu: 
• Overseeing the 
financial 
management of 
the bank 
• Ensuring the 
organisation has 
adequate 
financial systems 
and procedures 
• Monitoring 
organisational 
performance and 
taking action 
when required 
 • Presence/ 
absence of 
formal 
subcommittees 
Regular Review: 
• The board and 
management 
periodically review 
how they are 
working together 
Supervising and 
Supporting 
Management: 
• Selecting and 
monitoring the 
bank's chief 
executive or 
senior staff 
• Supporting and 
advising 
management 
 • Availability of 
written job 
descriptions' for 
board members 
Communication: 
• Communication 
between the board 
and management 
is good 
• Misunderstandings 
are rare between 
the board and 
management 
Board Maintenance: 
• Recruiting new 
board members 
• Reviewing board 
performance and 
ensuring it works 
well 
 • Availability of 
induction or 
training for new 
Board members 
Managing Conflict: 
• The board and 
management are 
able to solve 
conflict between 
themselves 
constructively 
• Board members 
are able to resolve 
conflict between 
themselves 
constructively 
External Relations 
and 
Accountability: 
• Ensuring that the 
bank fulfils its 
legal obligations 
e.g. submitting 
annual returns 
• Ensuring 
accountability to 
the bank's 
stakeholders e.g. 
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funders, staff, 
users and the 
public 
• Representing the 
interests of 
stakeholders in 
the organisation 
• Taking charge 
when things go 
wrong 
• Acting as a link 
with important 
organisations the 
bank deals with 
• Representing the 
bank externally 
• Helping to raise 
funds or other 
resources for the 
organisation 
  Meeting Practices: 
• The board has 
adequate notice of 
important issues to 
be discussed at 
board meetings 
• Board meetings 
have a clearly 
structured agenda 
• Important items 
are prioritised on 
board agendas 
• Board meetings 
run on too long 
• It is clear who has 
responsibility for 
following up 
actions agreed by 
the board 
• The board has 
trouble reaching 
conclusions 
 
 
Regression model showing the role of individual board processes in explaining 
the overall effectiveness of the boards using the above findings and themes. 
 
Variables Simple odds 
95% 
Confidence Adjusted odds Significant 95% Confidence 
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ratio interval ratio level interval 
Process 1 
                    
4.85  3.51 - 6.70 1.83 
               
0.003  1.22 - 2.75 
Process 2 
                    
5.98  4.39 - 8.15 3.48 
                      
-    2.38 - 5.11 
Process 3 
                    
2.84  2.29 - 3.52 1.69 
                      
-    1.28 - 2.23 
Process 4 
                    
3.04  2.36 - 3.92 1.44 
               
0.033  1.03 - 2.01 
Notes 
     Pseudo  R2=43% 
    No of respondents 41 
    Process 1 The board and management share a common vision of how to address bank's goals 
Process 2 The board has a clear understanding of its role and responsibilities 
Process 3 The board and management periodically review how they are working together 
Process 4 Board members are able to resolve conflict between themselves together 
* Simple odds ratio estimates are based on all respondents available at the time of interviews 
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11.9 Appendix 9 – Board intellectual capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectual property 
Component Human capital Social capital Structural 
capital 
Cultural capital 
Definition Innate and learned 
abilities, expertise 
and knowledge  
Implicit and tangible 
set of resources 
available by virtue 
of relevant social 
relationships  
 
Explicit and 
implicit codified 
knowledge (e.g. 
routines policies 
and procedures)  
Implicit and 
tangible resources 
available by 
identification with 
the values, norms 
and rules 
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sanctioned by the 
dominant group 
(e.g. honesty) 
Resides in Individual directors Individual directors 
board 
Board as a group Individual directors 
Key 
dimensions 
• General 
knowledge 
• Industry 
experience 
• Banking 
experience 
• Organizational 
experience 
• Board 
experience 
• Bank specific 
knowledge and 
experience 
• Functional 
experience and 
knowledge 
• General 
business 
knowledge and 
experience 
• Network of 
extra 
organisational 
contacts – 
scope of 
resources and 
nature of 
contacts 
• Relationship(s) 
with CEO, both 
as a board and 
as individuals 
• Relationships 
between board 
members 
• Documented  
board policies 
including 
manuals, 
charters and 
guidelines 
• Board culture 
• Implicit board 
procedures 
and norms 
• Individual work 
norms 
• Individual 
morals  
• Individual 
motivations 
     
 
Results of overall board assessments 
Effect on bank performance 
Positive Neutral Negative 
1 Strategy roles  
✓ 
  
• Framing objectives and 
vision of the business 
• Formulating (with 
management) and 
✓ 
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reviewing company 
strategy 
• Setting tone at the 
top/ethical culture of the 
organisation 
  
✓ 
2 Monitoring and control 
roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
✓ 
• Ensuring corporate 
survival (protecting 
shareholders’ interests) 
• Setting risk appetite of 
organisation 
  
✓ 
• Hiring, evaluating and 
firing of CEO  
✓ 
rare 
  
• Specifying lines of 
authority of management 
and board (reserved 
functions) 
  
✓ 
• Monitoring and 
evaluating management 
✓ 
1 
 
✓ 
1 
• Controlling operations ✓ 
1 
 
✓ 
1 
• Reporting to, and 
communicating with, 
shareholders 
✓ 
2 
  
• Recommending 
dividends 
 
✓ 
3 
 
• Evaluating board 
performance, and 
planning board 
succession 
 
✓ 
3 
 
• Ensuring compliance 
with statutory and other 
  
✓ 
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regulations 
• Reviewing social 
responsibilities 
  
✓ 
3 Service roles  
 
✓ 
  
• Enhancing company 
reputation and prestige 
• Participating in 
relationships with outside 
bodies 
✓ 
  
• Assisting organisation in 
obtaining scarce 
resources 
✓ 
  
• Acting as ambassador 
for the firm 
✓ 
  
• Providing support and 
wise counsel to 
CEO/senior management 
 
✓ 
  
 
✓ 
1 These roles are included twice, as they have both positive and negative effects 
on bank performance. Monitoring performance and controlling operations will 
lead to better performance, but may also impose constraints on managers’ 
freedom to generate shareholder value. 
 
✓ 
2 Boards improve market performance by influencing the perceptions of potential 
investors (signalling theory perspective). 
 
✓ 
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3 These two roles are assumed to have neither a positive nor negative effect on 
bank performance. 
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11.10 Appendix 10 – Respondent quotations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10: Respondent quotations 
 
Respondent quotations 
a. Question: Will training and accreditation of directors create value 
and impact positively on Corporate Governance in the financial 
service sector and how?  
Respondent 15: ‘‘Continuous development of directors is a required 
for any learning and innovative organization as this creates 
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awareness of changes in the market. The Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa has made it mandatory that directors should attend 
refresher courses and complete their continuous development 
programmes. The Central Banks have also developed different 
programmes for director developed, which includes inductions 
programmes, business management skills and regulatory 
framework.’’ 
b. Question: How often do accounting policies change in the bank? 
Respondent 3: ‘‘Accounting policies are changed as and when 
necessary. It is the responsibility of the board to make sure that 
policies are reviewed and aligned to the needs of the bank and 
regulations.’’ 
c. Question: Are banks observing the requirements of the King 
Reports and how many more King Reports are you going to 
produce? Respondent 35: ‘‘All listed banks are required to comply 
with the listing requirements and the King Reports relevant at the 
time. The Regulator conducts audits to make sure compliance with 
these legal frameworks.’’ 
d. Question: Is there a unified articulated organizational purpose 
shared by owners, board members and managers? 
Respondent 36: ‘‘A shared mind-set is possible in most professional 
boards, where all the stakeholders have common goals one of 
which is value creation for the benefit of all stakeholders. This is a 
difficult questions as it is difficult to measure where there people 
share the same vision.’’   
e. Question: How are Chiefs selected?  
Respondent 37: ‘‘A Chief is appointed after the death of his father. 
A regent is appointed by the elders who will then take over as the 
Chief and will appoint Izinduna. The Izinduna assists the Chief to 
govern and make sure that the community interests are observed’’ 
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f. Question: What are the main causes of Corporate Governance 
failures in emerging markets as compared to developed markets? 
Respondent 39: ‘‘Insider trading, lack of director independence, 
trading on non-banking activities, level of skills and experience are 
the major factors. Dominance by individual directors or 
shareholders affects judgement and decision making process of 
banks leading to governance challenges.’’ 
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1 Introduction 
 
The concern of the DBA is to research on managerial issues through 
critical review and systematic application of appropriate theories and 
research to professional practice. This can be contrasted to a PhD that 
emphasises the development of new knowledge and theoretical 
perspectives. A similar standard of intellectual rigour is expected out of 
this project. This research makes a contribution to knowledge in practice, 
in both cases this being new knowledge. 
 
Document 6 is the final one in a series of six, written as part of DBA 
research (this project) into the sense-making of the business world and its 
structures. The learning has been a process, which I am going to report 
and reflect on for the period 2005 to 2010, which covered the following 
areas: personal development, professional development, project 
development and project outcomes. There is a thin line between the first 
three areas of development as my personal development will impact on 
my professional development and vice-versa. Organising the progress in 
this way will provide a good structure for discussion as it flows into each 
other. (Murdock and Scutt 1999: 11) called this a cycle of learning, which 
is a concept for people who wish to continue to make progress in their 
managerial development. The experience over the period of this research 
forms the basis of reviewing, reflecting, drawing conclusions and planning 
one’s future. Not will only this structure assist the reader but will help me 
gather my thoughts and make the research experience a fulfilling one. 
 
We have all had experiences in private life surrounding the issues of 
developing relationships with parents, grandparents, siblings, our own 
children and so on (Murdock and Scutt 1999: 24). These relationships 
develop informally and are more or less effective depending upon how the 
individuals within the role set behave towards each other. Interrelations 
within a group may vary between being positive, constructive, negative 
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and destructive, depending upon situations, circumstances and the 
predominant motivation within the group. Cohot 7 has been an awesome 
group of professionals who worked very hard together although limited by 
distance, the experience has been phenomenal. Each individual within the 
role set has made significant contribution to the success of the group 
through knowledge exchange, which created a unique culture which never 
existed at the beginning of this programme. The success and 
effectiveness of the group was dependent on us as individuals within the 
working group who required mutual trust, support, respect and 
cooperation between all individuals within the role set, in order to achieve 
group and personal objectives. The role of informal leadership was held 
by different students at different times, depending upon the 
circumstances, or formal leadership where a given student assumes 
responsibility. 
 
In order to remember all this, an “index of experience” (Redman 1995: 23) 
(a diary) was kept of critical incidents, experiences, thoughts, emotions, 
new ideas and fun moments as they occurred over the period of the 
study. I recall my first experience after being accepted in the programme 
in September 2005 when the lectures were starting the following weekend 
and I did not have a visa to the UK. Fear and worry were the order of 
each day that followed as I had to raise the fees, get student visa and get 
approval from my employer. I did not know whether I had to do this and 
why?  
 
I was motivated by Covey et al (1994: 17) who argued that, the enemy of 
the “best” is the “good.” How many people on their deathbed wish they’d 
spent more time at the office? We’re constantly making choices about the 
way we spend our time, from the major seasons to the individual 
moments in our lives. We are also living with the consequences of those 
choices. Many of us do not like those consequences – especially when 
we feel there is a gap between how we are spending our time, resources 
and what we feel is deeply important in our lives. Our struggle to put first 
things first can be characterized by contrast between two powerful tools 
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that direct us: “the clock and the compass” (Covey et al 1994: 19).  The 
clock represents our commitments, appointments, schedules, goals, 
activities – what we do with and how we manage our time. The compass 
represents our vision, values, principles, mission, conscience, direction – 
what we feel is important and how we lead our lives. The gap between the 
clock and the compass had to make me make a choice. 
 
Sitting in the lecture room for the first time, I thought, what do I have to 
research on? The first handout was an article by Bareham et al (1999: 
103) “The DBA: what is it for?” I found the project ahead of me very 
challenging and requiring a significant part of my time. The person in me 
realized that he enjoys taking challenges and being able to finish what I 
have started. As an accountant I had to reflect on different areas that 
would interest me to research on. I came up with a lot of areas of interest 
to my career, life and I settled on the issues affecting performance of 
banks in emerging markets. 
 
The collapsing of many financial institutions in SA and Zimbabwe became 
an area of concern for me as it affected the whole economy and its 
performance. I found it an interesting area which became a very important 
research following the current trends in the world economy. My focus was 
to look at the drivers of business, who happen to be the board of directors 
and how they apply themselves to the success or failure of an 
organization. My interests were stimulated in this area rather than any 
other debate for the following reasons:  
• What happens behind the boardroom door? 
• What drives the business?  
• What do shareholders want in a business? 
• How effective are board of directors? 
• How is this effectiveness measured? 
• Why do some companies fail while others succeed while operating 
in the same environment? 
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We face grave impediments to learning in complex systems like a nation, 
firm or family (Sterman 2000: 33). Every link in the feedback loops by 
which we might learn can be weakened or cut by a variety of structures. 
Some of these are physical or institutional features of the environment – 
the elements of dynamic complexity that reduce opportunities for 
controlled experimentation, prevent us from learning the consequences of 
our actions and distort the outcome we receive. Some are consequences 
of our culture, group process and inquiry skills. Still some are fundamental 
bounds on human cognition, particularly the poor quality of our mental 
maps and our ability to make correct inferences about the dynamics of 
complex organizations. 
 
This became my focal point as I realized the challenges ahead and the 
requirements of different stakeholders in the corporate governance 
mapping. The interaction with senior officials and practitioners in this field 
of study became the motivating factor. Effectiveness of people is 
influenced by different factors like skills, experience, position, rewards, 
culture, ethics and transparency. How these apply to the financial services 
sector became the starting point. 
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2 Learning process 
 
A learning style is a student's consistent way of responding to and using 
stimuli in the context of learning. Learning styles are the "composite of 
characteristic cognitive, affective, and physiological factors that serve as 
relatively stable indicators of how a learner perceives, interacts with, and 
responds to the learning environment argued (Keefe 1979: 1)." Stewart 
and Felicetti (1992: 15) defined learning styles as those "educational 
conditions under which a student is most likely to learn." Thus, learning 
styles are not really concerned with "what" learners learn, but rather "how" 
they prefer to learn. Learning styles are points along a scale that help us 
to discover the different forms of mental representations; however, they 
are not good characterizations of what people are or are not like. We 
should not divide the population into a set of categories (i.e., visual and 
auditory learners). What these various instruments attempt to do is to 
allocate a person on some point on a continuum (similar to measuring 
height or weight). In other words, do not pigeonhole people as we are all 
capable of learning under almost any style, no matter what our preference 
are.  
 
The literature basically indicates that there is wide acceptance of the 
concept of learning styles; however, “there is disagreement on how to 
best measure learning styles” argued (Coffield, et. al., 2004). While the 
learning profession has long recognized the need for innovative 
instructional activities that relate to the diverse learning styles of learners, 
there is some question as to just how meaningful they are to the learning 
environment. That is, most researchers agree that we do have various 
learning styles and preferences, however, the research tends to agree 
that it is relative unimportant as it is far more important to match the 
presentation with the nature of the subject, such as providing correct 
learning methods, strategies, and context; than matching individual 
preferences (Coffield, 2004). For example, in a large meta-study, 
(Marzano 1998) found that graphic and tactile representations of the 
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subject matter had noticeable effects on learning outcomes, regardless of 
any attempt to match them with learners' modalities.  
 
Perhaps (Merrill 2000) has the best philosophy for using learning styles -- 
instructional strategies should first be determined on the basis of the type 
of content to be taught or the goals of the instruction (the content-by-
strategy interactions) and secondarily, learner styles and preferences are 
then used to adjust or fine-tune these fundamental learning strategies. 
Finally, content-by-strategy interactions take precedence over learning-
style-by-strategy interactions regardless of the instructional style or 
philosophy of the instructional situation. Merrill continued with the 
argument that most students are unaware of their learning styles and if 
left to their own means, they are “unlikely” to start learning in new ways. 
Thus, knowledge of one's learning styles can be used to increase self-
awareness about their strengths and weaknesses as learners. I found 
myself in a similar situation. In other words, all the advantages claimed for 
metacognition (being aware of one's own thought and learning processes) 
can be gained by encouraging learners to become knowledgeable about 
their own learning and that of others (Coffield, 2004). This became an 
action plan for our learning set. 
 
DBA approach to learning is to encourage action learning. Action learning 
is a means of development, intellectual, emotional and physical, that 
requires a group of subjects, through responsible involvement in some 
real, complex and stressful problem, to achieve intended change sufficient 
to improve observable behaviour argued (Revans, 1979: 3; Koo, 1999: 
89). Action learning as defined (Revans 1983) is a continuous process of 
learning supported by colleges, with an intention of getting things done. 
Through action learning individuals learn with and from each other by 
working on real   problems and reflecting on their own experiences. It is 
similar to learning-by-doing (IFAL 2007) but distinguished by the degree 
to which a process of learning is designed and organised (for example, 
excluding the everyday actions and learning of an animal or child). It also 
differs from experiential learning, which can apply to an individual alone, 
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by the degree to which reflection is supported by a group of colleagues 
(McGill and Beaty, 2001) often referred to as action learning set. Action 
learning requires both existing knowledge (i.e. from book learning or 
course work) and appropriate group questioning or reflection while trying 
to apply that knowledge to solve a real problem (Raelin, 1997). It is a 
broad developmental approach that can involve a wide array of 
participatory processes and tools to which entire publications series have 
been devoted (for example, Participatory Learning and Action published 
by the IIED). 
 
The researcher passed through a cycle of stages during the learning 
process which included: undertaking an action, questioning what 
happened, developing critical analysis, setting scenarios and testing the 
new knowledge.  Action learning activities were conducted in an informal 
and formal setting, designed to facilitate experiential learning and 
stimulate participation from all members of the learning set. This 
facilitated open dialogue between members, whose opportunities to 
interact with others from different backgrounds and countries, either within 
their own countries or the wider continents were realised. The support that 
students provided for each other related to the processes rather than the 
specifics of each other’s research – that was discussed with respective 
supervisors. My experience on the first day of our learning set meeting 
was full of enthusiasm, defensive about what I already believe in, little 
confidence and not sure of whether I will make it.  
 
Action learning (Marsick and O’Neil 1999) (The experiential school) as 
defined, is an approach taken by those who believe that (Kolb’s1984) 
experiential learning cycle is its theoretical base. Kolb’s cycle differs from 
Revans’ original approach in that it has equal emphasis upon all points in 
the learning cycle, with no definitive starting point rather than always 
starting with the “action stage.” The learning styles inventory he designed 
(Kolb 1984) provides an insight to the researcher if he/she perceives and 
processes information by categorizing him/her as a diverger, assimilator, 
converger and accommodator. Honey and Mumford (1986) stated that 
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learning is a cyclical process but, unlike Revans and Kolb, they do not see 
cognitive processing or biology as the influencing factor on learning cycle 
preference rather they see more socially based factors such as previous 
experience and environment as key. They devised a self-diagnosis 
questionnaire that provides an overview of an individual’s preference for 
four styles of learning” activists (learners who involve themselves in new 
experiences), reflectors (learners who are cautious and thoughtful, 
preferring to consider decisions), theorists (learners who can interpret 
their observations into their own cognitive models) and pragmatists 
(learners who are keen to apply new ideas and see how something works 
in practice). They argued that learning style preference can change at will 
or via circumstance, thereby inferring that preference is not as rigid as 
Kolb’s styles and individuals can set out to actively become “more 
rounded learners.” 
 
 Harrison (1996) criticised action learning as based on questions of cost 
effectiveness, its grounding within the scientific management paradigm, 
over-emphasis upon action and not theory, impact on participants and 
value to sponsoring organizations, the notion of a cycle learning does 
provide a framework for discussion and will be referred to in later. It 
seemed at this point in time that learning styles are not really "styles," but 
rather "preferences" in that i did not learn the best by using my style of 
learning. That is, i prefer one or more styles over others. Panel 
discussions, incorporating rich exchanges between learning set members, 
lecturers, supervisors, management and directors from organizations that 
assisted during the research also became a strong feature of the action 
learning process. My own experience leads me to believe that the above 
learning cycles lack explicit acknowledgement of context and emotions in 
learning experience.  
 
(Schon 1983: 49) referred this as “knowing-inaction.” Rather than referring 
to “action” he refers to “catching oneself – experiencing a dilemma and 
identifying one’s emotional response to it. He claims that situations are 
not given but constructed from events that are puzzling and uncertain and 
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consequent reflectivity is “surfacing” one’s intuitive understanding of these 
situations understanding which has been implicit in action and which is 
criticised, restructured and becomes embodied in further action. In his 
view reflection and action are not separate and discrete. 
 
Looking back to the past four years I can identify many learning 
experiences. Some more or less significant than others but for the 
purpose of this document I will focus on critical incidents mostly 
represented by the activity and writing associated with previous five 
documents as well as the overall experience.  
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3 Personal development 
 
As an accountant my approach has been realist, as my background 
requires evidence, structure, balance and systems. Researching on a 
different field which is not mathematical or accounting created challenges 
for me but I had to view things in a different way as I required fundamental 
mindset shift. Although at the beginning I did not have the philosophical 
ideas to help me articulate the nature of the challenges ahead. I had to 
learn first communication and presentation skills, which involved listening 
actively and using a variety of media and communication aids. It was 
important to recognize the importance of purpose, self – management and 
challenge for other people. 
 
Motivation might not readily spring to mind as involving communication 
skills. However, if viewed as a means of communicating shared interests 
and, needs, it can be seen that in order to do this I had to communicate 
individually to the group, organizations, lecturers, supervisors and 
examiners. Various researches carried out for example, [Maslow 1943 – 
(A review of research on hierarchy of needs theory), Hertzberg 1959 – 
(Hygiene and motivational needs – two factor theory), Vroom 1964 – 
(Expectancy theory predictions of employee performance), Porter and 
Lawler and Alderfer 1972 – (ERG theory – existence, relatedness and 
growth)], it is clear that people are motivated in various ways and by 
various means. Among them I was motivated by a sense of recognition, 
achievement, responsibility, freedom and interest to achieve a doctorate 
which could give me authority to write and research on any area of 
management. These were categorized into three: purpose, self-
management and challenge (Murdock and Scutt 1999: 36). 
 
If there is any one “secret” of effectiveness, it is concentration, which is 
grounded both in the nature of the student and in the nature of man 
(Drucker 1966: 102). Effective students do first things first and they do 
one thing at a time. I was challenged by this quotation and I had to reflect 
back to my experience, I became aware that events do not always turn 
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out as expected; instead there is an element of uncertainty. The 
programme had tight deadlines, standard of writing and level of detail 
required as per the marking scheme. My prior learning had never exposed 
me to this experience as we concentrated on theory without matching it to 
practical experience. Each of us has our own learning profile – our own 
preferred strategies for learning (Senge et al 1994: 421). My learning style 
governs how I approach new projects, how I increase my own capabilities, 
how I contribute to the learning set’s results and whether I find it easy or 
difficult to get in synch with a particular team. Developing a good mix of 
learning styles was critical to the learning set’s success in this programme 
especially at the beginning. 
 
As we moved on with the learning process I found myself being 
introduced to new terminology and concepts (‘ology, semiotics, ontology, 
morphogenetic, actor-network theory”) difficult, which tested my 
understanding through discussions with Colin Fisher, Jim Stewart and 
Alister Mutch (which reminds me of the Victoria Pie company case), which 
was an interesting case study for an accountant. My confidence level 
deteriorated compounded by English being my third language I could not 
trust myself even my contribution level in my learning set took a dive. The 
class was full of well learned people some being CEOs, FDs and doctors, 
I realised that the going was increasingly getting difficulty and I could not 
imagine me completing this programme more so being the only African in 
class my support structure was week. I had no one to lean on when I 
needed support when I am back to my base. 
 
When it was time to prepare document 3, I realised that I was in hot soup 
and the effect of myself being an accountant came to realise (qualitative 
research). This was my weakest link. I had to do document 4 first before I 
could start with document 3 as it required a lot of this terminology and no 
number crunching. I became more confident doing document 4 
(quantitative research) which explained why I am a realist, who required 
proof of actual performance of each bank as reflected by the financial 
statements. Colin Fisher one of my supervisors deserves credit on the 
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role he played on my document 3 to put it into shape. I felt like I was not 
going to make it.  
 
If you ever have the chance to observe predators in the wild, you may 
notice that they operate in cycles. Most of the time, they display barely 
any movement. They project a sense of calm focus, as if they are waiting 
for a particular moment. Then it comes: Their muscles are charged with 
intensity as they sneak up on their prey and strike. When it’s over, they 
return to their original calm. The cycle is back to its beginning (Senge et al 
1994: 59). I learnt in a similar cyclical fashion. I passed between action 
and reflection (observer of own thinking and acting), between activity and 
repose. I then realised that in any project or initiative, either individually or 
on a team, each stage demands deliberate attention before you move to 
the next. 
 
I had to draw more value from my learning set, class and lecturers when 
we meet. These general discussions on research methods, 
methodologies and several researchers shared their research materials 
and experience with me, which assisted in my development. This was 
both stimulating and a source of anxiety as I would spend the next few 
days reflecting on what had been said and I could worry about how I was 
going to put it on paper. I had to take these discussions to my specific 
area of research by discussing with my supervisors (Paul Barnes, Colin 
Fisher and Francis Neshamba). The fear would subside as I understood 
their explanations, which showed a lot of maturity and experience. I could 
move forward to the next stage with confidence and with a positive frame 
of mind. 
 
After many years of being an executive in different blue chip 
organizations, it had become a tendency that I was always seen as the 
leader who could give instructions and direction. Being a student again 
shifted my status, I had to do assignment, attend lectures and submit 
assignments on time. The concept of sensemaking proved helpful during 
my research and also in the real world, where I realised I do not have to 
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wear the same hat all the time. During lecturers, learning set meetings, 
interviews and meetings with my supervisors, I realised that status had to 
change all the time. 
 
The most interesting experience was when I submitted document 3, which 
one of my supervisors marked a pass while the other marked it a fail. How 
could this be? My world collapsed as I had never had a fail in my whole 
career and I thought that was the end. I reworked on the document and 
met with the same supervisor many times. After his approval that it was 
now ok for submission, he marked it pass with substantive amendments. I 
was in a shock, upset and I thought this was becoming personal. I had 
two meetings with him after that and he insisted that he wanted my 
English to improve as I was not expressing myself clearly. The supervisor 
I believe had shifted identity at that point from a supervisor to someone 
who did not want me to proceed with my research. At one point he wrote 
a comment that I was not going to make it, rather I work for am “Mphil.”  
 
We then agreed that we were going to work on this weakness as he was 
harder on me so that my document 5 will meet the required standard. I felt 
more tension about my identity, even my contribution in the learning set 
deteriorated. I felt rejected, but as I started talking to members in my 
learning set I realised I was not alone in this environment. Some had even 
decided to leave the programme as they felt that they were not going to 
make it. At that point the number of students in the class had decreased 
from 28 to 15. I took this positively and worked with him until I eventually 
resubmitted my document 3.   Document 4 was not much of an issue after 
document 3 ordeals, as I had to deal with quantitative information which 
was easy for me to interpret and my writing skills had improved. 
 
After submitting document 3, as I engage with colleagues, researchers, 
practitioners in strategy, corporate governance, risk and leadership, I 
became more assertive and confident. I also noted after document 3 that I 
was more assertive and confident engaging with colleagues in those – 
“ology” discussions and beginning to believe that I was developing a skill 
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that I never had. I then appreciated the role the supervisor played to 
unpack the person in me so that I could look at the bigger picture of 
research. 
 
Senge (1999) and Weick (1995) encouraged me to develop the spirit of 
personal mastery – (I had to go beyond competence and skills). I realised 
that I had previously considered analysis as simply reporting patterns 
which had emerged without giving a critical analysis of the events. The 
Weickian view suggests that authoring is activily creative in that I view the 
data through the lens of my own reality. I had to sensitise the language 
that I had to use in authoring and writing my documents.  
 
3.1 Learning set knowledge development 
 
The acknowledgement of horizontal social networks along the value 
chain, mainly perceived as vertically structured, opens the 
perspective for a new human dimension within economic and 
developmental relationships. Horizontal and vertical communication 
is essential in order to include all stakeholders of the value chain. 
 
Cohort 7 started with 28 students who were divided into 5 learning 
sets. It did not take long for the number to reduce to below 20 as a 
result of some students surrendering at an earlier stage. From the 
beginning the programme had some indications that it will not be any 
easy road. During the second year the learning sets had to be 
reduced to 2 as the number of students left was 12.   
 
Appropriate mechanisms, which enhance learning and the 
development of innovations, are (non-virtual) face-to-face events, 
like workshops, excursions and field-trips was the structure of the 
programme. Many students could not manage and had to drop as 
some failed. The programme required hard workers and dedication. 
The reduction in number was a blessing as I ended up in a learning 
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set of students with dedication and conviction to finish this 
programme. Major problem though was distance from each other as 
all members were from different countries, Ireland, France, England, 
Qatar, South Africa and Greece. It was difficult to meet as we had to 
schedule our group discussions during the week of lectures and 
fortunately the use and availability of technology assisted (Skype, 
video and telephone conferences) bridged the gap. There were no 
major negatives to report on as the group worked and jailed well as if 
we had known each other for years. 
 
3.2 Supervisor student support 
 
One thing that is particularly interesting about studies that have been 
done on the 'ideal' supervisor is that the findings all suggest that it is 
the affective dimensions that candidates value the most highly in 
their supervisors (support, availability, interest and enthusiasm). 
Issues of technical 'know-how' are usually rated somewhat lower 
down the list of desirable characteristics. Yet, possibly the most 
commonly reported difficulty for students relate to communication 
difficulties with supervisors. Establishing sound and productive 
communication early, and regularly reviewing communication 
strategies, can help avoid some of the more distressing situations in 
which students and supervisors can find themselves (Wisker 2005). 
 
The role of leaders is crucial to bridge different pools of knowledge 
and link different types of networks (like primary / family and 
neighbourhood networks with secondary / value chain networks). 
Leaders are critical in the process of appropriation of information and 
knowledge as well as innovations, as they support others in 
developing innovations. This means establishing cooperating and 
trust-based relationships, the redefinition of common objectives and 
strengthening the negotiation and conflict resolution abilities. 
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Research (Mainhard et al 2009: 359) suggests that a productive 
relationship arises from a process of implicit and explicit negotiation 
based on agreed goals and values such as: 
• mutual respect  
• open communication  
• an understanding of the expectations of the other  
• shared commitment to the goal of the completion of a 
successful research candidature 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Students, Supervisor ownership of the research project 
 
During the research project my supervisors provided the critical 
thinking and skill which assisted the student to develop a 
researchable topic. I do think it's quite a difficult process for parties, 
(supervisor and student) at this stage.  And it changes over time. To 
begin with the supervisor is in quite a strong position in defining and 
directing the student and the student is relatively subordinate at the 
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beginning (Figure 3-1), willing to accept advice and direction 
Delamont et al (2000: 141).  
 
As the student gets more and more into the subject (Figure 3-1), the 
relationship begins to change, because they develop an expertise 
which the supervisor is no longer sharing (Taylor and Beasley 
(2005).  Also, they develop a view about their intellectual property 
which is separate from the supervisor.  And it's a bit like a growing-
up process, an intellectual growing-up, and it leads to conflicts at 
certain points in time, as the student develops that independence.... 
(Kiley 2003: 345). There are some areas where I differed with the 
supervisors as the project progresses due to knowledge being 
developed and at the same time I was becoming the subject matter 
expert. I had to explain my argument to the supervisors and 
eventually we end up taking a position together. 
 
I have always found there's this period in the middle where there is 
that conflict, like my relationship with my daughter, where there is a 
change occurring, and it's quite difficult as the supervisor to begin to 
'let go' almost.  You feel they're not ready for it, they're not in control, 
and that leads to a degree of conflict which can be overt, or could be 
no overt.   
 
Recognising these conflicts, I had to develop key to the process and 
formulation of the problem/question, because it is that which ensures 
focus and engagement. The tension comes from providing enough 
direction to stop students going down paths which are non-
productive (which is a problematic judgment in itself), without taking 
over. In other words the student has to 'own' the thesis. Figure 3-1 is 
a process I had to follow up to the completion of this project from 
point 1 to point 2. 
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3.3 Summary 
 
Not all writers agree with Kolb's theory. (Rogers 1996: 108), points 
out that "learning includes goals, purposes, intentions, choice and 
decision-making, and it is not at all clear where these elements fit 
into the learning cycle." There are different types of learning 
(Habermas 1987: 1). There is no good understanding of learning 
styles as it stands. But it certainly does not follow that we all learn 
the same way - the senses may well work in concert, but (as 
someone with thick glasses, I can attest) some senses work more or 
less well, meaning that each individual may combine the senses 
differently (Coffield 2004). As for the Inventory, Kolb, himself, points 
out its greatest limitation. The results are based solely on the way 
learners rate themselves. It does not rate learning style preferences 
through standards or behaviour, as some other personal style 
inventories do, and it only gives relative strengths within the 
individual learner, not in relation to others. In my own case, I found 
the results dubious. The wording in the questions seemed vague 
and the results did not jive with my own view of my preferred 
learning style. 
 
Nonetheless, Kolb's contributions cannot be underestimated. 
Whatever their limitations, by presenting a model of experience in a 
scientific form, he has helped move educational thought from the 
locus of the instructor back to the learner. As many of the major 
contributors to the field, (Brookfield 1990; Cross 1981; Jarvis 1995; 
Kemp 1996; Knowles 1990, McKeachie 1994) have pointed out, 
experience has once again become a viable topic of discussion. The 
application of Kolb's theory which, models an innate process, to the 
pedagogy of a deliberate educational event has never been shown 
convincingly. Neither has the transfer of learning from one context to 
another been demonstrated. "It remains a powerful planning and 
thinking tool for facilitators. I wonder if there is evidence of the 
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application of the model stimulating better designed and led 
classes/sessions resulting in better outcomes. 
 
I note that my preferred learning style, as categorised by (Honey and 
Mumford 1986), was activist from the start of the DBA. I like to 
involve myself in new practical experiences. When I refer back to my 
dairy entries at the beginning, this is reinforced by comments from 
my learning set members. I then realised that I can also start writing 
and doing some research which will assist students, practitioners 
and organizations. My focus was now on document 5 and future 
research as I felt doing something active like writing would 
demonstrate some kind of progress rather than what I viewed as the 
more passive reading and thinking. The fear of unknown was 
disappearing as I was now positive and looking forward to future 
documents and research, which will make me a good writer and 
researcher. 
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4 Professional development 
 
Viktor Frankl, an Australian psychologist who survived the death camps of 
Nazi Germany, made a significant discovery. As he found within himself 
the capacity to rise above his humiliating circumstances, he became an 
observer as well as a participant in the experience. He watched others 
who shared in the ordeal. He was intrigued with the question of what 
made it possible for some people to survive when most died. The single 
most significant factor, he realized, was a sense of future vision – the 
impelling conviction of those who were to survive that they had a mission 
to perform, some important work. Gradually, new awarenesses were 
assimilated into basic shifts in attitudes and beliefs. This does not happen 
quickly. When it does, it represents change at the deepest level in 
individual growth. The executive makes strength productive stated 
(Drucker 1966: 73). He knows that one cannot build on weakness. To 
achieve results, one has to use all the available strengths – the strengths 
of associates, the strengths of the superior and one’s own strengths. 
 
Doing a research in the sector I am part of created a sense of anxiety, 
wondering whether my judgements were going to be impartial. I had read 
almost all the stories, why the banks were failing and I had a fair amount 
of understanding of the sector. As I became a practitioner in the risk and 
corporate governance field, I realised that there was something that I was 
doing wrong – (the type of writing, the aggression and too quick to 
conclude). As I moved to document 4, my focus and type of writing 
changed, I began to take an open mind and reflexive approach, thereby 
making my personal values and beliefs and their potential influence overt. 
This not only helped my personal development in that I became more 
aware of my view of reality and its potential impact, but helped me 
develop as a researcher. I discovered the capacity in myself and the 
vision – (the impelling conviction) that I was going to do this well. 
 
When we talk about “the passion of vision,” we are talking about a deep, 
sustained energy that comes from a comprehensive, principle-based, 
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need – based, endowment – based seeing that goes beyond chronos and 
even kairos. It taps into the deep core of who we are and what we are 
about. It’s fuelled by the realization of the unique contribution we have the 
capacity to make – the legacy we can leave. It clarifies purpose, gives 
direction and empowered me to perform beyond my resources (Covey et 
al 1999: 105). 
 
Before I even finished my thesis I was invited by two business schools in 
SA to supervise MBA dissertations. I then realized that the DBA was 
helping me realize the potential and capacity in me to research and write. 
Not only had my ability to discuss research methodologies and methods 
improved, but I had increased awareness of the student/supervisor 
relationship and the potential discomfort that perceived power differences 
can bring. Communication is an important component of the learning 
process, where I had to learn to listen more and talk less, which helped in 
my learning process. 
 
According to Wenger (undated), communities of practice are basically 
defined as groups of persons who share a passion for something that they 
know how to do and who interact regularly to learn how to do it better. In 
many cases, those forming the community of practice can be scattered 
over a broad geographical area and use virtual media and/or 
communication channels to share knowledge and experiences, as well as 
operate as a social network that does not depend on the variables of time 
and space to inter-communicate (Allen et al. 2003). The role that my 
learning set played in my journey of learning cannot be measured as we 
shared all the resources we had and technology was a useful tool to 
communicate among ourselves (Skype, video and telephone 
conferencing). The ability to use video conferencing when others are 
conducting their interviews were useful in my research process as I 
managed to develop questioning skills that assisted me to collect relevant 
information for my documents 4 and 5. 
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Probably the deepest and most often expressed pain we hear in the area 
of “time management” comes from imbalance. Obviously, balance is a 
“true north” principle. We see manifestations of it all around us – the 
balance of nature, balance of trade, balance of power. As with any 
principle, one of the most powerful witnesses of its reality is the 
consequence of living with its opposite – imbalance. Collection of data, 
contacting interviews, transcribing, analysing and writing documents 3, 4 
and 5. I had to look for someone to transcribe for me, while I am 
concentrating on other issues. This allowed me time to generate enough 
material to meet the requirements of this programme and becoming a 
good researcher. 
 
4.1 Learning outcomes 
 
The researcher has met the requirements of the DBA programme by 
developing competences in the following areas: 
• Developed capacity to demonstrate methodological and 
epistemological understanding of the issues surrounding 
research topics in management, strategy, finance, risk and 
corporate governance 
• Developed competences in academic writing, technique and 
critical review of different markets as a reflective practitioner 
• Capacity to display originality and creativity in applying the 
results of the research to professional, managerial and 
organisational activities 
• Formulate professional and managerial issues and problems 
in ways that have both practical and academic validity 
• Developed competence in conducting research that is 
credible within an academic and professional audience 
• Developed rhetorical skills in analysing and constructing 
arguments that weave together academic knowledge, 
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research based findings, reflections from professional practice 
and managerial experience and 
• identify, evaluate and criticise the academic and professional 
literature relevant to the identified issues of business and 
management and use it in developing my understanding and 
other practitioners 
 
4.2 Post DBA programme 
 
The aim of this programme was to validate at the highest academic 
level, the professional practice competence of the researcher 
working in business and management related areas. To develop 
knowledge of the information sources, analytical tools pertinent to 
effective research and analysis in business and management 
studies. 
The DBA programme has equipped me with the ability to learn from 
and reflects upon past experience; enhance consultancy, project 
management, teamwork, research, leadership and organisational 
skills. At the end of this programme I had the confidence of setting 
my own consulting firm, which current employs 68 highly 
professional consultants in different fields. Together we are able to 
develop excellence in analytical and quantitative skills in business 
and management research and problem-identification and problem 
solving in different markets, fields and organizations. With such a 
team I have demonstrated an original contribution to professional 
practice. 
Skills and experienced acquired as a result of this project has 
created a fully flagged consultant who is able to assist organizations 
on turnaround, strategy, business re-engineering, risk and 
governance processes. Ability to assess the relevance of current 
and emerging business theory and practice, from an interdisciplinary 
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perspective, formulates and executes effective solutions to complex 
real-world problems common to the practice of business and 
management. 
These competencies have assisted the firm (Dawn Advisory 
Services Pty Ltd) to be appointed on the panel of South African 
Government advisors and consultancy. I have been selected to be 
an advisor to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature that includes the 
Premier of the province. I have also been appointed a board 
member of the Gauteng Provincial Government, City of 
Johannesburg Group Audit Committee member and Johannesburg 
Tourism Company. I also chair the board of PFM Group. 
The University of Stellenbosch has invited me to be a member of 
their Unity for Corporate Governance for Africa which is responsible 
for conducting research on Risk and Corporate Governance in 
Africa. This unity is being used as a think tank for corporate 
governance in Africa. Our mandate is to develop Corporate 
Governance as a field of study. We have a target to develop 50 post 
graduates in Africa each year. My roll will be to lecture and supervise 
researchers in this subject in Africa, which will include risk, strategy, 
finance and management. I now have the capacity to influence my 
industry as a business consultant and will be publishing research as 
an expert author, which will assist organizations, practitioners and 
researchers. With this knowledge I have started to supervise 
students at four Universities [School of Leadership (SBL), Milpark 
Business School, Management College of Southern Africa 
(MACOSA), and GIBS (University of Pretoria Business School)]. 
Currently I have 11 students whom I have supervised during their 
dissertations and graduated with a Masters in Business 
Administration and Masters in Financial Management. 
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5 Project development 
 
Project development is a reflection on aspects of my experience 
associated with how the DBA project developed over the three years and 
how I managed the project. My interest in undertaking this research was 
triggered by the continuous failure of corporates and banks in Southern 
Africa. Being a company secretary at one point in my life triggered the 
need to understand the reasons for these failures especially after 2002 
(WorldCom and Enron era) and why other organizations are successful. 
This became an emotional journey as at the time of this research I was an 
employee of one of the banks that survived collapse in 1990, which 
resulted in the amalgamation of Allied bank, United Bank, Volkskas, 
Bankorp (including Trust Bank and Bankfin) in 1991 to form ABSA. 
 
From the beginning I divided my project into sections after getting advice 
from those who have travelled the same journey. This advice made my 
project formalized from start. I then put a structure in my diary which I 
called a development process for my DBA learning and the stages were: 
• Idea generation - to capture new ideas 
• Idea distillation - to screen out those ideas not worth taking 
forward  
• Concept definition - to consider specifications such as technical 
feasibility, analysis of the industry, available information and 
potential to produce a good research product. 
• Strategic analysis - to ensure my ideas fit into my project plans 
• Concept development - to create a prototype proposal or pilot 
service (document 1) and a conceptual framework. 
• Test the subject (literature review) and finalising the 
conceptual framework - to ensure my project can be modified 
according to DBA requirements 
• Project launch – this was the trickiest stage of my project as I had 
to start with a qualitative research, which was the most difficult part 
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of my project. Getting it right first time was essential but this was not 
to be.  
 
At this stage I realised that action research was a process by which 
change and understanding can be pursued at the same time.  It is usually 
described as cyclic, with action and critical reflection taking place in turn.  
The reflection was to review the previous action and plan the next one. I 
used to think that action research was the umbrella term, and action 
learning was an application of it.  Some of my colleagues, I found, argue 
that action learning is the umbrella term.  On reflection, I don't think it's 
worth debating. As they were previously practised, I think a useful 
distinction could be made.  In action learning, each participant drew 
different learning from different experience.  In action research a team of 
people drew collective learning from a collective experience. 
 
The collective learning and experience were useful for the success of this 
project. Each member of my learning set and the class at large played a 
crucial role in me being modelled to become a researcher I am today. The 
pain I went through during document 3 was useful in two ways: the way of 
writing and the decision making process. When I finally got the results for 
document 3 and it was a pass I wrote in my diary “yes!!!”  
 
Since I had never had a fail in my studying life, document 3 made me 
loose confidence and hope. The learning here was that perseverance, 
listening and taking advice is very important in one’s success. I looked 
back and said to myself, what was the reason for failure. Some of the 
reasons that came to mind were too much work, travel and family 
pressure. I realized that I would loose touch once I travel and forget the 
progress I had made. I remembered during my study for an MBA that we 
had the first lecture was about time management and managing 
interruptions (stress). I then realized the importance of each module we 
pass through in our learning curve and how it impacts on our life. The use 
of technology came to my rescue as the NBS electronic library was a 
resource and tool to use. I then asked my employer to give me a laptop 
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with access to a 3G network, which worked very well for me as I could 
access the library any time when I needed any information especially 
literature review material. 
 
The major challenge from document 3 was to keep track of high volumes 
of literature that I had gone through. I then asked a few researchers how 
they coup with such high volume of data. Most of them gave me the same 
answer, “indexing is the treatment for confusion.” I then tried it and it 
worked. The other learning point was the convergence of different 
subjects into my research project. The impact of finance, risk 
management, economics, engineering, biology, environmental studies, 
law, history, culture, art to mention a few was felt as I could not ignore one 
of them. I then learnt the dynamics of business and how complex the 
world is. The outcome of this experience and subsequent reflections was 
that I reviewed and revised my conceptual framework many times such 
that the investigation of an individual’s ethical stance and cultural 
discourse would be considered beyond the scope of this particular study. 
 
The disappointment came from the fact that not all board members 
respect ethics, which shows that there is a cultural discourse (Ubuntu) 
within the same communities. I learnt that cultural discourse is one of the 
reasons why corporates and banks fail. There is no alignment of interests 
between shareholders and directors. One of my questions to board 
members and auditors was, “How do you manage conflict of interest?” 
The answers I got were surprising as reflected in (document 3: 3: diagram 
1.1), self interest is the major threat to corporate governance, which has 
resulted in directors and auditors not carrying their fiduciary 
responsibilities resulting in bank failures. 
 
The learning was that, shareholders need to participate in the 
administration of the bank from strategy formulation, decision making and 
strategy execution. Board members need not shift their responsibilities 
and accountability to auditors as they have a stewardship role to play in 
the administration of the bank. Theories and regulations have failed to 
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solve the corporate governance paradox; hence shareholder activism is 
critical in the shareholder value creation model. Directors must start to 
manage for value in order to solve the corporate governance problem. 
 
“Corporate strategies with no execution strategies are bound to fail,” was 
one of the statements I wrote in my diary after meeting with Bob Garratt 
who is one of the most popular corporate governance gurus. Strategy 
execution is very important as strategy needs to be linked to operations 
argued (Kaplan and Norton 2008: 10). If this is not done, this will be 
another worm that will eat and cause the banks to fail. Execution of 
strategy and linking it to operations will improve operational efficiencies 
argued interviewees 34 and 35. 
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6 Linking the DBA programme to Knowledge 
Exchange 
 
Knowledge exchange can be defined as the process by which evidence 
and new knowledge, created through research inquiry, is shared with 
supervisors, peers, practitioners and other stakeholders to inform and 
support new knowledge. Knowledge exchange occurs generally as the 
result of 5 key activities or publications: 
• The development of research frameworks, 
• Enhanced researcher, peer, supervisor and practitioner linkages 
(research partnerships with Partners, class workshops), 
• Information dissemination (synthesis and implementation 
documents, research notes), 
• Extension activities (workshops, discussion groups), and  
• Knowledge-based networks and communities (website, Library and 
peer network forum). 
 
An effective research (knowledge) exchange process involves developing 
new relevant knowledge, exchanging the knowledge to user groups and 
using that knowledge in changed practices, policy or models. Problem 
solving and decision making – the ability to create effective policies, 
research programs and to engage them in practice – is strengthened 
when practitioners have access to the latest, relevant knowledge and 
evidence. As such there is an increasing emphasis on incorporating 
knowledge exchange and utilization into the research design and funding 
process. This toolkit explores how researchers can support knowledge 
exchange practices among themselves and students. 
 
Ideally knowledge exchange is a two-way process, engaging both the 
researcher and the practitioner (supervisor) in developing the research 
questions. The researcher systematically solicits and shares information 
and the supervisor provides constructive feedback. New knowledge may 
challenge practitioners’ existing models, leading them to question or 
 33
confirm their present assumptions. Questioning their assumptions can 
encourage practitioners to be receptive to learning new information. The 
new knowledge must be exchanged in a form that is immediately 
applicable or it will likely be ignored. Finally, it is critical that knowledge 
exchange takes place through a variety of techniques to accommodate 
the varied learning styles of practitioners. 
 
The DBA programme allows for knowledge exchange at individual, 
learning set, cohort and supervisor level. Students are allowed to interact 
with each other, lecturers, supervisors, academic professionals and other 
practitioners in the industry. This benefits students in widening their 
understanding of industrial knowledge, local market and international 
markets. New information is easily made available to other students which 
then benefit them in their research process.  
 
6.1 Challenges to the DBA and Knowledge Exchange Process 
 
The challenge of disseminating information within a cohort is to 
package that information so that students can get the information in 
an effective format. Students always find it difficult to conceptualize 
the language at DBA level especially the ‘’ology’’ of research 
methods. I struggled to understand this part of the research 
process. 
 
The difficulty in applying research-derived information to an 
operational scale is a challenge most students battle with. Research 
results from one region may not be applicable to others – models 
require calibration. Legal and compliance issues vary with different 
jurisdiction; hence some standards do not apply in other countries. 
What is best practice in other countries may not be best practice in 
others for example the issue of gay marriages. 
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The disconnect between new knowledge and existing government 
policy and/or regulations may lead to significant delays in 
implementing new ideas. It took the King III Committee three years 
for their recommendations to be accepted by the South African 
Government. Students in my cohort researched in different fields 
and different countries; hence it was difficult to relate to what others 
are doing. As a result we could not graduate at the same time. 
Others were more occupied with work and family issues, which 
delayed the completion time. Some like this student although work 
and family matters were challenges, the issue of distance prolonged 
the project. 
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7 Overall experience 
 
Easterby–Smith et al (1991: 46) argued that, “….. researchers are not 
keen on self-disclosure and they rarely explain precisely where their ideas 
and questions have come from.” This is true of this researcher as this 
document seemed more difficulty than document 3. Although I tried to 
manage my diary closely and include most interesting events in this 
journey it was a challenge to produce a true reflective journal. Reflecting 
on my learning has been a learning experience in itself as I realized that, 
learning in this context does not mean acquiring more information but 
expanding the ability to produce the results we truly want in life.  
 
Developing personal mastery goes beyond competence and skills, though 
it is grounded in competence and skills. People with high levels of 
personal mastery are more committed and they take more initiative. 
People with a high level of personal mastery live in a continual learning 
mode. They never arrive, argued (Senge 1999: 141 - 3). The learning 
experience was this new paradigm of personal mastery as I have 
imparked on a new journey of continuous development. Doing this has 
generated a force within myself called “creative tension.” Tension by its 
nature, seeks resolution and the most natural resolution of this tension is 
for my reality to move closer to what I want. It’s as if I have set up a 
rubber band between two poles of my vision and current reality. Personal 
mastery implies a willingness to invest what is necessary to create an 
environment that helps people become high-quality contributors (Senge et 
al 1994: 199). 
 
Personal mastery developed me into new capabilities that allowed me to 
be able to move from time management to personal leadership which, 
(Covey et al 1994: 269) described as time management works in the 
system; leadership works on the system. The ability to work on the 
system is an achievement which will not only assist me in my personal 
growth but assist organizations that I will research for and be able to add 
value and put them on the competitive edge. Interaction with bank 
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executives helped in my personal growth by understanding the dynamics 
that exist in organizations as different stakeholders represent different 
interests. 
 
Senge et al (1994: 356) stated that, “for a team which practices the action 
learning discipline, it is helpful to have a reason to talk and learn – a 
situation that compels deliberation, a need to solve problems, the 
collective desire to create something new or a drive to foster new 
relationships with other parts of organizations.” For my learning set to 
solve problems we had to set out ground rules for conversation and 
interaction which assisted us in meeting our targets. Our learning set was 
much organized as each member had to follow the rules. These rules 
were meant to help the team shape its conversations, not as an end in 
themselves and they should never become so dominant that they override 
the team’s purposes and learning. The learning here was that these rules 
also apply to the organizations we work for. 
 
The shift from working in the systems to working on systems has been the 
most achievement of this research journey. I have examined my impact 
on the last part of the research and its impact on me and I feel that I have 
achieved the objectives I set for myself at the beginning of the DBA 
programme as I have been introduced to new ways of thinking, writing, 
talking and learning. What is important is to be able to sustain the new 
ways and improve them with time. The DBA experience has allowed me 
to understand structural, system and cultural dynamics and how they are 
affected by organizations and how they affect organizations. These 
dynamics created the ability for me to be able to deal with various 
behaviours and skills necessary for me to apply across all managerial 
functions, transferring my learning to different occasions at different times 
under varying circumstances consistently.  
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